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Abstract

This dissertation is comprised of two sections: 1) “The Immanent Body in Late Antiquity”:
an analysis of late ancient christology, Stoicism and philosophy; 2) “The Extended Body:
Aesthetics”: depictions of monastic bodies in late medieval, Renaissance and contemporary
art.

I. The thesis of this dissertation can be stated as follows: the conditions under which
immanence is thinkable in relation to bodies are found in conceptual personae.
Contemporary philosopher Gilles Deleuze’s concept of conceptual personae, developed in
conjunction with French theorist Felix Guattari, helps navigate the complex relationship
between bodies and ontology developed by these three ancient thinkers. In order to
understand the formation of the conceptual persona of Christ in late antiquity, it was
necessary to return to the work of Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Athanasius.

II. The second part of the project begins with the Antony Series, which is a cluster of
Renaissance works of art designated by a common theme. They represent St. Antony, who,
being the first deep desert monastic, was the subject of my previous chapters. Therefore, the
link between late antique conceptions of the monastic body and Renaissance art becomes
explicit. Early Renaissance artists turned to an aesthetics of the monastic body in order to
revolutionize painting, for it was during the late thirteenth century that expressive bodies
were being created, bodies that would move painting towards the Renaissance. This
dissertation analyzes the precise point of this transition through a christological (i.e.,
monastic) understanding of the painted figure.
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Preface

I. Thesis

The thesis of this dissertation can be stated as follows: the conditions under which immanence is
thinkable in relation to bodies are found in conceptual personae. The thesis is philosophical, but
has historical consequences. This philosophical thesis has as its application late antique
christology. As a concept developed by Deleuze and Guattari in their last collaborative work, a
conceptual persona is the image philosophical thought presupposes before it begins to
philosophize. Conceptual personae are neither historical nor psychosocial types, but the image
thought presupposes.1 Conceptual personae provide movement and style to philosophy, and
ought to be conceived as virtual landscapes guiding the trajectories of concepts.

The historical consequence of this thesis is that the development of late antique orthodox
thinking gave birth not only to strong theories of transcendence and episcopal hierarchy, as it is
usually thought, but also to immanent bodies. The articulation of these politically charged
bodies, and the analysis of their relation to the ontologies supporting them, remains relevant to
contemporary continental thought as this genre of thinking continues to interrogate the relation
between ontology and bodies, thinking and practice.

1

Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? (New York: Columbia Press, 1994), p. 67.
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Aristotle’s simple definition of immanent causality—the quality of an action that begins and
ends inside an agent—as it has been adapted and applied by Deleuze in his interpretation of
Spinoza, has been employed here to specify the meaning of immanence.2 Deleuze defines
“immanence” by differentiating it from “emanation,” where the One produces effects that
remains outside itself (as in the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus), while immanent causality is defined
by an ontology whose effects remain within (immanent) to the cause and do not fall outside it (as
in the God of Spinoza).
In ancient and medieval thought, Aristotle’s definition was used to justify transcendence, since
the more immanent the life of a being (for example, Aristotle’s self-thinking thought), the more
perfect it is. That is why the thinkers addressed here—Irenaeus, Tertullian, Athanasius—are not
philosophers of immanence who reject transcendence.
In a manner that parallels Deleuze’s use of Aristotle’s definition in respect to Spinoza, I am
using it in christology to justify God’s immanence in the world. As the first immanent body
within the Christian tradition, the immanent causality of the mystical body of Christ is used by
these three thinkers to collapse the distinction between transcendence and immanence, a loss of
distinction marked by the theology of the incarnation. For Athanasius's “christic metaphysics,”
Christ is literally the “cosmos” and “all of existence.” The acts of Christ had cosmological
significance, and it was only through this conception of Christ's immanent activity that an
incarnate God was thinkable, a God that was active in the world. All of Christ's action begin and
end in his mystical body, and God is the other name of this immanent action. The immanent
causality of Christ—the conceptual persona—makes an immanent transcendence thinkable, and
yet, historically speaking, the persona of Christ has consequences beyond the reach of
2

See chapter one, section titled “Two Problems.”
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speculative theology.3 Here the task is different in thinking the conditions of immanence as they
relate to bodies.

This study therefore uses a philosophical theory to argue for the historical existence of what has
been termed immanent bodies. The existence of these types of bodies within history confirm the
philosophical theory that conceptual personae provide the conditions in which immanence is
thinkable in relation to bodies.

A body is an immanent body when its actions are understood to have immediate effects within
the “cosmos.” The body of Christ is immanent because its effects are contained within his body.
Ascetic bodies are immanent within the body of Christ because everything they do remains
within his body as its effects, modes or attributes. Though Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of
conceptual personae form the analytical structure of this analysis, this text does make immanence
an attribute of bodies. Immanence does not belong to these bodies in the sense of possession, as
if immanence were a noun. Since Deleuze would also use the category of immanent causality in
order to identify philosophies of immanence, this text has rather spoken of immanent causality
and not ventured into further defining immanence itself.4 Bodies are considered to be immanent
bodies when their acts are said to have immanent causality within the cosmic body of Christ, and
the acts and effects are immanent because their bodies are likewise considered to be the cosmos
itself. The immanent body is a literal embodiment of the cosmic Christ body.

3

In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze conducted a similar analysis of thought’s presuppositions when he distilled
the eight postulates of the image of philosophical thinking. See chapter three of Difference and Repetition, titled
“The Image of Thought.”
4
Deleuze, Gilles. “Immanence and the Historical Components of Expression,” in Expressionisn in Philosophy:
Spinoza (New York: Zone Books, 1990).

4
Firstly, there is the original immanent body, the body of Christ. This Christ is not to be equated
with the earthly body of Jesus of Nazareth, but has biblical precedents in the Pauline letters, such
as in Ephesians 1:22-23, “And he put all things under his feet and gave him as head over all
things to the church, which is his body, the fullness of him who fills all in all.”5 In this study, the
mystical body of Christ is interpreted as the name of an ontology, as a conceptual persona.
Secondly, there are bodies that are “repetitions” of the Christ body, whose acts are understood to
have immanent effects in the world that belong to the body Christ. These are ascetic bodies, and
their powers of “cosmological” adjustment will be analyzed especially in Athanasius’ Life of
Antony. An ability to immanently effect changes in “space,” or in the cosmos, bridges the
connection between the two types of immanent bodies. Moreover, it is this simple power of
bodies to effect changes in space that translates into the analysis of the work of art in the second
section of this dissertation.

While the first section of the dissertation concerns late antiquity and the conceptual persona of
Christ, the thesis of the second section is a natural outgrowth of the logic developed in the
previous section. The thesis of the second section is: the prevalence of the ascetic body in
Renaissance painting contributed to the notion of the work of art as an “autonomous” body, i.e.,
the picture space as one of immanent causality where “immanence” now means the internal
communication of elements within the painting which produce an autonomous work of art.
Building upon theoretical engagements with art theory and history, certain Renaissance works of
art—what I have termed the Antony series—are considered an immanent body, and are, by this
definition, “modern.” The work of art is a “formal cosmos,” to cite painter Paul Klee, defined by
internal resonance and an immanent communication of its elements of color and form. Every
5

See also Cor 12:12-31; Col 1:18; 2:18-20; 3:19; 4:13.
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effect of color and form remains within the frame or “cosmos” of the painting, and it is argued
that the ascetic body and the ascetic tradition influenced this type of expression in painting.
These vibrations come from the abstract forms themselves, and especially from their interaction.

Wassily Kandinsky, writing in 1911, and one of the major theorists of early Modernist abstract
art, wrote of the immanent causality of the canvas in his Concerning the Spiritual in Art, though
his language is that of resonance and vibrations. Kandinsky was attempting to justify, on formal
grounds, the decline of representational strategies in art, claiming that due to the lack of
representational depth in the Modern canvas, certain “spiritual” vibrations populated the abstract
canvas. Kandinsky’s argument, and for those theorists following him, was that forms on the
abstract canvas now communicated with each other, in an immanent fashion, and that it was this
property that “held” together the “flat” abstract work of art. As will become clear, the analysis of
Renaissance art assumes this thesis—immanent causality as a property of the abstract canvas—
and will attempt to locate this immanent causality within depictions of the early representations
of saintly bodies. With slight modifications, the definition of immanent causality employed in
the first section is thereby applied to a philosophy of art. Theoretically speaking, what immanent
causality accomplished for our late antique thinkers (the founding of an ontology such that a
cosmos is unified by an internal relay of cause and effect wherein transcendence is an effect of
immanence) it has also accomplished for a philosophy of art (the transcendent element of art, its
meaning or “spirituality,” is a result of the immanent causality of forms within the painting,
which also unifies the painting).

6
II. Method
The method employed here has been termed “genealogical,” not in the strict Nietzschean or
Foucauldian sense of the term, but in the sense that an “image of thought” is located and made
explicit across a historical spectrum. An “image of thought” is a term of philosophy in Deleuze
and Guattari’s work used to analyze how philosophy is constructed and how philosophies are
differentiated from each other aside from mere difference in content. An image of thought is the
“ground” upon which concepts move and have their character. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze
and Guattari termed this method of describing an image of thought “noology,” and this is the
method employed here. Noology not only refers to the study of images of thought across time,
but also to a “historicity” in which this image of thought constitutes subjects through its
influence on historical bodies. The conceptual persona of Christ is in this instance the image of
thought developed by Irenaeus, Tertullian and Athanasius.

Asceticism, as a genre of subject formation, is the historical result of the conceptual persona of
Christ. The focus on asceticism is in part due to Foucault and Peter Brown’s groundbreaking
work on how asceticism represents a type of subject formation never before seen in the ancient
world. It was the body to which the ascetics turned to achieve divinity. Since ascetic bodies were
spoken of in the same register as the mystical body of Christ—immanent causality—this study
argues that they are products of an immanentist christology spearheaded by Paul, Irenaeus,
Tertullian and Athanasius. The successive modification of the conceptual persona of Christ
through said thinkers develops into a historical subject formation, asceticism.

This study does not aim, therefore, to simply represent the ideas of these thinkers, but to engage
the conceptions of immanent causality in these thinkers that find expression in, first, the

7
speculative body of Christ in christology, second, the historical bodies of ascetics, and finally,
works of Renaissance art utilizing immanent causality to produce autonomous works of art,
forebears of their twentieth century, “modern” counterparts.

8

Introduction

Creation, Christ and the Body of Frankenstein

“No one can conceive the variety of feelings which bore me onwards, like a
hurricane, in the first enthusiasm of success. Life and death appeared to me
ideal bounds, which I should first break through, and pour a torrent of light into
our dark world. A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many
happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me. No father could claim
the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve theirs. Pursuing these
reflections, I thought, that if I could bestow animation upon lifeless matter, I
might in process of time (although I now found it impossible) renew life where
death had apparently devoted the body to corruption.”
“I had worked hard for nearly two years, for the sole purpose of infusing life into
an inanimate body. For this I had deprived myself of rest and health. I had
desired it with an ardour that far exceeded moderation; but now that I had
finished, the beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust
filled my heart.”
Mary Shelley, Frankenstein; or The Modern Prometheus

A New Monster
So writes the mad scientist character, Victor Frankenstein about his creation, perhaps the most
famous monstrous body in American and English literature. In these passages, Victor writes of
the thrill of renewing life in the body where corruption ought to be, of animating lifeless matter
that will be a torrent of light into “our dark world,” and yet, after his creation is alive, his
reaction is one of horror and disgust at the result. In these passages one discerns utopian desires
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met with a dystopian product. The dream of giving life through the creation of a body is
confronted with the actuality of the monster. Once the monstrous body was born, it had a life of
its own, and Victor tracks his creation into the cold recesses of the arctic, which is where the
epistolary tale begins. The lesson for scientists as well as artists is clear—once a body is let loose
onto the world, there is no telling where it might go.
What is presented here is likewise the story of a body, and the “operating” room here is the work
of thinkers who have dedicated their efforts to the creation of a different type of body. It is not a
body pieced together from the tools of science, but a body constructed from the equally
experimental tools of philosophy. Christ is the name of that body given life through these
thinkers. The first part of this text is a strategic genealogy of the Christ body gone virtual
through three late ancient thinkers. Irenaeus, Tertullian and Athanasius should therefore be
understood as technological operators in the construction of the truly most famous body in
Western history, and the point of this genealogy is, like Victor Frankenstein’s creation, an
assemblage. But why these thinkers? Like the body of the monster, there was a specific point
when it was given life. Assembled from fragments, the unnamed monster rose to life in an
instant. In the case of Christ, however, it took centuries.

Two recent trends in continental thought initially motivated this interrogation of the Christ
concept. First is the inadequacy in which the Christ figure is appropriated by various thinkers in
continental thought and theory. Though chapter one will go into more detail on this specific
issue, numerous thinkers—not all of them recent—have appealed to the Christ figure to support
various types of ontologies, either in materialist, vitalist/process, transcendental or transcendent
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variations.1 As one might expect, appeals to Christ have been more frequent during our age of
the “end of metaphysics.” More often than not, Christ is the harbinger of immanence, and his
“arrival,” according to said thinkers, signaled a new relationship with a transcendent God.
However, for those celebrating the so-called “end of metaphysics,” little attention has been paid
to christology while most attention has followed Heidegger’s notion that ontotheology and
metaphysics have been the primary discourses of philosophical and religious thought. Though it
was Kant who first coined the term ontotheology, it was Heidegger’s powerful analyses that
foreclosed a space in which to think christology as an equally relevant area of studies. 2
Strangely, while appeals to Christ have become more frequent, they occur in support of an antimetaphysical discourse and fail to address the genre of thinking wherein the Christ was
constructed, i.e., christology. One rarely hears the term onto-christology perhaps because
christology, as a genre of thinking grounded on a body, complicates Heidegger’s narrative of
Western philosophy as defined by onto-theology, i.e., the forgetting of the question of Being.
Christology is neither metaphysics nor an ontotheology, nor a strict philosophy of immanence,
but requires new categories of thought to address it properly. Yet if the figure of Christ did
establish immanence in the Christian tradition as thinkable under speculative conditions, then
transcendence will have to be conceived as an attribute of immanence. It is not enough to simply
state that what has gone by the name of transcendence in the history of philosophy is merely an
aspect or effect of immanence, as Agamben has claimed.3 To the contrary, such a move needs to
be proven through an engagement with the texts that, in many ways, have done more than any
another other to establish the architecture of Christian immanence.

1

See chapter one, section titled “Two Problems.”
Schrijvers, Joeri. Ontotheological Turnings? The Decentering of the Modern Subject in Recent French Phenomenology
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), p. 5.
3
See the “Taking Place” essay in The Coming Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
2
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In sum, with the exception of Radical Orthodoxy, christology has largely been ignored in
contemporary continental thought and Death of God theologies.4 As to what christology can add
to the narrative of the end of metaphysics, to our understanding of Christ and immanence, as well
as to the resurgence of body theory, remains a question this text attempts to answer.

What is initially problematic for contemporary appropriations of the Christ is that a subtle piety
remains in the usage of Christ. It is a paradox that many secular or atheistic ontologies appeal to
Christ as if to a powerful force that needs no explanation, as if Christ is a concept that can be
best adopted by simple reference, as if his name is still powerful, as if Christ speaks for just one
thing, i.e., immanence—as if Christ, and the God he deconstructed, existed. To the contrary,
Christ’s existence was very much in question in late antiquity. Though much nuance exists in
contemporary usage after the appropriation of Christ has taken place, seldom if ever it is
acknowledged that Christ, and the immanence he represents, is a construction like any other.
Less seldom is the actual construction of Christ addressed. This text therefore argues not just
against an uncritical appropriation of the Christ concept, but for a rethinking of a method of
thinking about Christianity in the continental tradition. It is insisted here that the best manner in
which to address Christ is to address how Christ was made in late antiquity. In addition, focus
needs to be paid on how Christ in the tradition does more than just inaugurate immanence, but
how this immanence is related not only to the Christ body, but to the most famous and
revolutionary bodies in the Christian tradition: saints, ascetics, martyrs, artists, etc. It is in the
creation of these bodies that one can find the secret trajectory of christology, to which this
genealogy is devoted.

4

One can find references to an onto-Christology in the work of John Milbank in his Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon
(London: Routledge, 2003), p. 78.
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The second factor motivating this interrogation is the manner in which immanence in
contemporary continental philosophy has been conceptualized as a noun rather than a quality of
an action that begins and end inside an agent, to use Aristotle’s, and, it will be argued,
Deleuze’s definition. If the Christ concept did, in some manner, aid in the development of
doctrines of immanence, then what type of immanence was it? What or who is the agent? What
is the action? What is the quality? Using this simple definition of immanence, the concept of
Christ is as much a concept within the philosophical apparatus of christology as it is a repetition
of a quality to be found on lived bodies. Christ the concept is therefore the product of a double
genesis—from the phenomenality of lived bodies as well as from the lived experimentations of
philosophy. This text is therefore a strategic genealogy in that in order to expose this double
genesis, specific thinkers will be taken up, with each thinker serving to highlight this genesis.

A Reversal of Christology

The genealogy here is strategic in a few senses. Numerous Christs existed in late antiquity, just
as there were many different expressions of Christianity. It is not claimed that the Christ
presented here is the best one, nor the real or most historically accurate version. Further, no
argument is given as to the truth of Christianity in general. On the one hand, the purpose of this
genealogy is to locate a logic of what has been termed the immanent body. The immanent body
can be found in poetry, mysticism, art, philosophy, religion, and can be found in such a diverse
range of thinkers as Levinas, Deleuze, Meister Eckhart, Athanasius, Weil, Blanchot, Novalis,
Thoreau, Bataille, Whitman, among many, many others. Naturally, the immanent body is
conceptualized in many registers and variations. Humanistic at its core, a version of the
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immanent body was found in Pythagoras. Of Pythagoras, David Fideler observes, “Humanity, as
the living image of the Logos, is the microcosm, the harmonic blueprint of the universe reflected
in miniature.”5 Pythagoras’ figural ontology is therefore one of the earliest articulations of the
immanent body. Christianity, borrowing many of its ideas from antiquity, alters this blueprint to
fit the landscape of Christian thought in three interrelated practices. First, Christ is
conceptualized as a transcendentalized logos and blueprint of the universe (Christ as co-creating
pattern for creation). God designs, forms and informs the world through Christ. Co-creation,
eternal generation, immanent causality—these are just a number of notions expressing the
blueprint function of Christ. Christ expresses and is an expression of God (the All). Second, the
attributes of a universe enfolded into the Christ body is applied to lived bodies. A perceptual
hermeneutic is constructed whereby one finds in lived bodies (saints, mystics, ascetics, martyrs,
etc) the universe in miniature. Third, because the lived body is conceptualized to have the
universe enfolded in it, it is therefore granted agential force to influence, or counter-actualize, the
universe—to add to the creativity of life. Only by virtue of the first two practices can we arrive at
the third. Life and body enfold one another, and it is difficult to entangle them. Of the experience
of the immanent body, Rilke called it the “Open.” At times, Blanchot referred to it (life) as the
“outside.” And Novalis asked, “We dream of voyaging across the universe. Isn't the universe,
then, in us? We do not know the depths of our mind. Toward the interior goes the mysterious
road. Eternity with its worlds, past and future, is in us.”6

This body is not limited to Christianity nor religious studies. The focus here is on ascetic bodies
and the power they were perceived to have on the cosmos, since their power was not limited to
5

Fideler, David R. Jesus Christ, Sun of God: Ancient Cosmology and Early Christian Symbolism (Wheaton, Il.:
Qwest Books, 1961), p. 64.
6
Quoted by Ann Smock in The Space of Literature (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 136. I also
thank Smock for directing me to Rilke’s quote as well.
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their bodies, but extended to humanity in general. Power ought to be understood in terms of
causality, and cosmos as the mytho-poetic arena wherein this power is exercised. But how is this
transference of power possible? How is logos christology related to lived bodies? What is the
role of christology in asceticism? Ascetic bodies were considered to be patterned after Christ, but
what type of theoretical architecture is required so that Christ is able to be ontologically
repeated? And what does repetition mean in this context? This text will address all these
questions.

On the other hand, what happens when we ask the question in reverse? In what sense is the logos
of christology the virtualized persona of a living body? The analysis of the immanent body of the
ascetic in the fourth chapter takes up this very question, concluding that the concept of Christ,
including his ontological properties, is equally based off of the body itself and its own material
properties. Dance and art theory are employed to argue that the phenomenon of the moving body
is involved in a practice of implication and explication, and it is no wonder then that we find
these two concepts to be major elements of the scaffolding in understanding who Christ was,
what he did and how it did it. To accomplish this task, attention is paid, first, to the
preoccupation of bodily limbs and members in ascetic literature, and, secondly, to how a
harmoniously moving body is a perfect replication of Christ, not in the physical sense, but in the
manner of how Christ harmonized the cosmos. Christ and lived body repeat one another.

The Portrait
In this strategic genealogy, a portrait of Christ is being constructed, and Irenaeus builds the
frame and stretches the canvas. Irenaeus constructs the plane of thought capturing the concepts
of our later thinkers. The first chapter uses Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of conceptual personae,
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developed in their last collaborative text, What is Philosophy?, to explore the ramifications of
Irenaeus’ highly sophisticated concept of recapitulation. Recapitulation is the act whereby Christ
sums up humanity.

Far from a simple appropriation of their work, this text does to Deleuze what he believed himself
to have done with Kant—to produce a bastard child through becoming more Kantian than Kant
himself. Simply put, like Deleuze’s “reversal of Platonism,” which he never considered a
reversal, the intention of his readings of philosophical figures was to find the secret inspiration in
Kant, or Plato, and begin from there. This project is Deleuzian in this manner. Implicit in this
reading of Irenaeus’ notion of recapitulation is the desire to keep Christ ontologically protected.
Depending on the context, I have used this phrase interchangeably with the virtualization of
Christ, which produced the ontological body of Christ, or, again, the conceptual persona of
Christ. Ontological protection refers therefore to the first operation in the construction of the
virtualized Christ body. Ontological protection produces the property of inexhaustibility and
repeatability for Christ. In his own language, Geoffrey Harpham writes: “Christ must resist the
tendency to form; he must remain infinite and inchoate, free from all objectification of his
being.”7 The conceptual persona of Christ keeps him inchoate, and/or embryonic; ontological
protection is the act that constructs this persona. To use a phrase Manual DeLanda employs to
describe material systems which are by nature unstable, ontological protection establishes
Christ’s “hylomorphism.”8 Christology establishes a system wherein the Christ persona remains
hylomorphic—one should think of “eternal generation” here—whose purpose is twofold:

7
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immanent and creative deployment of Christ in life, and second, the repetition of his body in
lived bodies.

After an engagement with Irenaeus, Tertullian is taken up as the representative thinker of late
ancient materialism. If Irenaeus built the frame onto which this portrait of Christ is painted,
thereby setting the parameters and limits of christological thought, Tertullian begins to outline a
figure on the canvas by providing color and texture to the surface. Flesh is the name of that color
and texture.
Tertullian’s christological materialism comes under the name of flesh, and Tertullian thinks flesh
so as to raise the status of life and honor the incarnation of Christ. Eugene Thacker’s penetrating
analysis of the concept of life has distilled a simple function of the word life that is also
applicable here. Life is required to think the living. Thacker’s thesis alerts us to philosophical
strategies of theorizing life, which in the end reveals that in every theorization of the concept of
life, a new concept of the living organism is being constructed. Tertullian’s exploration of flesh
as the shared substrate between God and man, whose other name is Christ, materializes the
trajectory in Irenaeus. When Tertullian writes that Christ is the “fabric of life,” Irenaeus’
assumption of Christ adopting the form of the All takes on a nuanced form. As we shall see, the
bodies of the martyr’s are forever on Tertullian’s mind, and his raising up of life is also the
affirmation of the deformed body of the martyr, the latter a repetition of the crucified body.

Primarily taken up in an Egyptian context through the work of Athanasius, asceticism will then
be engaged on a number of levels. What Athanasius’ work adds to this portrait is the movement
of Christ through the idea of imitatio Christi. The portrait of Antony in his Life of Antony is
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equally a portrait of the ideal Christian attempting to imitate the life of Christ.

Asceticism and their deformed bodies are repetitions of the martyr, since for Origen, asceticism
was “daily martyrdom.” The ascetic body represents a body under control. The ascetic control
and maintenance of their limbs marked excellence in practice, which explains the frequent
mention not of the body, but its limbs. Ascetic discourse and literature rely not on a general
category of the body (as our usage no doubt stems from its usage in Foucault and certain strains
in anthropology), but on an image system of the body as composed of parts. Ambrosiaster’s On
the Sin of Adam and Eve asks, “Either it operates as a whole or it comes to rest as a whole. Is a
body useful, if some of its members thrive while others wither?” Though this surely does not
define the ascetic task in its entirety, a major component to ascetic life was to unify the Parts
(limbs) into a Whole (functioning unit). The same was said of the Greco-Roman athlete, and it is
no surprise to learn that ascetics were considered “athletes of God.” But the discourse of ascetic
limbs relies on a certain repetition, and it is here that one can discern the manner in which the
Christ concept is conditioned by the phenomenality of the body. We witness the language of the
Part/Whole in dance theory and athletics, since it is here, in these acts, that the body presents the
greatest challenge to itself, which is to bring bodily discord into harmony. Remarkably, this logic
is found in ascetic discourse. “Ontological slippage” is the language conceptualizing the ascetic
body as a repetition of Christ, in such a way that the former’s disciplining of limbs is also an act
of redemption, in virtue of Christ being a unifying agent of discord. Inscribed on the body of the
monk is therefore a universal mythos of fragmentation, recapitulation and creation. The monk
with his physical body repeats the cosmological act done by Christ’s body. “And all that the
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Savior did through the Saints, he does in our own times through these monks,” says an
anonymous source in the epilogue to the Historia monachorum.

Two criticisms beset this treatment of ascetics. Are not ascetics agents of empire? Are not
ascetics destroying their bodies, not making their bodies more creative? To the first point, it is
true that ascetics can be conceived as agents and mouthpieces of empire. Athanasius, author of
the first hagiography, the Life of Antony, does have Antony come to Alexandria in support of
Athanasius’ anti-Arian polemic. Historians, however, largely consider this to be a fabrication.
This study focuses on asceticism’s earliest appearance in the Roman Empire, in Egypt in the 3rd
and 4th centuries, when asceticism was still young, impressionable and exhibits more traits of the
impulse to “get away” from civilization than it does to take part in that civilization. Ironically, it
is from this very distancing that ascetic agency derives. In fact, the monks often despised
humanity, believing pilgrims and general hangers-on irritating, a distraction to their
contemplation and ruinous to the purity of the pristine desert landscape. Antony’s practice
requires he gets away from his friends and admirers.

Secondly, ascetics can be conceived to be involved in a project of dismantling the body, or
hating the flesh and torturing the body. Yet this does not mean that they ignored the body, but
only found its effacement more important than its “health.” Though ascetics and their admirers
no doubt believed they were getting healthier, proved by the story of when Antony emerges from
the deserted fortress after nearly two decades of uninterrupted solitude and harsh desert life, his
friends were amazed to see how his body maintained its “former condition.”9 But the dark,

9
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almost Gothic, currents of self-mortification remain in asceticism and cannot be ignored. The
manner in which this problem has been dealt with here is redefining “health” as power.10

It is in ascetic discourse, hagiography and literature that the logic of the body is distilled (as
enfolded into the cosmos), a body able to constructively engage the cosmos. The ascetic body is
an immanent body because it was understood to effect the space around it in an immanent
fashion, i.e., without mediation. The two case studies in Renaissance art constituting the second
section of this dissertation are a creative adaptation of the logic of the immanent body, especially
its ability to effect space around it. While the analyses of art are not essential to understanding
the nature of this body in late antiquity, they do provide a fuller picture as to how this body
works in concrete practice.

The Renaissance: Art and the Power of the Body
Representations of ascetic bodies enjoyed an increase in popularity in the Renaissance for a
number of reasons. Ascetic bodies are interesting; they are torn by demons and temptations, and
they are expressive, singular, and God approved. Ascetic bodies represent a carnal spirituality
wherein the state of beatitude is registered on the limbs of the ascetic. Ascetic bodies are always
in movement, as attested by Martin Schongauer’s Temptation of St. Antony (Figure 1), which
displays a body caught in the throes of temptation.
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Figure 1. Martin Schongauer. The Temptation of St. Antony, 1480-90. Engraving.

It is no wonder then, that ascetic bodies are popular as painted figures since according to Da
Vinci in his treatise on painting only the body in motion is a body. A body is motion. The ascetic
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body, therefore, is more body than the rest. In it is revealed something profound about the body.
A second reason for the popularity of these painted figures is socio-political. A cult of the living
saint, originating with St. Francis, produced a new type of iconography—the living saint. St.
Francis’ stigmata, painted numerous times by the Franciscan painter Giotto, is one of the finest
examples of this new gestural iconography. It is also at this time where we find the first
narratives of a contemporary life set alongside the life of Christ. St. Francis as alter christus
testifies to the birth of a new artistic subject.

But aside from theories of the body, the role of ascetic representation in Renaissance art plays a
more profound, if subtle, role in the history of Western painting. From Giotto to Cezanne there is
a trajectory, noted by many art historians, wherein Giotto’s original invention leads to Cubism.
What is this invention? The autonomy of the work of art. This highly utilized phrase does not in
this context refer to the fact that a painting needs nothing outside of itself to explain itself, but
rather refers to the painting’s property of an immanent self-referential system of marks, colors
and forms acting together inside its frame. Autonomy because of immanent signification.
Immanent causality again—an act inside the painting in a way that the action begins and ends
inside an agent. The painting is an agent defined by a particular quality of an action, and the
quality of the perceptual experience defines the work of art against other visual experiences.

Prior to the Renaissance, art was embedded in ritualized environments and relied on outside
adornment for its signification, i.e., it was part of a religiously affiliated and institutionally
supported hermeneutic. But as the Renaissance developed the adornments were used less and
less in fine art painting. The work of art was coming into its own, and the fine arts were
beginning to treated as ends in themselves, no longer mere crafts or items for religious and state
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expression. In part, the representation of ascetics expresses this autonomy because of the fact that
painters used this figure to express something of the humanism of the Renaissance and NeoPlatonic revival. The ascetic was a Renaissance man in some senses—they forged an individual
path, were heroic against the demons and found nature to be the place to seek truth.

Giotto is known to have loosened the tongue of Medieval art. The second innovation of Giotto
was his deployment of gesture in his painted figures. Prior to the thirteenth century, painted
bodies were often stylized in a Byzantine fashion. What could not have been predicted before
this time was how the ascetic body in visual art replicates ascetic literature’s preoccupation with
bodily limbs. In other words, the ascetic body is an extremely important figure for the
Renaissance painters because, in an era where painters sought to paint limbs in movement and
wild gestures, the ascetic tradition provided the content to explore this body in paint. Giotto’s
stigmata of St. Francis highlights this decidedly, and not long after Giotto’s death, St. Antony
became a popular figure in the visual arts (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Giotto. Stigmatization of St. Francis, Bardi Chapel, Florence, 1319-28.

Depictions of St. Antony were extremely frequent, found in every major European region where
the Renaissance was underway. St. Antony is also a phenomenon outside the Renaissance period,
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with such artists as Dali, Cezanne, Flaubert, Manet, Carrington, Albright, and Ernst lending their
brushes to immortalize the saint once again. In 1946 a competition in Europe was held under the
theme of the Temptation of St. Antony (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Catalogue cover for the Bel Ami International Competition.
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Though Max Ernst’s version took the prize, the competition produced Dali’s version, now more
famous than Ernst’s, and his first work to employ religious symbolism. Renaissance painters,
Dutch engravers, writers, Modern and contemporary artists and filmmakers all have lent their
hand to depicting St. Antony, the deep desert Egyptian monastic considered to be the founder of
asceticism.

Always frontal and surrounded by demons, the Antony series, which has been designated here to
draw attention to a cluster of early and late Renaissance works, is a counter-movement in the
birth of Renaissance painting. Contrary to the muscular nudes of Michelangelo or Da Vinci’s
feminine touch, the paintings in the Antony series display a different set of qualities, qualities
which can be understood to exhibit the trait of autonomy that is said to begin with Giotto and
find expression in Cubism.

Istoria, or narrative, is the second theme to be taken up in the discussion of Renaissance art.
Forming the backbone of the Renaissance canvas, istoria is a property of the canvas based on
gestural communication between painted figures, and between the gesturing limbs of a single
body. Latin for story, it is through the istoria of the painted figures that a painting tells its own
story. Istoria gives to the canvas an autonomy because through its internal system of
signification (the painting signifies within a body, and between bodies), the viewer need not rely
on any outside information in order to decode the painting. Moreover, istoria exclusively relies
on a system of gestures, which, when analyzed alongside the earlier use of gestures (Giotto,
Cimabue, and the Antony series in general), adds further support to the role the painted figure
played in the creation of autonomy and immanent signification.
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The chapters on art and aesthetics can be broken into two categories: the gesturology of Giotto in
his stigmatas of St. Francis and their relation to the Antony series (ch. 5), and secondly, the
analysis of istoria and its relation to the concept of immanence in general (ch. 6). For a more
detailed outline, see the introduction to the chapters on aesthetics. The purpose of these analyses
is therefore to trace the historical power not only of the ascetic body, but what it represents in the
tradition of the visual arts and how it is employed toward the perfecting of that art.

Contribution: Immanence Under a New Name
This text will directly contribute to the fields of contemporary religious thought, theology,
studies in early Christianity and Continental philosophy. The intent of this study is to extract a
consistent appeal to immanence from the aforementioned fields of thought, and in the process
combine Christological thought, theories of the body, aesthetics and the desire for immanence.
As a concept, immanence will be brought to bear upon various disciplines, elucidating classical
problems and reframing contemporary concerns. Immanence is without question one of the most
important terms in contemporary theory and philosophical theology, and can serve as a stand-in
for post-metaphysical and post-structuralist thought.

As outlined in the first chapter, the concept of Christ has been appropriated by numerous
philosophers and theologians in the continental tradition as a figure of immanence. Yet this study
challenges the simple appropriation of Christ, and it challenges the simple opposition between
transcendence and immanence that has plagued philosophical theology. Depending on one’s
perspective, contemporary readings frequently catalogue historical philosophies and theologies
as weak systems of immanence if they contain even a “minimal transcendence,” and as too
strong systems of transcendence if they contain too little immanence. As the most infamous
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thinker of immanence, Deleuze himself was guilty of this characterization.11 Deleuze’s litmus
test was causality. If emanation was found to be operative in such a way that the cause remains
unmoved by the effect itself, as with the neo-Platonists and Medieval philosophy, then the
bastion of transcendence is being protected. Some philosophies even combined immanent
causality with emanation (Bonaventure, Erigena). It is argued in the final chapter that christology
is neither a philosophy of immanence nor of transcendence, but must come under a new
heading—the Christic cause. What makes this cause unique is the way the conceptual persona of
Christ alters christological thinking in the concepts of communication of events, consistency,
deformation and/or gesturology. These three concepts are features of the metaphysics of
Christian ontology as well as prisms in which to interpret famous bodies in Christian history. If
so-called ‘high christology’ is said to be Hellenistic in nature, translating the social and ethical
message of Christianity into a philosophical one divorced from the realm of life, this text will at
least provide methodologies for proving how the ‘high’ has as its final flowering a ‘low’
anthropology, applicable very much to lived bodies and daily life.

The genealogical work has not been completed to merely highlight the way Christ has been
constructed, but serves three functions: (i) to conduct a nuanced historical and philosophical
investigation into the concept; but also steer this work into a desired direction; (ii) that direction
is to distill a logic in the concept of Christ that crosses thresholds into other disciplines and in
which the logic cannot be said to be the property of Christianity; (iii) through the deployment of
this logic, to provide a new modality of thinking the relation of bodies to ontology as well as to
provide a future philosophy for the creation of new bodies, new forms of life.

11
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Part I.

The Immanent Body in Late Antiquity
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Chapter 1

Conceptual Personae

Chapter abstract:
What is the relation between religious figures and the construction of
immanence? What is the Christian image of thought? Deleuze and Guattari’s
understanding of conceptual personae, developed in their last collaborative
work, offers profound implications for thinking about how the concept of
Christ organizes theology. Christ is Christianity’s conceptual persona, and it is
the first appearance of a body-ontology that we see in Western philosophical
history. The concept of Christ, however, took centuries to construct, but we
can find in Irenaeus’ notion of recapitulation the first attempt to place Christ
in the center of a philosophical system. Recapitulation is the first instance in
theological history wherein the Christ “body” is laid out as an image of
thought, to which all subsequent concepts must submit. As such, the persona
of Christ can inhabit the world in an immanent fashion only when he does so
philosophically. This chapter therefore draws the connection between the
conceptual persona of Christ and the image of thought he introduced.
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Christology: A Modality of Thinking

Christology is first of all a modality of thinking. What christology accomplishes, before it allows
the faithful to participate in the “life of Christ,” is the insertion of a body at the nexus of a series
of problems: existence, diversity, ethics, death, and so on. Christology was and is, as all
innovations in thinking are, a solution to a problem. The solution was not singular, but responded
to a cluster of problems besetting late antiquity. Of course, John 1: 1-4 remains the predominate
text for how Christ will be understood within the larger contexts of God, creation and
redemption, for this text grants to the figure of Christ new powers of presence: presence at the
time of worldly creation (co-creator), that through which all things were made (screen of
creation), and finally, that Christ is life, and it is in this life that we all live (immanence; Christ as
new figure of the One-All). Proponents of the synoptic gospels often claim that John’s
cosmological Christ distorts the human-centered, social gospel of Jesus in favor of a Hellenized
logos-Christ, the latter more a philosophical principle than a poor messiah who taught social
justice, non-violence and, equality. This critique was, after all, spelled out decisively in volume
three of Harnack’s History of Dogma.1

However, has the opposite claim ever seriously been considered, namely, that it was John and
the christology built upon his opening lines that would have the greatest effect in humanizing
Christ? This is precisely what will be argued here, and many new concepts will have to be
introduced by the early authors, and/or emphasized from Paul’s letters, in order to accomplish
this goal, concepts such as recapitulation, ascetic imitatio christi and immanent causality.
Designating the quality of an action that begins and ends inside an agent, it is the immanence of

1
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God in the world that is often regarded as the unique contribution of Christianity to doctrines of
immanence. However, God did not make the incarnation, nor did God incarnate Christ. Rather, a
concept of Christ made new type of God thinkable. A God who was incarnate, a God who
descended into the world, a God who could be identified with material life yet separated from it,
an immanent God—this is what the concept of Christ made possible. Deleuze and Guattari’s
notion of conceptual personae will provide the framework for analyzing how Christ made this
possible.

Injected into ancient systems of thought, Christ is a concept that was introduced and created by
philosophical tools, in the manner of the monster of Frankenstein. As the harbinger of bodily and
divine immanence, it was the power of his conceptual persona that formulated the specific
Christian concept of immanence, creating what we can call the Christian image of thought.
Deleuze and Guattari will help define how personae organize philosophy and theology, since
Christianity is not unique in that it employs a figure to think with.

In this strategic genealogy, Irenaeus is the first thinker to be taken up. The following chapters
will be devoted to Tertullian and Athanasius. Each thinker represents an operation in the
construction of Christ, and each thinker builds, in the manner of a portrait, on the ideas
developed before them. Tertullian’s concept of flesh requires Irenaeus’ notion of recapitulation,
and Athanasius will put to work Tertullian’s concept of flesh to describe his embodied ascetics.

In sum, Irenaeus constructs the frame and stretches the canvas upon which this portrait of Christ
is being painted. Through an understanding of Christ as a recapitulated being, and by placing
Christ at the three points of causality (near, immanent and end), Irenaeus establishes a manner of
thinking about Christ that will find itself deployed by Athanasius centuries later. More
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specifically, the point is not just to track how Christ was constructed over time, since many
Christs existed in late antiquity, just as there was no single Christianity. What is at stake in the
later chapters is how the high Christ of late ancient christology becomes crucial to the ascetic
project of imitatio Christi. Only by analyzing how Christ works in christology is it possible to
discern how ascetics function in ascetic literature. Since the ascetics were considered to be
imitations of Christ, it is important to first ask the question what is the philosophical
performance of Christ?

Two Problems
Two problems beset current treatments of the Christ in continental philosophy and theology.
First is the usage of immanence as a noun or entity of affirmation, and the related use of Christ as
the entrepreneur of an immanent ontology, whether in its bodily, phenomenological-affective,
transcendental, a/theological or bio-political variations. It is my claim that continental
philosophers, especially those who address religion, have yet to take the concept of Christ
seriously, and that, perhaps latent in the most avowed atheisms of our day, there lies a subtle
piety towards this word, this Christ, seen most effectively in the fact that we are still using his
body as a site upon which to make universal statements, create ontologies and test our
epistemologies. It does not matter if difference or identity is preserved by Christ, or if Christ is
the law of the same or another name for a materialistic vitalism—for thinkers still remain pious
towards this body when the name of Christ is simply appropriated.
For instance, when Žižek recently argues that Christ’s eschatology refers not to a time to come,
but immanent time, he argues for a certain Christological reading of immanence. 2 When Žižek
writes that “Christ is resurrected in us, the collective of believers, and his tortured dead body
2
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33
remains forever as its material remainder,” he is understanding Christ in a rather predictable
(post-structuralist and post-metaphysical) manner. Like Vattimo’s Christ and many other Christs,
Žižek’s Christ was the figure who taught us transcendence does not exist, and that immanence,
constructed via the void in immanence, is all there ever was.3 Milbank, under the guise of the
“infinite particular, concrete universal,” speaks of Christ as the perfect, ontologically inspired
dialectical figure of justice, whose mere existence provides proof of “the infinitely abstract
source of this infinite particularity.” For Milbank, the central figure in the current Radical
Orthodoxy movement, the body of Christ is the materiality of materiality, i.e., Christ is a
resource whose inexhaustible “body” testifies to an infinite economy of God’s will in which no
thought, matter or soul can escape. Victor Taylor sums up their position nicely when he surmises
that both Milbank and Žižek would surely agree that “There is nothing outside the body of
Christ.”4 Badiou, in his manifesto on St. Paul, will speak of the Christ-event that “sets up an
immanentization of the spirit” that is not to be confused with transcendence.5 Jean Luc Marion’s
Christ is but a transparent icon through which givenness itself, as gift, becomes manifest.6 Jean
Luc Nancy’s meditations in Corpus act as an ode to the unfinished modulations of thinking,
breathing, and philosophizing on the body, the body (of God), but, really, we should blame it on
Christ. In a commentary on Nancy, Derrida recasts the Christ in terms of a dialectics of touch, of
being touched and touching, of Christ an interior exteriority, a “fleshly locus” of (im)material
splendor. Michael Hardt, when speaking of the incarnation, writes that “The figure of Christ has
often been understood as a point of mediation of the external relationship between divine essence
and worldly existence. But the incarnation, the self-emptying of Christ, denies any possible
3
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exteriority and hence any need for mediation.”7 For Hardt, the kenotic enterprise of God as he is
incarnated in Christ erases all traces of transcendence. For Hardt, following in this tradition of
appropriating the persona of Christ for an ontology of immanent materialism, the incarnation,
therefore, becomes a theological proposition—“the plenitude of materiality.”8
Michel Henry’s I am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity repeats the usage of the
Christ concept as an organizing tool to re-think immanence in the age of the end of metaphysics.9
As the title insinuates, Christ is the Truth because he reveals something transcendental about the
way the world reveals itself. Highly indebted to the christic phenomenology of Henry, Francois
Laruelle’s Future Christ: A Lesson in Heresy is another text attempting to claim Christ as a
rightful ancestor of continental immanence.10

Hegel, Nietzsche, (early) Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Kant—all appeal to the Christ in one way or
another, either to support their project or defend it against the all-consuming Christ. What all
these appropriations of Christ share in common is an image of Christ-as-extension, and of an
immanent working of Christ in this extension. As we shall see, Irenaeus is the architect of
recapitulation, which is the concept authorizing this extended Christ. If according to Deleuze,
Spinoza was the “Christ of philosophers,” then Irenaeus is the finest philosopher of Christ. It is
through an analysis of Irenaeus’ notion of recapitulation that we can better understand how it is
Christ can be understood as an immanent force.

The second problem is much easier to resolve, and it follows directly from the first problem. Its
essence is that Christ is assumed to be a ready-made concept. It is as if continental philosophers
7
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have picked Christ up off the ground of theological history, and made him into a ready-made
object for theological appropriation, but if we can remember the great lesson of Duchamp’s
readymade, it was a statement about artistic process—how, and in what manner are art objects
made. Our task here is analogous: how and in what manner is immanence made. We know what
contemporary immanence is responding to (transcendence, hierarchy, totalization, systems,
gender rigidity, power, law, injustice, and so on) but what was Irenaeus, the great ancient theorist
of immanence, responding to when he set off to construct it with such radicality? The claim here
is that Christ did not bring immanence, or a materialist a/theology, or teach the value of the
immanent event during his crucifixion and resurrection. Christ did not deploy immanence as if it
were an object or principle, and neither did St. Paul’s Christ. Certain theologians who became
“victorious” in the battle over orthodoxy beginning in the second century refined a concept of
Christ in which Christ brought a quality of action to materiality, in which Christ was stretched
across an onto-material fabric. The establishment of immanence occurred philosophically, with
philosophical tools and procedures, and only when it was established there could it enter the
literature (christology) and the Christian world as a mode of life, in which it would find
expression in Christianity’s great experiment on the body, asceticism.

For most of philosophical history (even with Deleuze) immanence is not an object but simply
designates the quality of an action that begins and ends inside an agent (Aristotle’s “immanent
cause”; Physics 11.7), and if you know the history of philosophy, it is mainly the Catholics who
hotly contested its relevance until it burst on the scene with Whitehead and process philosophy,
upon which it became entangled with post-structuralist France, deconstruction, phenomenology,
neo-materialisms, and so on.
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Moreover, if today’s thinkers are using the Christic body as a quasi-universal site upon which to
say something “universal” or shared among all bodies, and if immanence is always a tool for
resistance, then it would serve our politics and philosophies well to see how Christ was
constructed then so as to aid us in our forays into how better to construct him now. In sum, to
avoid these traps of understanding immanence as a noun, or of thinking that immanence was
simply brought at one moment, we should turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of conceptual
personae to see how immanence is constructed, and further, how the persona of Christ will set
the precedent for finding a in our body (ch. 4). But they get us only so far, and we have to
develop new modes of analysis in which to understand this operation. Only in returning to this
basic definition—as a quality of action—can we understand 1) what the persona of Christ did for
philosophy, 2) how and what this quality of action is, 3) and lastly, how Christ is a theological
accomplishment rather than a given, perhaps the finest conceptual addition to the Western
Christian philosophical landscape, thanks to Irenaeus. I will begin with a discussion of
conceptual personae, then spend the remainder of the time on recapitulation and ontology.

What are Conceptual Personae?
No other concept in the Deleuzian corpus has been as ignored as conceptual personae.11 If one
looks at the entirety of Deleuze’s texts, one finds philosophical monographs on the singularity of
a thinker’s thought (Bergsonism, Foucault, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Proust and Signs,
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, The Fold:
Leibniz and the Baroque). As a unit of analysis, conceptual personae are explicitly taken up in
11
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his last collaborative work with Guattari in What is Philosophy?, where, upon reading how
central they are to his understanding of how philosophy is constructed, one is led to think that
perhaps Deleuze was thinking through conceptual personae all along. In this final text, it is
central to his vision of how immanence is constructed, as well as how philosophical concepts are
managed. Conceptual personae “carry out the movements that describe the author’s plane of
immanence, and they play a part in the very creation of the author’s concepts.”12 It is conceptual
personae that construct a plane of immanence, organizing philosophy in such a way that the
personae’s virtual existence provides the ground upon which concepts live and breathe.13

Theorists working in the field of continental philosophy of religion and theology have primarily
focused on adapting Deleuze’s metaphysics to various fields, and much has been done in the way
of contextualizing and utilizing his work in the fields of process theology, mysticism,
phenomenologies of religion, postmodern theology, death of God theology and more recently,
the material philosophies of contemporary Speculative Realism, under Brassier or Meillasoux, or
the Non Philosophy of Laruelle.14 Despite this warm reception of Deleuze in these discourses, or
his rejection in the case of the latter, as well as the battle over who properly owns immanence
(the religionists or the philosophers, the Realists or the theologians), the connection between
conceptual personae and immanence remains unexploited.15

As all concepts are a solution to a problem, conceptual personae answer the question of how
philosophies are born, and how they have style. Composing the image of each philosophy—
populating the stage, as it were—are actors with varying degrees of importance, talent, skill and
12
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capability. Taken together, these actors perform in certain ways, and it is their movement (style)
that distinguishes one philosophy from another: “style in philosophy is the movement of
concepts.”16 Concepts in philosophy are inevitably divided up according to a division of labor—
certain concepts bear the brunt of a thinker’s ontology, while others only appear in varying
degrees of importance. Plato’s concept of participation subsumes nearly all the minor concepts
into its fold, rendering his theory of eros, remembrance of the forms, creation, and justice
dependent on the fact that immanence is understood only through participation. Deleuze himself,
as Badiou adeptly highlights, conforms all his thought to a distinction (virtuality/actuality),
which are but two sides to the same concept, immanence.17 But what grounds Deleuze’s style,
that is, what inheres in his numerous texts, are conceptual personae, for as the unseen
dramaturgist, 18 they “carry out the movements that describe the author’s plane of immanence,
and they play a part in the very creation of the author’s concepts.” Conceptual personae are what
Deleuze sought, what his philosophy desired, and they form the basic unit of his analysis.

In their examples, Deleuze and Guattari begin with Plato. Socrates is indeed the principal
conceptual persona of Platonism, but, they warn, “there is a danger of confusing the dialogue’s
characters with conceptual personae.”19

The conceptual persona is not the philosopher’s representative but, rather, the reverse:
the philosopher is only the envelope of his principal conceptual personae and of all the
other personae who are the intercessors, the real subjects of his philosophy. Conceptual
personae are the philosopher’s “heteronyms,” and the philosopher’s name is the simple
pseudonym of his personae. I am no longer myself but thought’s aptitude for finding
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itself and spreading across a plane that passes through me at several places. The
philosopher is the idiosyncrasy of his conceptual personae.20
The role of conceptual personae is to show thought’s territories, its absolute
deterritorializations and reterritorializations. Conceptual personae are thinkers, solely
thinkers, and their personalized features are closely linked to the diagrammatic features
of thought and the intensive features of concepts. A particular conceptual personae, who
perhaps did not exist before us, thinks in us.21
Conceptual personae simply are the virtual presence of a philosophical mode of life: Nietzsche’s
suffering in actual life has become the modality of affirmation (Zarathustra, Dionysius, AntiChrist) in his philosophical life. A philosophical life cannot be thought apart from the virtual life
that the philosopher instituted. It is this spectral presence which haunts the history of philosophy,
not to mention haunting the placement of philosophy in history.22

But how is immanence a direct result of conceptual personae? First, immanence must be
constructed. Philosophy is constructivism—philosophy is “the discipline that involves creating
concepts”23—and structures are necessary for the consistency of thought. Consistency is not
measured in categories of truth or falsity, but connections, growth and speed. Conceptual
personae are the scaffolding upon which concepts lie, providing a ground upon which concepts
can make connections with other concepts. Conceptual personae deploy immanence because they
construct a system for thought, a plane, and concepts will have “attached” to them, as an
immanent cause, the virtual life of the personae. Much in the way that the topography of a given
landscape determines how and where water will collect and flow, the persona is found in the
concepts by virtue of what they come into contact with. The persona is the landscape upon
20
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which concepts are defined, and upon which they receive their behavior. If thinking requires a
prephilosophical plane of immanence, which provides the diagrammatic features for thought,
then the personae work in conjunction with concepts as intensive features; that is, they bring a
philosophy to life. Secondly, immanence is a direct result of conceptual personae because
immanence is a modality of life, as the title of Deleuze’s last essay attests. “Possibilities of life or
modes of existence can be invented only on a plane of immanence that develops the power of
conceptual personae.”24 Immanence inspires a mode of life through conceptual personae. It is in
this manner that ethics is ontology for Deleuze.25 Therefore, we should judge the success of a
conceptual persona on what type of behavior it authorizes, and this mandate will come in handy
when we think about the Christ figure.

One is tempted at this juncture to simply say that because they inspire modes of living,
conceptual personae are simply affects attributable to thought (like art’s aesthetic figures), not
thought’s foundation. Maybe they are what thought produces, not what it is grounded upon.
Perhaps they are closer to a visceral seeing, or a haptic thinking, paralleling not a seeing that is a
touching but a thinking that touches as well. Why allow conceptual personae to do so much work
for the shape of philosophy? And then there is the obvious critique that we are blurring the
distinction between art (affect) and philosophy (concept), which Deleuze and Guattari do
themselves, it being the job of the former to move bodies and the latter to “merely” establish a
thought-event from an all-pervading, differential virtuality. Deleuze and Guattari do warn of
confusing aesthetic figures (art), which are the powers of affects and percepts, with conceptual
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personae, which are the powers of concepts.26 Despite this warning, however, they offer the
following: “This does not mean that the two entities do not often pass into each other in a
becoming that sweeps them both up in an intensity which co-determines them.”27 Which is also
to say: 1) not all philosophies establish modalities of life, and 2) often we see in the history of
philosophy the concept-affect. Kierkegaard, Zarathustra, and Don Juan are cited as examples—
each are aesthetic figures bound to philosophical modes of living. Their power lies not only in
their philosophical persuasion, but in the power these conceptual bodies emit, and the lifestyles
engendered by them. Given Deleuze’s penchant for equating power and affect ala Spinoza—as
the combined capacity to affirm—it follows that the more powerful the conceptual persona the
more we will see this figure passed on in life and philosophy. In other words, as Pierre Hadot has
claimed, philosophy is and always has been a way of life.28 The same goes for theology, and no
better conceptual persona exists than that of the Christian Christ. Christ as concept is Christ as
affect—any attempt to isolate the two results in dangerous distortions on either side of the
equation. While the Christian mode of living, exemplified by asceticism, martyrdom and the rare
instances of the stigmata are the modalities of life inspired by the conceptual persona of Christ, it
is in christology where we find this conceptual persona.

From What is Philosophy? to What is Christology?
Christology organizes theology around a persona, and Christ is the persona of christology. 29
When Deleuze and Guattari ask the question—what is philosophy?—they find an elegant
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solution. Philosophy is the art of inventing concepts with the help of conceptual personae. Now,
when we ask a similar question—what is christology?—we get an inverse answer: Christology is
the art of a conceptual persona through which a philosophy is born. But how is Christ positioned
as a prephilosophical figure, as one in whom all subsequent concepts submit? How is Christ
constructed, and who is the main architect?

Immanence in our present case is measured by the fact that when we look for Christ, we shall
always find him. Christ inheres in materiality, in divine reality, in ethics, body, concept, life and
death—as Athanasius says, and which basically sums up many centuries of thinking, “All things
derive from the Word their light and movement and life.”30 Christ is present in the whole as
much as in the part because he simply is the whole and the parts simultaneously, and it falls to
the property of the whole to be able to manifest itself in parts, just as the mind can manifest its
power in a toe without delimiting itself in that toe.31 In short, for Christians the Christ becomes
the All—this pithy statement sums up what the incarnation accomplishes, and as we have seen,
the understanding of Christ as an extended site/body in which ontology is tested, constructed and
deployed remains operative in twentieth century philosophical theologies. The problem in
question is: What is the tactic for laying out this Christ body as the Christian plane of
immanence? Irenaeus’ concept of recapitulation presents itself as one of the first, and boldest,
attempts by a thinker to lay out the persona of Christ as the image of thought. For Irenaeus,
recapitulation simply is the incarnation—it is the generative principle behind the Christ adopting
all flesh. But Irenaeus didn’t invent the concept, for Ephesians 1:9-10 reads, “God’s secret plan
has now been revealed to us; it is a plan centered on Christ, designed long ago according to his
mystical-eclectic theologies of the ancient world through its insistence on Christ’s centrality in theology. See M.C. Steenberg’s
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good pleasure. And this is his plan: At the right time he will bring everything together under the
authority of Christ—everything in heaven and on earth.” Recapitulation is the name of this
“bringing” together in the name of a body, a bringing together that is also an extension. As a
theological concept, recapitulation is a second century phenomenon first outlined by Justin, and
later by Tertullian, but between these two it is Irenaeus who will do more than any other to give
the concept rigor.32

Irenaeus
“Christ is the last syllable which, ‘being part of the whole metrical
fabric, perfects the form and metrical beauty of the whole.’”
Augustine, On True Religion, 22:42
Bishop of Lyons from 177-200, Irenaeus’ christology is “orthodox” and familiar on many fronts:
human beings were made free in the beginning. God did not make man good, but gave him free
will, which is good. What was good in man was the design (that obeying felt good). But mankind
in general fell from grace because of the primal disobedience of a single man, and death, as a
collective consequence, is a result of the Fall.33 Part of the urgency of Irenaeus’ christology,
which was always striving towards unity, was that he was fighting against “division” on many
fronts. If Christ was a solution, then Irenaeus’ problems set the coordinates for his theory of
recapitulation, for which he is famous. Irenaeus’ concerns were many—apostolic succession, the
unification of the Old and Testaments in the figure of Christ (against Gnosticism), the promise of
the second coming and the realization it may not be coming soon. Each problem threatened
unification in its own way, but recapitulation, as the notion that Christ sums up in himself all of
corrupt humanity, is a conceptual solution to said problems, and it remains one of the most
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creative visions to reconcile the relationship between divinity and man.34 Writes Daniel Wilson:
“Christ’s humanity had to contain all the characteristics and qualities of general humanity in
order for him to deify humanity, and Irenaeus vividly pictures the humanity of Christ to
emphasize that God did become flesh in order to identify with humanity.”35 Moreover, it is
because of recapitulation that theologians can claim, in a manner that all will understand in the
coming centuries, that all things owe their existence to Christ.

Mainly writing against Marcion and the Valentinians, Irenaeus titled his main work A Detection
and Refutation of the Falsely Named “Knowledge,” though history has shortened it to Against
Heresies. Originally in Greek, it first appeared after 180 C.E. In his refutation, Irenaeus lumps
together Marcion and others by calling them Gnostics.36 Irenaeus’ war against the Gnostics was
fought on two fronts: against those trying to expand scriptural application, and against those who
were trying to limit it.37 Irenaeus found heresy on either front, and Tertullian would fight the
same battle, a battle for scriptural authority at a time when what counted as “authoritative”
scripture had yet to be defined.38 A student of the famed martyr Polycarp, Irenaeus would do
more to ontologize the crucified body than any other early theologian.

Admittingly, Irenaeus is problematic for any theorist of immanence, especially when one is
attempting to read him as one of the great liberators of thought. As a foremost opponent of
heresy, publically known for attacking his critics and those who didn’t support his theory of
scriptural integrity, Irenaeus is hardly known in theo-philosophical history as a philosopher of
34
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immanence. The opposite could be argued, and easily, for it is historically and theologically
accurate to place his thought at the beginning stages of systematization, episcopal hierarchy and
dogmatic consistency.39 Irenaeus established orthodoxy, put order into Christian thought, and
organized a tight ontological schema wherein Christ is the transcendent head of the Church, the
ultimate ruler of all humanity, the one who, like a king, brings all together under his divine
status. Irenaeus insists on correct thinking, and the bulk of his largest work, Against Heresies, is
devoted to criticizing rogue theological thought: the Gnostics, Marcionites, etc. Irenaeus might
seem hardly worthy of a twenty-first century, Deleuzian inspired re-reading. However, recent
work done in the areas of recapitulation theory uncovers a different story. M.C. Steenberg
explicitly refers to Irenaeus as a “theologian of creation,” arguing that it is this theme more than
any other which should be foregrounded when discussing his work.40 Further, it is now common
parlance to call his theology a “cosmic anthropology” or an “optimistic anthropology,” though
little has been done in discussing what is anthropos in his anthropology. But how does
recapitulation affect lived bodies? Does it do so at all? Will it be used in the future? In essence,
the question is, what does recapitulation give birth to? Mark Graves recently argues that
Irenaeus’ anthropology is unique in that humanity is born imperfect, but can grow toward the
divine in successive stages.41 Contrasted with Augustine’s anthropology where “people were
born perfect and then fell from grace,” or Aquinas, where the willing part of the soul is oriented
toward God, Irenaeus proposes a view of humanity as wholly maturing toward God, a humanity
only able to receive what it is, at a particular time, able to receive. Though Christ is the
nourishment we receive over time, it will be shown that “maturity over stages” applies to
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humanity and Christ, for Christ had to mature through history in his appearances as prophets in
order to reach his final and perfect form (as Christ), and we need to align ourselves to his being
as we perfect ourselves. The exchange is co-dependent, each enabling the other—humanity is
able to mature because Christ himself, as the bedrock of our subjectivity, matured as well. One
could call Irenaeus’ theological anthropology, or the human condition, an apprenticeship in
Christ. It is in this specific innovation that his work is so important for the monastic experiment
and subsequent ideas of imitatio Christi. It is also for this reason that Eric Osborn terms
Irenaeus’ thought a “theocentric optimism,” referencing the possibility of humanity to attain
God-like status.42

For Irenaeus, God is transcendent, and Christ is the organs of our body, organizing humanity to
an ultimate, hierarchized end. Due to the incarnation, all glory that can be attributed to our flesh
must be referred to that which gives glory, i.e., Christ. Again, a very un-Deleuzian sentiment. But
it is in this absolute exchange, of the absolute becoming-Christ of our bodies and the becomingbody of Christ (the logic of the incarnation) where one can discern the seeds of a theory of an
immanent body, that is—God is a name for a certain organization of the body. While it is the
contention in later chapters that the power to present divine attributes on the body is not a
function of God, but of the (monastic and artistic) body, here it is argued that Irenaeus opens the
door for this (political/aesthetic) power to be given to the human body, as per Virginia Burrus’
account of the political force of the shameful martyr or desert monastic, and/or Patricia Cox
Miller’s angelic bodies of late antiquity.43 Irenaeus is not a death of God theologian by any
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means, but it is my conviction that Irenaeus is ultimately a thinker of immanence on the level of
bodies.

What this exegesis of recapitulation will balance is a double-sided approach. On the one hand,
Irenaeus’ does fall victim to a transcendentalizing of Christ and God, of ordering beings
according to their participation in Christ. It is only by virtue of Christ that the flesh is given
power, but, if we refuse to “believe” in transcendence, to accept it as an actual category of being,
and if we treat it as a conceptual innovation intending to do work for a thinker, only then can we
understand how Christ (as a quasi-transcendent) could actually be employed to recharge
immanence. On the other hand, Christ’s position as head of humanity is but one aspect to
recapitulation, and does little justice to its complexity. Recapitulation includes Christ’s humbling
himself to take human form, Christ’s death as servant, his resurrection and his suffering.
Recapitulation includes God taking a human form but equally the human taking a divine form—
so it is with this tension that we must proceed. What is ultimately at stake in this re-reading of
Irenaeus’ concept of recapitulation is 1) what can be found in the concept that is later used for a
robust practice of anthropos, 2) how human bodies can mature into virtual bodies of Christ, and
3) how these previous effects in turn give birth to a certain autonomous and abstract quality to
the painted body. To this end we shall extract the components of the concept appearing in
successive thinkers, and as we will see in chapters 2-4, the concept will have to make its way
through a variety of late antique thinkers before being able to be logically deployed in support of
monastic practice.

Recapitulation
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As expected, Irenaeus cites the bible for the deep source of his preoccupation. Romans 5: 12-21,
a crucial text in his arsenal, reads:

Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin, and in
this way death came to all people, because all sinned—To be sure, sin was in the world
before the law was given, but sin is not charged against anyone’s account where there is
no law. Nevertheless, death reigned from the time of Adam to the time of Moses, even
over those who did not sin by breaking a command, as did Adam, who is a pattern of the
one to come…Consequently, just as one trespass resulted in condemnation for all people,
so also one righteous act resulted in justification and life for all people. For just as
through the disobedience of the one man the many were made sinners, so also through the
obedience of the one man the many will be made righteous.
At its core, the concept of recapitulation traces the results of a single act—the crucifixion—and
how this act carries ontological weight: how a new law replaces the old, how the Adamic body is
retrieved by humanity, how death is overcome by life, how disobedience is replaced with
obedience, imperfection with perfection, fragmentation with wholeness. Numerous other Biblical
texts wherein the concept of recapitulation is incipient include, John 12:32, “And when I am
lifted up on the cross, I will draw everyone to myself”; John 11:52, “It was a prediction that
Jesus’ death would be not for Israel only, but for the gathering together of all the children of God
scattered around the world”; Ephesians 1:9-10, another important massage, reads, “God’s secret
plan has now been revealed to us; it is a plan centered on Christ, designed long ago according to
his good pleasure. And this is his plan: At the right time he will bring everything together under
the authority of Christ—everything in heaven and on earth.” As one might expect, when we do
find the notion in Irenaeus’ writings, it is, as Eric Osborn argues, wrapped up in at least eleven
different concepts, some of them being redemption, perfection, unification, and so on.44
However, unification, in its philosophical and political components, is the major problem to
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which recapitulation responds. Irenaeus writes: “We could not receive imperishability and
immortality unless we had been united to imperishability and immortality. And how could we
have been united with imperishability and immortality unless imperishability and immortality
had first been made what we are, so that what was perishable might be absorbed by
imperishability and what was mortal by immortality.”45 Calling it a metaphysics of
transcendence is both sloppy and imprecise, a reflection more a post-Heideggarian philosophy of
religion that has trouble seeing shades of ontology other than immanence and transcendence.
Rather, recapitulation is a body-ontology, and there exists no parallel in the Western
philosophical tradition.46
Recapitulation obeys a unique logic: one tree cancels out another—the “tree” of the crucifixion
overrules the tree of sin, and makes a life without sin possible again.47 Through the crucifixion,
Christ brings the Adamic body to perfection. Through Christ’s obedience, Adam’s disobedience
is rendered null. Irenaeus writes: “For He would not have been one truly possessing flesh and
blood, by which He redeemed us, unless He had summed up in Himself the ancient formation of
Adam.”48 As the universal body, the Christ body is the pattern of ours, and any alteration in his
registers immanently an alteration in ours. 49 Irenaeus thus establishes an unmediated
transmission between all corrupt bodies and Christ’s perfect body by understanding the
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crucifixion as a completion.50 Christ is not a mediator for Irenaeus, but rather, he becomes the
central figure for his theology’s conception of matter, body and redemption.

Irenaeus needs a strong concept of Christ because without it he cannot solve the great puzzle—
what it is Christ brought? We know what happened after Christ—corrupt materiality was fixed—
but we do not know exactly how he is authorized to do so on a philosophical level, for Irenaeus
is not content with proclamations that mere faith is all one needs. Christ is not an object of faith
or worship, but quite the contrary. Christ is not a simple mediator, not a mediatorial Logos.51
Mediation is problematic because it still keeps divine activity removed from the world. Christ is
a solution to Irenaeus’ main preoccupation, which is where Deleuze and Irenaeus coincide:
protecting an ontological force. To protect this force, Irenaeus deploys the logic of immanence,
and Irenaeus knows the logic well: “As through a conquered man our race went down to death,
so through a conqueror we ascend to life”; “As through a tree we were made debtors to God, so
through a tree we receive the cancellation of our debt.”52 What makes this a logic is the manner
in which an act, regardless of its temporal position, is necessarily transmitted immanently across
the material spectrum. What authorizes Irenaeus to make such fantastic claims is that Christ is
for Ireaneus a modality of thinking, a site organizing his speculative theology. It is in the name
of this Christ persona that he can claim this immanent transmission, and so, now, we must turn
our attention to precisely how Christ is constructed.
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The decisive point for establishing Christ as a conceptual persona comes when Irenaeus follows
up Paul by asking, “How could Christ be the end of the Law unless he were also its beginning?”
Or, as Irenaeus asks more practically in a response to the Ebionites, “How can they [believers] be
saved unless he was God who wrought their salvation on the earth?”53 In order to deliver his
promise of salvation, Christ will have to be an organizing principle before creation, an immanent
principle within it, and its final telos. 54
Christ’s Temporal Structure
Christ’s most important characteristic is his temporal structure, and it is this structure that acts as
a pseudo-fabric upon which Irenaeus layers his entire philosophy. This structure is composed of
a near point, immanent point and far point, each representing a stitch in which the Christ fabric is
woven. Below I offer a brief sketch of this complex temporality. Taken together, they constitute
the initial act of the Christ persona’s construction.
a) First, Christ’s near point is his co-presence with God the Father (John 1:1-4; 1 Cor. 8:6;
Hebrews 1-3). As Word, the Son co-exists with the father, and in proximity to the original points
of creation. Christ is near the father in that he is his agent for creation, “For he has been with the
Father from the beginning.” Equal parts ontological and aesthetic, founded and founding, Christ
designs creation with an eye to installing internal principles inside humanity—our will tending
towards the Good, creation towards perfection, and each thing reflecting God’s beauty. In book
V of Against Heresies, Irenaeus explains that as maker of the world the Word “invisibly contains
everything that was made and was imprinted in the shape of a Chi in everything, as Word of God
53
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governing and disposing everything.”55 As an outcome of co-presence, Christ therefore contains
creation by virtue of being immanent to all his creations.
Irenaeus’ unique christological contribution is in what consequences co-creation implies. But we
can infer why he stresses this concept—co-creation answers the question of how Christ can
complete humanity. Co-creation implies that there is an immanent design latent in humanity, and
for this reason, co-creation naturally implies co-presence, and pre-existence. Christ can complete
humanity because he is already implicated in it (“and he recapitulated in himself the work
already fashioned”56). Christ is not a descended fragment of God redeeming humanity due to his
divine power, but does so internally, from a code already formed by him. Christ is not a figure of
exteriority, but of extreme interiority. This is one aspect in which the integrity of the incarnation
itself is involved in each of these points, since if the incarnation is to be a robust and complete
incarnation, then he must have been incarnated all along, at all times. God does not create
through Christ; rather, Christ is a name for a type of creationist epistemology in which for the
Christian God is revealed in all parts of creation. God did not incarnate Christ, but quite the
opposite. Christ is a concept making the thought of an incarnate God possible.

Christ as near point establishes an ability for the Christ figure, such that because of his near point
status, he is able to instill in humanity a bit of the Word in all of creation, and he is enabled from
this position to enter historical and material life at will.

b) Aside from mere co-creation, Irenaeus understands this co-presence to authorize immanent
appearances from Christ in history, a fact that may render his time in Jerusalem at the turn of the
millennium important for only one reason—his death via crucifixion. It is Justin Martyr who
55
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offers the first account of what is often called a “saving history,” a history which, as Osborne
argues, does the same work for Justin as it does for Irenaeus, i.e., establishing continuity between
the previous prophets and the final prophet of Jesus, and unifying the Old and New Testament
into a single, divine plan. Osborne writes: “The new thing which has happened in Christ is the
fulfillment of former things.” 57 If God spoke to humanity in a somewhat fragmentary manner
through the Old Testament prophets, he did not do so in the case of Jesus. Osborne surmises that
Christians during this time were somewhat pressed as to why their “message” had come so late,
their response being the very conception of history as the unfolding of a design immanent to it.

The specific points about this history is not history itself, but in what manner manifestation
occurs. Irenaeus writes: “From the beginning he was accustomed, as the Word of God, to
descend and ascend for the salvation of those who were in distress.”58 Christ sustains the
universe, as in Hebrews 1:3, but he does so in a more concrete way than that of abstract logos.
Christ descends at (God’s) will in any form for the benefit of mankind, serving as an active
design principle, or corrective, to the decadent extravagances in human material life (sin).
Irenaeus’ genius is his understanding that Christ only intervenes bodily to the extent that the
world was formed from his body (the near point). Irenaeus writes, “Thus from the beginning the
Son is the Revealer of the Father, since from the beginning he was with the father.” 59 Christ is
the author of the existential novel of human life, and yet his universal persona also lends himself
to be its resolution.60 Irenaeus’ conception of Jesus’ life is that of a virtual topology of mimicry:
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Christ is a figure who can copy any bodily landscape so as to correct whatever part of humanity
is incorrect—“still others saw the Father’s glories adapted in various times to men who saw and
then heard, and to those who would hear subsequently.”61
While Athanasius will later speak of Jesus’ necessary time in the body in order to educate our
senses (to teach us to live as the monastic does), Irenaeus delves deeper into the uncanny
temporality of Christ through life’s stages. While Irenaeus speaks earlier of the necessary
immaturity of infant life, a life unable to obey God’s commandment, here the situation is more
complex: how and in what manner will Christ design himself in each stage of life? Why did he
have to live so long in a human body?, Irenaeus seems to be asking, a question Athanasius will
also ask. Irenaeus is precise in his answer—he took the form of all bodies in all their stages out
of a fear of not being comprehensive. Irenaeus writes: “He was made an infant for infants,
sanctifying childhood; a child among children, sanctifying childhood,” and so on in such a way
that each stage in life has a corresponding body, and each body a singular mode of atonement in
which atonement is activated. Irenaeus again, “He did not appear to be other than what he really
was, as they say who hold that his appearance was illusory. No; he appeared as he really was.” 62
What was of consequence is the integrity of the incarnation, for Irenaeus is actively engaging the
space-suit christology of the Gnostics, who understood Christ’s descent into bodily form as but
the donning of a material mask. If Christ was to be universal, then this universalism must show
all bodies the way to correction and redemption. Again, it is the logic of immanence at play—
transcendence gains in immanence the more the transcendent caters itself to the form of the
immanent. God becomes closer to the world to the degree that Christ, the name of God’s
immanent agent, is understood to contain all immanent forms.
61
62

Against Heresies 4.20.6.
Ibid. 2.22.4.

55
More was involved than just descent, for if the world is a song written by God, then Christ is an
embodied note that descends into life at just the right moment to give life that beautiful sound.
“Where there is composition there is melody; where there is melody it is at the right time; where
there is the right time, there is benefit.”63 Christ’s descent into flesh in the form of a body in
history required precision timing and a catering to the forms of local bodies. Benefit could only
be achieved with this precision pairing.
c) Third, the far point of Christ’s temporality is the cosmological completion implicated in his
death by crucifixion. In Book III, Irenaeus explains the logic: “And he recapitulated in himself
the work originally fashioned, because, just as through the disobedience of one man sin came in,
and through sin death prevailed, so also through the obedience of one man justice was brought in
and produced the fruit of life for the men formerly dead.”64 The logic is of a redemptive
repetition, which is the repeating of an original act that restores the faults of the previous act.
Irenaeus sees this logic operative in Eve and Mary as well, for in their case since it was through
Eve’s disobedience that mankind fell, it was through Mary’s obedience that mankind is
redeemed: “So too the knot of Eve’s disobedience was loosed by Mary’s obedience, for what the
virgin Eve had bound by her unfaith, the virgin Mary loosed by her faith.”65 What is remarkable
about Christ’s final recapitulation is the logical necessity, indeed, immanent causality, by which
it operates. Irenaeus does know why recapitulation works as a theory, but he does not know
exactly how. All he knows is that it does work—new life is possible, death overcome, and the
defeated race is defeated no more. Exactly how it works can be found in the logic of immanence
itself.
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While we have already spoken of Christ’s difference and repetition within history, Eric Osborn
notes that the repetition also takes on an onto-historical bent in the case of Irenaeus. Osborn
writes of Christ’s repetition: “His action is repetitive in that it returns to the point of error and
replaces the wrong deed with the right deed, thereby rectifying the ancient fault.”66 The classical
(Pauline) interpretation is that through Christ we can overcome death, and there is no shortage of
passages to make this case. But Irenaeus imports the concept of perfection into recapitulation,
and in this sense he is garnering inspiration from John and the Synoptics as opposed to the
Pauline insistence that Christ’s recapitulation means overcoming death.67 Irenaeus would be
more akin to say that it is the perfecting of life rather than an overcoming of life.
Though the previous two points of Christ’s temporality serve an equal function in his theory of
recapitulation, as it is classically understood recapitulation is the name of this third point—
anthro-cosmological completion. As we saw in his immanent point in human affairs, Christ had
to be at once identified with history and yet “virtually” separated from it; this does not mean that
he wasn’t fully identified with materiality, for the distinction was in how Christ could be
expressed. Christ was distinguished from God by his mutability and from materiality by his
morphological capabilities. As logos, the near point placed him at the point of creation in such a
way that “through him all things were made,” while the immanent point fulfilled the requirement
of “he was always present with the human race.” Though the third point comes last, it is really
first in Irenaeus’ system.

Christ fulfills the divine purpose, assumes humanity as a whole and restores the imperfect, but he
does so on the condition that he is able to, and he is only able to do so first, because he is already
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implicated deep into the fabric of created life (near point), and second, because the principle of
creation is no longer that of divine deity or God but of a human body placed at the point of
creation. Only by virtue of his near point can he be given the agency of an immanent point,
serving as a portal into the innermost recesses of human materiality, and only by virtue of his far
point can his entry into immanent life be understood as life’s improvement, or as correction.
Irenaeus is fond of Paul’s language of a universal body, citing how we are all joined by the
“joints and ligaments” of God. We are all the limbs of God, and Christ, when he moves, being
the head, we naturally follow. The golden thread, as it were, that registers an immediate effect in
life itself is authorized at the imagistic level of an ontologically generated, corporeal body, for it
is not at one point that Christ’s authority is established but the holistic fabric that is his
conceptual persona. Immanence is the logic of multiplicities—of connections across this
conceptual persona.

Christ is the name of an ontological body, a most unique philosophical invention. Christ is the
name of one event only, and one should hear inflections of Deleuze’s claim that there is only a
formal distinction between events, for all events are really events of the One.68 Irenaeus, like
Deleuze, speaks of one metaphysical event, the Christ event, and like Deleuze’s three syntheses
(or cuts) of temporality, Christ will also inhabit the pre-philosophical layer of immanence, for the
world is now subservient to him, residing in him, completed in him.69 Christ as a far point in this
rendering is nothing but a recapitulation of creation in us; his purpose as comprehensive design
is adopt the form of corruptibility so as to render the corruptible incorruptible. Only through this
difference and repetition of the Christ form in its three modalities can the stain of the Garden be
erased.
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Avoiding Exhaustion

An important question arises: Is it not the point of establishing immanence to never stop, never
complete, never finalize? Will not Deleuze, and his collaborative works with Guattari, make the
point that immanence can never quite be established, for it is always-already, or that the very
philosophies that establish immanence have as their intent to never contain the power of
immanence, to never have the last word on what or where it will go? Immanence resists, right?
To these questions, we reply that recapitulation accomplishes for Irenaeus the power of a Christ
body never able to be exhausted. In order for Christ to inhabit and correct all our bodies, he must
have an ontological power of inexhaustibility and morphological capability. 70 Christ must be
tireless and deformed, i.e., rhizomatic. Christ must be a plastic force. 71 (It is worth noting that
this fear of inexhaustibility highlights an old image of the Christ appropriated from Hellenistic
cosmology, that image being Christ as solar God, an inexhaustible source of energy, constantly
and forever the source of energy without being depleted).

The great practices and performers inspired by this Christ—martyr, stigmata, ascetic—all attest
to bodily deformation in favor of a “higher” formation. In other words, the crucified body has
entered theology as a transcendental plane of immanence (recapitulation itself) that would
organize all subsequent Christian thinking. Moreover, the responsibility will fall to later
centuries, specifically in the theologies of Tertullian and Athanasius, to perfect the physical
redemption doctrine of recapitulation, doctrines which requires the precise logic deployed by
Irenaeus.
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Of all the problems to which philosophy can and has addressed itself, Deleuze fears the
exhaustion, or containment, of virtuality, a fear which will continue throughout the entirety of his
work. If philosophy is the art of creating concepts, then his own concepts are thought-events
constructed to counter-actualize the ontological reserves of the virtual. Deleuze’s fears do not
give rise to a conservatism, but, as Agamben will note72, a critical attempt at ceaseless
“ungrounding,” an attempt that could be said to be the ultimate task of Difference and
Repetition—the locating of a generative principle of ungrounding.73 Deleuze notes: “Beyond the
grounded and grounding repetitions, a repetition of ungrounding on which depend both that
which enchains and that which liberates, that which dies and that which lives within
repetition.”74 According to Deleuze, virtuality needs to be protected in philosophy, from religion,
from power, from Popes and kings. The problem is Bergsonian, constituting the greatest threat to
immanence, a threat which constitutes Deleuze’s anxiety about religion, which is that religion
captures immanent energy fields, hierarchizes them, and makes them attributes or properties of
the plane of transcendence.75 Deleuze and Guattari are clear in their position on religion:
“Transcendence enters as soon as movement of the infinite is stopped,” and it is religion
understood to be the agent of stoppage.76 But what if the opposite is the case?
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For Deleuze, the transcendent does not threaten immanence by being transcendent, but by virtue
of capturing the vital energies of an immanent field.77 Deleuze’s main strategy for protecting
immanence is to claim that immanence is all there is, albeit a construction, with the exception of
THE PLANE, and that moments in the organization of transcendence are violent towards the
vitalist energies.

It cannot be denied that for Irenaeus God is transcendent, first creator, perfect, without parts
(“what contains is greater than what is contained”78), uncircumscribable, and so on, but if Christ
is the form through which we know the world, if Christ is the agent of visibility of God, if Christ
is the body in which we participate, if Christ is the agent through which the world was made, if
Christ is the beginning and end of all things, if there was never a moment when Christ was not,
and there will never be a moment when he is not, then what use is God? God accomplishes very
little for Irenaeus, nor does he care much for his definition79, but his role as designer and
decision cannot be underestimated. God is act itself, as Irenaeus, like Philo before him, is
constantly battling notions that God is pure, eternal inactivity, isolated from the earthly sphere.80
God as articulated by Irenaeus is a code producing the Word, internal to himself, and through
this production creating an unruly, deformed body of potential—the eternal generation of the
son.81 The unruly, deformed body is Christ. God can produce the code at any time in history
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because he used this code to produce the world (Christ’s near point). In order to think an
incarnate God, Christ has to be conceptualized as a co-creator.82

God is a code because not only is the world his design, but there inheres internal to life a telos
directing humanity to be like him. This telos should be understood not as a direction but as a
design. The telos is a code that needs to be awakened, not completed—once it is awakened there
is no end, for the “end” is actually the immantizing of God and/or the divinizing of humanity.
One could counter that the concept of resurrection is yet another form of bodily transcendence,
but it is not that simple. For Irenaeus, since Christ took a bodily form, then the resurrection is
bodily as well. Moreover, it is not a radical break but an improvement, and about as concrete as
Paul’s “heavenly bodies.” Irenaeus writes that “since men are real, their transformation must also
be real, since they will not go into non-being but on the contrary will progress in being.”83

Conclusion
Why is immanence constructed? Why is it appealed to? Why make the body of Christ so
important? A few ways of answering these difficult questions present themselves. According to
Deleuze, the purpose of conceptual personae is to establish modalities of life, and the logic
employed by Irenaeus will make him famous for this precise reason, for it is his theory of
recapitulation that will authorize the great disciplinary practices within Christianity. The
conceptual persona that is Christ succeeds for Irenaeus because it remains latent in the
disciplined practices of monasticism, for it is here that the living monks will be understood
through the categories of crucifixion and martyrdom, replete with all the complex temporalities
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that we saw on Christ’s virtual body. Irenaeus’ refinement of the concept of recapitulation will
have a lasting influence on late ancient christology. As we shall see, Tertullian’s valorization of
the flesh, which was itself a quasi-transcendentalism of the Christ body, will rely heavily on
Irenaeus’ innovations.

Irenaeus was the first thinker in this genealogy, and the rationale in selecting his thought from
among the many others in late antiquity is that he begins a trajectory of thinking eventually
finding expression in the body. In part thanks to Athanasius, the practices of the ascetics will be
conceptualized as recapitulated beings, as beings that have the powers to unify the cosmos and
harmonize their surroundings. This genealogy is strategic in that sense, i.e., it seeks to define a
concept of Christ later to structure the manner in which ascetics are interpreted. Recapitulation is
the one of the first major conceptual innovations in that trajectory.
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Chapter 2

Flesh, Body, Earth—Tertullian

Chapter abstract:

As was argued in the previous chapter, recapitulation secured the
ontological protection of Christ. Irenaeus placed Christ in all the
important philosophical points (near, immanent and end point), so as to
guarantee for Christ the highest possible cosmological and terrestrial
importance. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of conceptual personae
helped theorize the relationship between philosophical personae and the
instituting of immanence. However, the implications for the Christ in
material life remained unexploited. In this chapter it will be argued that
the concept of flesh, as it is conceived by Tertullian, relies on the notion
of recapitulation. Recapitulation can be credited with Tertullian’s
insistence that Christ, who is flesh, is the “fabric of life.” Expansive,
incarnated, composed of blood and spirit, flesh occupies the central
position of Tertullian’s christology. Moreover, this study is meant to
enrich and engage the recent popularity of contemporary materialist
ontologies, negative theologies or death of God/immanentist
philosophical theologies.
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Introduction
As the second thinker to be addressed, what does Tertullian add to this portrait of Christ? It was
said that through his concept of recapitulation Irenaeus constructed the frame and stretched the
canvas upon which this portrait of Christ is painted. Tertullian distinguishes himself from many
ancient thinkers through his concept of flesh, and it is this aspect that adds texture and body, so
to speak, to this portrait. Embracing the paradoxes of embodiment, defilement and divinity,
Tertullian outlines a transcendental materialism under the name of flesh, a word which defines
his christology more than any other.

The first step was taken by Irenaeus, and he made it possible to think of Christ as a substitute for
the All, since Christ was understood to embody all that came before it. The act of recapitulation
erased the ancient “stain” and made possible a life in God once again. But Irenaeus didn’t quite
address the question of materiality. For him, Christ assumed the form of all bodies, not
necessarily all life. Tertullian, in this second operation, establishes this claim—Christ is a
substitute for the “fabric of life.” Tertullian will not sidestep gross materiality, claiming that
Christ was even “abject” in nature, a fact proving the very reality of his incarnation. Another
unforeseen consequence of Tertullian’s christology is that because flesh is the common substrate
between God and man, a possibility is created for a relay between life and body, and between
body and life. In other words, it makes possible an ontological slippage (to be addressed in the
following chapter) between a part and a whole in such a way that an alteration of the whole can
take place through a part. By creating a middle term between divinity and materiality, flesh,
which is a metonym for Christ, authorizes a mutual becoming between the ground of a being and
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the being itself. The cosmos can be moved from a body through immanent causality—this is
where this analysis of late antiquity is ultimately headed.

The Performance of Flesh
This is an age of circulating flesh.
Stelarc, performance artist.

In 1989, a little known artist from Brooklyn by the name of Andres Serrano took a photograph of
a small crucifix submerged in a glass jar (Figure 4). At first glance, the picture is beautiful—
Christ, clearly embattled with his head hung low, is bathed in golden light. The outlines of
Christ’s body are nearly lost in the luminescent glow. The nail holes in Christ’s right hand are
clearly visible, and are the most focused part of the image, while the left side of his body drifts
towards nondifferientation. Only a cloth covers his emaciated torso. If you didn’t know better,
you’d say the work is from a pious Catholic.
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Figure 4. Andres Serrano. Piss Christ. 1987.
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Nothing at first glance would lead you to think it is one of the most controversial, and famous,
works of contemporary art, but if you read the title—Piss Christ—you’d suddenly realize that
the golden hue is that of the artist’s own bodily fluids. Serrano submerged the crucifix in a jar of
his own urine, and Piss Christ was born. In 1989, when it was included in a Washington D.C.
gallery, outrage ensued, mostly because the work was part of a traveling show receiving a
portion of its funding from the National Endowment of Arts. The political right followed with
law suits, criticism and congressional pressure to cut funding to the N.E.A. for supporting such
obscene and anti-religious art. After numerous legal battles and oversight committees, funding
stipulations were made, and the N.E.A. survived intact. An ambivalent Catholic, Serrano’s
interests in the symbolism and ideas of religion spread like wildfire throughout the art world, but
though his case was one of the earliest, it was only the beginning.
As New York art critic Eleanor Heartney points out, aside from the “culture wars” of the eighties
and nineties, which was Serrano’s milieu, something very “catholic” was going on in the art
world, and Serrano is but one player, merely representing deeper trends within the recent
phenomenon of bodily materiality in art.1 Heartney cites an interview with popular B.B.C. art
critic and nun, Sister Wendy, to make a point. In an interview with Bill Moyers, Sister Wendy
refuses to understand Serrano’s work as blasphemous. Rather, in regards to the prevalence of
violence, sex, lust and nudity in Western art, Wendy is asked about her reaction to the little
known Brooklyn artist’s crucifix submerged in urine. Sister Wendy replies that, “It would never
have occurred to me to be shocked.” “I’m a Catholic,” she offers. She continues, “God looked at
his creation and saw that it was good”; “There is nothing amiss in any part of the human body.”
Heartney uses Sister Wendy to illustrate a point about the growing tide of 60’s and 70’s
1
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performance artists mutilating, biting, scarring, burning and cutting their bodies so as to embody
social criticism, activities continuing to this day. Which is not to say that all Catholics approve of
Piss Christ, destroyed as it was in the spring of 2011 by conservative, axe-wielding Catholics
when on display in the French town of Avignon.
Heartney’s point is this: many of the original, international performance artists whom spawned
the movement were Catholics or from Catholic countries. Gunter Brus, Hermann Nitsch (Figures
5 and 6), Carolee Schneeman, Chris Burden, Piero Manzoni, Arnulf Rainer, Vito Acconci and
Linda Montano, among others, were all beholden to what Heartney terms the “Catholic
imagination,” which she defines as an “incarnational consciousness” towards the paradoxes of
embodiment.
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Figure 5. Video still from one Hermann Nitsch’s 1960’s blood rituals, which were part of the
Orgien Mysterien Theater.

Figure 6. Photo of Hermann Nitsch by Sven Eisermann.2

Those paradoxes include the very concept of the incarnation, sexual desire merging with desire
for God, the ability to inscribe “immaterial” social realities on a material body, as well as the
often blurred boundaries between the grotesque and the beautiful. Heartney is not saying that
postmodern performance art has its beginnings in Catholicism, for one should look
predominantly to the crisis of the easel picture after Modernism, the bloodbath of Vietnam,
sexual liberation and gender equality for its ideological roots. However, according to Heartney,
there is something peculiar about the way Catholics, or those from Catholic countries, are using

2
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their bodies in ways that others are not.3 The Catholics are more violent, bloody, masochistic and
sexually oriented, observes Heartney. The manner in which they employ their bodies, and its
flesh and fluids, can be explained by appeal to the Catholic theological and philosophical
tradition, which Heartney does effectively. Yet her text cannot help but make the point that there
is something Catholic embedded within performance art. Or, as I will argue, there is something
very performative in early Catholicism more generally. What is Catholic about performance art
is the relation of the enfleshed body to the social body.

What follows here should be understood as a detailed study that can be easily put into
conversation with Heartney’s arguments. Are not monastics performance artists? Do they not
also blur the boundaries between pain and pleasure, beauty and the grotesque? Are not their
bodies sites of social and cosmological dramas? Did they not have audiences as well? If
contemporary performance artists use the body, and its flesh, to inscribe social realities in a very
particular manner, and if this method can be found in Christianity, then this study traces the
ancient manner in which the flesh of a body is understood to be an equivalent, or substitute, of
the “social body.” Foucault and Mary Douglas made the point decades ago: because the body is
inscribed in political relations, then any alteration to the body can be read as reflection of that
power relation.4 Naturally, this alteration can be made in the direction of the solidification of
power, but it can also be a critique of that power. Late antiquity did not hold a notion of a secular
social body as we do today, but an equivalent notion encompassing the network of bodily and
social relations was present, and we shall find it in Tertullian’s theological concept of flesh.
Tertullian did not have a theory of the body, though he does use the term for many categories as
3
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do the Stoics, since for the Stoics only bodies exist.5 Yet, since the purpose of this study is to
track how Tertullian’s notion of flesh becomes enfolded within the imagery and christology of
ascetic literature, especially the ascetic body, a theory of the body inserts itself as a consequence
of his divinely embodied materialism. In other words, Tertullian’s robust theory of the body will
ultimately find itself expressed in Athanasius.

More than a mere relation, however, for Tertullian there is something consubstantial between our
bodies and the enfleshed social. Tertullian’s statement that Christ, as flesh, is the “fabric of life”
will be the first point to be taken up, as it is here that a very physical body (Christ) is constructed
in such as way as to be determined by, and determining of, ontological and social realities.

A Special Form of Earth
“What is flesh but earth in a special form?”
Tertullian
Rather than offering a general summary of Tertullian’s writings, our focus will be specific: what
role and function did recapitulation have in the construction of a univocal Christ, such that Christ
can be said of all names and things? What is flesh? Together, Irenaeus and Tertullian would do
more than any other to entrench logos christology in theological speculation, and it is
recapitulation that allows the full consequences of the logos-Christ to come to fruition. In its
simplest rendering, Irenaeus finds that Christ sums up, completes and perfects the corrupt
Adamic body. But recapitulation’s role in constructing a more general robust theory of the
incarnation is best summed up by theologian John Macquarrie:
5
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It is not that, at a given moment, God adds the activities of reconciliation to his previous
activities, or that we can set a time when his reconciling activity began. Rather, it is the
case that at a given time there was a new and decisive interpretation of an activity that
had always been going on, an activity that is equiprimordial with creation itself. [my
emphasis]6
The temporality of reconciliation as “already going on,” especially when it becomes an attribute
of lived bodies, is the interpretative moment in christology when God’s act of creation becomes
immanent to the world. It is through the recapitulated Christ that this activity can be understood
to be implicated, in all times, with creation.

Why Tertullian? Born in Carthage around the year 160 C.E., what makes Tertullian so
interesting as a late ancient thinker is that he, to quote Virginia Burrus, “enthusiastically
embraces the challenge presented by Christianity’s most controversial teaching regarding the
divine incarnation and fleshly resurrection,” accomplishing this feat, no doubt, by way of “boldly
placing flesh at the center of his theological construction.”7 In our reading of Tertullian, our
interest in flesh will be confined to two areas: recapitulation and body-ontology. But why flesh,
and why today?

Flesh Today
According to Richard Kearney, “The theme of flesh was largely ignored by Western metaphysics
since Plato.”8 The same can’t be said for the past twenty years. If we can situate the popularity
of flesh in post-metaphysical philosophy and theology, flesh is more often than not a trope for
the ground on which we are constituted, akin to a material transcendental—in short, flesh is the
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condition of embodiment, establishing the politics of touch, the phenomenological excess, the
gift-gifting element, that which makes us akin to animal life, the source of affect, performance,
the field upon which our self dissolves and co-becomes with its surroundings, or, finally, flesh is
the final truth of Christianity—divine life incarnate in all its vulgarity and sublimity, violence
and passivity, in all its dirtiness, muck, vulgar eroticism and erotic ontology. For Tertullian, as
for today, flesh is the dominant category where the contestation for Christian truth finds itself
played out. However, to understand the provenance of flesh’s popularity in contemporary
thought, we must first go through phenomenology, as it is here that Husserl’s epoche, or
reduction of all transcendencies will be used to find in flesh a transcendental and formal
property. According to Ricouer on Husserl, “To say that the flesh is absolutely here, and so
heterogeneous with respect to any set of geometric coordinates, is equivalent to saying that it is
nowhere in terms of objective spatiality.”9 As we shall see, Tertullian would no doubt agree.
Flesh in Husserl’s account is an irreducible formal power, and it is this “nowhere” that will
eventually give flesh its normative, constructive role in materialist ontologies. Like Kant’s
manifold, Husserl’s flesh is inextricably bound to material forms all the while remaining beneath
the radar of conscious perception.10 However, though Husserl brings flesh out of the confines of
a narrow, and ancient, theological discourse with his Cartesian Meditations, Richard Kearney
observes that Husserl only pointed in the direction of a philosophy of the flesh.
In his The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty responds to Husserl’s use of the flesh: “The
seer and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and which is
seen. It is this Visibility, this anonymity innate to Myself that we have called flesh, and one
9
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knows there is no name in traditional philosophy to designate it.” Merleau-Ponty continues,
“…flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance.”11 Merleau-Ponty believes that we need an
“old term” if we want to designate the rich materiality that is flesh. He decides on the term
“element,” understood as an “incarnate principle,” an element of being.12 This determination of
flesh as an omnipowerful, transcendental category of metaphysics will go largely dormant, as
Existentialism gave way to French post-structuralism, and the embodied, genetic semiotic will be
found in linguistic constitution and no longer the material constitution of bodies.

For the phenomenological structure of flesh to make its way into theories of immanence and
embodiment, it would first require a mediating theology that finds as its task the construction of
new theological categories beginning from the dynamism of signs, not the stasis of the signified.
Hence, the marriage of French post-structuralism and American pragmatism in the form of Death
of God theology. Thomas Altizer, Gabriel Vahanian, Paul Van Buren, among others within the
movement would concern themselves with what one could call a Radical Tillichianism—religion
being immanent in culture. What we cannot forget about the Death of God theologians is their
emphasis on the constructive power of the immanent as sole provider of theological material.
While the theological task had historically been to display the transcendence of the incarnational
paradox, now we begin from immanence and stay there; thereafter, if one discerns flickers of the
transcendent, it is always as an effect of the field of immanence. Immanence in terms of signs is
no longer understood as an achievement, but a property of the given.

With strong backgrounds in phenomenology, and indebted to the task of process theology (and
its emphasis on God’s activity as opposed to his being), continental theorists such as Catherine
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Keller, Michael Hardt, Karmen Mackendrick, Richard Kearney and John D. Caputo, among
others, have each in their own unique way used the phenomenological structure of flesh—the
sense of flesh—to arrive at an affirmation of immanence. Not to be equated with the body, the
flesh, writes Caputo in Deleuzian and Derridean keys, is the virtual plane of events, while for
Hardt the flesh is “the vital materiality of existence…Flesh subtends existence; it is its very
potentiality.”13 Terming his theology a carnal theology, Caputo writes: “The flesh is
simultaneously a site of vulnerability and of pleasure, of bodies that so pulsate with sensation
that their acting in the world is suspended and the flesh itself becomes all the world there is.
These are bodies that are saturated with themselves, scenes of ‘‘auto-affection,’’ as Michel
Henry puts it.”14 Caputo’s usage of flesh serves more than a few functions. First, flesh as the site
of events constructs a shared substrate from which to create a material continuum between flesh
and the shared weakness of (the name of) God and humanity, a continuum defined by the
impersonal, singular event. Second, his appeal to flesh, when contrasted with the risen body of
Christ (a body sans flesh), creates the opportunity to equate the latter with conceptions of the
post-human, techno-infused bodies of the twenty-first century and beyond, i.e., angelic, ghostly
immaterial bodies of our future digital technology. Risen bodies, or bodies without flesh, may be
idealized repetitions of events already occurring, at the transcendental level, in actual bodies.
Caputo writes:

On my accounting, the risen body, held suspect as a literal fact, is an attempt to release
the event that stirs within the body, to release the sense, or at least a sense, of the body.
The risen body is an idealization of the empirical body which is trying to express the truth
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of the body, the event that takes in the body – as an event of mobility, velocity, light,
power, and incorruptibility.15
Also having his theoretical provenance in phenomenology, and situating flesh as a categorical
transcendental, Kearney describes his project as a “micro-eschatology” or “the passing from
protest to prophecy and from prophecy to the retrieval of the sacred in the everyday,” all the
while strategically utilizing the phenomenological reduction. Kearney calls Merleau-Ponty’s
work on the flesh a “eucharistics of profane perception,” and counter-signs flesh’s sacramental
value. Catherine Keller, in the tradition of process theology, writes:

What if we begin to read the World from the vantage point of its own fecund
multiplicity, its flux into flesh, its overflow?...A chaosmic Christ would represent the
flow of a word that was always already materialized, more and less and endlessly, a flow
that unblocks the hope of an incarnation….It takes place within the shared,
spatiotemporal body of all creatures.16
In addition to Keller, Caputo and Kearney, there is a field of contemporary Catholic
phenomenologists appealing to flesh so as to advance the pervasive transcendental conditions of
flesh, and, by a philosophical sleight of hand, find the “God” of materiality in flesh itself.
According to Caputo, these thinkers—notably Jean-Luc Marion and Michel Henry—constitute
an important segment of the return to religion in contemporary continental philosophy.17
Appearing first in In Excess (2004), to be picked up subsequently in The Erotic Phenomenon
(2007), flesh is for Marion is an example of a saturated phenomenon that gives itself without
relation, and, vis-à-vis a critique of Descartes, flesh is the shared horizon of ego and other. Flesh
is not a simple concept for Marion, and cannot be summarized easily; however, what can be said
of flesh is that it operates at a crucial intersection of problems for Marion, including the
15
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conditions of phenomenality, the nonidentity of God and “truth” of the incarnation—all facets
indebted to the Husserlian tradition of phenomenology.

With all the options for flesh, what does Tertullian, a North African thinker born in the middle of
the second century C.E., add to the resurgence of flesh as a linguistic intervention into twentieth
and twenty-first century theo-philosophical discourse? What Tertullian has to add to the
conversation is, perhaps, the very existence of the conversation. It was Tertullian who made flesh
the central paradox of the Christian incarnation, and his thinking on the subject is reflected, in
structure and content, in the orthodox creedal debates occurring long after his time. What does
flesh do today? Flesh allows us to commune, but how? Flesh is the a priori of sensation, but is
sensation a given or a capacity that requires our crucifixion? Today, flesh is a metonym for
resonance, capability, performance, embodiment and communication in all its varieties.
However, this is the case because christology originally laid out this image of thought,
authorizing a plane of immanence under the name of flesh itself, and Christ as a conceptual
persona is but another name for flesh, as we shall see with Tertullian.

In order to grasp the constructed nature of flesh, we must turn to classical sources, as it is here
where the specific logic is laid out before us. Here we can better understand how christology
initially authorizes flesh, and conversely, what flesh authorizes—the ascetic body. I turn to these
sources to bring to light another discourse of flesh that has recently made its way into theory—it
is the spectacularly deformed, enfleshed bodies of ascetics, imagined by Patricia Cox Miller,
Virginia Burrus, among others. Within this second discourse of the flesh, we find an
“athleticism” of the flesh, a concept of the flesh not as a common site of embodiment, as we saw
with contemporary immanentist theologies, but flesh as a difficult and laborious end-result of a
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specific bodily technology. We find a concept of constructed flesh, a body of flesh that performs
a sublime incarnation only at the limit of what a body can do, not flesh as phenomenlogically a
priori or the condition of possibility of embodiment.

Flesh Again
From St. Paul to Tertullian to Athanasius, who doesn’t speak of flesh in early Christianity?
Translating the Greek noun sarx, flesh is a multivalent concept in the New Testament, used at
least 135 times in its noun form and 10 times in its adjectival form.18 Found predominantly in the
writings of Paul, its usage can be found in twenty one of the twenty seven New Testament books.
The origin of the word sarx can be traced to Homeric times, and can be found in all the literature
between then and the years of the New Testament’s composition. Writes Burton of its usage,

‘Sarx,’ properly meaning flesh, the soft portion of the body of an animal, living or once
living, retains this meaning throughout all the periods we have been studying. In them all
it is also used by metonymy for the whole body…Neither in non-Jewish nor in Jewish
writers does the term seem to have acquired any ethical significance.19
Though Plato, unlike Seneca, held a notion that soma was a hindrance to the intellectual life of
the soul, Plato does not use sarx in his vocabulary, nor does he consider the body, and its matter,
to be inherently evil. For purposes of simplification, since the relation between these terms
deserves more attention than given here, often when sarx is used in Hellenistic literature it is as a
part of soma, i.e., as the soft outer layer of a body, and does not figure in ethical ontologies.
Though Tertullian was writing in Latin, he would have been familiar with Greek usage of sarx,
and Tertullian, like Paul, continues to use flesh in its general historical linguistic context, but not
18
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without a major innovation. Flesh is for the New Testament writers a metonym for the whole of
man, “by human generation and heredity.”20

If flesh stands for anything, it is a trope for the passions, desires and imperfections; flesh can
mean anything from humanity in general to our post-lapsarian condition or the corrupt telos in
our behavior. Flesh can be family lineage, the object of desire or desire itself. But according to
Dayton, “There is no uniformly evil reference in the New Testament use of sarx.”21 Caputo sums
it up nicely when he writes that flesh in the New Testament is “everything that is both vulnerable
and or able to be wounded.”22 In short, flesh is not what hinders the construction of the heavenly
body of 2 Corinthians 5, where we will “not be spirits without bodies, but we will put on new
heavenly bodies.” Flesh needs to be forged in relation with the construction of our “new
heavenly bodies,” not forgotten.
Given flesh’s profound ability to mark the (down) Fall of man, it is clear that Christ assuming
flesh will pose the most daunting question to the early thinkers: Though it was good for
humanity, how was Christ’s flesh not hazardous to a strong conception of God? Tertullian asks
the question outright in De Carne Christi: “Let us examine our Lord's bodily substance, for
about His spiritual nature all are agreed. It is His flesh that is in question. Its verity and quality
are the points in dispute. Did it ever exist? Whence was it derived? And of what kind was it?”23
Flesh, it appears, has a long and storied history in philosophy and theology, and its strategic
appropriation stems from its ability to support those seeking transcendence or immanence: flesh
accommodates. In her reading of texts after Tertullian’s De Carne Christi, such as Augustine’s
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City of God, the Genesis Rabbah, and Palladius’ Lausiac History, Burrus finds in the late antique
conception of flesh a transcendent excess. 24 Citing Plato’s khora, a term exercised most notably
by Derrida in Khora, Burrus finds that materiality is already associated with excess, and that the
Christian imaginary furthered this term to describe ascetic bodies, Christ’s body, as well as
various other tropes. It is the case, then, that we can thank Tertullian’s exceedingly complex
treatment of flesh for its resilience, morphological capability, and overall ability to work
in/from/for all types of immanentist or transcendent theologies?

Flesh is activated for Tertullian only in relation to a broad spectrum of other concepts: the
resurrection conquered flesh and yet, paradoxically, the incarnation brought flesh; flesh is sin,
yet it was Jesus’ flesh that made possible the removal of ours; flesh marks Jesus’ strength but our
weakness; flesh is the hindrance to the Christian project but the avenue, according to Peter
Brown, through which the Christian project of desire defines itself against a Greco-Roman
sensibility.25 The task before us is how to think flesh as ontologically generative, as a
transcendental, and inhabit the problem to which flesh is the solution. What is flesh a solution to?
Though christology has received the brunt of much post-metaphysical critique, accused as it is of
translating the humanity of Jesus into the high christology of the episcopate, eventually finding
itself equated with authoritarian Vatican politics and abuses of power, here we are reading
christology as a necessary ingredient in bringing our attention back to the project of (i) bodily
construction and (ii) forms of resistance built on a structural relation between the body and the
social.
24
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The Fabric of Life: Flesh and Life in Tertullian
Famous for saying that Jesus’ burial and resurrection are certain because of their very absurdity,
for claiming that there is absolutely nothing wrong with the liquids in the womb, Tertullian’s
texts represent a mid-second-century struggle to make sense of the claim that God donned human
flesh. We can assume from the highly polemical nature of this former jurist’s writings, this
assumption was not shared by all Christian groups. As was the milieu in which Irenaeus was
writing, the battle for orthodoxy is raging, and Tertullian, as was the bishop from Lyons, was
instrumental in establishing exactly what “orthodoxy” is. However, I do not wish to support
orthodox theologians in their rhetorical battles, but merely to track a problem inherent to the
orthodox position, i.e., the Christ as a body-ontology and its relation to flesh.

Tertullian was born in Carthage, North Africa, held a position as a jurist in Rome and spent
many decades defending orthodoxy, but moved away from the church late in his life, around 207,
due to his beliefs in Montanism. Despite his moving away from the Catholic position, the central
tenets of his ideas remained “Catholic” after his Montanist period.26 God is the supreme being,
unborn, eternal, without beginning nor end; the Fall occurred because Adam ceased to mind the
things of God; the Father is the whole substance while the Son is a part; the Father and the Son
are not identical but distinct in degree and person; the Word is logos, being co-present at the time
of creation. Tertullian, in Against Praxeas, writes “Thenceforth God willed to create, and
created, through the Word, with Christ as his assistant and minister.”27 Like Irenaeus, Tertullian
had enemies—pagan polytheists, Marcion, Valentinus, and Monarchians.28 As proof of his
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“victory” in the battle over orthodoxy, much of Tertullian’s theology is reflected in the creeds of
Nicaea and Chalcedon (451).29

Tertullian advances Christian theology through his use of ornate rhetoric combined with an
uncompromising logic, which he generously employs to defeat the various heretical positions,
whom he frequently refers to as “devils.” Preferring to use the term Son as opposed to logos, he
would nonetheless advance the cosmic scope of Christian reflection on Christ through his
creative deployment of recapitulation.30 Exceedingly complex, as we saw with Irenaeus,
recapitulation gives rise to certain theological operations, and it is these operations guiding the
discussion below.
Nowhere is Tertullian’s thought more complex than in his discussion of recapitulation. Though
assumed and implicit, Tertullian speaks directly of recapitulation in but a few occasions, notably
in his “On the Epistle to the Laodiceans” and De carne Christi. Tertullian does not, like Irenaeus,
spend pages upon pages theorizing how Christ summed up humanity. But there is a good reason
for this—Tertullian merely assumes this is the case, a fact allowing him even more freedom to
explore the “absurdity” and impossibility of the incarnation without having to justify it from new
principles. For Tertullian, as for Irenaeus, recapitulation “both fulfills and corrects,” and while
the logic is that of Christ explicating humanity and implicating it towards a more perfect future,
we must be wary of terming this logic a dialectic of any sort.31 Indeed, a feedback loop does exist
between two sets of operations: (i) Christ and God, wherein Christ assumes the form of flesh so
that God can become whole again (so that diversity once again rests in divine unity, a diversity
caused by the fall), and (ii) humanity and Christ, where Christ assumes flesh so that our bodies,
29
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the fabric of flesh, can become whole again. Yet if there is a dizzying amount of reconciliations
at work, and they are numerous, they exist not between humanity and Christ nor between God
and Christ. Rather, the multiple reconciliations are justified by a single gravity-orienting
thought—the entire ontological drama occurs on Christ’s body, for thanks to Irenaeus the
Christic body is now the paradigmatic ontological image to which Tertullian will return to again
and again in his writings. In a manner prefiguring the scholastic debate over univocity, Christ as
arche-being is here said of all diverse beings, names, and events—for this is the purpose of a
strong concept of Christ.32 Christ is a form of extreme diversity in unity for Tertullian, and
allows a form of life itself to emerge.
De carne Christi is a text written around 207 to address the Gnostic “heretics” Marcion,
Valentinus and Apelles, who according to Tertullian deny the human nature of Christ by denying
that he donned actual flesh. It is in this treatise, potentially written under Montanist leanings
(Tertullian having become a Montanist around the year 199), where Tertullian expounds on the
idea that, first, Christ had human flesh, and second, the notion of the incarnation requires he did
so. A crucial argument he puts forward concerns the vastness of Christ’s body, and how Christ,
aside from simply “summing” up humanity, is the fabric of life itself.33 As one might expect, the
concept of recapitulation plays a major role in the understanding of this fabric.
In De carne Christi 17, Tertullian reiterates recapitulation but with a biological emphasis: “And
in this man God was born, taking the flesh of an ancient race, without the help, however, of the
ancient seed, in order that He might reform it with a new seed, that is, in a spiritual manner, and
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cleanse it by the removal of all its ancient stains.” 34 Strangely, Christ does take the flesh but
does not take part in the ancient seed of Adam, a fact that seems to belie his insistence that Christ
was fully enfleshed, for is it not the case that being born of “seed” is a most human property?
Tertullian’s insistence seems odd, given that for him flesh is synonymous with the body (“I will
at once state that I understand by the human body nothing else than that fabric of the flesh…”35),
which should lead Tertullian to conclude that seed is crucial for a body to be a body. But this is
not the case, and two reasons account for this fact.

First, the rationale is in part biblical conformity—Christ was born of a virgin, and so was
conceived aside from the usual biological workings of male and female partnership. Christ took
the flesh of the ancient race, but not the seed (of Adam), which makes flesh prior temporally and
ontologically. A reasoned opposing argument might well claim that Adam’s initial seed was pure
before its defilement in the Fall, given that Irenaeus makes no such distinction between Adam’s
flesh and his seed. Yet what differentiates Tertullian’s conception of the Adam-Christ connection
from that of Irenaeus is that Tertullian wants to take us one step further back—namely, before
the seed—insisting on the potentiality of the medium as opposed to the product (Adam) created
from that medium. Bringing together Genesis accounts of creation, Johannine pre-existence and
Jesus’ virgin birth, Tertullian continues in the passage:

But the whole of this new birth was prefigured, as was the case in all other instances, in
ancient type, the Lord being born as man by a dispensation in which a virgin was the
medium. The earth was still in a virgin state, reduced as yet by no human labour, with no
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seed as yet cast into its furrows, when, as we are told, God made man out of it into a
living soul.36
An analogy is set up—earth : soul :: virgin : Christ. In the first term of each set, we witness a
sense of place (earth/virgin) as virtual-potential to the actualizations that result from its
materiality (soul/Christ). Tertullian is indeed taking us to a place, but it is a place without a
place. We are in the Garden of Eden before humans are created, and it is in a “virgin state”; the
potentiality of sin, man and woman, are not yet created, and so there is no division between God
and his creation, no separation. This is as close to “pure life” as we are going to get, a world of
pure potentiality without the threat of lapsarian difference. Tertullian is here imagining a
phenomenology of fertile, divine space. This is not God’s place, but divine space itself. Jean Luc
Nancy’s meditations on the “giving place to the world” of the divine square nicely with this
paradox, given that by equating Christ with flesh, and reinscribing Christ at the initial act of
creation, Tertullian is here creating a new image of what creation is for the world, since the
world is now flesh,37 and further, since that fabric is, it turns out, what Tertullian will in the next
sentence call flesh itself. Flesh is virgin, unmarked by “labor,” but the materiality of this virgin
place does have tendencies, trajectories and behaviors; namely, it is geared towards the creation
of forms. Akin to Deleuze’s distinction between the molar and the molecular, or smooth and
striated space, Tertullian is able to protect Christ from the stultifying, world of formed bodies.
Christ must remain a transcendental condition of bodies, as it is this placement as flesh, without
the trajectory of a seed, protecting his generativity.

By refusing to grant Christ a human seed, naturally liable to decay and beholden to the normal
telos from life to death, Tertullian is in conversation with Stoic and Middle Platonic reflection on
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the spermatikoi logoi, or the plurality of generative logos. Tertullian is speaking to a crowd well
versed in the categories of Hellenistic reflection, and so, if Christ is to be equated with the logos,
then he will be essentially unable to take a final form. Chris’s task as logos is rather to remain
materially generative, but materially inchoate, for the spermatikoi logoi are the divine ether
organizing the world rather than being the world itself.38 This was no doubt Irenaeus’ concern as
well, a concern which led him to recapitulation—a fear lest Christ form into a final body, to be
ontologically protected.39 But Tertullian adds to Irenaeus an auto-generating property wherein he
is not dependent on the seed of another for his birth, a property that unbinds him from human
modes of production, and hence, manifestation. Rather, Christ is the place, the earth itself, from
which man is conceived, just as the virgin body of Mary was not dependent on male seed.
Tertullian continues:

As, then, the first Adam is thus introduced to us, it is a just inference that the second
Adam likewise, as the apostle has told us, was formed by God into a quickening spirit
out of the ground—in other words, out of a flesh which was unstained as yet by any
human generation. But that I may lose no opportunity of supporting my argument from
the name of Adam, why is Christ called Adam by the apostle, unless it be that, as man,
He was of that earthly origin? And even reason here maintains the same conclusion,
because it was by just the contrary operation that God recovered His own image and
likeness, of which He had been robbed by the devil. For it was while Eve was yet a
virgin, that the ensnaring word had crept into her ear which was to build the edifice of
death. Into a virgin’s soul, in like manner, must be introduced that Word of God which
was to raise the fabric of life.40
Thus it is established: Christ is a second Adam not by a sharing of Adam’s seed, but by the (i)
substance through which Adam was formed (earth-flesh); (ii) act of conception (not ex nihilo);
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and (iii) place of conception (virgin-life). Taken together, we can begin to see the body of Christ
being spread out ontologically. What is profound about Tertullian’s thought at this juncture is the
sheer exchangeability of Edenic place with the body of Christ, of flesh and life, of earth and
virgin, of one body with another. In Tertullian’s theorizations there is an interpretation of
materiality as always-already infused with spirit, but which had had the “edifice of death.”41 The
contrary operation that Tertullian refers to in the third sentence reveals the ontological slippage,
or exchangeability of operations, within the incarnation. The slippage revolves around two
operations. The first is familiar: God creates Adam from the earth, but death enters the earth
through the virgin Eve. Now the Whole is ruined by a Part. Referred to as the contrary
operation, God puts into a virgin Christ which is to “raise” the earth. Now the Whole is
redeemed by a Part. Crucial to this operation is the exchangeability of mediums. The earth from
which Adam was made must be in some way equivalent to the virginity of Mary.
What is at stake for Tertullian’s materialism, if we can tentatively call it that, is precisely what is
at stake for twentieth century materialist ontologies. As an organism, the human body inhabits
this flesh-earth, and any attempt to “raise” up the status of life must be understood as an attempt
to call attention to an element in brute material life that cannot be accounted for. In this raising
up, the organism is reconfigured, reconciled and transfigured. Bergson, Whitehead, Deleuze, and
more recently, the materialisms of Jane Bennett, Freya Mathews, David Abrams, to name but a
few, consistently appeal to the material/matter substratum to explain something about the human
body. It is as much a post-humanism as it is a pre-humanism. Tertullian’s spiritualizing of earth
and the appeal to matter for contemporary theorists, for whom the appeal to matter is less
spiritual than it is ecological, translates into a common materialist maxim—the health of the
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ground is the health of the organism. Though in a passage previously cited Tertullian does
equate flesh with body, he does not mean that the body, as we understand it today, is simply
flesh as he understood it then.42 Flesh was previously the defining attribute of the human, even
preexisting the infusion of soul. Flesh was for Tertullian the thing that Christ assumed. Yet when
Christ donned flesh, he united spirit and flesh. Christ is “one person in whom are conjoined two
substances.”43 While it is true, according to Geoffrey Dunn, that “What it means to be conjoined
in one person was not something that was investigated here any further,”44 it is not the case that
the outcome of Tertullian’s christology fails to affect how bodies are conceived. Since Christ
assumed flesh, and since it is established that the path to redemption is through Christ’s flesh,
flesh on the human body becomes equally an instrument of divinization. We put on the flesh of
Christ towards our divinity just as Christ put on the flesh of man towards his humanization. What
this material-spiritual relation between human flesh and Christ’s flesh establishes is the method
for thinking about the “true” site of Christian life. The true “site” is all of Life, since Christ is,
effectively, the “fabric of Life.” In essence, just as Irenaeus established through recapitulation a
transcendentalism of Christ, here we have the same idea though under the name of flesh. Christ
remains a conceptual persona in both instances, despite the slight modification. And since any
appeal to a transcendental in philosophical practice is likewise an appeal to the forms of life
conditioned by the transcendental, Tertullian’s christology by default establishes a new way of
conceiving divinely inspired bodies, a conception that will find expression in asceticism.

Below is a remarkable passage from De Carne Christi employing this logic:
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We have thus far gone on the principle, that nothing which is derived from some other
thing, however different it may be from that from which it is derived, is so different as
not to suggest the source from which it comes. No material substance is without the
witness of its own original, however great a change into new properties it may have
undergone. There is this very body of ours, the formation of which out of the dust of the
ground is a truth which has found its way into Gentile fables; it certainly testifies its own
origin from the two elements of earth and water—from the former by its flesh, from the
latter by its blood. Now, although there is a difference in the appearance of qualities (in
other words, that which proceeds from something else is in development different), yet,
after all, what is blood but red fluid? What is flesh but earth in a special form? 45
The power of the “element” in matter acts as the transcendental ground, or an empirical field
with properties, such that any alteration to it effects the forms it is generative of. The basic
constituent of material life neither corresponds to concrete materiality itself nor a purely spiritual
substance. The either/or or both/and properties of this flesh expresses the main thrust of the
incarnation. Irenaeus’ positioning of the body-ontology of Christ was an ingenious step in
personalizing the transcendental field of philosophy, such that appeals to it could be made with
more precision than would have been otherwise with an abstract field. The main difference
between late antiquity and contemporary thought lies between the personified materialisms of
Irenaeus and Tertullian and the abstract, or bodiless, materialisms of the twentieth century.

Flesh and Spirit

In Adversus Marcionem and Adversus Praxeas Tertullian speaks of the two substances of Christ:
flesh and spirit.46 These are inseparable: flesh is his human characteristic, while spirit is his
divine characteristic. Flesh is the “Son of man” (Irenaeus’ specific invention) and spirit is God.
God, however, is different in “person” (a term introduced by Tertullian), but one in substance.47
45
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Personhood is the manner in which distinction is made in the economy of the trinity. Distinction
in personhood allows Tertullian to avoid splitting the univocal substance of God. The problem is
in part Biblical, squaring John 3: 6, “that which is born in the flesh is flesh, and that which is
born of the Spirit is Spirit,” with Luke 1: 35, “Therefore that Holy Thing which shall be born of
thee shall be called the Son of God.” To be kept apart, flesh and spirit are nonetheless co-existent
in God’s nature, but not Christ’s. In Against Praxeas, Tertullian writes, “Neither the flesh
becomes Spirit, nor the Spirit flesh. In one Person they no doubt are well able to be coexistent.”48

Tertullian is wrestling with an old philosophical problem, Heraclitian in origin, a problem to
which our twentieth century materialities are still responding to—is change a valid attribute of
being? Does change ultimately destroy the purity of the original? In our present case, the
problem is recast in terms of substance—does God’s substance change when he takes human
form as Christ? If it does, he is no longer God. Irenaeus insisted that only things contingent could
change, due to their corruptibility, and that contingency marked the entrance of beings into time.
Contingency marked finitude just as finitude entails corruptibility. Tertullian, however, in a
section in Against Praxeas titled “The Word Clothed in Flesh,” draws somewhat different
conclusions. The specific instance that this philosophical problem assumes is trying to think
exactly how Christ donned human flesh, and it is related to the entrance of beings into time
because, properly speaking, Christ was an exception to the rule that objects which enter time
become corruptible.49 Indeed, Christ entered time and God, his divine part, remained
unchanged.50 As Bynum notes, it is a concern and a rejection of Aristotle’s definition of a thing
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or objecthood, which observes that “A thing that has changed ceases to be what it is and becomes
something else.”51 But God’s nature cannot be changed when he takes the form of Christ and
enters time, right?, Tertullian is asking himself. Marcion, a Gnostic to whom Tertullian is
devoting much energy, believes that Jesus cannot be fully divine for the very reason that should
God don human flesh, then God ceases to be God.
The problem of God’s nature remaining unchanged after he donned flesh was, after all, the crux
of the issue behind the exceedingly complex notion of “eternal generation.” Origen, writing after
Tertullian, is credited with introducing the concept of how something “begotten” could be truly
divine. Origen saw no conflict between God’s immutability and God’s incarnation: “But I
consider that there is no evening in God, nor any morning, but time coextensive, so to speak,
with his unbegotten and eternal life, in which the son was begotten.”52 As I have shown,
Irenaeus’ body ontology already placed Christ at the site of numerous temporalities (near,
immanent and end point). Origen finds it shocking and impious to imagine a time when the Son
was not. Recalling Tertullian’s attempts to remove Christ’s birth from the normal trajectory of a
seed to organism, Origen scoffs at any notion that the Son’s generation follows the lot of normal
animal acts: “It is impious and shocking to regard God the Father in the begetting of his onlybegotten Son and in the Son’s subsistence as being similar to any human being or other animal in
the act of begetting; but there must needs be some exceptional process…”53 Eternal generation is
that exceptional process. In other words, Christ is a concept used to rename something of the
divine activity in materiality. Christ allows it to be said that God has always already been acting
in the world. Creation was not a one-time act, but an immanent and ongoing affair. Ultimately,
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eternal generation dulls the teeth of a teleology in human life, namely in the sense that life is
infused with minor corrections in one’s life as opposed to a final judgment.
In the debates of the logos’ role in the trinity’s internal economy, we are also dealing with two
problems: (i) the question of the one vs. the many, or how unity can encompass diversity; also
the problem of univocity; and (ii) an ontological power struggle between God and Christ. Paul
Hinlicky correctly notes that for Origen, and for the problem in general, there is no eternal Father
without a necessary implication of an eternal Son.54 Though Origen was clear there was
“ontological subordination” in the divine life, nonetheless the difference in kind, not degree,
(which was the distinction between God, Spirit and Christ), created a problem of preserving the
power of a single divinity when it is identified with multiplicity.

To the first problem, addressing an audience skeptical of how this is not polytheism, or how real
difference is not introduced into the Godhead by distinctions in person, Tertullian in Against
Praxeas provides a creative solution: the division in the trinity actually supports unity.55
Difference is the highest expression of a single name for being. The trinity is actually unified in
the internal division because it is only Christ who can deliver the kingdom back to God,
therefore unifying God who ought to contain the All. God does not contain the All because of the
Fall —a break in the intimacy of divine unity, at least—as now enemies are free to roam.56
Tertullian relies heavily on the logic of recapitulation to prove Christ’s role in completing unity:
“The Son actually has to restore it entirely to the Father”57 so that God may “be all in all.” Inside
trinitarian dynamics there is a clear division of philosophical labor: the father and son are two
54
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separate “persons” because one subjected all things while it is to another to whom it is delivered.
At work in the notions of delivery, however, there is more than a distinction of labor identity. It
is a division of the process of redemption. If we recall a logic common to process theology,
namely that of an emphasis not on the substance but the accidents, occurrences and events
happening in the name of God, Tertullian’s Christ acts as an agent of the internal difference
within God. Christ gives movement to God, which allows him to encompass diversity. Christ’s
flesh is his materiality, and his spirit is an attribute of his flesh, which is his unity.

Christ can unify difference because he is, first and foremost, logos. The concept of logos as
world reason, stitching the cosmos together as a natural law, was frequently used in the
Hellenistic world, especially since for the Stoics the logos orders the world by setting matter in
motion and giving it form. For Plato, logos was a guide to true being, and was not pantheistic,
whereas the early Christian apologists actually combine elements of Stoicism and Platonic
philosophy.58 The Apostles creed has no mention of the logos doctrine, and John’s gospel leaves
unresolved the tension in the statements that the son is equal and the fact that the son is lesser
than God.59 Even as far as the middle of the second century, around 150, two views of Christ
existed: adoptionist (Arian; Gnostic) and pneumatic (Jesus was a heavenly spirit who assumed a
heavenly body).60 The use of the logos would thereafter, after the mid second century, be the
primary means through which Jesus was defined. For Tatian and Justin, writing decades before
Tertullian, God created the world out of his will with his logos, thereby keeping divine unity
through the generation of difference. For Tatian, the logos was a solution to an old Platonic
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problem, that of “overcoming the antithesis between unity and plurality.”61 In essence, the logos
doctrine allowed the early Christians to solve, in their own manner, the main philosophical
problem bequeathed to them by antiquity. Though Harnack, and later, Bultman, was one of the
harshest critics of the logos doctrine, once having said that it allowed the early theologians never
to have to mention the Jesus of history, he nonetheless admits that its conceptual flexibility
dampened the “speculative anxiety” that the early Christians had. In other words, it allowed them
to philosophize on an equal level with their Hellenistic peers.62 Logos could be creatively
appealed to in numerous situations, but most importantly, Christ-as-logos allows us to think of
God and life together.

To use the medieval notions of implicare and explicare, which will become crucial lenses in a
later chapter to understand the Christ concept, it can be said at this juncture that what the Son
does is explicate sinful humanity and at the same time implicate all of humanity toward a future
state: i.e., the son delivers, completing unity’s essential nature, but does so at the cost of altering
that unity so it can achieve a future state that was always-already. Therefore, the difference
inside the One is made possible by a creation of the One as it acts to gather the primordial unity.
As always with middle terms, Christ acts on two levels—ontologically and bodily. The logic is
repeated on the site of human materiality in such as way that the fragmentation and ensuing unity
of the Christ is a drama that occurs in our lives. As the Christ enters our most internal parts, as he
is with God, our naturally sinful selves become complete, our “parts” reassembled the moment
we reside in Christ. In De Anima, Tertullian writes: “every soul takes its status in Adam until it
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receives a new status ‘in Christ’; until then it is unclean; and sinful, because unclean, receiving
shame from association with the flesh.”63

The logic of fragmentation-completion, solved by implication-explication, is eagerly applied to
the gruesome deaths of the early martyrs so as to make sense of why these performances were so
important for the early Christian communities. Not only were the deaths of the martyrs
performative repetitions of the crucifixion act, it bespoke of a deep rite of passage for the ideal
Christian—to be lost and found again. According to Burrus, martyrdom is for Tertullian “the
quintessential transformative rite of Christians.”64 With their flesh scarred and burned, as was
Christ’s, human flesh became a site of social inscription, just as Christ’s crucifixion was equal
parts cosmological and social. Burrus continues, “In all this unspeakable suffering—in all this
carnal passion—the worthiness of the much-maligned flesh surfaces like a flush on skin brushed
by God’s loving touch.”65 Flesh can be sinful, messy, tears, spills, bleeds and is liable to
corruption, but because it is the very thing that God needed to assume for us to assume our
divinity, then flesh marks the transformation and site upon which glorious bodies are seen. In
fact, to speak of a sin of the flesh is to blame the tool for the master’s sin. Flesh becomes the
battle ground for eschatological peace. Departing from Paul, it is not the substance of flesh that
can sin for Tertullian, but its actions.66 Flesh is teachable, instructable—Christ would not have
descended otherwise. Tertullian writes in De Anima:

For although the flesh is sinful, and we are forbidden to walk according to the ‘flesh,’
and its ‘words’ are condemned as ‘lusting against the spirit,’ and on account of the flesh
men are censured as ‘carnal,’ which is a disgrace, yet there is nothing disgraceful about
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the flesh, as such. For by itself the flesh has neither sense nor feeling so as to urge or
command to sin. How could it? It is merely instrumental…67
Yet, in case one thinks flesh is merely given this spark of life by God, such is not the case.
Rather, the glory of flesh inheres in flesh itself. According to Burrus, flesh’s glory is “less a
power exercised over or against nature” than it is allowing to surface the divine qualities of lived
bodies.68 Ultimately, for Burrus, flesh is the shamelessly shameful site of the Christian paradox
regarding human embodiment and what the incarnation really means. What it really means is
that the human body, and what is done to it, is given a performative agency unparalled in the
ancient world. This body is inscribed by the social and political realities of injustice, religious
belief, the foundation of the state’s authority, and religious/ideological tolerance. While the body
remains an abstract entity, what is necessarily implied in performance is bodily movement.
Stillness, we must remember, is also a form of movement. I will now turn to one manner in
which the movement of the body is linked to the movement of the soul, since the paradigmatic
conceptualization of the body is that from the movement of the body we can sense the condition
of the soul—this perceptual hermeneutic is active in Athanasius and can even be found in Da
Vinci’s theorization of the painted figure, over a millennium later. In his accounting of the birth
of the body, Tertullian borrows from the earliest Stoics a belief that the body comes to be when
the pneuma enters the body’s limbs, giving it movement, shape and soul. It is this alliance with
limbs and souls that will eventually find expression in ascetic literature.

Compression and Recapitulation
In De Anima, Tertullian argues outright for the corporeality of the soul: “Yet we will not hesitate
to assert that the more usual marks of corporeality, which are completely inseparable from that
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condition, are found also in the soul: such attributes as shape and definition, and the three
dimensions of length, breadth, and height, by which scientists measure bodies…”69 And in De
carne Christi he writes, “The soul, in my opinion, is sensual. Nothing, therefore, pertaining to
the soul is unconnected with sense, nothing pertaining to sense is unconnected with the soul. And
if I may use the expression for the sake of emphasis, I would say, ‘Animœ anima sensus est’—
‘Sense is the soul’s very soul’” (xii). Musing on the Genesis account of God breathing life into
Adam (Gen. 2:7), and clearly borrowing from Stoic conceptions of birth, Tertullian draws an
interesting distinction between the activity of soul and body, which can further help us
understand their intimate relationship:

Surely all the breath passed straightway through the face into the inner parts, and was
diffused through all the spaces of the body; and at the same time it was compressed by
the divine breathing and was moulded by every feature within and hardened, as it were,
in a shape. Hence therefore the corporeality of the soul was solidified by compression,
and its appearance formed by a moulding process.70
On this account, the body’s landscape provides a captive device and resonating feature that takes
its hardened shape from the soul’s infusion. Likewise, Philo and the Stoics, the latter some five
centuries previous to Tertullian, equated the soul with pneuma (‘breath’), conceiving this breath
to infuse the body to its most extreme regions.71 The soul capitalizes on the internal plumbing of
the body (“surely all the breath passed straightway through the face into the inner parts”),
adapting itself to the body’s idiosyncrasies, given that the body appears to pre-exist its shape.
But even more remarkable are the affinities with the Stoic notion of tonos (tension).
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According to the pupil of Zeno, considered the founder of Stoicism, Cleanthes held a notion of
tonos—defined as “a blow of fire”—which is akin to the harmonization of the cosmos by
Christ.72 For the Stoics, this blow of fire exists in the human soul, and in the soul it is the
physical cause of the virtues. But tonos also plays a cosmological role. The origin of the cosmos
is due to the tonos in the matter of the universe.73 Cleanthes’ use of tonos comes to us in
fragments and we cannot construct it reliably given the texts. However, the basic import of tonos
is the “stretching of a cord,” because only a stretched cord makes a noise when plucked. Tension
is the property of a body that produces a harmonious sound. The beauty of this sound indicates a
harmonious state of being, whether in the body or cosmos. Irenaeus’ insistence that Christ not
only descended but descended at an opportune time, recalls the concerns of cosmic harmony so
important to Stoics and Christians. Irenaeus writes, “Where there is composition there is melody;
where there is melody it is at the right time; where there is the right time, there is benefit.”74
Christ’s benefit was that he finished the composition of humanity, striking earth at just the right
time, retroactively rendering it, and all that came before him, melodious.

Tonos is a quality of pneuma. For Chrysippus, pneuma is a substance that permeates the cosmos,
giving it life, just as it makes a living man whole.75 Cosmologically, pneuma provides unity and
quality; for nature, nutrition and growth; for soul, sensation and movement; for mind, logos or
rationality. Pneuma has a motion with two phases: into itself and out of itself. “The state of the
pneuma in this activity is sometimes called tension (tonos).” The actual movement of in and out
can be termed tonic or tensional movement (tonos); the inward movement produced cohesion,
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unity and being, while the outward movement causes dimensions or qualities.76 In Tertullian’s
passage, the movement that forms the body utilizes both directions. Divine breath enters through
the face, expanding and contracting the outer skin of a pre-existing flesh, and then, once it took
shape, the soul was formed when it hardened. The soul’s corporeality did not mould the body,
but the reverse. The breath was molded by the body’s features, i.e., its limbs and members. The
soul has a distinctive shape, and this shape is allied to the body.
Not just a body, but the body’s members are saturated with soul. Just as we are all members of
the larger body of Christ, so too are our body’s members expressing the soul in our bodies.
Further complicating the sense of a soul entering a body, Tertullian layers on the concept of
discipline to the soul, thereby bringing the ascetic logic of performance closer into view. In De
Anima, the soul has a power of choice, which is a property of our nature. That property is defined
by its freedom, which is the ability for our will to change our nature through its own “selfdetermination.”77 So, we can conclude that if the soul is necessarily implicated in the members of
the body, then we can perhaps reverse the logic and conclude that the body’s members can
indeed affect the soul. Which is exactly what Tertullian means when he says that the “natural
properties of the soul…advance and develop with it [the body] from the moment when it
acquires its being.”78 Though the soul is of a single substance, it is liable to vicissitudes over
periods of time, for as with God’s personhood, alteration of mode does not equal change of
substance, and so therefore the question of the ethics of these modalities, a question close to
Spinoza in his Ethics, will be inevitable.79 Movements of the body, therefore, are indicative of
higher or lower states of the soul. When centuries later in The Life of Antony, Athanasius speaks
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of viewing the soul through the members of the body, he is channeling Tertullian’s corporeal
movement.

Earth, Ground, Life, Flesh
I began with a story of Brooklyn artist Andres Serrano’s Piss Christ and Eleanor Heartney’s
claim that something very Catholic resides in 60’s and 70’s performance art. According to
Heartney, the catholic imagination, expressed in an incarnational consciousness, sees not only
body and soul as one, but has fetishized bodily disfiguration, dismemberment, masochism, and
self inflicted torture of all stripes.80 Heartney is not alone in her thinking, and the point hardly
needs to be made that there is a strand of morbidity and violence, self-inflicted or not, in
Christianity’s history.81 Tertullian’s christology, however, is an early resource for thinking about
the social and political power ascribed in and around the human body. Though ascetic
hagiography and literature, not to mention Christian history as whole, is replete with
glorifications of bodily dismemberment, blood and leper’s pus, Tertullian does not take his
language into glorifying the transcendently abject nature of the body. Or does he? In fact, for
Tertullian what is “wonderful” about the “abject” flesh of Christ is that it is precisely not
supernatural, not heavenly, not shimmering with divinity.82 What is remarkable is that Christ’s
flesh is “infirm,” “not honorable,” “disordered,” “ruined,” “sinful” and “condemned.”83 It is a
miracle for Tertullian that Christ’s body was abject, which, for Tertullian, proves the very
materiality of the incarnation. De carne Christi reads:
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But if there had been in Him any new kind of flesh miraculously obtained (from the
stars), it would have been certainly well known. As the case stood, however, it was
actually the ordinary condition of His terrene flesh which made all things else about Him
wonderful, as when they said, Whence has this man this wisdom and these mighty
works?... His body did not reach even to human beauty, to say nothing of heavenly
glory...The sufferings attested His human flesh, the contumely proved its abject
condition.84
Tertullian is unique because his thought at one and the same time speaks of the renewed vitality
of material life (earth/flesh), but also of its abject nature. The multivalence of flesh will be
characteristic of Athanasius’ thought as well, thanks in part to Tertullian.

Tertullian conceives flesh as the instrumental center of parallel and equivalent processes:
personal and cosmic redemption. As flesh, our materiality shares in the life of Christ. As flesh,
Christ embodied the form of the accursed so that the curse would be no longer. Building upon
Irenaeus’ concept of recapitulation wherein Christ is said to have assumed all of humanity,
“summing” it up in his body, Tertullian established Christ as a fabric of life through which all is
bound: the concept of Christ reorganized the manner in which to view God and humanity,
allowing them to be thought together. Using the term “flesh” to designate this fabric of life,
Tertullian indicates that the ubiquity of flesh is symptomatic of what the incarnation means. To
be able to find flesh everywhere, to be in it and to think through it in theological terms—this is
the ubiquity of the flesh. Flesh’s all encompassing embrace of life is but one result of the
ontological body of Christ.

By calling attention to the transfigurative power of flesh, Tertullian begins a discussion of
process materiality that continues to this day. Tertullian’s appeal to the processes embedded
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within flesh calls forth a logic of implication and explication in which the health of the ground is
the health of the organism. The appeal of Deleuze to the virtual provided the same solution to the
same problem—the incarnation was a concept that increased the virility of that ground, and
Christ was the agent of reformation. Tertullian endorses the logic of implication/explication, “No
material substance is without the witness of its own original, however great a change into new
properties it may have undergone.”85 By equating Christ with earth, Tertullian is calling attention
to our own partaking of that materiality, since “What is flesh but earth in a special form?,” asks
Tertullian. 86 Because they are formed of the earth, the appeal to the earth is actually an appeal to
bodies, and the equation of an earth with a body is made possible through the body ontology of
the conceptual persona of Christ, set up by Irenaeus. In becoming the fabric of the All, and in
encompassing diversity through his body, Christ is a univocal body, which is but another
expression of recapitulation and the power of the conceptual persona established by Irenaeus—
all things are said of Christ and in Christ. As we shall see with the ascetic literature in chapter
four, the ascetic body was likewise a univocal body, able to embody a universal power in the
Christian imagination.

Earth and ground have been used interchangeably in this analysis, but more precision is needed.
Tertullian is not, strictly speaking, fixing the ground, but trying to envision—trying to spread the
good news, as it were—a new image of the body’s relation to its external surroundings, i.e., to
life. It is the relation between the living and life. Eugene Thacker says it eloquently when he
defines life as “that concept which is necessary in order to think the living,” and in the case of
Tertullian Christ-as-life is that concept to which he turns in order to rethink the living. Christ is
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not just an ontological ground, but an amalgam of ontological ground and virtual body. This
amalgam will prove decisive for asceticism.

Tertullian’s conception of flesh is the second philosophical operation in the construction of the
Christ persona. Tertullian is a transitional figure between Irenaeus and Athanasius for a number
of reasons. First, Tertullian materializes and transcendentalizes the recapitulated body of Christ.
Christ is not just the body at the end of time, but the enchanted materiality that always-already
was, is and will be. Flesh becomes a medium and a concept in which to reinvent and re-think the
human. Second, by focusing on the medium of exchange between God and man, Tertullian
sketches an outline for a christology of becoming; Christ becoming body, body becoming Christ,
and all on the common substrate of flesh. This is not to say that transcendence and the eternal
stasis of God are not products of christology as well. That is undoubtedly true. Rather, there may
inhere in christology a seldom recognized trajectory towards becoming. It will be argued in the
following two chapters that this trajectory finds expression in the ascetic body, not to mention
the martyr, saint and mystic within the Christian tradition. This is not a “reversal of christology,”
but the attempt to find within christology trajectories and resources that have created some of the
most powerful bodies in Western Christianity.
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Chapter 3

The Whole and the Part: Athanasius’
Ontological Movement in On the Incarnation

Abstract

In this treatment of Athanasius’ On the Incarnation, our focus will be on the
metaphors and imagery of “ontological movement,” as it is borrowed both from
Stoic ontology, medical literature and from ancient philosophy. It will be argued
that the effective and sometimes cosmological power given to the ascetic body
in Life of Antony, which is a later text, is a direct result of the logic of the
whole/part that Athanasius utilizes in the earlier On the Incarnation. This
chapter is therefore a close reading of a specific logic in On the Incarnation,
while the following chapter concerns how this logic is applied to ascetic texts
and discourse. The overall logic of the whole/part argument as it relates to
ontological movement can be summed up as follows: creation is moved in the
advent of Christ. God moves creation, including his own nature, when a preexisting part splinters (or is begotten) from the whole in the hopes of bringing
the parts back together again.
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Introduction

“What must be the nature of parts which can in some way
contain or express the whole within itself?”
Gottfried Leibnitz
“Events are the foam of things, but what I am
interested in is the sea.”
Paul Valery

In the two epigraphs, Gottfried Leibnitz and Paul Valery are interested in the same relation, but
ask the question from different aspects of the problem. Leibnitz asks how a part can express the
whole, and he is subtly critiquing Spinoza’s emphasis on unity to the detriment of the particular,
or difference. Rather than ask about how the whole can become a part, to which Spinoza posited
his theory of the modulation of substance, Leibnitz asks how the part can express the whole. It is
important to note in this terminology that while the whole becomes a part, the part expresses a
whole. This difference in language indicates a subtle metaphysical relation, which, it will be
argued here, has an analogous relation in the body itself and the way the body moves. In short,
because the body’s limbs express the body’s will, and because for much of the ancient world the
universe was a giant body, the language one finds in metaphysics is conditioned by the body
itself—this is at least the conclusion of the following chapter. This chapter, however, does more
than just point out this fact—that philosophy is based upon an image of the body—but articulates
precisely how this relation works in the christology of Athanasius, one of the chief architects of
the “orthodox” understanding of the incarnation.

The idea of a part expressing the whole is a different question than that of the whole becoming a
part. The former is more profound when one realizes how seldom the question is articulated in
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the history of philosophy and theology. Paul Valery’s language of the “sea” entertains an interest
in the whole, and Valery in a few lines succinctly summarizes Deleuze’s metaphysics with the
appropriate language of waves, foam and the univocity of the sea. Waves are actualizations of
the water, and the water, which is the virtual, cannot help but produce waves. Water and waves
co-define each other in tides of energy transformation. The whole becomes parts in a seamless
fashion, as if that is precisely the function of the whole (to divide itself in an eternal return), and
the parts are nothing but transient formations of the whole, as if it is in their nature to dissolve
and become the sea once again. One could rewrite the history of philosophy according to the
contours of the whole/part relation, up to and including the post-structuralist concern for
difference and a materially infused metaphysics. Remarkably, through the prism of the
whole/part problem one can interpret diversity, multiplicity, being, God, nature, unity, social
ontology, ethics and many other foundational concepts in the history of philosophy.

But what about the whole/part problem in relation to Christ? And christology? What will be the
contribution here is how the whole/part problem finds itself worked out in the logic of the
incarnation, where a part (Christ), through its incarnation, fixes the whole (unifies God) and the
parts (creates harmony). To call up once again a simple definition of immanence—as the quality
of an action beginning and ending inside an agent—Christ as a philosophical concept makes it
possible to think this type of immanence. Christ brings a quality of an action (immanent
causality) and, at the same time, makes it possible to think of God as an agent in which Christ
“works.” The part effects the whole, makes it possible to think the whole, and/or renders it
possible to conceive of God as a totality. In other words, Christ makes the incarnate God
thinkable. Immanent causality makes it possible to think (divine) immanence. God doesn’t
incarnate Christ, but Christ renders God thinkable. Moreover, while the language of God as
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eternal being and transcendent entity is predominant in late ancient christology, if one reverses
the perspective with the idea that Christ makes God possible, then God, it turns out, becomes a
quality of action within immanence. In order to argue this point, a logic first needs to be distilled.

The purpose of distilling the logic will be heuristic, a device for determining how Athanasius
will understand the ascetic body, and the phrase ontological movement will name how the ascetic
body becomes embedded within the discourse of cosmological harmony. Firstly, the word
“ontological” is here employed because of its affinities with the study of the nature of being.
Secondly, ontological movement refers to the effectuation of a new configuration of the
“cosmos.” Thirdly, ontological movement refers to the ability of the Christ body to invent and
reinvent a new ground of being.

The properties of ontological movement, once attributes of Christ, will be then applied to the
ascetic body. This being said, this and the following chapter are divided by a division of labor.
This chapter is a close reading of Athanasius’ relatively early text, On the Incarnation, while the
following chapter will focus on his Life of Antony. It will be argued that On the Incarnation
provides the fundamental insight for how to interpret the supernatural and heroic qualities of the
ascetic body in the Life of Antony, as well as in other ascetic texts.

This is the third late ancient thinker to be taken up. The thought of Irenaeus and Tertullian have
already been addressed, and specific attention was paid to a concept of Christ that will find its
expression in Athanasius. What is relevant to Athanasius’ Christ, since there are many different
articulations of the Christ concept in the ancient world, is how this concept of Christ would be
applied to ascetic bodies. This is the strategy in this genealogy. Since we began with Deleuze and
Guattari’s notion of conceptual personae, and since it is the trait of conceptual personae to create
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modalities of life, here and especially in the following chapter we discover the modality of life
(asceticism) created by the Christ personae. It is well known that Athanasius is one of the early
architects of ascetic theory, having penned the first hagiography, and his characterization of
monastics as “imitations” from the “pattern” of Christ has been well documented.1 The specific
contribution here is not only the relevance of his christology to his anthropology, but 1) the
specific vision he brings to the human body that has its origin in his christology, i.e., his
description of Christ in On the Incarnation, and 2) the manner in which this concept related to
Stoic ontology and the second century medical literature of Galen. More specifically, the manner
in which Athanasius links co-creation and recapitulation is responsible for one of his lasting
contributions to late ancient theology: Christic causality.

Universe as a Body

The idea that the universe is a body not uncommon in the ancient world, and one is able to find
the thought in Pythagoras, the Eleatics and the Stoics, among others. It is equally common to
encounter the idea that the human body is a microcosm of the universe as a whole, and Genesis’
language of man being made in the “image” of God testifies to its historical authenticity. Less
common is the belief that since the universe is a body, and since the human is a microcosm, then
the microcosm ought to be able to influence, or effect, the universe. This is what will be termed
ontological movement. As it turns out, this is precisely how Athanasius conceptualized the Christ
figure—as being able to effect the cosmos, both in the sense of creating anew, altering and
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influencing. Of course, when Christ moved his arm Athanasius did not mean that the distant stars
physically moved, as might the Butterfly effect of contemporary quantum mechanics assert.
Rather, what is insinuated is that Christ was a system, and that any alteration in one part
registered an effect elsewhere. Athanasius’ insistence on Christ’s central role in creation and
redemption allowed him to create what will be termed here Christic causality. Christ is an agent
working within the universe, and in his actions Christ is making a specific articulation of the
universe possible for the first time.

Athanasius

Born in C.E. 298 in Alexandria, Athanasius is one of the most important architects of Trinitarian
thought in the history of Christian theology, and the history and theology of the fourth century
will be forever dominated by the figure of Athanasius.2 What makes Athanasius such a dominant
figure in fourth century theology is not necessarily the originality of his ideas, since others before
him had understood salvation in a similar manner, but, according to David Gwynn, “the clarity of
his vision and the power of his language.”3 More than for any other thinker, the incarnate Christ
is the center of Athanasius’ thought, as was flesh for Tertullian, and his christology will provoke
the foundational dispute between his chief opponents, the Arians, a political dispute enveloping
the years between Nicaea and Chalcedon, and a philosophical dispute over the nature of the
Logos; in other words, it is a debate on the identity of Christ.4 For Peter Leithart, Athanasius
writes through the Christ persona and the cross: “It is all about Christ. It is a Christic
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metaphysics. Even when Athanasius is exploring the nature of created reality, the cross and the
Christ of the cross remain in the forefront of his mind.”5
Athanasius will understand Christ’s role in creation and salvation in the same manner as
Irenaeus. Like Irenaeus, Christ’s status as recapitulated being (salvation) works in strict
conjunction with his status as pre-existent logos (creation). Early in his On the Incarnation,
penned when Athanasius was just thirty-seven years of age, he writes: “There is thus no
inconsistency between creation and salvation; for the One Father has employed the same Agent
for both works, effecting the salvation of the world through the same Word Who made it in the
beginning.”6 Before time at the creation of the world and in time during our tenure in the world,
Christ works simultaneously, as the same agent in both instances. The whole/part relation is
easily inscribed on this schema, and Athanasius will do it himself. Christ as a quasi-figure of the
whole finds himself embedded in the parts during creation, and yet, during the incarnation,
Christ who is now a part expresses a fundamental truth about the whole, correcting it in his
power.
Athanasius’ On the Incarnation contains the fundamental insight elucidated in his later writings,
and so this text may in fact not be “a boyish performance of an unripe theologian,” but an early
and courageous attempt to think, a grasping in the dark for a concept to bring the Christ concept
a rigor previously unseen.7 But what is the main problem for Athanasius? What is at stake? What
is at stake was the human fact of corruption, and how Christ made incorruptibility of the body
possible. Between corruptibility and the potential of incorruptibility Athanasius will have to
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create a concept rendering this infusion of incorruptibility possible. Christ is that concept—
Christ is not the whole nor the part, but allows for a new articulation of their relation possible.
God does not send Christ so God can become incarnate, as that is a statement of faith. Rather,
Christ makes the concept of the incarnate God possible. Without question, On the Incarnation
belongs in the genre of apologetic writing, a genre according to Timothy Barnes already
outmoded when Athanasius is a boy.8 However, if the purpose of apologetics is to show that
“belief in Christ is not unreasonable,” then much of theology is apologetic. More to the point,
Athanasius’ apologetic is a work of speculative christology. Since, according to Pelikan Jaroslav,
who is citing Gregory of Nyssa but which equally applies here, “It was the task of speculative
thought to render the sublime ordering of the universe as cosmos generally intelligible,” then
Athanasius is clearly engaging in a cosmologically oriented speculation.9 Writes Pelikan, “For it
was axiomatic that order was preferable to disorder and anarchy.”10 What is unique about
Athanasius’ speculation, and which marks christology as a uniquely figural discourse, is the fact
that Athanasius is making the “cosmos generally intelligible” through Christ: the conceptual
persona of Christ is allowing for an intelligible cosmos. Christ gives it rationality, structures its
being and guides its telos.11 The universe is intelligible through Christ because of the simple fact
that for Athanasius the universe was literally made through Christ (co-creation).

The Fall from Contemplation

Like the thinkers before him, the Fall for Athanasius was an act of the will that brought death
and corruption to the body. Brakke sums it up nicely: “According to Athanasius, the original
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human beings fell when they allowed their souls to be destabilized by the impulses of the body,
including fear, and Christ enabled subsequent human beings to resist the passions when he
extinguished them in the flesh that he assumed.”12 Akin to Tertullian’s biological fears of bodily
disintegration, for Athanasius death is constantly spoken of in combination with bodily
corruption. While intimately related, death and corruption do not correspond. “But if they [Adam
and Eve] went astray and became vile, throwing away their birthright of beauty, then they would
come under the natural law of death and live no longer in paradise, but, dying outside of it,
continue in death and in corruption.”13 Because we fell out of contemplation of God, we lost our
beauty and became corrupted, carrying death like the plague (Athanasius refers to this death-state
as “non-existence”). One is corrupted while living under the law of death. Corruptibility is a state
of the body while death is an existential fact.
Christ is an agent of God incarnated so as to allow humans to enter new life, freed from the “law
of death.” According to Athanasius, destabilized by the impulses of the body, the soul became
corrupted and because Christ himself opened up an ontological opportunity (Christ was more
than just a teacher), others could follow suit in their own resistance to the passions. The
ramifications of the impulses of the body for his Life of Antony, and how the ascetic life is an
attempt to tame the impulses, already makes clear that it is through the body that the soul’s purity
is won. Though we fell from Eden through a lack of contemplation, it is not through more
contemplation that we enter again. One must purify the will by first purifying the body.

Therefore, returning to this Edenic state entails a disciplining of the will through the body, and
Christ’s performance on earth was for Athanasius the exhibition of the required discipline. Yet
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Christ’s life was much more than just a model of ideal activity, since for Athanasius “God
became man so that man might become God.”14
The Arian Christ could not lead humankind “behind the veil and into the divine fellowship
because he is not part of it, since, in the end, there is no divine fellowship to be part of.”15 Part of
the strategy for articulating the “divine fellowship” was through a concept of Christ as co-creator
and con-substantial with God. Eager to differentiate himself from the Arian position of the
created son and sanctification by human virtue, Athanasius makes it clear the son is eternal, consubstantial with the Father, and that humans benefited immanently from his incarnation.
Moreover, another reason for insisting on co-creation was the claim, which would have
distinguished Christianity from classical theories of the origin of the cosmos, that God did not
need an instrument in the creative act.16 Christ was not an instrument if he was co-present and
eternally begotten. Christ made our participation in the divine life immanent. But how exactly
was this possible? What philosophical tools made this notion of immanence believable?

Recapitulation, Flesh and Substitution
It was by surrendering to death the body which He had taken, as an offering and
sacrifice free from every stain, that He forthwith abolished death for his human brethren
by the offering of the equivalent. For naturally, since the Word of God was above all,
when He offered His own temple and bodily instrument as a substitute for the life of all,
He fulfilled in death all that was required. 17
According to this passage, in his sacrifice Christ was both an “equivalent” and substitute of the
“life of all.” A substitution by equivalence—this is the essence of recapitulation. Furthermore,
this equivalence is more than just an abstract formulation of one body completing other bodies,
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as it was with Irenaeus. Athanasius relies on a more subtle use of flesh when he speaks of the
“bodily instrument.” Tertullian equated flesh with the fabric of life, and Athanasius is using the
general thrust of Tertullian’s materialist notion when he speaks of substitution. According to
Burrus, Athanasius requires that we “imagine the Logos and flesh of Christ, life-sustaining Word
and otherwise-moribund body, as intimately interwoven, almost as two aspects of the same
entity—‘a life wound closely to a body’ and a ‘body wound closely to life.’”18 Through this
mutual equation of life and body, of body implicated in life and life in body, we can through the
Christ figure account for the totality of existence. To think Christ as equated with existence is
therefore to conceptualize Christ as a figure of univocity. The Christ is said of difference (the all)
without being identified with difference (substitute). Athanasius observes, “He is still Source of
life to all the universe, present in every part of it, yet outside the whole.”19 Christ does not simply
transcend the material world, which he does do, but is “present in every part of it.” Christ is in
the parts of creation as rationality, frame, essence, pattern, image, archetype and impress.

When Athanasius links the end with the beginning (co-creating logos with recapitulation), as
Irenaeus does, Christ is not a dramatic historical introduction, but rather the constant presence of
an agent accompanying history. And it is worth noting that Gregory of Nyssa will link beginning
and end as well in his own version of a Christic metaphysics.20 What Athanasius is doing is reconceptualizing the incarnation. No longer is the incarnation a single act of God, but the state of
the world that has always been, that was always-already: “For this purpose, then, the incorporeal
and incorruptible and immaterial Word of God entered our world. In one sense, indeed, He was
not far from it before, for no part of creation had ever been without Him Who while ever abiding
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in union with the Father, yet fills all things that are.”21 For Burrus, this Christ is a “proper
inhabitant of a realm of inexhaustible space, located but everywhere and nowhere.”22 Christ is
not just immanent before the Fall or after the Fall, before the crucifixion or after the
crucifixion—Christ simply is the transcendental ground upon which the drama of the whole and
the parts unfold.23

Ontological Movement and the Logic of the Transfer
“He is before all things, and in him all things hold together.”
Col. 1:17
Stephen Davis asks the perennial question central to Athanasius’ christological system: “How are
the effects of the Word’s deification of his own human body actually conveyed to humanity as a
whole?...What facilitates this salvific transaction for Athanasius?”24 Davis is correct to note
Athanasius simply assumes the “transaction” works, and for the answer one must look rather to
his cosmology, though it is possible that Athanasius may have gotten his “exchange formula”
from Clement.25 As we shall see, Athanasius will utilize a shared transcendentalism of the flesh
initially spearheaded by Tertullian. Athanasius will call it a “kinship” of the flesh. Virginia
Burrus, in more a contemporary bio-religious idiom, calls this immanent transaction a “sacred
blood transfusion” and a “sublime metabolic process.”26 The logic of the transfer—how humans
benefit from Christ’s death?—is extremely complex. And according to Brakke, the ultimate
rationale for the transfer of the Word’s incorruptibility to other human bodies’ potential remains
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“unclear.”27 However, as we have seen, it does seem to be the case that the “kinship of the flesh,”
which is the matrix of our relation with Christ, relies heavily on the thought of Irenaeus and
Tertullian.

To begin, Athanasius recalls a logic that Irenaeus relied on repeatedly—because it was through a
tree that we became corrupt, it is through a tree that we can become incorrupt. The second tree
cancels out the first. Athanasius also utilizes classical metaphors of debt repayment, fulfillment
and exchange for understanding how this transfer of potentiality happens. Irenaeus and
Athanasius are clear that there is no penal substitution, i.e., the formulation that God punished
Jesus with death in order to pay the penalty for sin. Athanasius does speak of “debt” but it is not
sin but death itself which receives the payment from Christ so that we may conquer death.
Because of Adam’s transgression, we are all liable to death, and so Christ pays this primal debt. 28

As expected, the notion of immanent causality plays a crucial role for Athanasius in the payment
of this primal debt, but what is remarkable is how it is thought. For Athanasius, immanent
causality is necessarily linked to co-creation—“He both fashioned essential being and restored to
health the thing that he had formed.”29 On the one hand, restoring and fashioning is the language
of immanent redemption caused by the agent of Christ. On the other hand, Christ can do so
because he is immanently present in each being by virtue of co-creation (“the thing that he had
formed)”. Co-creation authorized Christ’s immanent acts. Christ was the same agent working in
both operations. This linking of co-creation and immanent causality is one of the major
conceptual innovations of Athanasius, and his ability to slide effortlessly between the two
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highlights the power of his vision for which he became famous.30 Proverbs 8:22, a crucial text
for co-creationist/pre-existence theologians, reads, “The Lord possessed me in the beginning of
his ways, before he made anything from the beginning.” What is “revolutionary” about
Athanasius’ understanding of Proverbs 8:22, according to R.P.C Hanson, is that Athanasius
“insists that its terms apply to the incarnate, not the pre-existent Christ.”31 In other words,
Athanasius’ interpretation of Proverbs 8:22 saw no difference between the pre-existent Christ
and the incarnate Christ. Though Hanson calls Athanasius’ interpretation “ridiculously farfetched,” it does reveal the main concern of Athanasius, which is to locate Christ’s “activity” in
his incarnate body and not in his pre-existence.32 Of course, Christ’s activity is very much part of
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his pre-existence, and the pre-existent Christ is crucial for Athanasius, yet it is mainly what preexistence authorizes that is of main importance to Athanasius. Co-creation and pre-existence are
concepts deployed to justify Christ’s immanent and redemptive causality in the world.

What Athanasius desires is a Christ that is fully identified with material life yet virtually
separated from it. Daniel Wilson observes, “In order to redeem humanity, Christ must be
transcendent and ontologically separate from the creation, being the “Creator” God who has the
ability to re-create the image and likeness in humanity.”33 Yet, as we have seen, Christ is both
fully identified with life and virtually separated from it. Athanasius wants an incarnate Christ
able to descend at will, a Christ present in the parts and in the whole, and able to enter the parts.
Co-creation is the specific solution to the problem of the latter, and it solves the ability to enter
the parts at will. Moreover, in a remarkable twist, co-creation is a type of causality that has as
its main application immanent causality. In other words, though there is a quasitranscendentalism of Christ’s status of co-creation, reminiscent of the demiurge and or the
mythos of the Timaeus, here Christ does retain that transcendental status yet its main application,
or what it accomplishes, is immanent causality. This is why co-creation is a transcendentalism
and not a transcendence, if by the transcendental we invoke Kant’s classical usage, namely as the
condition of possibility of existence. For instance, existence requires as its condition of
possibility a co-creating Christ, and so therefore within the forms of life a Christic element
remains.

Christ was God incarnate—this is what Athanasius assumes. Yet this is to believe in the
existence of a Christian God, which this text does not. God did not make Christ, nor create the
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incarnation. Christ, as a philosophical concept, made the thought of an incarnate God possible.
Christ made Christian immanence possible.

Rehabilitated from Greek philosophy, co-creation is a concept designed not only to allow Christ
into the world (the incarnation), but to give him power to adjust the fabric of that world. Because
co-creation accounts for how Christ can embody material forms, co-creation implies an aesthetic
principle. Christ is somehow embedded within the diversity of forms found in nature and human
experience. If Irenaeus sought to place Christ at the center of an ontological system, and if
Tertullian sought to enflesh the world with the flesh of Christ, then Athanasius’ investment in the
incarnation is about creating a consistent principle between creation and salvation—it is the same
operation when Christ created the world as when he effects salvation in our own bodies.
Tertullian provided a transcendentalism of the flesh analogous, or at the very least implicit, to
Athanasius’ understanding of the flesh. Christ as both identified with the whole of creation and
its condition of possibility is theoretically analogous to Tertullian’s conceptualization of flesh.
We can say of Christ for Athanasius what Michael Hardt says of the general contours of flesh in
the Christian tradition: “Flesh is the condition of possibility of the qualities of the world, but it is
never contained within or defined by those qualities.”34

Because Christ envelops humanity and the cosmos, cosmological creation and redemptive
creation must be univocal—that is, it must be spoken of in the same name. In other words, in our
world there is an immanent, cosmological cause which acts in the same manner as it did in the
creation of the world. The body ontology of Irenaeus supplied the qualifications for this first
positioning of Christ as transcendental figure containing all while not being identified with the
all (recapitulation). Recapitulation provided the language of universal inclusion, correction, and
34
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perfection. Wilson again, “Christ must also immanently identify with humanity in order to join
it, redeem it, and as the perfect substitute pay its debt of sin and death, which humanity incurred
at the Fall.”35 In this instance, substitution is but a variant of the language of recapitulation.
Athanasius repeatedly returns to Christ’s extreme intimacy and extreme exteriority to illustrate
his vision. What Athanasius will gain from this placement of Christ as source of whole
(exteriority) and presence in part is not a dual understanding of Christ as human and divine; that
it does achieve this is hardly worth noting. More profound is the morphological flexibility, to
borrow a phrase from Manual Delanda, attributed to Christ in virtue of this unique ontological
position: (i) he can assume any part without fear of being equated with it because he is
generative source; (ii) he is source of all and thereby can’t be accused of being distant from
creation. This morphological flexibility is also his immanent power—the ability to at once
activate a singular part, be present in that part, all the while remaining the “source” of that part.
One could use another term originating with Aristotle—hylomorphic—though this term is
frequently found in the literature on medieval angelology to denote their specific ability to act in
form alone without the use of a body.36 Christ is hylomorphic not in the sense of not having a
body, but of being able to act in form by virtue of assuming all forms. Perhaps an apt way to
describe this christology is transfigurative—across all figures in the sense of containment—and
for obvious reasons recapitulation remains a crucial component in the notion.

Christ is not a body outside the parts, but is, strictly speaking, the image and activity of the parts
fitting together. One should recall here the Stoic notion of tonos, or tension, which holds the
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cosmos together in the movements of expansion and contraction.37 Harmony of parts is the goal
of Athanasius’ Christ, just as Irenaeus understood the salvation of all the world in musical terms.
Leithart observes, “As Logos, the Son is the framer and arranger of the creation, and the fact that
there is harmony in the creation is testimony that it was framed “logically,” that is, by the
Logos.”38 By harmony one should hear inflections of immanence, since harmony was for the
Stoics a state of affairs in which all parts of the cosmos were working together, unified as it
were, towards a central task. The parts cannot work together if they are not in immanent
communication with a central information-feeding source. Athanasius’ insistence that Christ
remains in all the parts, while also differentiated from it, reflects the concern for complete
immanence and the conductorship of that harmony. In his insistence that Christ is not just a part
(not just a human being) and not just the whole (not just God), Athanasius is also silently
engaging varieties of “unorthodoxy” claiming Christ is God itself and unmixed with humanity
(docetism), or that Christ is solely a human (Arianism). Paradoxically, for Leithart, “because
God is truly transcendent, he is immediate to the world.”39 The identity of Christ becomes the
central pivot for dealing with Athanasius’ main theological rivals, but Christ also becomes, in the
process, the central pivot for thinking about God and man. But as to the ultimate influence on
Athanasius—was it the Stoic doctrine of Logos immanent in the world? or the Middle Platonist
notion of Logos controlling the world through its emanation?—Hanson somewhat humorously
notes that “We do not know, and perhaps neither did Athanasius.”40 But what is clear is that
Athanasius utilizes from both traditions, and, in his usage creates a distinctive form of
immanence centered on an ontological body.
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Athanasius will refine the Christ of history that came in stages (Irenaeus), as well as the
apprenticeship in humanity (Tertullian), and state that Christ took a body because he wanted to
move “as Man among men, meeting their senses, so to speak, half way. He became Himself an
object for the senses so that those who were seeking God in sensible things might apprehend the
Father through the works which He, the Word of God, did in the body.”41 Immanent power is
relevant here in a practical phenomenological sense. Though in this passage Christ becomes an
object, the logic of the whole/part is consistent with the logic of the incarnation. The rationale for
insisting on Christ’s immanent power renders his life and actions all that more effective, which is
the germ of Athanasius’ argument. In other words, Athanasius understands all of the whole
coming together in the part, or the body of Christ, so as to immanently effect the whole and/or
re-create the whole so that it is no longer under the “law of death.” For Athanasius, sensate life,
as the ability to perceive and be affected, is the method whereby Christ’s body gained agency on
the earth. Christ was more than just a teacher, which would have been closer to the Arian
tradition, but embedded in his acts were larger cosmological consequences.42

Immanent Causality
In order for Athanasius to conceive of Christ’s immanent power in the world, Athanasius found
it imperative to think co-creation and immanent causality together, as two aspects of the same
agent. Co-creation for Athanasius did not give Christ a passive role regarding his inherence in
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the forms of creation, but an active role in that because he was co-present, he could be present
again in flesh. In other words, it allowed him to link his cosmology with his anthropology.43
Immanent causality is the principle by which Christ operates in this world, and Christ’s
movement in a body has cosmological, not moral, consequences for Athanasius’ high
christology. Athanasius reflects on the transfer of effect in Christ’s immanent life, his life as an
“object” of the senses. Irenaeus and Tertullian focused their energies primarily on the way in
which Christ’s death carried an immanent consequence in life—this is the question not of how,
but if the whole effects the parts, or conversely, if a part can reasonably effect the whole.
Athanasius is asking another question, the question of immanent causality: how can a part effect
the totality of parts (the whole, or God). Athanasius takes it for granted that Christ as part does
effect the whole. Christ is the principle of immanent power, and God is but another name for the
sum of parts, but God can’t be understood without the parts—Tertullian admitted as much when
he stated that God was basically incomplete before Christ, but that after Christ gathered diversity
together, only then could God be thought to be complete. This is the question of immanent
causality.44

For a cause to be considered immanent, it must begin and end inside an agent, a definition which
harkens back to Aristotle’s usage. Immanence is not a noun, but a state of affairs that has as one
of its properties a resonance and immediate communication among its parts. In this instance,
immanence is not what Christ brings, as if it were an object of reflection or contemplation.
Immanence is not an object of affirmation, not the Real, nor ground of Being, nor any other
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variant of ultimate ground. Christ is an immanent cause allowing the parts to come together, but,
more importantly, allowing the parts to communicate with each other through a medium, which
is himself, or the conceptual persona. The immanent cause describes the range and origin of an
action, but traditionally does not hint how these connections are established. Deleuze’s
transcendental empiricism, with its striated materiality and shifting, rhizomic virtualities, was his
solution as to the genesis and strategies of how an agent (the virtual) finds itself immanently
implicated in the world of matter. Immanence is not a substratum of life, as Deleuze will himself
sometimes infer, but the quality of an action beginning and ending inside an agent. Ontological
movement defines a specific trait of immanent causality, which is that of a part effecting the
whole; the word “effect,” while having resonances with “affect,” is primarily employed here to
the ability of an agent to both influence and reconfigure. While affect would suffice, its primary
meaning referring to the act of “to influence,” the term has been avoided because its denotation
is not strong enough to capture the act of not only influencing, but bringing about a new
configuration and re-creation. Meaning to bring about, and to influence, “effect” better captures
the relation of a part to a whole under consideration here.

An important passage reveals how Athanasius describes the ontological movement of Christ by
conflating co-creation and immanent causality:

When He moved His body He did not cease also to direct the universe by His Mind and
might. No. The marvelous truth is, that being the Word, so far from being Himself
contained by anything, He actually contained all things Himself. In creation He is present
everywhere, yet is distinct in being from it, ordering, directing, giving life to all,
containing all, yet is He Himself the Uncontained, existing solely in His Father45 (3.17).
Co-creation necessarily implies immanent power for Athanasius—the power to effect the whole
as a part. Numerous trajectories come together in this passage: 1) the anxiety of Athanasius to
45
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keep Christ distinct from creation, which highlights his docetic tendencies, yet present in every
part, highlighting his robust incarnationalism; 2) immanent causality—Christ is everywhere
directing, ordering, moving, etc. within all aspects of existence; 3) recapitulation, in that Christ
contained all things himself; 4) Christ’s bodily movements/acts/gestures have immediate,
cosmological consequences on earth.

One should not be fooled as to the real-time Christ of Athanasius, adopting a body and educating
humanity. For Athanasius, Christ is cosmological, and Athanasius’ focus is on how his body,
when moving on earth, had cosmological and soteriological significance. Another translation of
first sentence of the above quote, which reads rather awkwardly in the Lawson translation above,
reads: “nor, while he moved the body, was the universe left void of his working and
providence.”46 Recalling the highly popularized butterfly effect of modern physics, by moving his
body he moved the universe, Athanasius continues the passage, “His body was for him not a
limitation, but an instrument, so that he was both in it and in all things, and outside all things,
resting in the Father alone. At one and the same time—this is the wonder—as Man He was living
a human life, and as Word He was sustaining the life of the universe, and as Son he was in
constant union with the Father.”47 This language of moving the universe should does not mean
the earth or objects in the universe physically moved, but is part of the construction of the
medium and quality of action in that medium. The “universe” is the space of mythos and poetry,
defined by immediate and immanent relays of acts, while the acts within this space applies to all
aspects of this space. The acts and the medium come about at the same time, and co-define each
other—this is Athanasius’ genius. While the references to the “Father” are never lacking, they
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play little to no role in Athanasius’ anthropological christology except to note that Christ rests in
the Father, or that he is in constant union with the Father. God is not ordering the universe, it is
Christ with divine power that is doing it from the “inside,” as it were, immanently. If according
to Thomas Weinandy, Athanasius’ conception of the incarnation is not intended to imply that
“the Word ceased quickening or governing the universe,” then the opposite is the case.48 The
incarnation for Athanasius is intended to imply that the Word takes an ever important role in
governing the universe.

Why the Cross?
Athanasius considers Christ’s cosmological acts/movements in terms of ridding the evil spirits,
the crucifixion, resurrection, miracles and healings. As one might expect, the crucifixion is the
most important act of Christ for Athanasius.49 But what is unexpected in the manner in which the
crucifixion becomes the image of recapitulation. For Tertullian and Irenaeus, the crucifixion
merely represented the death of Christ, and recapitulation was concept in which to understand
the rationale behind the horrible death. For Irenaeus, the world was indeed wrapped up—
recapitulated—in the body of Christ, but it wasn’t necessarily the crucified body. For Athanasius,
however, it is a literal aesthetic of the crucifixion that remains essential for any thought of
recapitulation. Regarding the gestures of the crucifixion, and linking them with the notion of
recapitulation, Athanasius writes: “Here, again, we see the fitness of His death and of those
outstretched arms: it was that He might draw His ancient people with the one and the Gentiles
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with the other, and join both together in himself.”50 The “ignominy of the cross” was fitting as a
cosmological gesture.

Why the cross, Athanasius ponders? First, Christ chose it because like any athlete, he confronts
the battle that is given to him.51 Second, because it was his duty to bear the curse, he had to wear
the form of the accursed. Referencing John 12: 32, the bodily comportment of outstretched arms,
a unique trait of crucifixion, has the effect of drawing all people to him (recapitulation). Fourth,
and most importantly, a crucifixion takes place in the air, which is where demons block the
passage of the faithful from earth to heaven. Citing Ephesians 2:2 in combination with Hebrews
10:20, Athanasius not only believes the air is the sphere of the devil, but claims the air is purified
by a death on the cross.52 Christ’s crucified flesh purifies the air in its suffering, thereby clearing
a path for the righteous. This imagery, more than mere metaphor, would again find repetition in
the Life of Antony, where it is Antony raised up in the air, extended and outstretched, savagely
attacked by demons so as to purify the air for others. Moreover, thanks to Tertullian, the way to
redemption for all mankind is no longer just through air now-purified, it is through Christ’s body
itself, through the veil that is Christ’s flesh. Christ’s body is understood by Athanasius as a literal
“door” and at the end of the passage Athanasius understands Christ’s body as the “path” to
heaven. The placement of Christ in the air, as an agent of cleansing and redemption is the
aesthetic equivalent of Irenaeus’ more formal definition of recapitulation, and gives bodily shape
to Tertullian’s otherwise bodiless, enfleshed materiality. While it is but one example, the manner
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in which Athanasius interprets Christ’s gestures of outstretched arms is indicative of his figural
imagination.53

Moving Creation with a Body

In all his concepts, Athanasius returns again and again to the whole/part distinction, also the
problem of the one vs. the many, and, as we shall see below, he borrows much inspiration from
Stoic cosmology. For instance, as regards the Word’s appearance on earth, Athanasius writes
“For, as I said before, if it were unfitting for him thus to indwell the part, it would be equally so
for Him to exist within the whole.”54 While the language of immanent causality is not
Athanasius’ language, the language of the whole/part is, and remains the dominant register
through which he understands the logic of the incarnation.

Tertullian argued on similar grounds, though with a different emphasis. It was the problem of the
many in the Godhead that led Tertullian to assert that the Word actually increased the stability of
the one, for since the world was in a state of the many, it was the Word that gathered the many
into the one. Tertullian’s main issue was with the devolution, or corruption of God, when the
Word took human form, and Tertullian was battling “heretics” who claimed that a God who took
a human form could no longer be a God. For Tertullian, the problem was no so much what
justified the one assuming a part, as much as it was of protecting the solidity of the one when
emphasis was paid to a part. Tertullian did not ask how Christ assumed human form, nor under
what logical operation it was justified. Athanasius, however, is working with a different set of
problems. To his Stoic critics, Athanasius must justify the logical possibility of the whole
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assuming a part. Citing the Stoic cosmological belief that the world is a body, in On the
Incarnation Athanasius asks what is wrong with believing the whole entered a part? If we grant
that the world is a body, Athanasius concedes to the “Greek philosophers,” then “what is there
surprising or unfitting in our saying that He has entered also into human nature?”55

It appears that the sticking point of Stoic cosmology according to Athanasius is that human
nature is not a “part,” while for the Christians human nature is as much a part of the universe as
anything else. But there is more to the argument than just whether or not human nature is part of
the universe, an idea most Stoics would find sufficient. Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations
submits a view to this very idea: “What is rational in different beings is related, like the
individual limbs of a single being, and meant to function as a unity. This will be clearer to you if
you remind yourself: I am a single limb (melos) of a larger body—a rational one.”56 Though we
could find differing accounts as to what human nature is for the Stoics and Athanasius, the real
issue is the cosmological significance of a special part harmonizing the whole. It is to the
efficacy of just a single part that the Stoics would most likely find abhorrent, given the Stoic
emphasis on sociality and individuals necessarily working together.

Therefore, before us we have competing accounts of what it means to incarnate the logos. On the
one hand, for the Stoics, the rational human must embody the larger rationality of the ethereal
logos, and by doing so, allow the whole to function more efficiently, which in turns effects the
productivity of the social sphere. Stoicism and the larger thread of Greek ethics took place in a
public milieu. “What injures the hive injuries the bee,” writes Aurelius. The web of logos is
interwoven, future oriented, harmoniously composed, one world made up of parts. Humans are
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limbs of a universal body that must help it move beautifully and harmoniously—the point is to
attune oneself by acting in accordance with the nature of the logos, and therefore to purify one’s
will of anything that does not accord with the logos. Though of course the whole absolutely
needs the parts to function correctly, in essence, the part must efface itself in favor of the power
of the whole, and the whole can only be a harmonious whole when all the parts are actively
working in unison.
On the other hand, Athanasius’ cosmology shares the Stoic concerns of harmony, and the
imagery of a world as a body and humans as limbs he too shares, but he differs as to the ultimate
power of a part. What creates the sticking point is the Christian understanding of the advent of
the incarnation, i.e., the fact that the whole is incarnated in one of the parts, and it is up to a
specific part to fix the whole: “He both fashioned essential being and restored to health the thing
that he had formed.”57 This act of restoration is not so much a publicly performed ethical or
ritualized performance, as it was for the Greek, as much as it was a private affair.58 More than a
few arguments are put forth by Athanasius to justify the power given to a part, arguments no
doubt distinguishing Christian ontology from Stoic ontologies. First, creation was made through
Christ in the beginning, and so therefore the fact that he can later assume a part that he formerly
created is taken for granted (an argument again linking co-creation, immanent causality and the
incarnation). Second, because he is immanent to all creation, it is in Christ that we move and
have our being. It follows therefore that it is only natural he take a body as ours. Third,
Athanasius puts forward two arguments (in the form of questions) drawn from the body itself: (a)
does not speech issue forth from Mind into the tongue without the tongue being associated with
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Mind?, and (b) does not man actualize himself when he moves his toe without himself being
associated fully with the toe?59 Clearly, Athanasius is justifying how the power of the whole can
be found in a part without, however, being degraded as the whole.60 Athanasius writes: “The
Word of God thus acted consistently in assuming a body and using a human instrument to
vitalize the body. He was consistent in working through man to reveal Himself everywhere, as
well as through the other parts of His creation, so that nothing was left void of his divinity and
knowledge.”61

Drawing on the Stoic notion of tonos (tension), which was discussed in the previous chapter,
Christ will be seen by Athanasius to have immanent power in the world, i.e., his ability to effect
the whole of creation is not only unlimited, but immediate and immanent. Again, the central
tenet of On the Incarnation, “nor, while he moved the body, was the universe left void of his
working and providence.”62 This is ontological movement, and it is a common notion found in
the ancient world. According to David Fideler, as early as Pythagoras we find the notion that the
human body “is the microcosm, the harmonic blueprint of the universe reflected in miniature.”63
And Stoic ontology is equally unanimous about the universe being a giant body composed of
members and parts, in which the parts can come to embody, and correct, the whole through
meaningful action. In the Christian context, ontological movement and immanent power perhaps
become two aspects of a single concept, which can be said to be christology’s original
contribution to philosophical knowledge. What christology develops is a Christ causality,
defined by the understanding that the body of Christ acts as an agent of cosmological
effectivity—Christ alters, reconfigures and creates space anew. Though it shares similar
59
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properties, Christic causality is not immanent causality, if not for the obvious reason that Christ
is the agent. The term “space” is a theoretical translation of the concept of the whole and/or God.
Because God is conceived as all existence, as all that there was and will be, as the virtual mythos
of all encompassing reality, as the fabric of the universe, God is in one sense the All. The term
“space” is meant to capture this notion without ethical or moral overtones, yet also to bring our
attention to the medium though which causality needs to execute itself. The agent of any type of
causality needs a theatre to exercise itself, and space is a translation of a mythologically oriented
conception of the cosmos. But is this space really the space of God? From the perspective of
Christian theology, yes. Yet as I have been arguing, it is the Christ concept that makes this
thought of God possible, so whereas for Christian theology Christ is made known through the act
of God, in reality it is through the concept of Christ that this God is made known to thought.
Through the operations of Irenaeus, Tertullian, and the many others not discussed here, Christ
lays out this immanent space, so it is properly his.
The Cappadocians likewise held a similar account of Christ’s causality in the cosmos. Jaroslav
Pelikan’s penetrating study of the influence of “natural theology” on Cappadocian christology
reveals similar conceptions of Christ moving the cosmos. For Pelikan, the prime motivation
behind the assertion of Christ moving the cosmos was the perennial problem of Christianity in
late antiquity: polytheism. For the Christians, the unity of mankind was a corollary to
monotheism.64 If the God of Israel was One, and not one of Many, it therefore had to encompass
all of creation. What may be called Christian “universalism” rests on a closely related note, i.e.,
the unification of all humanity under one God. But Christians had to slightly modify the Judaic
monotheistic structure from which Christianity grew. Christians had to have a God that was One
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yet a God able to enter the parts of creation. A new life through faith in Christ is the prime
illustration of God being able to enter the parts (a singular life). What the concept of Christ
achieved was a concept of God able to unify the parts of creation. Moreover, Christians also
interpolated into their doctrine another concept well known in the ancient world—culture as an
“advance to perfection”—however it was now through their savior that the world re-gained its
direction. Whereas according to the Christians the Greek worldview was that of nature and
history moving without direction, the Christians offered an eschatological hope of a new
universe, a new universal cosmological harmonics.65 Christ could only be a new direction for
life’s forms if he had something to do with the creation of all the forms. Since origin determines
nature, the origin of the forms of life in Christ determined their nature as advancing towards
perfection in Christ. Gregory of Nyssa and Basil, like Athanasius, thought it necessary to link
beginning and end if one were to ascribe Christ immanent powers. Naturally, in order to think
advancement of any nature recapitulation had to be assumed, which it was by Nyssa.66 Pelikan
calls Nyssa’s eschatology christocentric, as one might expect.

Whereas for the more Platonically minded Cappadocians the final telos of existence was towards
a final Good, for Athanasius it was closer to Stoic harmony. Another point of difference
distinguishes the “Alexandrians” from the “Cappadocians.” For the latter, Basil in this instance,
it was God who after giving each thing its form “welded all the diverse parts of the universe by
links of indissoluble attachment and established between them so perfect a fellowship and
harmony that the most distant, in spite of their distance, appeared united in one universal
sympathy.”67 These so-called “indissoluble” attachments, while created by God during creation
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for the benefit of God, are for Athanasius the very functionality of Christ. Athanasius’ “kinship
of the flesh”, or what Burrus called the “sacred blood transfusion,” is precisely this attachment
between the phenomenal forms of life. It is the glue and potential of communication of parts in
the whole. For the Gregory of Nyssa, it was the will of God that allowed his speculative thought
to move from “part to whole,” but also from the whole to the part. And Macrina, reiterating
Gregory’s conception of God’s will, writes “the movement of God’s will becomes a fact at any
moment that God pleases, and the intention becomes at once realized in nature.”68 Pelikan quotes
Col. 1:17 as proof of a latent christocentrism in Cappadocian thought (“In him all things are held
together as a system”), and follows it up by observing that recapitulation is perhaps the most
central framework for understanding this “system” of Col. 1:17. Pelikan acutely observes that the
contingency of creation relies on a christocentric premise, and is grounded on a christocentric
cosmology, but what can be added to Pelikan’s study is the fact that it is the concept of Christ
that makes the thought of the Christian God possible, not vise versa.
Another aspect of Athanasius’ thought distinguishing him from his Cappadocian counterparts is
his language of Christ as physician. In the Life of Antony, “Fragments of the Moral Life,” and
elsewhere, Athanasius writes that it were as if Christ were a physician sent by God to heal
humanity. Seldom commented upon in the critical literature, there is perhaps more to the idea of
Christ as “physican” and the medical metaphor than is given credit.

Galen and the Medical Discourse of Parts
The language of part/whole is also found in Greek medical and biological thought, in which,
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largely beginning with Aristotle, finds its way into the famous Roman physician-philosopher
Galen, who in the second century C.E. would write an important treatise called On the Use of the
Parts. Plato would devote considerable time to a theoretical articulation of the part/whole
relation in three of his late dialogues (Parmenides, Theaetetus, and Sophist) and Aristotle is no
less interested.
In what modern medical discourse calls “functional analysis,” the ancient world’s interrogation
into the health of an organism begins with an analysis of how its parts relate to the whole. A part
is judged useful through its beneficial contribution to the whole organism, what is called its
chreia. The latter is not to be confused with energeia, or its active change. A part may contain
both, and the distinction is that chreia refers to the part’s role it plays in the survival of the
organism, while energeia refers to the specific motion of an organ. Chreia is often accomplished
through a part’s energeia.69 Furthermore, a part’s potential for energeia is dependent upon the
“character of the substance” constituting the part. If a part is made of inferior elements, so too
will be its energeia, and, by default, its chreia. Once defined, the chreia tells us why a part
exists, the for what of its being. A body is a product of intelligent design (by a craftsman or
demiurge), and so therefore, for Galen the “existence, structure and attributes” of an organism’s
parts need to be conceptualized against their chreia for the whole organism.70 Sedley writes “the
most important ‘cause’ (aitia) to consider in explaining an organ is the ‘aim of its activity.”71

The language of the part/whole is ubiquitous in the ancient world, and can be found in ethical
juridical, political, philosophical, cosmological, numerological and aesthetic writings, among
others. Plotinus will use the language of part/whole to describe the nature of the soul’s relation to
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the body, the way a seed relates to the tree, and the way science works through its interrogation
into parts—all within a few pages.72 Closely related, and in many circumstances
indistinguishable, is the problem of the one-many, which is evident when in the Parmenides
Socrates argues that he himself could be considered many because of his varying parts.73
However, the relevance here is the notions of health (of the cosmological body), authorization
(what allows a part to fix the whole) and use value (the chreia of Christ). While it is not being
claimed here that Athanasius is borrowing ideas from the medical literature, what is being argued
is for a congruence of ideas between Athanasius’ notion of a physician Christ as a part fixing the
whole in relation to the prevalent discourse of part/whole in the wider medical philosophy.

For Athanasius, the health of the whole (God) is dependent on the harmony of its parts, and
harmony relies on correct chreia, that is, each part must contribute to the overall function of the
organism. Though the language of teleology is frequent in Athanasius to describe human life,
when he speaks of the cosmos as a whole, his language drifts into that of “harmony”; though, of
course, going from discord to harmony is a type of telos. In Orations Against the Arians, a text
dating much later than On the Incarnation, Athanasius writes of the Word’s imprint on creation,
its purpose being “so that the whole universe would not be divided, but be in harmony with itself
as one body.”74According to the Life of Antony, it was as if Christ were a physician “given to
Egypt by God,” a sentiment echoed numerous times by St. Antony in his letters.75

Intricacy and the interdependence of parts speaks less of the parts than of the maker of the
Whole; “The mutual dependency of parts points to the contingency and dependency of the
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whole.”76 We have seen how Athanasius, and Gregory, linked the end with the beginning
through an identification of the same agent of Christ as co-creator and as telos (recapitulation).
But what may allow him to make this philosophical procedure is a simple principle: origin
determines nature. Christ’s role as re-creator in life is possible only in virtue of him also being
co-creator before life existed, and nowhere but in his miracles is Christ’s status as divine creator
in the world proved.77 His origin as co-creating logos determines his nature as re-creating,
cosmological being who harmonizes the universe. Christ can re-fashion created things because
he himself is uncreated. To use the language of Deleuze and Guattari, the co-creating Christ is
said of the re-creation of ontological difference because he, as an agent of prior creation, inhered
in the moment of creation so as to impart difference. Christ is an engineer of difference since he
creates difference then and creates within difference now. Christ is not made in the image of
God, but God is conceived in the image of differential Christ. When Deleuze and Guattari say
God is a lobster, they perhaps misspoke.78 The provocative phrase was intended to call attention
to the double articulation of God, of God as spoken of in two registers, just as are the geological
strata forming the basis of their analysis.79 As another name for an abstract machine, God can be
doubly articulated—as an agent of territorialialization and deterritorialisation, as object-forming
and object-effacing. Within this double movement one finds the heart of Deleuze’s ontology: the
virtual becoming actual while the actual dissolves back into the virtual. But though God is given
the attributes of the doubly articulated lobster, in fact Christ is the lobster, the double
articulation. Christ is the middle term between two aspects of himself. First, God as the “origin”
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of Christ, and second, the world as the origin of God and Christ. But Christ makes this
articulation of God as double possible. Since conceptual personae have one side faced toward
nondifferentiation and the other towards differentiation, it likewise applies to Christ that his one
side facing nondifferentiation is God while the other towards differentiation is creation.

And Christ can create again and again in life because he is eternally begotten by the Father,
being an inexhaustible resource for immanent activity in the world (repeated as well at the
ontological level: eternal generation).80 Conceiving the Christian Logos as activity, however, was
not a new idea in the ancient world. In the attempt to accommodate the movement of Christ with
the eternal movement of God, authors would invent strange answers. For instance, Marius
Victorinus, an ardent third century defender of the Nicene formulation, would likewise formulate
a metaphysics of movement and pseudo-movement based on a distinction between God and
Christ. Christ as logos is “movement in motion” while God’s movement is “movement at rest.”81
Regardless of the strange articulations involving movement, understanding the Logos as activity
was common. All of which makes a new God possible—a God immanent in the parts, but not
identified with it, a God able to appear in the parts when so willed, and a God able to reconfigure
the whole in virtue of being able to fix a part.

Conclusion

While the thinkers discussed previously (Irenaeus and Tertullian) were presented in a single
chapter, Athanasius’ work will be taken up in the following chapter as well. As the third thinker
to be taken up in this strategic genealogy, the purpose of this analysis is to distill a logic of Christ
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that will find itself embedded in ascetic discourse. Since the lives of ascetics were imitations of
Christ, then, one would presume, it is only natural that the attributes of Christ would be applied
to ascetic bodies—which is exactly what happened. This chapter exposes the world-harmonizing
logic of the Christ figure in Athanasius’ On the Incarnation, and the following chapter will
analyze how this logic was deployed in ascetic literature and applied to bodies. Ontological
movement is the thread connecting the two chapters, since it is equally an attribute of Christ and
human bodies.

The overall logic of the whole/part argument as it relates to ontological movement can be
summed up as follows: Creation is moved in the advent of Christ.82 God moves creation,
including his own nature, when a pre-existing part splinters (or is begotten) from the whole in the
hopes of bringing the parts back together again. This is ontological movement from the
perspective of the whole, and it follows the logic of the incarnation precisely: in order for divine
immanence to be established, the whole must assume the form of a part—Christ assumed the
form of a curse so as to rid us of ours. It is only by this internal operation that creation can be
renewed. Further, it is not enough for the whole to just enter the part. The avenue through which
it is incarnated must first be justified by a pre-existing principle in the parts themselves (cocreation implies the ease of the whole entering the parts). To use the language of transcendence
and immanence, there is already a collapsing of the whole (classically understood as the
transcendent) and the parts (what is immanent to the whole) in such a manner that the identity,
function and justification of whole depends on its consistency of parts.

From the perspective of the parts, what Heidegger called the ontic, Christ thereby moves creation
when he moves. In Athanasius’ ascetical writings, to which we now turn, the power of the
82
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(Christ) part takes on a different dimension, and the relationship between ontological movement
and bodily movement is often blurred. If Athanasius believed that the incarnation allowed the
Christ body to move the cosmos, what about our bodies? Imitatio Christi, as the type of
christology espoused in the Life of Antony, will layer onto the human body the movements of the
Christ body in such a way that the gestures of the human body will become a point of focus and
interest for Athanasius and others writing in his wake. The literature of the ascetic body is
written with an eye to the repetition of the entire Christic battle—from co-creation to
fragmentation to recapitulation to immanence. The ascetic hagiography is therefore a re-writing
not just of the life of Christ, but of his philosophical underpinnings as recapitulated being. The
fragmented ascetic body replicates the state of affairs of the world prior to the crucifixion (in a
state of disorder), performing the redeeming act through the ascetic performance, creating
harmony once again. As we shall see in the following chapter, the repetition of Christ requires
quite a bit of conceptual innovation on Athanasius’ behalf.
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Chapter 4

Body Parts: From Recapitulated
Body to Immanent Body

Abstract:
This chapter will ask several questions: How does a body express the glory of
creation? In what manner can the human body be understood to be a replication
of the cosmos? What is the ascetic performance about? How can one achieve
flesh? The previous chapter was a study of the logic of the incarnation in
Athanasius’ On the Incarnation. Using Athanasius’ later text, The Life of
Antony, this chapter will concern the ascetic obsession with controlling body
parts—or members—and how the earlier logic of On the Incarnation has
authorized the power given to harmonized and disharmonized body parts. As
points of hermeneutical focus, four areas will be given special attention
regarding how the body was used to create ascetic agency: imitatio Christi (form
of task), demonic appendages (medium of resistance), desire (universal
substrate), and immanent body (counter actualization).
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Avant Garde Bodies
The awakened and knowing say: body am I entirely, and
nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about
the body.
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra
The body is no longer the obstacle that separates thought
from itself, that which it has to overcome to reach thinking.
It is on the contrary that which it plunges into or must
plunge into, in order to reach the unthought, that is life.
Deleuze, Cinema 2
How does a body express the glory of creation? In what manner can the human body be
understood to be a replication of the cosmos? What is the ascetic performance about? The
analysis below—of Athanasius’ ideas of the incarnation and his conception of the ascetic body—
should be understood in multiple registers. This analysis is as much a study on performance art
as it is on early Christianity. It is as much an analysis of the charisma of beauty as it is on one of
the first Egyptian monastics, St. Antony. It is as much about what profits from courage and how
Nietzsche should not have been so critical of the ascetic project. It is as much a study into the
shape of ontology and the logics allowing certain philosophical operations to occur. It is as much
about how the question of the “good life” was answered less than two millennia ago. And finally,
in an era where technologies of all stripes are attempting to open up the body for its own
exploitation, whether it is for profit, power, medicine or politics, it is equally about another era’s
interrogation into the opening that is the body, how to define it, and what to let in. This is a
lesson no less relevant in the early twenty first century.

The treatment of On the Incarnation in the previous chapter focused on the metaphors and
imagery of “ontological movement,” both as it is borrowed from Stoic ontology and how it
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differs. The effective and sometimes cosmological power given to the ascetic body in the Life of
Antony is a direct result of the logic of the whole/part developed earlier in On the Incarnation. In
this chapter, what the analysis of the Life of Antony will accomplish is 1) how the immanent
body is the achievement of lived bodies; 2) the manner in which ascetic bodies are repetitions of
the Christ body; and 3) the dynamics of counter-actualization, which is a phrase borrowed from
Deleuze to describe the manner in which a body is developed and/or dissolved so as to become a
vehicle of creation. We will say of the lived body what Deleuze, in answering the question of
what is an event?, says of the plant: “The plant sings the glory of God, and while being filled all
the more with itself it contemplates and intensely contracts the elements whence it proceeds.”1
Deleuze’s notion of counter actualization, developed in The Logic of Sense, is an attempt to
understand the body’s relation to the earth, and, more specifically, how a body can become a
vehicle for creative power in the world. Deleuze believes that certain bodies, if constructed
properly, can immanently effect life. The latter is only possible because they embody life (the
All), since it is only through this fact of embodiment that their effectivity can be immanently
registered. Deleuze is a thinker of becoming and process, and framing part of the ascetic task in
terms of counter actualization is likewise to claim a certain trait of becoming in christology and
ascetic literature. So, in a sense, the ascetic sings the glory of God, filling itself with divine
creation so as to become an instrument of salvation like the logos in which it is modeling.
The logic of immanent causality, once a property of Christ, likewise applies to certain forms of
bodies, and it will be argued that ascetic bodies, as portrayed in the early hagiography, are a type
of these bodies. Ultimately, the two texts must be brought together, since Athanasius’
conceptions of ontological movement in On the Incarnation justify the power given to the ascetic
body in his Life of Antony. A subject receiving scant attention in the critical literature, there will
1
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be a focus on the ascetic obsession with controlling body parts—or members—and how
christology (beginning with Irenaeus) has authorized the power given to harmonized and
disharmonized body parts.

This is the second part of the third and final late ancient thinker to be discussed. This reading of
ancient texts has been a strategic genealogy of a concept of Christ that will find itself embedded
within the discourse of the ascetic body. In many ways, this genealogy is experimental, intending
to locate resources and tools for thinking a secret trajectory within christology. What is that
secret trajectory? In this instance, immanent bodies are the final expression of a genre of logos
christology begun by Irenaeus. The construction and hermeneutic of immanent bodies will
require all the resources discussed in the previous chapters, and the concepts and ideas come
together in the idea that bodies can effect space; that is, bodies are attributed with such universal
power that their agency extends to the entirety of the cosmos. In Athanasius’ On the Incarnation,
the ability to move creation is a clear attribute of Christ, but in the ascetic literature we find that
this attribute is transferred to the ascetic body, but not without undergoing alterations in
language. The ascetic does not strictly move creation or effect the cosmos, but there is within the
literature an immanent causality attached to their being in such a way that their power is
fundamentally grounded in the ontological movement of Christ.

The strategic genealogy presented concentrates on, first, how the concept of Christ, including all
its conceptual architecture, becomes embedded within the ascetic project, and second, how the
concept of Christ, as found in the conceptual persona of Christ, is a repetition of a logic of the
body. The logic of the body—requiring the concept of immanence, recapitulation, flesh and
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ontological movement to make sense of it—should not be understood to be strictly religious in
nature. Placing Christ at the center of life and thought, this is christology’s motivation. However,
a “reversal” of christology is to find Christ the concept in the material conditions of life, to
investigate how concepts are born of the movements of the body. This chapter will conclude with
how ontology repeats the phenomenon of lived bodies through an analysis of bodily parts and
members.

Body Parts
The question of body parts was as important for the ancient ascetic as it is for contemporary
forms of self representation. Are we not in the twenty-first century obsessed with getting the
right body parts? Primetime shows are devoted to plastic surgery, and the “actors” in said shows
construct their bodies from the installment of new lips, bellies, eyes, hips and noses, and modify
the contours of their body from the extraction and addition of flesh, some of which is theirs,
another’s, or altogether non-organic. Famous bodies are interrogated with relentless scrutiny in
popular print and visual media, which only further entrenches the race toward the perfect, ageless
body. With the ability to manipulate the body increasing at an alarming rate, twenty first century
Western subjects are all becoming artists and our bodies are becoming works of art. French artist
Orlan has taken the furthest step in this direction, treating the surgeon like the priest as she blurs
the boundary between aesthetics and esthetics. Orlan’s numerous and ongoing surgeries, some to
transform her body so it can match the qualities of feminine Renaissance beauty, testify to the
morphological (and technological) potential in which we understand the body in the twenty-first
century. A body consists of parts, if there is even a body at all anymore.
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It should not surprise us then, to learn that ascetics of the third century and onwards were thought
to be painted by God, that is, through their discipline and virtue divinity was seen to be
inhabiting their body. Clearly, the phrase does not refer to any adornment on the ascetic body.
Quite the opposite—their experimentation took place on the body itself, on its moods, shapes,
behaviors, habits and flesh. The “paint” of God was complex, bound to gesture, interpretation,
virtue and the control of the will. But the fashionable bodies of today do have one thing in
common with the ascetic bodies of the past. Both were thought to be avant garde figures for their
time, expressing the finest attributes of that cultural milieu. This chapter will, in part, argue that
ascetic bodies were avant garde because they were thought to literally interpret culture, and in
this interpretation serve as a inscription pad in which culture, and its theological underpinnings,
was written. Any movement of the ascetic body, then, externalized its consequences. In many
ways, ascetic bodies are the first post-human bodies. Though they are post-human bodies living
in ascetic hagiography, they are nonetheless technologized by christology. Judith Butler,
following Foucault, claimed that discourse can also perform on bodies, and shape those bodies.
Since this is the case, the bodies found in hagiography, most notably Athanasius’ Life of Antony,
which cannot be said to represent all of ascetic hagiography by any means, are forms of techne
designed as patterns for the reshaping of our habits. Given that for Edith Wyschogrod asceticism
was in part an act to expand one’s power, gained from the disowning of that power, Nietzsche
was incorrect in saying that the ascetic denies himself.2 Nietzsche did not know what was being
affirmed in the ascetic enterprise. Deleuze, the perennial Nietzschean, will help us make a case
against Nietzsche’s negative portrayal of the ascetic.
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Borrowing from Stoic gesturology, which has its origins in the pedagogy of Greek rhetorical
training, the ascetic body was represented in the literature as a complex system of bodily
movements, and great attention was paid to mastering the limbs of the body. Such difficulty was
there in mastering the body’s limbs that the ascetic understanding of the body was not as a
unified organism, but of a riot of independent parts. One of the tasks of asceticism therefore was
the harmonization of these parts. Lest one think of mastering the body in this fashion as trivial, it
ought to be pointed out that athletics is a massive cultural sector focusing exclusively on getting
the body parts in line, mastering the limbs, bringing the members together—the baseball pitch,
golf swing, soccer kick, gymnastics, or athletic movement in general. All testify to the inherent
instability of using a body when it is pushed to the limit of what it can do. This dynamic
instability is just once facet of the materiality of the body. The athletic analogy is, after all, not
too far from ascetic self-understanding, as they were frequently referred to as “athletes of God.”
Movement is different, attention to movement is a premium, and movement is interpreted
differently when in the world as opposed to movement in a monastic setting. In short, a world of
difference resides between “eating in the world” and “eating in the monastery,” and this
difference must be applied across the spectrum of the ascetic performance.3

To use a phrase of Jane Bennett, who borrows it from Deleuze, there is a micropolitics to bodily
movement. Late twentieth and twenty-first century performance artists created a genre of art out
of using the gestures of the body to speak to a larger social body. Sitting is a gesture, as the
Freedom Riders of the 60’s highlight, as is standing in front of a tank, as the lone man expressed
in Tiananmen Square. Gestures are only politically effective within the confines of habit and the
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politicalization of norms in public and private space.4 The revolutionary gesture, as opposed to
the habitual gesture, expresses the habitual system as a whole while also criticizing that whole. A
logic of implication and explication is at work—ascetic bodies were performances, and their
gestures both implicate political ideology while also explicating a modality of escape. After all,
ascetics became famous for fighting empire, and the very notion of withdrawal, according to
Valantasis, posits the fact that “social power is always contested. Two different societies, two
different worlds compete for the definition, articulation, and modulation of power”5; “Ascetic
reality is by definition a resistant reality within a dominant system.”6 It is in this context wherein
the rational lies for engaging late antiquity. The same is true here as it was with Foucault, history
is being engaged to say something about the present.

I began with an epigraph by Deleuze which expresses that it is into the body that thought must
plunge in order to reach life. Tertullian successfully accomplished this feat through his concept
of flesh. This chapter is an attempt to do just that, but with a slight difference. It is not the body
that we will think, but the body that gives to thought. The body that gives to thought thoughts of
the body is the conceptual persona. In other words, our thought will eventually plunge into the
virtual body of Christ organizing lived bodies. In order for this relation to occur—virtual body
and lived body—a logic is needed, and Athanasius provides one.

The Drama of the Cross Can Do Without the Cross
Athanasius’ Antony is a proud and learned ascetic, one who shuns humankind for the solitude of
the desert, a man who, after his parent’s death, puts his sister “in the charge of respected and
4
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trusted virgins” so that he could devote the remainder of his life to gathering the “attributes” of
Christ. Antony would live to be a hundred years old during an era when the average life span
was twenty-five.7 In his hagiography, the first in history, Athanasius is not so much writing on a
figure as he is inventing a figure.8 The Antony of the vitae is Athanasius’ creation, and a new
relationship at this historical juncture forms between Christ and human bodies with this text—
bodies are given a supernatural agency in their quest to become Christ-like. Bodies become, to
quote Patricia Cox Miller, a “locus of sanctity.”9 Where this study adds to the theorization of
holy bodies in late antiquity is in the manner in which Christ remains a conceptual persona, first
laid out by Irenaeus, but which Athanasius relies on for the notions of imitatio Christi and the
related idea of Christ as an immanent cause in the cosmological and human body. Paul’s epistles
are no doubt the first texts promoting an imitatio Christi, of sorts, and the writings and literature
surrounding the second century martyrs take imitatio into a repetition of the crucifixion, but
Athanasius with his Life of Antony will provide the theoretical architecture for thinking about
Christic bodies, what I will term in the second half of this chapter the immanent body.

Athanasius is known in the development of Christological debates for his unswerving insistence
that God and creation are united. On the Incarnation reflects Athanasius’ insistence that logos
and flesh are not isolated, but must be thought together: at these two extremes lie Christ as cocreator (logos) and recapitulated Christ (flesh as totalization of Christ). Athanasian christology,
as it will develop in the middle of the fourth century, will provide the material for a vast
reorganization of the body—asceticism. What Athanasius will construct is a theology of the
incarnation that begins in the middle, between God and creation, a theology of whose middle
7
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body (Christ) will be stretched over the extreme terms (God and creation) so as to generate a new
image of Christian thinking and a new body to go along with it. Though our other thinkers have
attempted to do this in degree, it is Athanasius in his Life of Antony who completes the early
inspiration behind Irenaeus’ recapitulated Christ. Within this stretching, or laying out of a plane,
Athanasius authorizes a radical revolution in theological thinking—the drama of the cross can
do without the cross. Following and yet severely modifying Origen’s claim that we can be
martyrs “by the testimony of conscience,” Athanasius would rather have it that we are martyrs by
testimony of the body.

Throughout Athanasius’ text, we find the conceptual persona of Christ appealed to time and time
again. If the purpose of the recapitulation of Christ was to keep him ontologically protected, an
act first producing the conceptual persona of Christ, then here in the earliest hagiography we find
the finest expression of the conceptual persona. Given that for Deleuze the purpose of a
conceptual persona is to develop a mode of existence (“Possibilities of life or modes of existence
can be invented only on a plane of immanence that develops the power of conceptual
personae”10), the ascetic persona is the actualization of the conceptual persona of Christ. The
persona of Christ remains virtual and inexhaustible, for it is at the same time one with the
material plane of existence (Tertullian’s flesh), but on the other hand it is also distinguished from
it by virtue of being the “pattern” to which the monastics seek to model themselves. For
Tertullian, flesh was, and remains, the achievement of Christ, but for Athanasius the ascetic had
to work hard to embody that flesh.
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But what does it mean to say that flesh is an achievement of Christ? What could it mean to say
that it is also an achievement of lived bodies to achieve flesh? In his treatment of ascetics,
Athanasius will imply just that—though flesh is ubiquitous, it also must be earned, and the
ascetic task is to earn it. Here he departs from Tertullian’s expansive, and, one might say, easy
concept of the incarnation.

The Master Pattern
As we saw with Irenaeus, recapitulation puts ontological power in Christ’s body. Modified by
Tertullian and Athanasius, the concept of recapitulation becomes materialized to such a degree
that it will be used to explain how the power of a part exercises such force over the expanse of
the whole, since according to recapitulation theory Christ is the whole. This relationship between
the whole/part is not a dialectic, but a necessary component to how Christ expresses himself
from the viewpoint of our ancient authors. The power of Christ’s body on earth depends on the
notion that he expresses the whole in his actions. This modification of recapitulation will also be
used to express properties of the human body as seen in ascetic literature and hagiography. More
specifically, as we shall see later in this chapter, the whole/part dynamic will be translated to the
human body in terms of fragmentation/wholeness, and it is through this tension that the ascetic
“technology of the self,” as Foucault termed it, will be understood in this analysis. A distinction
is therefore required between the recapitulated body, which still contains traces of transcendent
language, and the immanent body. Irenaeus’ recapitulated Christ, as rule and “head” of creation,
remained mired in hierarchy, and was understood as a top-down principle of governance towards
an end directed by God (final cause). In contrast, what characterizes the immanent body is the
fact that the properties of recapitulation are transferred to the lived body. In other words,
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ontological movement will become a fact of lived movement, split off from myopic discussions
of purely ontological questions of the whole/part. Christ will no longer rule over creation, but
will enter it as an immanent cause, guiding creation from within. The recapitulated body deals
with Christ, while the immanent body is an attribute of lived bodies.

In terms of early Christian asceticism, the immanent body is the translation of the recapitulated
body of Christ, with the monk represented in the literature as an alter christus in that his task is
to channel Christic energy and through conquering his body (as Christ did his on the cross),
serve as an equal conduit though which creation’s regeneration is spread.11 At the end of the
vitae, it is said that even though monastics desire to live a solitary life, their actions have
universal effects because “the Lord shows them like lamps to everyone.”12 The monk as a vessel
for the light of Christ repeats the fact that Christ himself was a vessel for the light of God. When
God “sent” Christ the world was permanently altered, and so there is a similar effect with the
monastic body.

Ascetics repeat Christ’s power, acts and accomplishments on a number of levels. Like Christ, the
monk shows others the path. Brakke writes: “Just as the Word used his assumed body as an
‘instrument’ in the incarnation to the benefit of humanity, so too the Word now uses Antony’s
body as his instrument to the benefit of those around the monk.”13 Like Christ’s achieved state of
perfection, the monastic desires to return to an Edenic state. Like Christ, monks are given the
power to heal. Like Christ’s body, the monastic body needs to be cleansed so that it is no longer
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a copy of the divine, but shines with the splendor of the divine itself. After spending reportedly
twenty years in an abandoned fortress avoiding all human contact, Antony’s friends had finally
had enough and “tore down and forcefully removed the fortress door.”14 Antony emerges as if
from a “shrine,” and the Lord works through him because at this moment many of those present
were healed immediately (immanent causality). Antony’s body remains steadfast with what
“accords with nature,” and this trope of nature as utopic place is repeated later in the vitae when
Antony creates a pseudo Garden of Eden in the “inner mountain.” In this far desert outpost,
Antony planted vegetables and fed visitors and even rids the land of beasts.15

The moment when Antony emerged from the deserted fortress is also the famous moment when,
after seeing Antony, others take up the ascetic cause and the “desert was made a city by
monks.”16 Not only is his body reconfigured and restored, but so too are the people around him,
the desert itself. What theoretically connects all these “powers” is a concept of the ascetic body
as a repetition of the Christ body with the power of immanent causality—the logic of a part
(Antony’s body) effecting a new configuration of the whole (the desert, other people, etc).

Transparency of body such that the power of the whole shines through is the goal. What shines in
Antony is what is passing through Antony. Upon receiving visitors, Antony is adamant that they
not marvel at him, but “marvel at the Lord,” since it is really the Lord within him that creates the
marvel.17 And, after repeated battles with demons, Antony exclaims, “It is not I, but the grace of
God which is in me.”18 Questions of the simulacra, the copy, the origin, repetition—all become
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part of the conversation, but these concepts also must be modified. Not only is being a copy the
goal, it is the avenue through which to alter the original, since it was the case that Christ altered
the concept of God. Here, being a copy alters the concept of Christ, making Christ less of a
transcendent force above human affairs and but closer to a force within every human body.

On an ontological level Christ unified the parts of creation, but on a material level the monastic
tempers the parts of his body so as to receive a taste of the resurrection, and in each instance of
unification the power is tremendous. The monastic repeats some of the most powerful “ideals”
lodged within Christian theology. Just as Christ was a pattern for ascetic practice that could be
actualized time and time again, Athanasius’ Antony is a “picture” for monasticism. Speaking to
many would-be readers, Athanasius writes in the opening paragraph of the Life of Antony that in
hearing the following story, many will want to emulate Antony, and that indeed, “Antony’s way
of life provides monks with a sufficient picture for ascetic practice.”19 Just as Christ was at the
center of an ontological continuum for Athanasius, the monastic body was at the center of what
he understood to be the model of Christian piety.

The Life of St. Antony appears at the confluence of varying forces in late antiquity. The forces
acting on the text, and which the text reflects, are the growing monastic movement in Egypt at
the time, the burgeoning “Catholic” model of doctrinal arbitration spearheaded by Alexander and
Athanasius, the Arian controversy, the location of divinity in virtuous living as opposed to
locality, and the various philosophical and theological debates surrounding the incarnation. Of
these socio-political dynamics, the Arian controversy is perhaps the most influential on the
formation of the text. According to Brakke, the Arian controversy was “a conflict between two
19
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competing pictures of this Word, as model of virtue (Arian) and as enabler of virtue
(Athanasian), and between two corresponding forms of Christianity, the school (Arian), and the
episcopate (Athanasian).”20 Athanasius’ insistence that Christ is an enabler, rather than a model,
reflects his Christological concerns about the identity of Christ. Christ is an enabler because
through the incarnation of the logos, our divinization becomes possible.21 More than a mere
Arian model, Athanasius will conceptualize Christ as a world-forming agent then, as first cause
at the time of creation (near point), but also, now, as an immanent cause in our own bodies,
which when set against ascetic practice becomes the virtual pattern used to (in)form the human
body.

It could be argued that Arian christology was more easily attuned to the ascetic task, since their
Christ was born fully human but had later achieved the grace of God through excellence in
virtue. For their text, the Arians stressed supporting scripture, such as Luke 2:52: “Jesus
advanced in wisdom and stature and favor with God and man.”22 For the Arians, the redeemer
was a “representative creature” but by no means the only possible one.23 For Athanasius,
however, Christ cleared the path from demonic blockage, thereby allowing humanity to once
again reach heaven through our own battles with demons. For the purposes of this study, which
is focusing on the immanent power given to the ascetic body, it will become clear that
Athanasius’ christology provides the body with more effective power than could Arian
christology.
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Though scholarship tends towards recognizing Athanasian authorship of the vitae, this view is by
no means unanimous.24 Most likely, Athanasius probably encountered Antony only once, and he
appears in Athanasius’ writings only once outside the vitae. Because it promotes a pattern of a
body which is itself based on another image (Christ as image of God), the text was made to
repeat itself. Athanasian christology is designed for repetition because within it contains the
fundamental inspiration of repetition itself. To cite Deleuze, that inspiration is the fact that what
gets actualized in the world is not the “logical” result of the virtual energies creating it. A gap
necessarily exists between the virtual reservoir of energy (understood as Christ) and the
expression that this energy gives rise to (ascetic bodies). This gap is opened up in terms of
24
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representation and repetition. The monastic is a repetition of Christ, but a repeated
representation, a fact underscored by Harpham when he observes that asceticism is an art of
making oneself representable.25 Of course, this act of representation, of making visible, of
incarnating oneself, will be used to support the iconophile’s argument in the sixth and seventh
centuries that Christ’s incarnation was itself a making-visible, thereby justifying the makingvisible that icon painters undertook. In many ways, the concept of a soul, ideal or immaterial
meaning in Western art can be traced to this logic.

Accommodating to difference, it is the pattern, not mold, which becomes entangled with imagemaking processes. Just as the point of the virtual/actual distinction is the protection of singular
forms, here it is no different: the persona of Antony’s vitae inspires, and is inspired by the
conceptual persona of Christ. The “forms” that are being protected in our present case are
modalities of existence (the Christian virtuous life), which is the ultimate expression of
conceptual persona according to Deleuze. It is worth noting that the most famous repetition of
the vitae is Augustine’s conversion in book VIII of his Confessions, where the young African
writes, after hearing the voices of children in a nearby house: “Whether it was the voice of a boy
or a girl I cannot say, but again and again it repeated the refrain ‘Take it and read, Take it and
read.’” Having heard the story of Antony’s conversion Augustine convinces himself that “this
could only be a divine command to open my book of scripture and read the first passage on
which my eyes should fall.”26 Thereafter, “all the darkness of doubt was dispelled,” and
Augustine’s dramatic conversion is complete.
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The Life of Antony reads like a movie script, drawing us in. Fantastical, dramatic, filled with
demons, near death experiences and psychological breakdowns, it can rival any action movie. Set
against the silent background of the deep desert, the story follows the story of a young Egyptian,
Antony, on his path towards the withdrawal and the popularizing of the term monachos. Though
the Gospel of Thomas may be the first place the word monachos is used, after 359 it is
Athanasius’ vitae that would become the most famous portrait of eremitic withdrawal, and would
do more to promote the ideality of the monk than another other text.27

As readers of hagiographies, we never have access to the real bodies beneath the text. The saintly
bodies of the ascetics are, to quote Miller, “neither real nor unreal; rather, they are effects of the
hagiographical texts in which they appear.”28 What we are witnessing in the texts, according to
Miller, are “word-pictures” of the body, textual re-presentations that place the saintly body in a
continuum with the Christic body.29 Miller understands ascetic hagiography to tread a fine line
between claiming too much holiness for the saint and too little. Claiming too much is to commit
idolatry, and claiming too little is to remove the spiritual efficacy of the holy body. Miller writes,
“Holy bodies are epiphanies of transfiguration that occupy a signifying space between
transcendence and immanence.”30 Where this analysis adds to Miller’s study on ascetic bodies is
the lens through which I view their performative power. Whereas Miller focuses on the role of
transfiguration imagery in ascetic hagiography and literature, I am emphasizing the role of
crucifixion imagery to interpret the holy bodies. Of course, there is much overlap between the
two, as there is an entire genre of altar piece art, as well as various currents in all Christian art,
27
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representing the crucifixion as a trans-figuration of some sorts. Any time we see a Christ on the
cross beaming with heavenly light it is in this genre. Because of the trans in transfiguration,
which I am interpreting more generally as a body across figures, or a multifigured body, or, more
precisely, a form-less and virtualized body, I will be focusing on the formless in christology, as
previous discussed, and how a specific tension is played out between the formless and the
formed in ascetic bodies. We will be reading the task of asceticism as the construction of a body.
But what is a body?

Nietzsche and Deleuze on Ascetics
Following the basic insight of Deleuze’s refusal to define a body in terms of identity, since a
body is made to perform, a body is best defined by, first, what it is capable of doing and, second,
what it is being captured by. We shall therefore focus our attention here on what is being
constructed in the ascetic body, and what this body is intending to capture. Nietzsche’s famous
critique of the ascetic ideal in the third section of Genealogy of Morals, as well as sections in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, has had a large influence in shaping views of the ascetic project as
body-denying, body-hating and body-negating. Nietzsche, well educated in Greek thought,
brought to his critique of asceticism a Graeco-Roman image of what the healthy body was. If the
task of Greek ethics was to make oneself a work of art, incorporating notions of beauty, control
and physicality, the earliest ascetics found disfiguration admirable and deformity beautiful. 31
Understood against the backdrop of the original Graeco-Roman “athletes of God,” the ascetic
athletes did seem to simply negate everything the ancient world held in high esteem.
Yet thanks to Foucault and Peter Brown, current scholarship on late antiquity has moved quite
far from Nietzsche’s negative conception of the ascetic body—not only is the ascetic not denying
31
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the body, but affirming to the extreme the fact that body and soul are a true body-soul matrix,
each relying on the other for their health. Asceticism does not deny the world, but experiments
within the world to affirm principles and energies found in and on the body. Often described in
otherworldy language, the results, powers, arts and energies of ascetic bodies are very much of
this world. Ascetics were making themselves works of art, but scholarship needed the time to
figure out exactly what type of art that was. William James even went so far as to critique
asceticism for its “excessive worldliness.”32 As it turns out, the ascetic is passionate about the
creation of new values. Nietzsche might contend that the ascetic’s new values are simply
internalized from Episcopal authority, yet the repeated claims, in Antony’s vitae as well as
numerous stories in the Lives of the Desert Fathers, attest to another reality. The monks often
despised humanity, finding pilgrims, onlookers and general hangers-on irritating, a distraction to
their contemplation and ruinous to the purity of the landscape. The monks forged their own path,
and in deep desert eremiticism there was no ascetic priest. The eremitic monk was, according to
Brown, the “lonely man.”33 Antony himself repeatedly moves further and further into the desert
trying to dodge the pious or just curious. So desirous of avoiding human contact, in one scene his
friends break down his door to get a sight of him. Antony, clearly irritated, responds by moving
further into the deserted Egyptian landscape. Another story from the Historia Monachorum
reveals that in one enclosure in the Thebaid there was a monastery in which the gatekeeper
refused to allow anyone inside the gates “unless he wished to stay there for the rest of his life
without ever leaving the enclosure.” Visitors stayed by the gate, had a night’s sleep, then would
be sent on their way the following morning.34
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The main task of the monk is to get himself out of the way. Dogmatically rejecting all pretenses
to individuality and subjectivity, the ascetic is involved in a process of constructive abstraction.35
The ascetic must dissolve him or herself. One criticism of Deleuze is that his philosophy
promotes what Peter Hallward calls a creative subtraction, which can be summed up in the
following sentence, “The only positive or affirming thing that a creatural force can do is to
dissolve itself.”36 For Deleuze the creation of a body was a difficult process, and often
dangerous, which can easily be said of the ascetics. Deleuze’s conception of a body was
constantly referred to in conjunction with the ground of which it was a part. Earth and organism
cannot be thought apart, and Deleuze was keen to imagine ways in which the human body could
help the earth become more creative, not rob it of its creative potential. For Deleuze, it is in the
dissolution of the body that the intensity of the inorganic shines gloriously: the becoming-Whole,
the subject beside itself, pure life in all its multiplicity—these are all names of the final product
of dissolution. In the case of the ascetic, we have an analogical situation: with a selfunderstanding that one was created in the image of an ontological force, the ascetic seeks to
removes traces of bodily and subjective life such that one can attain the Christic force that first
engendered the body. Though made in the image of God, the monk must remain formless, just as
Christ must remain formless because only in this state can he be form-engendering, i.e., able to
be repeated. The so-called attainment of “new life” in Christ is analogous to the new life the
body receives when it dissolves itself into the abyss of virtual energies. For Deleuze, the creative
act is not in creation, nor in creatures, as in human artistic or musical creation, but in the way the
body dissolves itself. Such dissolution, or sacrifice, is what is called counter-actualization.
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Hallward does not put forward a theory claiming that Deleuze’s philosophy is ascetic, in fact he
explicitly says quite the opposite.37 Deleuze’s philosophy of dissolution and counter actualization
is ascetic, but not in the manner Nietzsche understands it.

Indeed, the monastic is involved in a subtractive process—sin, passions, desire, etc—but with
each subtraction comes an addition, and with each addition comes power. I will understand
power in the Deleuzian-Spinozian sense: the more power a body has the more it is able to
receive, and emit, affect. A body is more powerful the more connections it can establish with the
outside, what Adorno termed the “external.” This power will be understood in affective and
socio-political registers. As to what the ascetic produces for culture, their greatest addition may
be the thing which they can never offer, the thing that does not yet exist. Valantasis again,
“Finally, the most influential power of all the ascetical constructions of social power remains the
power that does not yet exist or that is not yet or fully constructed or real.”38 As to what this
power may be, one must leave ultimately to art and creativity, and to the socio-historic fact that
an intention in a work of art, or performance, may or may not be translated into the dominant
culture with the same significance as that in which it was created. In short, one never knows how
a work of art, or body, is going to change the course of history. But this does not mean the
ascetic body is powerless. What the ascetic body has, which Christ has in Athanasius’ On the
Incarnation, is ability to effect the whole of creation with speed and immediacy—the power of
the immanent, immanent power.
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With Deleuze’s theories of bodily construction inhabiting our analysis, it will be understood that
the ascetic remains involved in a complicated discipline to blur the distinction between his body
and that of Christ, what I will refer to as transparency. My thesis is straightforward: to be
captured by Christ is the goal of the ascetic task in Athanasius’ Life of Antony. The ascetic body
is constructed for a very specific purpose: to capture the Christ concept and repeat the acts of
Christ. But as to exactly what it means to be captured by Christ is not answered very easily. To
answer this question, this study will locate four areas in which this task is accomplished: imitatio
Christi (form of task), demons (medium of resistance), desire (universal substrate), and
immanent body (counter actualization).

(i) Imitatio Christi
Imitation involves perpetual becoming because Athanasius assumes as his subject-model the
absence of a subject. As the goal which the ascetic desires to attain—a life in Christ made
possible by the repetition of that life—the ascetic position of subjectivity is vacuous. Brakke
writes, “Athanasius appears to have lacked a concept of an essential self or given personality;
rather, conformity to some model defined a human being’s character, for good or ill.”39 Peter
Brown observes that “The hermit’s personality, as thus mapped out for him by the religious
koine of the age, wavered between the stable guardianship of Christ and of his protecting angel
and the unstable, incoherent forces of the demonic.”40 Augustine’s inner “warfare” in book VIII
of his Confessions, in which he claims that the impulses of nature and those of the spirit are at
warfare with one another, testifies to the lasting power of the conformity model of Christian
identity. The sense of formlessness was bequeathed to Christians from Greco-Roman culture,
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whose notions of body can be defined as malleable, “constituted by forces surrounding and
pervading the body, like radio waves that bounce around and through the bodies of modern
urbanites…the body is perceived as a location in a continuum of cosmic movement.”41

Because of the lack of a subject, the goal of ascetic self-awareness was not, as one might
imagine, the founding of a subject, but quite the opposite, its dissolution.42 Hence Harpham and
Patrician Cox Miller’s emphasis on the ascetic as an “emerging person” or an “evolving
subject.”43 Complete transparency and the complete void of a subjective position was the goal.
Just at the moments when Antony should be claiming his subjective power, Athanasius has the
young monk defer his power to another: “Working with Antony was the Lord, who bore flesh for
us, and gave to the body the victory over the devil, so that each of those who truly struggle can
say, It is not I, but the grace of God which is in me;”44 “For the performance of signs does not
belong to us—this is the Saviour’s work”;45 “nothing shall separate me from the love of
Christ.”46 This deferral of power to a virtual body (Christ) is a crucial device that Deleuze will
employ so as to not exhaust the ontological power of the virtual in the actual. Though the actual
is a manifestation of the virtual, it does not encompass it. We saw this move before in
Athanasius’ insistence that the act of God assuming a part does not harm the integrity of the
whole, and we are seeing it again in Antony’s effacement of his status as just a part. As the formgiving, Christ must be protected at all costs.
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To put complete power into Antony is not only ontologically a bad strategy, it is also bad politics
for Athanasius.47 Writes Williams, “The repeated statements to the effect that is was not Antony
who performed this or that wonder, but God or Christ, contribute to a depersonalization of power
so as to facilitate its identification with a longer and broader history of power within the
tradition, and therefore to insure a more predictable future for its use.”48 Athanasius wants to
ensure that any power individuals do have is deferred to a source outside that individual’s body,
and further, to ensure that this power will live on.

Whereas Christ did not have to “work” to achieve his status as divine being (God simply
incarnated him), the monk must labor tirelessly for divinity to enter his body, i.e., the value of
achievement in ascetic practice and the oft-cited description of ascetics as “athletes of God.”
Like the athlete, the ascetic must treat their body as a substance that can be changed.
Instrumental, said Tertullian of the flesh. In the Sayings of the Desert Fathers, Antony is
reported to have compared the body to a lump of iron: “Whoever hammers a lump of iron, first
decides what he is going to make of it, a scythe, a sword, or an axe. Even so we ought to make
up our minds what kind of virtue we want to forge or we labour in vain.”49 Antony is not
negating the body, but has a clear vision of the type of body he is trying to create. The
“achievement” of the ascetic, once he has reformed the body, resembles an earlier state: “The
monk’s basic ascetic task is to preserve his “natural” self from the corruption of the passions.”50
Indeed, the body is reformed, manipulated, deformed and altered dramatically, but the trials and
47
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tribulations of the Egyptian monk aimed at the restoration of an earlier state. Just as Christ was a
new Adam, the monk is a repetition of Christ. In the deep, harsh desert, Antony will create a
garden and tame wild beasts, and like Adam and Christ, create a new way of living. But the
Platonic conceptions of the copy as inferior do not apply. As we have seen, Christ has by this
time been ontologically protected through direct and indirect usages of Irenaeus’ concept of
recapitulation. Here, we see the outcome of that protection in the notion of Christ as an
inexhaustible “pattern.” Brakke writes, “The incarnate Christ’s behavior represented a master
‘pattern,’ of which the numerous saintly patterns were acceptable variations.”51 As a textured
plane of immanence, the ascetic achieves his goal of the whole being immanent in him as part to
the degree that their bodies dissolve into the conceptual persona of Christ.

Though there is a lack of a secular subject-model upon which to ground the ascetic identity, this
is not to say nothing is gained in transparency, for as Harpham nicely shows, the ascetic
enterprise is very much a for-profit business. “Early asceticism is capitalism without money,”
writes Harpham.52 What is gained is clear enough—Christ. Christ, as the object of desire, is
gained, doubled over, and repeated on the body, power and affect of the monk. But this does not
mean success is guaranteed. Adiaphoria, the most feared of bodily states, is the state of
becoming unhinged from all reality, the “most terrible temptation of all…to betray their
humanity.”53 Eternally left open, the ascetic in his experimentation was liable to all manners of
becoming. In the state of adiaphoria “the boundaries of man and desert, human and beast
collapsed in chilling confusion,” writes Brown. A paroxysm and enfolding of bodies,
materialities and mutual becomings, adiaphoria did not just mark the point at which the ascetic
51
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had gone too far. Quite the opposite, it marked the place the monk had to go, only it was better
that it didn’t reveal itself outside the monk’s body in the form of desperate wanderings, talking to
oneself and general fits of madness. Adiaphoria assured that the monk had completely destroyed
all traces of subjectivity, for as Foucault says of this special technology—no truth of the self
without destruction of the self.54 Bataille notices the same lack of concern for self, where in his
definition of God, he writes “God—for me—means the lightening flash which exalts the creature
above the concern to protect or increase his wealth in the dimension of time.”55 For Bataille,
temptation is inextricably linked to the desire to unground oneself, to “fail, faint and to squander
all one’s reserves until there is no firm ground beneath one’s feet.”56

Though imitation would make the monastic body more visible, it also served the politics of
locality. In other words, by making orthodox living an attribute of holiness, Athanasius was
consciously removing the locus of holy power away from physical place and putting the “locus
of sanctity” into saintly bodies.57 Because it was in the living body, and the body defined by its
movement, Christianity was in “every place.”58 The monk could be restless and in constant
motion—the monk is always moving, and desert “places” are constantly being colonized and
deserted—because place no longer matters. One explanation for this could be the trajectory of
thought, begun by Tertullian’s notion of place without place.59 Tertullian argued that Christ is
devoid of the ancient, and stained, seed of Adam because he was born of the virgin earth prior to
when Adam was created. Christ, as flesh and “life itself,” was and is everywhere, spread out and
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infused into materiality like salt in salt water. Likewise, the constant motion of the monk where
little Edenic territories are carved out of the desert landscape suggest almost nomadic tendencies
of the ascetics. Of a desert ascetic John, who surpasses in virtue all the other monks of the time,
it is said that “It is not easy for anyone to find him because he is always moving from place to
place in the desert.”60 As in this story, the ability to move, to create territories, thrive, then
reterritorialize oneself was considered a great virtue. The monk was not worried about losing
Christ when they moved their place, for Christ was embodied in action rather than local
geographies. Christ was the literal and philosophical territory upon which the monastic lived, and
upon which his narrative was constructed. Christ was a virtual territory, a conceptual persona,
upon which the life of the ascetic marked his years.

A major tool available to the ascetic was their discernment. Since a theory of the individual self
did not exist, and since the demonic was an extension of the self, self-awareness was paramount
in the act of bodily construction.61 Discernment was crucial in determining what was the result of
one’s thoughts and what was not.62 What is discovered in the struggle with the “tenacious
material,” to use a phrase of Foucault, is the abyss of a sinful nature, and the concomitant
impossibility of ever attaining true perfection. Because to attain true perfection, à la Christ,
would amount to blasphemy, the ascetic had to reconcile himself to a life of unceasing desire,
struggle and temptation. That his subject-position would never finally form in his technology of
the self is taken for granted. Such a situation makes ascetic desire even more crucial. As
Rubenson notes, discernment is close to gnosis. “In all this it is knowledge, gnosis, that is
necessary. If a man does not know his time, if he does not realize the conditions in which he is,
60
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he cannot attain true self-knowledge and knowledge of God.”63 In the Sayings, Antony says,
“Some have afflicted their bodies by asceticism, but they lack discernment, and so they are far
from God.”64 It is no surprise then that it is through discernment of others that he was able to
gather “the attributes of each in himself,” thus allowing him to embark on the ascetic mission.
Athanasius praises Antony’s ability to discern the demonic spirits: “This too was great in
Antony’s asceticism—that possessing the gift of discerning spirits, as I said before, he
recognized their movements and he knew that for which each one of them had a desire and
appetite;”65 “For discrimination between the presence of the good and the evil is easy and
possible, when God so grants it.”66

Vigilance and eternal watchfulness Antony espoused on nearly every occasion with novices:
“His watchfulness was such that he often passed the entire night without sleep, and doing this not
once, but often, he inspired wonder.”67 Antony encouraged a public confession of one’s
thoughts: “Let each one of us note and record our actions and the stirrings of our souls as though
we were going to give an account to each other.”68 A vigilant reminder to never shut down the
senses unless one wants to allow a window of opportunity for the devil to enter—the body must
remain open, always open, but it must gauge the flow of thoughts, food and passions entering the
body.
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(ii) Demons
“The monk must always consider at least a
part of himself as demonic.”
David Brakke69
Not only was the desert the demon’s territory, the sidereal backdrop of the desert landscape
provided a theatre where the monk’s gaze could exercise itself with the most facility.70 If the
martyrs had the crowded Coliseum as their venue, the monks had the desert crowded with
demons. Midway through the vitae, Athanasius is clear that the monastics are a new type of
martyr—martyrs of conscience.71 The desert offered the opportunity for clear discernment in all
aspects of visual imagery—truth in terms of good and evil, less distractions but stronger, more
focused temptation, greater hardship but sweeter rewards. According to Goehring, “If ascetic life
in the desert made the struggle with evil easier, it did so only in the sense that it made it more
direct. In the desert, there was less to distract the monk from the fight and fewer ways for the
enemy to confuse him.”72 As the home and last refuge for the demons, the desert was the place
where the monk must go if he is to have any effectiveness in helping himself and his fellow
humanity.

The desert is the proving ground of messianic bodies and their combat: “…Antony positively
develops this combat as the means of acquiring virtue, of gaining and possessing the immutable
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and permanent. The battle and conflict becomes the means of preserving and transforming the
body into a subject capable of living virtuously.”73

In the Life of Antony, the theme of the demons appears in the text in two ways: through the
narrative encounters Antony has with the demons, and through his lengthy sermon.74 It is the
four encounters with the demonic where Antony’s discerning expertise will be tested with the
greatest consequences, and in each encounter Antony grows more devout and focused on his
discipline. First and foremost, any encounter with the demons put the body in a state of
paroxysm—the body gestures wildly, pulled and torn apart by demons. In the text, we can feel
the pain and terrors accosting Antony. Antony tries to keep the demonic attacks private, which is
logical given the premium on solitude, but one scene in particular stands out as exceptional in the
vitae. Demons attacked Antony at the fortress, and his friends stood outside, anxious for his
safety:

Since he did not allow them to enter [his friends], those of his acquaintance who came to
him often spent days and nights outside. They heard what sounded like clamoring mobs
inside making noises, emitting pitiful sounds and crying out, “Get away from what is
ours! What do you have to do with the desert? You cannot endure our treachery!” At first
those who were outside thought certain men were doing battle with him, and that these
had gained entry by ladders, but when they stooped to peek through a hole, they saw no
one, and they realized that the adversaries were demons.75
As their first line of attack, the demons attack Antony’s thoughts, but they quickly realize that
Antony is too strong for this strategy. Instead, as their second strategy they attack his body by
way of physical battle, illusion, apparition, and trickery. In the vitae, once the attacks become
physical, they never cease to be so. In the manner in which they attach themselves to his body,
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the demons extend the range of the monastic body, testifying to the struggle of the ascetic to both
open himself up to the outside and manage the contents of the act of opening. According to
Harpham, the demons not only provide resistance, but are the medium through which
achievement is gauged.76 Seemingly of outside origin, the demons are as intimate to Antony’s
interior as any other object. The demons are part of Antony on a fundamental level, and provide
a glimpse of the minor physics within the ascetic understanding of the body. The minor physics
that the demons exploit is of a cosmological disharmony expressed in the language of bodily
fragmentation and difference. Brakke’s striking statement—“The monk must always consider at
least a part of himself as demonic” 77—refers to the fact that the interiority of the monk’s self is
analogous to the state of the universe. The monk’s battle to harmonize his body and reach a state
of “undifferentiated unity,” as Brakke calls it, repeats Christ’s act of cosmological harmony
found in his On the Incarnation.

What is remarkable about Athanasius’ demons is how they inhabit a liminal space of being both
a projection of an internal state of affairs, and being very real physical beings with their own
independent existence. In other words, one never really knows if Athanasius is using the imagery
of the demonic as simply a metaphor—a literary device—or if he believed in their concrete
materiality. As to the issue of how the demons inhabit the inside and outside of the ascetic body,
one consistent property is that their actions correspond “to the condition in which they find us;
they pattern their phantasm after our thoughts. Should they find us frightened and distressed,
immediately they attack like robbers, having found the place unprotected. Whatever we are
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turning over in our minds, this—and more—is what they do.”78 More specifically, the demons
represent nostalgia and attachment, nostalgia for a life that was, and attachment for a life that the
monk may desire. On the one hand, the weapons of the demons are “thoughts,” reminding him of
food, sex, companionship, possessions, and various other items of a life that was. On the other
hand, the demons represent the current struggle the ascetic experiences: the struggle with virtue,
full-time devotion to God, the weakness of the body, and so on.79

A tale in the life of Pityron, in the Historia monachorum, reiterates this point, “For whichever
passion one overcomes, one also drives out its corresponding demon.”80 Representing passions,
the ascetic needs to turn the demons into his virtue. According to analytic philosopher Lester
Hunt, Nietzsche holds a similar view of virtue. For Hunt, Nietzsche’s theory of virtue, found
mainly in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, follows this general trend of converting one’s passions into
one’s virtues.81

Just before Antony clashes with the philosophers, and just after he moved to the inner mountain,
Antony has a vision in which he sees himself outside himself, and is being lifted off by certain
beings. Antony sees a great ugly figure tossing souls from the air, with some passing through:
“Next, he saw some foul and terrible figures standing in the air, intent on holding him back so he
could not pass by.”82 The foul beings in the air asked for an accounting of his life, and Antony’s
guide-beings said that his slate before he was a monk has been wiped clean, but that of after
becoming a monk you can take an account. “Then, as they leveled accusations and failed to
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prove them, the passage opened before him free and unobstructed. And just then he saw himself
appear to come and stand with himself, and once more he was Antony, as before.”83 In this
passage, the air is a figure of the “soul’s passage.” The Life continues: “And his understanding
was opened, and he comprehended that it was the passage of the souls, and that the huge figure
was the enemy who envies the faithful.” According to Brakke, the element of the air was the
principle element where the battle for salvation occurred—for Christ as well as for us.84

As agents and symbols of the Fall, the demons are manifestations of a fallen state of affairs. To
rid oneself of demons is tantamount to achieving the Edenic state, long since lost since Adam’s
transgression.85 Writes Brakke, “Because Antony considers the monk’s like to be a process of
return to an original undifferentiated unity, the demons represent the tendency toward separation,
division and individuality.”86 Conquering the demonic is tantamount to clearing a heavenly path
for oneself, but for the ascetic it is also a “public” and/or a social performance, wherein the monk
clears the path for others. This figure of the air repeats the claim that Christ was crucified in the
air so he could clear the path for our souls, and the additional fact that Christ himself was the
path. Athanasius now understands the monk to be performing a similar duty.

The demons are images of subjectivity, passion, temptation, desire and of the transparency of the
ascetic body-mind complex. Without the demons, temptation cannot be encountered, and without
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temptation, no success can be gauged.87 Understood against the background of success, the
“athlete” of God would therefore be without an enemy, and the ascetic task unravels.
Athanasius’ christology, in which the demonic is central, is structured by some form of
repetition. Since the ascetic is involved in imitation, and cannot escape the entanglements of
mimicry, it is only natural that in the desire to imitate, another form of imitation could serve to
deceive the monk. Harpham observes,

In all they do, demons represent a principle of perfect imitation that is at once the goal
of the ascetic and his undoing...And the purity of their mimicry perpetrates a crisis of the
logos in the suspicion that the “original” is already structured by repetition; this suspicion
is, indeed, virtually institutionalized in the doctrine of the Logos: ‘In the beginning was
the Word.’88
Anxiety over the real vs. the copy, the christic vs. the demonic—all results of the
institutionalization of repetition in logos christology. One might assume that the best way to rid
oneself of the demons is to keep away from them, to avoid them, pay them no attention. In a
certain sense, this is exactly what Antony does, but in another sense Antony must fully embrace
the demonic, and incorporate their corrupt bodies into his with the best of his ability. The ascetic
needs to court temptation, needs to enter it, and when he does assume the form of the demonic,
his body being under siege, the imagery is of not rejecting anything, but of allowing oneself to be
dissolved in the face of onslaught, to become the beasts.

In his sixth letter, Antony writes: “For they are in secret, and we make them manifest by our
works. For they are all from one source in their intellectual substance; but in their flight from
God, great diversity arises between them through the variety of their working.”89 With
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Athanasius’ use of the language of diversity, we find ourselves once again in the territory of the
One vs. the Many. If we were to use Deleuzian language, the word-picture of the ascetic under
attack is an image of pure difference and ontological ungrounding. The demonic encounter is
indicative of cosmological difference, to which the ascetic overcoming of the demonic satisfies
the principle of unity. Writes Brakke, “Demons are built into the structure of the fallen cosmos as
the principles of differentiation.”90 Hence the fact that the acts of the monk have cosmological
registers, which will be taken up later in this chapter. The image of ascetic onslaught, however, is
not a picture of a monastic becoming something other, but a picture of becoming itself, and this
becoming is the becoming of the body in the endless task of “athletic” modification. Since the
demons are intimately tied to the power of one’s will to calm the passions, redirecting the flood
of desire inherent to the body is crucial to rid the demons.

(iii) Desire
“Bestiality with the monastery’s donkeys could not be ruled out.”
Peter Brown, Body and Society
At the center of ascetic desire is the art of construction. In what follows, we will see how desire
is the fuel of this construction, for it was in the art of defining, managing and spiritualizing desire
that Christianity will make inroads into Pagan sensibility.91 The early groups of the second
century were so heterogeneous, and from such different social and religious backgrounds, that
according to Brown “a sexual nature was the one thing they had in common.”92 What is universal
is a division in the heart of humanity, a void or a wound, as Augustine would call it, at the center
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of human subjectivity. As we saw with the ascetic abyss of subjectivity, here we learn that desire
is the fuel of the ascetic narrative, and maps out the topography of a subject not in search of
itself, a body which must desire and deform itself. Burrus observes, “In hagiography, the sexed
subject—the subject itself—is continually deformed, unformed, and reformed in the dynamic of
a desiring resistance, a resisting desire.”93 According to Burrus, the management of desire is a
profound skill of the ascetic, sliding between the temptation to close desire’s circuits but also the
resistance to that closure. It is because of the inability to close desire that the ascetic subject
came to realize the vacuous gap at the heart of its subject-model, the solution to which it posed:
fill up the heart, mind and body with Christ. Only then will one be complete—what one was
intended to be. It is because of the omnipresence of desire that the interior of the ascetic was an
open amphitheatre, an emerging subject.

The monk could not just negate desire. The ascetic praxis of managing desire is that it had to be
courted, and the ascetic had to put themselves at the limit of mental and bodily health
(adiaphoria). Attributed to Abba Antony, it is said that “Whoever had not experienced
temptation cannot enter in the Kingdom of Heaven…Without temptation no-one can be saved.”94
Likewise in one of the famous scenes in the vitae, Antony is battling the demons, and when
finished, exhausted and nearly dead, a beam of light descends on him and the pain in his body
disappears. Aware that it is God, Antony reasonably asks God where he was during the demonic
attack. God answers that “I was here, Antony, but I waited to watch your struggle. And now,
since you persevered and were not defeated, I will be your helper forever, and I will make you
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famous everywhere.”95 This is God’s only appearance in the vitae. Like the story of Jacob
wrestling with the angel (demons are angels too), God rewards the athletic struggle.

Desire made the ascetic, made the ascetic project, and it constructed the social and political
imagery of the ascetic world. Desire is production on a number of levels. Likewise, for Deleuze
desire is not defined in terms of negation, lack, suppression or repression; this is what Deleuze
refers to as the “curse” of desire, mostly thanks to Freud. Rather, desire is being.96 Desire is what
constitutes bodies, who are themselves manifestations of being like all other organic life. Desire
is taken up by Deleuze and Guattari most forcefully in Anti-Oedipus, where desire is
reconceptualized in terms of production and consumption. Desire produces the social, rather than
the laws and propaganda determining what a body desires; desire is responsible for the material
configuration of the real. Deleuze and Guattari write: “Desire produces reality, or stated another
way, desiring-production is one and the same thing as social production. It is not possible to
attribute a special form of existence to desire, a mental or physical reality that is presumably
different from the material reality of social production.”97 Desire is not a unit in the human
body, or a force that can be opposed to other forces, but rather the name for the machine that is
the body. Though their analyses are primarily devoted to a critique of Freud and contemporary
flows of capital, when taken in the larger context of Deleuze’s writings desire speaks much more
specifically to the task of construction. As F. LeRon Shults acutely observes, desire plays a
major role in the construction of immanence and its enigmatic relation to the body without
organs. In the opening paragraph of “November 28, 1947: How Do you Make Yourself a Body
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without Organs?,” Deleuze and Guattari immediately link up the productive capacity of desire
with the bodily construction. In regards to constructing the body without organs, they write:
At any rate, you make one, you can’t desire without making one. And it awaits you; it is
an inevitable exercise or experimentation….you can botch it. Or it can be terrifying, and
lead you to your death. It is nondesire as well as desire. It is not at all a notion of a
concept but a practice, a set of practices. You never reach the Body without Organs, you
can’t reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit.98
And a few pages later: “A BwO is made in such a way that it can be occupied, populated only by
intensities. Only intensities pass and circulate.”99 Desire “fills itself and constructs its own field
of immanence.”100 Dismantling the body never meant killing yourself, but “opening the body to
connections that presuppose an entire assemblage…”101

But what is a body without organs, and what is the relation to the ascetic body? Simply put, the
BwO is a limit of intensity, an image of deterrorialization, wilderness, apocalypse, the
potentiality of the virtual itself, a formless body dissolved into the ungrounded force of
difference. A body without organs is a “body as event.”102

The BwO requires practice and a set of practices, and must involve experimentation. Failure is
always an option, as is death, write Deleuze and Guattari. How close is the ascetic body to the
BwO? Not close at all, for the BwO cannot be reached. But neither can the christic body for the
monk, as that would be idolatry. The ascetic task is endless. But this does not mean that some
manifestation of the BwO is not what ascetics desire. Is not Christ a virtual, formless body
inhabiting a virtual, spectral presence in the lives of the ascetics, to which they desire with all
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their being? Is not the ascetic project nothing but a vast experimentation of the body, courting
death at each turn, designed to make the ascetic body dissolve in the nearness to the divine, and,
in this dissolution, become populated with the intensity of creation, understood to be Christ
itself? Is not the ascetic body designed to perform, in duplicate, with that of Christ? What, then,
is Christ? Can Christ be conceptualized as a bodily state of affairs, rather than a transcendent
element governing and hierarchizing the ascetic project? Irenaeus claimed that Christ assumed
all of humanity in his incarnation, assuming not just physical imperfections, but the virtual
corruption found in all human and non-human entities. Without question, with his theory of
recapitulation, Irenaeus transcendentalized Christ. Tertullian insisted that Christ, as flesh, was
“life itself.” So it is not the case that ascetics are also desiring to be “life itself,” understood
under the name of Christ?

To make this conceptual leap, we need to better link Christ and body under the heading of
immanence. Immanence will mean here what it is—it describes a state of affairs such that an act
begins and ends inside an agent. According to Brown, the body-image the ascetics brought with
them to the desert consisted primarily of a notion of the body as autarkic system. Brown writes:
In ideal conditions, it [the body] was thought capable of running on its own “heat”; it
would need only enough nourishment to keep that heat alive. In its “natural: state—a
state with which the ascetic tended to identify the bodies of Adam and Eve—the body
had acted like a finely tuned engine, capable of “idling” indefinitely. It was only the
twisted will of fall men that had crammed the body with unnecessary food, thereby
generating in it the dire surplus of energy that shows itself in physical appetite, in anger,
and in the sexual urge.103
Brown’s claim that the ascetic was not just returning to a prior state, but that it was a state
immanent to the body under the right conditions, reinforces the observation that the body is a
self-sufficient machine. The ascetic was not after adding Christ to his or her body, but creating a
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body that needed (no)thing. It was this body—in need of (no)thing—that was prelapsarian, and is
structurally akin to Tertullian’s virgin earth. But it is also a Christic body in a very narrow sense:
insofar as Christ is layered onto the texture of material life (the Incarnation), Christ is also selfsufficient, creating the world anew from inside its parameters (immanent causality). Further,
Brown’s thesis explains how in response to the question, what shall I do?, Antony responds “Do
not trust in your righteousness, do not worry about the past, but control your tongue and your
stomach.” Too much food begins the downfall and disorderliness of the passions. The body is
not so much finding itself as it is constructing itself so it can be a repetition of the cosmological
balance of nature—harmonious, self-sufficient life force, whose powers remain in immanent
flux. The very real and supposed power of the ascetic body relies on this autarkic system, for
with autarky no disorder can arise. Conceptual power surrounds the ascetic body as if by halo.104

(iv) Immanent Body

Body Parts
Mention of body parts are so frequent in ascetic literature that one is led to believe that the
dominant image of the body is that of fragmentation into parts. The ascetic task is therefore to
bring the parts back into unison. Pseudo-Macarius the Egyptian in his Homily IV, composed in
Asia Minor at the turn of the fifth century, writes of not just protecting the body from “evil
things,” but the parts of the body.
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Just as in actual existence this body is dull witted, in the same way even the soul, being
a subtle entity, embraces the eye through which it sees, the ear through which it hears,
likewise the tongue through which it speaks; the soul is held together embracing the
hand, and in general all the body and its parts through which the soul completes all of the
pursuits of life.105
By “gathering” the body parts together, the ascetic protects the “beautiful tunic of the body
untorn, unburnt and unblemished.”106 According to Pseudo-Macarius, the parts of the body are
liable to distraction, each with their own weaknesses and passion. This bodily rebellion leads to
fragmentation. In many ways, the soul is coextensive not with the body’s parts, but with their
immanence to each other, i.e., their immediate and functioning totality. Graceful movement
defines the beautiful soul because graceful movement is indicative of a well-trailed will.
In Coptic Manichaeism, the imagery is found in the Kephalaia of Mani, where in a poem Mani
speaks of illness overcoming the body’s parts. To heal the fragmented body according to Mani, a
wise man must perform incantations over the limbs of the body, hoping to return the body to its
natural state of wholeness.107 Likewise, when the ascetic fasts, his members take part in the
fast.108 Once thought to be penned by Augustine, Ambrosiaster’s On the Sin of Adam and Eve
reveals that the whole body is equated with usefulness. Ambrosiaster is in the passage speaking
about the cessation of human generation, and he asks if the world would be dysfunctional if
some things ceased to be while others continued, but the reference to the health of all the body’s
limbs is unmistakable: “Either it operates as a whole or it comes to rest as a whole. Is a body
useful, if some of its members thrive while others wither?”109
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What I will term the immanent body is the goal of certain ascetic practices—controlling the
body’s members through suppressing the passions and focusing on the intellectual part of the
soul. Each task cannot be thought without its partner—controlling the limbs is not merely a
performance of a well-trained will. Internality and externality were each instrumental to one
another. The ascetic task of putting the body back together highlights the often neglected view
that, in its natural state, the body is defined by a riot of independent parts each moving in their
own directions. Demons attacking the limbs of the body, such as we can see with the numerous
depictions of the Temptation of St. Antony, frequently in art history, is a visual imagination of
bodily fragmentation and deformation—an aesthetic moment of pure difference. Though it is
hard to say exactly where the notion of bodily fragmentation comes from—lived experience, preSocratics, ancient theories of medicine and physics, Stoicism, etc—we can pinpoint the relation
of the task to unify the body with the ontological imagery of the world as a giant body. In other
words, the task to unify the body, to make it whole again, is to repeat the ontological problem of
difference at the level of the body. Limbs immanent to other limbs is what is immanent in the
immanent body—body as duplicate harmonious universe, limbs communicating with perfection
and precision.

.
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Figure 7. Photograph of dancer Amanda Wooden. Photo by Jordan Matter, 2012.
But what is it about limbs? Limbs are the body’s natural adornment. Limbs are the body’s
jewelry. For fashion theory, limbs are territories and units of sensation. Limbs allow us to use
tools. The athlete of the Greco-Roman period had to have a harmonious physique, each muscle
proportional to the others and each limb suited perfectly to their bodies proportion, a property
required of our modern day body builders as well.110 Da Vinci and Alberti, two of the great
theorists of Renaissance painting, would make this concept of proportional harmony the
cornerstone of the beauty of the painted figure. Considered athletes of God, ascetics had to wear
their virtue like the athlete wore their body—in control, with power and will, decisive. This
translated to beauty, grace and supra-worldly description on the side of athletes and monks alike.
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Mallarmé would write of the grace of the dancer as inhabiting a field no longer relegated to a
horizontal, phenomenon field—a body, one could say, without a territory (Figure 7). For
Mallarmé, grace is sublimity, and is the reward of the body when it creates the conditions of its
own weightlessness.111 Dance theorist Sondra Fraleigh adds to Mallarmé’s definition of grace the
concept of intentionality: “It is the entire body conscious of intentionality…These are those
times when you become absorbed into your body’s consciousness, your intentions dissolve, and
movement becomes easily commensurate with body. No element of the movement is foreign to
you; you claim it as yours.”112 With an emphasis on intentional movements, of letting the
discipline sink so deep into the body that the body becomes the practice, the ascetic body is,
according to Fraleigh’s definition, dancing. Andre Lepeki provides an equally powerful
theoretical account of the dancing body, brining ever closer the ascetic body and dancing body
through a conception of sociopolitical agency,

This body, visceral matter as well as sociopolitical agent, discontinuous with itself,
moving in the folds of time, dissident of time, manifests its agency through the many
ways it eventually smuggles its materiality into a charged presence that defies subjection.
Dance as a critical theory and critical praxis proposes a body that is less an empty
signifier (executing preordained steps as it obeys blindly to structures of command) than
a material, socially inscribed agent, a non-univocal body, an open potentiality, a forcefield constantly negotiating its position in the powerful struggle for its appropriation and
control.113
Defying subjection, moving in the folds of time, smuggling into materiality a charged presence, a
socially inscribed agent, an open potentiality resisting appropriation and control—as much is
being claimed of the ascetic body. The ascetic body is also performing like an athlete, and
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anyone familiar with the notion of the athletic body in Graeco-Roman antiquity knows that grace
is the sine qua non of the athlete. When in motion, the divine athlete’s limbs swung with
cosmological harmony. As every athlete knows, any difficult athletic movement requires the
entire body. Each limb must work with each other—the entirety of the body must enter the
singularity of the limb. The Whole must enter the Part. Myron’s Discus Thrower, carved in the
fifth century b.c., represents the athletically dancing body caught in the moment when the body
recoils itself so as to generate outward movement.
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Figure 8. Discobolus of Myron. Roman marble copy of a fifth century Greek bronze.

This tension, or tonos, captures the moment of athletic grace, the moment when movement
becomes athletic. The downward turned face of the Discus Thrower (Figure 8) intensely focuses
on bodily control, especially the arc of his back arm, in which the slightest twitch of this limb,
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causing a misfire or misdirection, signals inevitable failure for the flight of the discus. Like the
baseball pitcher or the golf swing, the plane of arc that the limbs must follow is so exact it takes
years to master, and entire sports are conceived on this fact. When an athlete has lost his swing,
there is no formula to get it back. Though ascetics are not engaged in any of these types of
activities, these facts however remain true to lived experience, and the Greco Roman notion of
the ascetic as an “athlete of God” was surely just one perceptual register in which to understand
the ascetic’s control of their limbs. Controlling the limbs was for Greek athletics an act of divine
favor, and the athletic body was cosmological in that, like the role of the logos for the cosmos, it
held unruly forces together when their nature was to fragment. The body for the Greeks was the
same as it was for the early Christians—the body’s movement was interpreted in ontological and
cosmological registers.

Due to his burning service for God, Symeon the Stylite had “chastity of body with pure
limbs,”114 but we are not told exactly what “pure limbs” are. According to his vitae, “In open
view the flesh of his feet ruptured from much standing, but his steadfast mind was on fire for his
Lord, a contest in secret. The vertebrae of his spine were dislocated through constant
supplication, but he was fastened and held together by the love of Christ.”115 In the Life of
Antony, an encounter with a “very tall demon” is being relayed by Antony, and, as is common in
the vitae, he fights off the demon with “the mention of the name of Christ.”116 Repeatedly, the
demon whipped the beleaguered Antony, but upon repeating “Nothing shall separate me from
the love of Christ,” the demons lashed out at each other instead, and Antony’s body remained
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intact.117 On another occasion, Antony is asked to pray with some monks in a boat. After
entering the boat, Antony perceives an odorous smell that no other monks can discern. The other
monks try to convince Antony the odor is coming from dead fish, presumably lying around in the
boat, but Antony, the wiser of the bunch, recognizes it to be the scent of a demon that had
possessed a young boy. In typical dramatic fashion, Athanasius writes: “But being rebuked in the
name of our Lord Jesus Christ, the demon departed and the man was restored to health.”118 Being
able to summon Christ against the tendencies of bodily fragmentation that encounters with the
demonic involve is a power of the ascetic. Christ restores the unhealthy and comes to the rescue
when Antony’s body is being lashed by demons.

Christ as support for the ascetic project is typical language for ascetic literature, but in the
reference to his dislocated spinal column, with one’s love of Christ as the agent of bondage, it is
hard to tell the difference if this is purely literary technique (metaphor) or reflects the true belief
that Christ was a material sinew holding the monk’s body together, though I am apt to lean
towards the latter. Just as we saw with the phenomenon of the demons, it is real and not real,
residing not in both categories at once, but perhaps constructing a category unique to this specific
tradition, i.e., embodied thought grounded in the conceptual persona of Christ, or what Miller
calls the figural imagination of late antique Christianity. Christ is not only holding the theology
together, but, according to the hagiographical accounts, holding actual bodies together.119
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At the end of the Antony’s vitae, it is said that Antony retained the health in his feet and hands,
and in his “Letter to Marcellinus,” Athanasius speaks of how the wrong desires create a state of
discord in the body, which manifests itself in the parts of the body.120 More than any other,
Antony’s Letters, eight in total, express a direct theorization of the movements of the body.121

The Antony of the vitae, however, differs remarkably from the Antony of the Letters. The major
difference between the two is the Letter’s emphasis on self-knowledge. Rubenson concludes that
the Antony of the Letters is closer to a spiritual teacher of gnosis, as opposed to the powerdeferring combative ascetic of the vitae. Of the Antony of the Letters, Rubenson writes, “his
theological background, his emphasis on self-knowledge and the lack of references to
authoritative writings or to ecclesiastical leaders suggest that he was what could be called a
charismatic teacher of spiritual gnosis.”122 While the Letters emphasize Jesus, rationality, the
parousia, cosmology, the Holy Spirit, and speak of demons as non-visible internal agents, the
vitae is decidedly Christocentric and only mentions the Spirit on one occasion as the giver of
grace. Demons are visible in the vitae, and while rationality does play a part, spiritual combat
and bodily practice is arguably more important than self-knowledge.
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Antony speaks of three motions of the body in his first letter, which are taken up and repeated in
the following letters. The movements are as follow: 1) natural—“There is that which is
implanted in the body by nature, compacted with it in its first creation; but this is not operative if
the soul does not will it, save only that it signifies its presence through a passionless movement
in the body.” Movement exists here, but it is passionless, having its origin in the soul. This is
Edenic movement. 2) abundant: a movement from too much food and drink, which causes the
blood to heat up, which leads to the passions, which leads to the Fall, which leads to
fragmentation. This reiterates Brown’s notions of the body as autarkic system. 3) demonic: a
movement of the demons when they become mixed in the body’s limbs. These three movements
constitute the aesthetic system of movement for Antony. Eagerly seeking to gain the first
movement (natural, i.e., Edenic), the second two form the structure of ascetic temptation.
Abundant and demonic movement are inextricably linked, most likely as a trickle down effect
from the second to the third. Too much food creates one movement which thereby opens the
passions and allows the demons to take over the body.

While not addressed as directly in the vitae, the letters are clear that the demons are mingled in
the limbs of the body. While some “wounds of the soul,” however, remain outside the body,
“being mingled in the will,” the movements of the body have their origins in a will divided
against itself. 123 Though the principle of essence to appearance seems to predominate how
disorder manifests in the body (from will as essence to limbs as manifestation), it is not the rule
that one cannot fix the problem of disorder from appearance to essence. In other words, the
ascetic reaches the will through the body’s limbs. Guided by the spirit, Antony in the letters
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speaks of purifying the eyes, tongue, hands, belly and feet. Only after going through the body
parts, does Antony speak of the resurrection:

And I think that when the whole body is purified, and has received the fullness of the
Spirit, it has received some portion of the spiritual body which it is to assume in the
resurrection of the just. This I have said concerning the sickness of the soul which are
mingled with the members of the bodily nature in which the soul moves and works; and
so the soul becomes guide to the evil spirits which by it have been working in the limbs
of the body.124
The body whose parts are purified attains some “portion” of the resurrected body. For
Athanasius the resurrection is not just about the end of time, but of restoring in time man’s
original body and will,125 and in his letters Antony preserves a tension between the already and
the not yet of Jesus’s coming.126

Ontological Slippage
Letters III, V, VI and VII bring forth the Stoic logic of a world with a harmony of parts, or
members working together as one. Letter VI in particular explicitly connects body and cosmos
and the mutual problem they share—alienation of limbs. Antony begins by citing Col. 1:15-18,
which is a summary of Christ’s pre-existence and co-creation, and reiterates the basic tenets of
recapitulation, which states that (i) Christ is the head of the church, and that (ii) his body is the
Church. Antony’s language would not strike us as strange were he to keep the conversation on
the ontological level, but this is not what he does. The passage continues:

Therefore we are all members one of another, and the body of Christ, and the head
cannot say to the feet, ‘I have no need of you’; and if one member suffers, the whole
body is moved and suffers with it. But if a member is estranged from the body, and has
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no communication with the head, but is delighted by the passions of its own body, this
means that its wound is incurable, and it has forgotten its beginning and its end.127
The strangeness of the passage is constituted by the slippage between the ontological and the
bodily. The imagery is of a cosmic body with alienated members who can no longer
communicate with the head because the members, which are themselves bodies in their own
right, are estranged from their own bodies thanks to the passions. Because the limb-bodies are
estranged from themselves, they can no longer communicate within themselves, and this
dysfunction repeats itself a second time in a dysfunctionality in the cosmic body. The lack of
communication reveals a state of affairs—the “wound” of humanity—and because of it the
member “has forgotten its beginning and its end.”128 Christ, as physician, makes it possible for us
to activate communication once again on both levels by recapitulating the beginning with the
end. This technical operation occurs because, as I have argued earlier, Christ is a body-ontology,
and so any philosophical operations at work on this level have dual effects when it comes to
bodily understanding (ascetic practice) and ontological cohesion.

So remarkable and frequent is the sliding between language of the actual body working together
and the cosmological body working together that one is led to conclude that the ascetic selfunderstanding of controlling the body’s limbs necessarily repeats the ontological power of Christ
bringing difference under the cloak of unity, or of constructing unity on the basis of a harmony
of parts. My thesis: the monk’s body is an immanent body because it is at once a cosmological
body, replete with the cosmological drama of fragmentation, recapitulation and creation.
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But what logic is employed to justify Antony’s language? Letter VI invokes the logic of the
incarnation, stating that Christ took the form of poverty to rid poverty, weakness to rid weakness,
and so on. Humanity was wounded, and Christ, adopting the form of the wounded, came to earth
as a wounded “physician.” Christ’s assumption of the wound healed the wound. In theoretical
terms—assumption of the whole by a part heals the whole and the parts. Monastic practice is in
some sense therefore a distilled, albeit lengthened, crucifixion. The monk’s body is given
cosmological power because written on the body is the (Christic) narrative of cosmological
fragmentation, recapitulation and creation.

Christ is indeed immanent to the ascetic body, but the answer to what is Christ? is not a
hierarchical being governing the ascetic body. It is instructive to remember how we got to this
point. Irenaeus established the fact that Christ gathered humanity into his body. Drawing on the
Stoics, Irenaeus would reaffirm Paul’s statement that the cosmos is a body. Tertullian established
the fact that Christ was more than just the cosmos, but the “fabric of life,” and with the caveat
that Christ had another name, Flesh. Moreover, Tertullian was insistent on the absolute proximity
of flesh to living man, thus paving the way for ascetic notions of achieving that proximity. Flesh
is instrumental, according to Tertullian, which can be understood in two registers: Christ taking
flesh was an instrument of God to incarnate the world, or our flesh is instrumental in becoming
Christ-like. These were not two different acts, but had to be thought together, mostly thanks to
the power of the conceptual persona that Irenaeus laid out. Athanasius’ logic in On the
Incarnation drew from Tertullian the fact that Christ’s assumption of a part unified the whole,
but Athanasius will further refine the dynamics of the ontological movement of a part and how
this has significance for the whole. Moreover, whereas the Pauline language of the ontological
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body is that of Christ as the body of the church, “to Antony it is an image of the entire
creation.”129 Athanasius’ Life of Antony completes the conflation of Christ and lived body by
placing Christ at the center of the ontological spectrum—Christ as immanent cause—thereby
allowing for the concept of imitatio Christi to take hold in practice.130

Two acts repeat themselves in enfolded con-substantiality, and the difference between lived body
and the cosmos blurs to non-differentiation. The virtual event that is Christ’s incarnation and
subsequent unification (being speaks in one voice after the Christ-event) is repeated in historical
time with similar consequences. The door is opened for the ascetic body to take part in the
creation of new life, to pick up, as it were, where Christ left off, to become, in Deleuzian
language, deterritorialized. “And all that the Savior did through the Saints, he does in our own
times through these monks,” says an anonymous source in the epilogue to the Historia
monachorum. And as if to frame the activities of the ancient athletes, the prologue reads “Indeed,
it is clear to all who dwell there that through them the world is kept in being, and that through
them too human life is preserved and honored by God.”131 Life’s creation and preservation is an
act of the ascetic body.

Avant Garde Bodies
If by avant garde we mean the property of an individual to further creation through creative acts,
as it was first defined in the early nineteenth century by Saint Simonian Olinde Rodrigues to
describe the artist, scientist and industrialist, the ascetic body is an avant garde body, guiding
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creation to new and different forms of creaturehood.132 Curiously, the current theorization of the
avant garde artist locates a similar tension between artist and social body that we have found in
the ascetic body. As cultural vanguards involved in communication with transcendent forms and
mystical processes, the artists of the earliest avant garde movement act as figures of
propheticism, privy to hermetic realms of creation, redemption, and beauty. One need only think
of the upward moving triangle of Kandinsky’s theosophy.133 The project of the historical avant
garde was equal part social and aesthetic, with their utopian visions taking shape in the smallest
of perceptual cues and the largest of industrial vision (Bauhaus, Russian Constructivism). Mark
Taylor notes that “influential members of what eventually came to be known as the avant-garde
advanced utopian visions, which, though not acknowledged as such, were actually artistic visions
of the kingdom of God.”134 Peter Berger’s Theory of the Avant Garde, one of the earliest
theorizations of the problem of “proximity” of the avant garde to culture, reiterates the problem
of the ascetic body’s relation to surrounding life. The avant garde artist remains in a problematic
situation vis- à-vis culture in that to bring together art and life-praxis, which was and remains the
goal of the avant garde, the distance had to be collapsed between art and life.135 However, when
the distance was collapsed, the theoretical edge garnered from “critical distance” was lost as
well, which thereby disabled art’s ability to create the objects for culture’s renewal. Too much
cultural intimacy allowed their art to become life—in the form of stagings, readings,
performances, and so on—but at the same time artists lost the critical edge, the distance as it
were, required of a cultural prophet. In essence, the question is: to what degree can an individual
and the acts surrounding their being express the cultural body while at the same time renew that
132
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cultural body? We can translate this, once again, into the logic of the part and the whole—the
ability of the part to be the whole and yet distinct from it. As we have seen, this was foremost of
Athanasius’ concerns for Christ—that Christ be equated with it on a material level but distinct
from it on a virtual level.

Given that the agency granted to the ascetic body requires that they too express creation through
their embodiment of a repeated Christ, the logic of the ascetic remains on the structural level
analogous. To be a vehicle of God, to express the glory of creation in a single being, to shine
with luminescence, to explicate the cosmos, to have one’s being rest in being itself, to renew
creation—this is the by-product, if not the goal, of asceticism. Writes Valantasis,

Asceticism functions as a system of cultural formation; it orients the person or group of
people to the immediate cultural environment and to the unexpressed, but present,
systems that underlie it….Asceticism may be defined as performances designed to
inaugurate an alternative culture, to enable different social relations, and to create a new
identity.136
No longer is creation a top-down emanative or telos driven causality, but the principles whereby
creation is renewed are immanent to creation itself. The property of Christ’s co-creation cannot
be overestimated, for it is this property above all others allowing the early Christian authors to
justify the fact that Christ could renew Creation not just because he was sent by God, but because
he was always-already part of creation. Christ could renew creation because he had made it. The
creation of the immanent cause is therefore a repetition of the original cosmological act of
creation. God did not send Christ, and the Christ did not embody God, but rather this specific
articulation of Christ made the thought of an immanent God possible, since the tools for thinking
divine immanence were not readily available. Transcendence was not erased from the
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philosophical terrain, but rather transcendence was renamed as the harmonization of the parts;
the whole, as the image of the harmonization of parts.137

Deleuze terms this process of renewing creation from within “counter-actualization.” To renew
creation from within, one had to dissolve the self and become transparent to the forces around
them. Bataille terms such subjective death the moment of opening unto the infinite, where “death
desired by the holy man turns into divine life for him.”138 According to Bataille, the mystic and
saint desire an object in which it is hard to say whether it is the glory of life or the blackness of
death.139—“In each case it is hard to say whether the object of desire is the incandescence of life
or of death.” It is only on the edge of death that the world becomes transparent to the ascetic. 140
The dissolution of the self, which is broadly conceived the placeholder for one’s identity, is
instrumental for Bataille. Under certain conditions, Deleuze found the dissolution of the self not
only safe, but productive, and, in most instances, required. But what motivates the theorization of
counter-actualization when Deleuze’s ontology is already teeming with creative life? The
problem is that the forms of creation, as the process of actualization hints toward, are divorced
from the virtual. The forms and objects of creation are helpless to add to the creativity of nature.
In other worlds, only virtuality is creative. Creation goes from virtuality to actuality, and not vice
versa. But in rare instances the creature can embody the form-giving virtual powers and in turn
speak for the whole. Hallward sums up this fact nicely, “The actual is not creative but its
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dissolving can be.”141 These instances are rare, requiring experimentation, risk and the creation
of a new body able to dissolve itself so as to capture the life around it. In this Deleuzian
becoming-virtual there is a danger, or, one should admit, a probability of becomingimperceptible, anonymous, and asignifying. The counter-actualized being loses its status as being
in favor of the abstract Whole.

Using Deleuze’s concept of counter-actualization, we can see how the ascetic body adds,
completes and renews creation. This process is guided by the fact that Christ is not just the name
of a religious figure, but the image of a body-ontology. For Deleuze’s notion of counteractualization to be possible, a certain ontological configuration had to be constructed; that is,
each being, or part, had to be understood as an expression of the entire system. Once this is
established, whatever can be seen in the part is expressive in some manner of the whole. It is the
logic of implication and explication so crucial to process thought. The disciplining of the will
and the body put the body in order, and was more than analogous to the harmonizing of the
cosmos—the ascetic body under control was understood with the language of a self-sufficient
universe. But as we know, the ascetic project was not just about the spectacle of control. Equally
populated by stories of deformity and the state of being out of control, ascetic hagiography
provided a view of human life in its most extreme conditions. The imagery of the human
condition highlighted by this literature is that of the task of perpetual re-creation.

Effecting Space
Broadly conceived, counter-actualization concerns the creative potential of the human body to
influence life. We can understand this potential in another register—effecting space. Since in the
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following chapters we will see how the ascetic body has influenced Western painting, it is only
fitting that this potential be put into spatial metaphors. Effecting space should be understood as a
theoretical translation attempting to broadly define ascetic power. The “space” in question is not
physical space. Space refers to a mythological and cosmological field that was believed to have
been altered in Christ’s advent. Broadly conceived, this space is not empty, but defined as a
fabric whereupon any alteration immanently registers an effect elsewhere. It is a translation of
“the universe” yet it differs from this positivist notion in the sense that this “space” is enfolded
within the Christ concept, and, moreover, co-defined by the Christ concept. This specifically
Christian cosmology is made possible by the concept of Christ, since Christ is, in a way,
commensurate with it. Immanent causality is the main feature of this space.

Though with Athanasius the concept received more definition, it was found in a more primitive
manner in the work of Irenaeus and Tertullian. Recapitulation concerns the retroactive
deployment of Christ across a historical spectrum, in such a way that Christ corrected the corrupt
Adamic body. As a “second Adam,” Christ drew the historical plane of bodies upon him, acting
as a device of capture for all historical bodies. For Tertullian, effecting space was found initially
in the flesh, where Christ, by donning human flesh, divinized humanity. Flesh was itself an
active space wherein the drama of the incarnation took place. Just as the flesh was equally a
cosmological, material and mythological site upon which the Christian story was told, space is
equally so. In On the Incarnation, Athanasius held a Stoic-influenced theory of Christ
harmonizing the cosmos, and ontological movement was the name given to this act of Christ:
“nor, while he moved the body, was the universe left void of his working and providence.”142
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However, as the third thinker to be taken up in this genealogy, Athanasius makes a critical move
that would have profound consequences for the history of Christianity. With his Life of Antony,
he develops a way of speaking about human bodies that calls forth his christological views. The
Christ who moves the cosmos is now translated into the Antony of the desert. The translation of
idioms is not exact, and the language changes from that of the cosmos to more immediate
insinuations of the ascetic altering social and political reality, with of course numerous other
examples of altering mythological space. But herein lays the power and agency of ascetics—the
power of the cosmological Christ was transferred to human bodies. The Christ performance was
repeated in virtue of a repeatable Christ, the latter made possible by the conceptual persona of
Christ. Ascetics were, after all, imitations of Christ. But what exactly does imitation mean in this
context? Monks didn’t simply imitate Christ. Athanasius creates a christology of the human body
that imitates, albeit in a philosophical manner, the Christ of christology. How exactly is this
done? How exactly does the monk effect space? Since it is not a simple translation of the
ontological movement of Christ, one must engage aspects of the ascetic tradition that assume this
power to be active.

First is the power over the demonic. By conquering the demonic, the ascetic clears the “air” for
the world. Antony does not just make it possible for his brethren in the desert to rise to heaven,
but all of humanity. The ascetic therefore has a universal power, and the starkness of the desert
backdrop is intended to call attention to this universalism. The desert is, as it were, a universal
stage whose consequences are felt on the global stage. The conquering of demons occupies a
central part of the vitae, which cannot be said of Athanasius’ other works. The term “space”
captures the physical and bodily aspects of the ascetic enterprise, since it is through the body, not
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the mind, that the ascetic achieves their goal. The ascetic’s body is an instrument just as Christ
was an instrument: “Antony becomes the instrument of the Logos, as the humanity of Christ had
been the Logos’ instrument in the incarnation.”143 The ascetic is represented not as retiring into
the desert, but “as marching into the desert to engage the devils in battle, and so to make a
positive contribution to the salvation of the world by participating in the Logos’ saving work.”144
In other words, Antony’s contribution to Egypt is immense, since it is insinuated that no other
monks after Antony have to do battle with the demons. Antony’s victory is national as much as it
is personal.145

Athanasius is intent to erect a model of piety based on the notion that deification can be achieved
without martyrdom.146 For Clement actual death is preferred for deification, yet nonetheless he
paves a way for an intellectual sacrifice.147 Whereas for Origen the Christian drama and story
was primarily an epistemological one, for Athanasius’ Antony it is equally physical.148
According to Goehring, “Antony’s innovation lay not in the idea of withdrawal per se, but in its
translation from an ethical to a physical plane…Antony expanded this concept of withdrawal to
include a physical separation from one’s fellow Christians through flight to ever more remote
retreats.”149Though Antony was not the first ascetic, the physicality of Antony’s invention
concerned not just the physical body nor his physical isolation, but the shared ontological
movement within the earth-body relation.
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The ascetic primarily uses his body to do his “saving work,” not his contemplative powers, to
exercise his logos, which explains why in the vitae there is no language of the “soul’s ascent to
God in contemplation, but rather of its descent into the world given over to sin, a descent to the
place of the demons there to do battle with them.”150 Andrew Louth notes that this lack of a
contemplative emphasis—what he terms the “anti-mystical strand” of monasticism—will find its
way into the rule of St. Benedict, likewise providing no language of contemplation. Athanasius
modifies the various Neo-platonisms of the day by not positing the soul’s natural flight from the
body to the heavenly place of incorruptibility, but the heavenly logos becoming corruptible in the
body. Just as Christ had re-created the world, so to Antony refines the ideal image of the
Christian, re-creating and clearing the mythological “space” towards righteousness.

Second, Antony has the power to vitalize the desert, to make the desert a city. Antony has the
power to convert. After being inspired by Antony, many monks take up the solitary path, “And
so, from then on, there were monasteries in the mountains and the desert was made a city by
monks, who left their own people and registered themselves for the citizenship in the
heavens.”151 But there is an immediate influence to make the desert a city, and a far influence to
make the “real” city a desert. The context in which to understand the desert becoming a city and
the city becoming a desert is both political and soteriological. Political because Athanasius, as
the scriptwriter behind the scenes, believes Alexandria to be equally purified like the desert.
Soteriological because the theological context concerns the advancement of Christian
civilization.152 Ascetics are, quite literally, understood to be pulling civilization upwards to
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greater levels of purity, and therefore, reward. Just as Christ harmonized the universe in his
incarnation, so too the ascetic carries the burden of a corrupt civilization on his back. It is in this
sense that ascetics are the “new heroics” of the age.153 According to Burrus, the valorization of
the desert is not a simple rejection of the city, but its refashioning. Alexandria, the home and
center of Athanasius, is not aligned with the defiled city, but likewise a desert in need of purity.
Brining the ascetic cause into the city is the true political and theological goal of Athanasius. 154
The refashioning and re-creation of the city, however, takes place by avenues other than just
inspiration. Indeed, a mystical bond connects Antony’s power in the desert to his power in the
city. Akin to the “kinship of the flesh” that Athanasius believed humanity to have had with
Christ, there seems to be a similar bond between Antony and the city. Antony’s home, writes
Burrus, “is in some important sense still Alexandria.”155 Antony’s kinship of the flesh is not just
with his fellow humans, but with city centers as well, testifies to this ability to create space anew,
to have power from afar via a mythological space of immanent causality.

Conclusion
If one had to update Athanasian christology in the language of twenty-first century theology, we
would have to say that it trafficked in a process theology based on a language of movement
between the conceptual persona of Christ and the body of Antony. This language of movement is
the flowering of the logos christology begun centuries earlier by Irenaeus, in which the body of
Christ is said to have recapitulated all of humanity. Athanasius’ logic in On the Incarnation
addresses the part/whole problem directly, claiming that the Christian incarnation can be

153

Burrus, ‘Begotten, Not Made,’ p. 77.
Ibid. 74-75.
155
Ibid. 76.
154

205
understood theoretically as the whole entering a part, and, in this process, correct the parts and
the whole. This language took many forms, but it was predominantly worked out in the Stoic
language of a body and its members.

The ascetic body is an avant garde body with cosmological properties of harmony and
unification because it was understood through the registers of Christ’s similar project of unifying
cosmological difference. Understood not only as a repetition of the Christ body, it was the
concept of Christ as difference and unity of difference (the univocal name) through which the
ascetic body was conceived. Christ was difference because in him was (i) the principle of
creation of different beings (co-creation), and (ii) through him difference was gathered—
recapitulated being. Under the imagery of limbs and members, the ascetic struggle was in part
controlling the internal riot that was endemic to the fallen body—arms and feet and hands have
an autonomy of their own, needing to be put under the control of a single will. Internal
connectivity had to be established, and immanence of action in the body, where an arm moves
only with the approval of the entire body, became a hallmark of ascetic beauty.

What this analysis says about early Christianity is that, after all, Christ is the name of a concept.
Concepts are not static representations of states of affairs in the world, but revolutionary bits of
intelligence equally oriented towards future states. Christ had to be invented. But why was he
invented? One could respond with numerous answers, and many have, but in our present case it
is clear that Christ was invented so as to lay out a new plane of immanence in the ancient world.
Christ was created philosophically, and therefore was meant to solve philosophical problems: the
problem of diversity, salvation, cosmological harmony, and so on. However, this is not to say
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that philosophical problems are unrelated to problems in life. Asceticism, developing through,
on, and from Christ’s plane of immanence, is a direct response to the question of how ought one
to live? Upon this plane of immanence new modes and practices of thoughts developed. Guiding
the creation of new practices was the conceptual persona of Christ, inhering in thought like a
virtual tendency or disposition, like a mountainous topography guiding the streams and rivers of
christology. This topography gave to early christology and ascetic literature an aesthetic of
suffering (the glory of crucifixion/martyrdom/mutiliation/deformation), and the concomitant
expression of stasis (control/rationality/direction). Taken together, these two aesthetics do not
compete, nor do they constitute a dialectical system in need of sublation. Rather, they are two
modalities of expression in which the conceptual persona of Christ nurtured Christian thought.
Moreover, since for Deleuze and Guattari the veracity of a conceptual persona is tested by the
modality of life it inspires, the conceptual persona of Christ is one of the most enduring in
Western philosophical history, and it is surprising that Deleuze himself, or his readers, never
turned to Christianity to explore the role of personae further.

As I stated at the outset, this analysis is as much a study of performance art as of early
Christianity, as much of beauty as of St. Antony, as much of Nietzsche and as of the shape of
ontology and the logics allowing certain operations to occur. Now our attention will be directed
towards art and the revolutionary role the ascetic body played in constructing a new image of the
painted figure, one which was to aid in the construction of the Renaissance canvas. Specifically,
the notion of effecting space will be taken up in the turn to art, since the logic of the immanent
body will be found operative in paintings and depictions of ascetic bodies.

207

Part II.

The Extended Body: Aesthetics
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An Introduction to Renaissance Aesthetics

Toward Art

The first section comprising the first four chapters can be understood as the construction of the
concept of Christ in late antiquity. Aside from being a genealogy of an idea, the reading of the
construction of Christ was strategic so as to highlight its contributions to the visual imagination
in late antique thinkers, such as Irenaeus (recapitulation), Tertullian (materialism and flesh), and
Athanasius (ascetic body). That logic, simply put, was the ability of a body to effect the space
around it in an immanent fashion, i.e., in an unmediated way. The initial chapter was framed by
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s notion of conceptual personae. I quickly departed from any
orthodox or simple appropriation of this idea. The basic insight of this concept is that philosophy
and/or theo-philosophical systems are often structured by personified figures inhering in the
system. These figures or personae give a philosophy a style and a movement to its concepts. It is
remarkable that this idea, which bears so much weight in Deleuze and Guattari’s late
collaborative piece What is Philosophy?, has received little to no attention in the critical
literature surrounding their work, not to mention its clear affinities with Christianity, which is
arguably one of the most important philosophical systems in Western history to employ a
persona in its theoretical architecture.
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The concept of immanence specific to Christ was christology’s contribution to late antique
philosophy and theology, and it was argued that the final flowering of this “high christology”
was a bodily practice centered on ascetic imitation. In one sense, the first section is in part a
genealogy of immanence via practices of bodily and figural representation within the Christian
theological and philosophical tradition. But why turn to visual art? And what is the thread that
connects late antique christology and asceticism with medieval art nearly a millennium later?
The following two chapters will attempt to answer this question.

Simply put, the turn to art is the testing of a thesis, and the engagement with visual studies is a
case study in a logic of the body. The presence of a philosophical persona to authorize a visual
and artistic practice produced the immanent body. In this sense, this text is faithful to Deleuze
and Guattari’s conception of a conceptual persona, whose function it is to establish modalities of
living. Christ was the figure, or conceptual persona, that first, played a crucial role in ascetic
practice and the creation of the ascetic body, and second, provided the perceptual hermeneutics
in which to interpret that practice. The figure of St. Antony is a repetition of Christ, and
Antony’s political and cultural “power”—his ontological power—must be thought as an
extension of the power afforded to Christ in the christological writings previously discussed. The
attribute of Christ’s ability to harmonize the cosmos is applied to the ascetic body. These bodies
are extended. Extension must be thought in a few registers. Extension is another name for
immanent causality for the following reasons: (i) immanent causality established a modality of
thinking in which it was possible to understand the ascetic as embodying the All; (ii) the features
of embodiment allowed thought to trace in this All an immanent causality in which the ascetic
body had the powers to alter creation immediately from their bodies. Of course, the ascetic body
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did not literally “move” creation. Mountains did not move when the ascetic body moved, and
rivers did no cease to flow downhill. Moving the cosmos is the language of mythos and poetry,
which does not take away from its psychology and religious power.

This notion of the power of movement, detailed in chapter 4, was intended to call attention to the
notion of material redemption so crucial to conceptions of the incarnation, wherein life itself—
including material objects—became part of divine life. Movement is equally a term of Christian
salvation (the law of death has been replaced by the law of life) as it is materially transcendental
(the conditions of life now contain the principle of salvation). Movement is another name for the
immanent causality of the Christ body, and later, the ascetic body. For instance, once Antony
cleared the air of demons all the faithful could immediately pass from earth to heaven, just as
after Christ’s crucifixion it was proclaimed that a new life was now possible. Antony’s power
was immanent and extended, the latter because of Christ’s previous articulation as recapitulated
being. Christ is, therefore, the original power of extension. However, in a strange alliance
between aesthetics, history and theology, this concept of extension becomes relevant when put
into the context of visual art, especially Renaissance painting. The notion of an extended body
effecting the space around it will become a critical attribute of the Renaissance figure, as well as
one of the formal properties of the painted canvas.

Extension in Art
“Giotto is made to stand at the commencement of a
development that, in the eyes of Meier-Graefe and his
fellow early Modernists, was to lead in the end to the work
of Cezanne. In other words, it was to lead to what for the
Modernists was the central achievement of modern art.”
Charles Harrison
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The argument put forward in the following chapters on art is that the ascetic body, as it is
represented in art—beginning with St. Francis and the Antony series—reflects and contributes to
the Renaissance’s revolutionary idea of the living body as a moving body. Da Vinci and Alberti
in their respective treatises on painting both argue that the truly alive figure, which is the sought
after figure of Renaissance painters, was the figure in motion. The manner and style in which the
ascetic body is represented as in motion not only highlights the changing perceptions of the time
as to what a living saint was, but expresses an early trait of the abstract canvas; hence the above
quote by Charles Harrison claiming that there is a tenuous line of artistic development beginning
with Giotto and leading to Cezanne, the latter often considered the founder of Modern abstract
art.

As I have noted, this concept of extension is predominantly theo-philosophical, though its effects
are clearly material in nature. Extension is a property and result of the conceptual persona of
Christ. The ascetic body, like the Christ body, was understood to effect the space around them. 1
Though the topic of the Christic cause will be taken up in the concluding chapter, what justifies
at this juncture the transition to art is precisely this point—the articulation of a body to effect the
space around them. The following two chapters argue this point through a focus on the artistic
canvas as a space of immanent communication, defined by the properties of internal resonance
and communication. The notion of a canvas as an internally resonating entity defined by speeds
and effect is not a new concept. Wassily Kandinsky, writing in 1911, and one of the major
theorists of early Modernist abstract art, wrote as much in his Concerning the Spiritual in Art.
Kandinsky was attempting to justify, on formal grounds, the decline of representational strategies
1

See final chapter.
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in art, claiming that due to the lack of representational depth in the Modern canvas, certain
“spiritual” vibrations populated the abstract canvas. These vibrations come from the abstract
forms themselves, but also from their interaction. The general thrust of Kandinsky’s argument,
and for those theorists following him, was that forms on the abstract canvas now communicated
with each other, in an immanent fashion, and that it was this communicative property that “held”
together the “flat,” abstract work of art. As will become clear, the following analysis of art
assumes this thesis—immanent communication as a property of the abstract canvas—and will
attempt to locate this “immanent communication” within depictions of the early representations
of saintly bodies. Moreover, it will be argued that this concept of immanent communication
relies on a logic of the body found in ascetic discourse and literature, namely, that the ascetic
body had the power effect the space around him. In turning to art, the space around the ascetic
body is the canvas, and they effect the space through a concept of theological force. What allows
this property of effecting space to be found in art, as opposed to asceticism, is a logic of the body
developed within early Christianity whose imaginary structure and content is applied in the
strategies of visual representation.

At stake in my reading of late medieval and Renaissance art concerns not only the artwork
involved, but conceptions of what Modernism is, and how its trajectory is conceived as a
continuous tradition. To cite Giotto as a deep source of Modern art is therefore to make a claim
about the teleology of Modern art, namely, that it had one.2 In fact, this claim may say more
about our contemporary understanding of Modernism than of medieval art. But as Harrison has
shown, the idea that Giotto was “modern” is not limited to the contemporary period, but can be
2

In fact, the telos of art runs all throughout modes of recasting the history of art, and can be found very prominently
in the 19th century as well, as noted by Rachel Teukolsky in The Literate Eye: Victorian Art Writing and Modernist
Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 94.
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found in numerous examples among Giotto’s contemporaries in the fourteenth century. Among
those “modern” traits, according to German art historian Julius Meier-Graefe writing in 1915, are
individualism of expression, emphasis of the pictorial over the decorative, and the autonomy of
the work of art.3 To believe that it is these elements that define Modernism is already to take a
stance as to what Modernism is, a view not shared by all. However, the notion that Giotto’s
innovation does in a tenuous manner lead to certain traits of the Modernist canvas is the view
adopted here.

Autonomy, Self-referentiality and Immanence
First, I will discuss the function of the ascetic body as it appears in visual art, especially 13th and
fourteenth century Italian painting. To be clear, the Antony series is my own term with no art
historical precedent. The Antony series not only represents a new figure for the history of art,
which builds on the imagery of the stigmata of St. Francis, but will exhibit some of the traits of
Modernism (especially Cubism) that Harrison, and others, find in Giotto’s technique.

Second to be discussed is the role of istoria (narrative) in Renaissance painting and how this
concept, perhaps more than any other, fragments the body while also unifying the
communicational properties of the canvas. The discussion of stigmata and the Antony series
deploys a technique of representing the body that is later picked up in the theory of istoria.
Utilizing contemporary art criticism and theory, it will be argued that we can find the properties
of the ascetic body in visual art within the concept of istoria. Further, the telos of the

3

Harrison, Charles. “Giotto and the ‘rise of painting,” in Siena, Florence, and Padua: Art, Society and Religion
1280-1400 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 73.
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fragmentation of the body within notions of istoria helps to engender what is termed in art
historical scholarship as the autonomy of the work of art.

By autonomy, what is referred to is not the autonomy of the aesthetic experience from the
normal categories of human experience, as the Kantian sublime indicates, nor the autonomy of
the work of art from culture (art for art’s sake), as certain strands of Modernist theory espouse.
What autonomy refers to is a structuralism of the canvas as an auto-referential entity, in the sense
that all the work of art requires is what is phenomenologically before the viewer. In other words,
autonomy refers to the fact that the Modern canvas needs nothing to signify, as its entire
significatory agency takes place on the plane of the canvas. Conceptualizing the work of art in
this manner is old fashion, given that socio-critical trends in art historiography have moved away
from this type of Greenbergian analysis into conceptualizing the work of art as socially
embedded. However, by focusing exclusively on the canvas’ formal properties it should not be
assumed that this socio-critical analysis is irrelevant. The absence of this form of analysis comes
merely as the result of a desire to trace out an idea, and nothing more.

For Greenberg, what was new about the abstract canvas was precisely the fact that its logic of
representation had little need for reference to the world of nature, to which painters had turned
for a millennia. In 1949, at the height of the popularity of the abstract canvas, Greenberg writes
of Cubism, “We no longer peer through the object-surface into what is not itself; now the unity
and integrity of the visual continuum, as a continuum, supplants tactile nature as the model of the
unity and integrity of pictorial space.”4 Greenberg’s phrase of a “visual continuum” defined by

4

Greenberg, Clement. “On the Role of Nature in Modernist Painting,” in Art and Culture: Critical Essays (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1961), p. 173.
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unity and integrity is a direct argument for the autonomy of the work of art as a visual, selfreferential field. It will be subsequently argued that the self-referentiality of the work of art is
another name for immanent causality. To those for whom the autonomy of the work of art robs
the work of its ability to engage in political questions, here the opposite is argued. The power of
the work of art to emit affect comes as a result of its ability to assemble effect through its selfreferentiality.

As I said above, the conceptual links between Giotto and Cubism have been made in art history,
albeit in a fragmentary nature. What this study attempts to do is make these links more explicit,
and unravel the knot of the influence of the ascetic body in Renaissance art. To summarize, (i)
Giotto’s painted figures, especially his depictions of the stigmata, rely on an ascetic logic of the
body; (ii) this logic of the body finds itself expressed in the Renaissance conception of istoria;
(iii) since it was the duty of istoria to unify the visual space of the canvas, istoria as a theoretical
component of the canvas shares traits of the Modern, abstract canvas; (iv) therefore, historical
understandings of the birth of painting in Western art are enriched from a late antique conception
of the body.

In sum, the two case studies in Renaissance art are a creative adaptation of the logic of the
immanent body, especially its ability to effect space around it. While the analyses of art are not
essential to understanding the nature of the immanent body, they do provide a fuller picture as to
how this body works in concrete practice.
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Chapter 5

Christological Aesthetics: The Antony Series

Appearing not long after the muscular and heroic Renaissance figure is
being discovered in Italian painting in the 13th and 14th centuries,
what I will term the Antony series represents a collection of works
rejecting this figure. Further, it will do so by utilizing a millenniumold Christian logic—the genre of the gesturing monastic body. The
Antony series serves not only, however, as a corrective to the heroic
bodies of classical Renaissance painting, but actually plays a more
profound role in the history of Western painting—the birth of the
autonomous work of art. It is not only through the figure that the
Western canvas will be born in Italy in the duecento and trecento, but
the figure will also be utilized in what will be some of the first abstract
works in Christendom—the Antony series. Hence, I argue for an
inextricable relationship between the Antony series, abstraction and the
birth of the canvas.

Introduction
This chapter is the first of two case studies exploring the formal role of the painted ascetic body
in Renaissance art. Neither exhaustive nor comprehensive, the purpose of this chapter is to
document how the logic of the body, as distilled in the previous chapters, finds itself creatively
deployed onto the painted canvas. The ascetic body was not just appropriated for painterly
delight, but was used because of how the ascetic body was perceived. Certain aspects of late
antiquity and its theological heritage arrived with the ascetic figure as it made its way into the
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visual culture of Europe in the thirteenth century.1 The qualities of effecting space and of free
floating ascetic bodies were appealing to the Renaissance painters for a number of reasons. The
ascetic body was much more than just new content for visual art, but would help alter the way art
was constructed. One of those ways is the ascetic contribution to the painted canvas: its
contribution to the telos of the autonomy of the work of art in Modernism. Originating within
the language of Kantian aesthetics, autonomy is not defined by purposelessness nor a lack of
functionality in this current context,2 but as a trait of the canvas to be defined by its formal
communication between the parts on the canvas. It is in the internal resonance and immanent
communication of canvas’ parts that a painting’s self sufficieny (autonomy) is achieved. Since
countless studies on the autonomy of the work of art exist, this and the following case study
argue specifically for the role of the painted ascetic body in achieving this autonomy.3

A canvas is not a painting, and anything painted is not a canvas. While the use of paint is
ubiquitous throughout history, the canvas (as a mobile system of immanent signification bereft of
its ritual and liturgical setting) is the product of the West, and therefore can be understood
through specific philosophical, and, as I will argue in this section, Christological categories. As
we have seen previously, christology separates itself from theology in that it is concerned with a
conceptual persona, Christ, and in the way that this figure organizes all aspects of Christian
thinking. In the attempt to think asceticism and the visual arts together, as relying on similar
principles, our first point of contact between the arts and christology in this chapter will therefore
be the figure, as it is not only through the figure that the Western canvas will be born in Italy in

1

See Siglind Brulh’s treatment of the resurgence of the painted ascetic in his The Temptation of Paul Hindemith Mathis Der
Maler As a Spiritual Testimony (Hillsdale, NY: Pendragon Press, 1998), p. 114.
2
See Kant’s treatment of the sublime in his Critique of Judgment (1790).
3
James Elkins and Michael Newman’s The State of Art Criticism (NY: Routledge, 2008) provides a nice overview of the
autonomy of the work of art and its relation to commodification.
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the duecento and trecento, but the figure will also be utilized in what will be some of the first
abstract works in Christendom. These are what we will call the Antony series in our attempt to
unify the works under a single heading, a series whose remarkable vitality has failed to receive
any scholarly attention. To date, there is no such thing as the Antony series, but as you will see it
deserves the title of a series due to the specific problems they address, the manner, style and
formal consistency of the works, as well as the Christological assumptions it deploys.4 The
Antony of Egypt, subject of the previous chapters, is not to be confused with St. Antony of
Padua (1195-1231). Because of St. Francis’ admiration, the latter was also a popular painted
figure in the late medieval and early Renaissance period, and can be distinguished not by the
demonic but by a book.5

Given this early form of abstraction the series prefigures the undifferentiated, color-field works
of Modern painting, paintings which Clement Greenberg would define as “sheer sensation” and
“decentralized.”6 The Antony series creates a similar plane of sensation, but it is through his
figure that it is accomplished. This chapter has two parts: after a discussion of historical context,
the chapter will move into specific theoretical concerns.

The Antony Series
“My idea is that every specific body strives to become master
over all space and to extend its force (--its will to power:) and
to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually
encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends
by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that
are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together
for power. And the process goes on—”

4

Siglind Brulh’s The Temptation of Paul Hindemith seems to come closest to a thematic treatment of St. Antony in visual art,
though his focus is undoubtedly later in history, beginning perhaps in the 16th and 17th centuries.
5
Leslie Ross has provided a succinct write-up for how to distinguish the two in the visual art tradition; Medieval Art: A Topical
Dictionary (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996). See Ross’s entries on both saints.
6
Greenberg, Clement. “The Crisis of the Easel Picture,” in Art and Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p. 155.
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Nietzsche, Will to Power, section 636.

A giant, club-wielding bird is just about to strike a helpless, unarmed man; the bird’s tongue
points violently from its cracked beak; its knuckles are gnarled and worn (Figure 9). On his back,
the man cries out in terror, his right arm shielding himself from various other beasts, animals
equal part hatred, fantasy and “orthodox” theological fiction. One demon, which we cannot see,
pulls the man’s white hair and the flesh of his forehead stretches from the tension. The painting
is a clamor of eyes, arms, teeth, shrieks and bone; but it is equal part dynamism of color, line,
shape, immanent pain and lack of perceptual depth. If you squint hard enough and look at the
center of the painting, the body disappears in the violent onslaught. You do not know where his
body begins and ends. The supposed foreground and background, so crucial to the Renaissance
picture space, dissolves. The beast’s hand that is pulling his hair bleeds into his body and what
looks like a rat with horns seems to be gnawing on the man’s cape, or is that the rat’s own
clothing? Clothing and fabric, what we’ll understand as an analogy of the picture space itself,
lose their rightful property and become their opposite. The forms of victim and perpetrator,
violator and violated blur and expand in color. The space is topological: each redeems the other,
and yet, the final redemption is other than the bodies—the surface is redeemed through this
expansion.
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Figure 9. Detail from Grunewald’s Isenheim Altarpiece. Antony is central
and in Blue. Photo, Art Resource, NY.

The colors are earthy but not subdued; in fact, there is as much a violence of color as anything,
and it is a remarkable feat to make the desert, where this scene takes place, so colorful.
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The man I’ve been describing is Saint Antony, and the scene comes from the Life of Antony and
depicts the fact that in his attempt to achieve closeness to God Antony must first battle the
demons blocking his passage. The painting is Matthias Grunewald’s Temptation of St. Antony
(1515)—a scene from his Isenheim Altarpiece—and it is far from triumphal. Agony is more
precise, but as we will see, these pictures only work if we understand it as willed agony, which
will be translated into a form of joy.
Grunewald’s Antony, and nearly all those in what I will term the Antony series, are themselves
captions or stills of indiscernible passage. The body of Antony, stretched vertically and
horizontally across the canvas, is the objective zone of indiscernability.7 Stretching, blurring and
extension—in other words, we can’t discern the real figure because it is not about the figure’s
formation, but deformation. As we saw in the previous chapters, the concept of deformation can
be traced to first, the logos Christ in his position as co-creator, and second, his status as “Son of
Man,” which though Pauline in conception, was considerably modified by Justin, Irenaeus,
Tertullian and Origin all the way to Athanasian orthodoxy. In the latter it finally achieved the
precision it was lacking, and asceticism was the register through which this occurred. As the Son
of man, Christ entered a historical narrative and modified the matter of his body to suit the
desires of the age; he was an avant garde body in every sense of the term, pushing specific
milieus towards higher self-realizations. Coming first in the form of the various prophets, he was
finally “recapitulated” in his last appearance in Jerusalem, and it is the crucifix that is the image

7

Deleuze found in Francis Bacon’s paintings zones of indiscernibility, where structure, figure and contour supply the movement
to painting. The color-figure melts into the background via an organic ring (contour) that surrounds it; the ring opens and closes
and the figure inside the ring is exposed to the outside elements. The movement goes in two directions: towards increased
figuration and towards increased deformation. Deleuze’s book on Bacon is his most religious in that it directly borrows from the
language of martyrdom, body, crucifixion and sensation. Deleuze will find in this movement of figure to background and
background to figure, though it is not stated outright, a basic Christological premise. That premise is the capturing of a body in
passage, and the inability to discern deformation from formation. Indiscernability is the name of this twofold property of the
body.
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of this summing up; this recapitulated gathering of all mankind, materiality included, on a second
“tree” is the imaginative fodder for the early theologians. Each theologian would advance the
complexity of the Christ body, giving it more activity within history until it would come to its
final conclusion in asceticism, a movement that constructed an immanent crucifix within bodily
life. For as Origin (and Paul) says, “we die daily” signaled the monastic enterprise as a repetition
of the crucifix. The monk’s body, therefore, would work the same miracles as Jesus’ body, yet
the temporality would extend itself over a lifetime (Antony lived to be 105 at a time when the
average lifespan was 25). With their body “painted by Christ,” the monastic enterprise actively
performed the power of the incarnation, and the agency given to the monastic body is a mere
repetition of the avant garde body of Christ, avant garde because his appearance signaled both
the presence of a corrupt humanity and the potential of its renewal.8

The logic we are tracing is thus: the body is dismantled in favor of a higher formation. In turning
to aesthetics, it is these scenes of St. Antony, painted over and over again in history, appearing as
contemporary as Cezanne, Dali, and the famous surrealist Max Ernst, which are Christianity’s
most radical affirmation of the aesthetics of the body’s dismantling, and can be situated in a long
tradition of ascetic logic. In their surprising consistency, the Antony series forms a lost cannon
within painting’s history, challenging the integrity of the Renaissance figure shortly after its
inception in the 14th and 15th centuries. Each age has appropriated the saint for a variety of
reasons. French novelist Gustave Flaubert would spend nearly his whole life writing his
Temptation of St. Antony, only to find himself unable after 30 years to be satisfied. The earliest
known painting we have by Michelangelo is one of the temptation of St. Antony, and the knotted
8

Saint Simonian Olinde Rodrigues first uses the term in his essay, "L'artiste, le savant et l'industriel” to designate the power of
figures in social reform. He locates three main figures: the scientist, artist and industrialist, however here the use of the phrase the
avant garde is meant to place the Christ body in conversation with a certain understanding of the body to bring a culture forward,
and further, to connect this notion of telos to material redemption. For the most complete and theoretically nuanced treatment, see
Peter Burger’s Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
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form of Antony’s wrestling body, as we saw in Grunewald, would mark Michelangelo’s bodies
for the rest of his life. Michelangelo’s painting, done at the early age of 12 or 13, is an exact
copy of Schongauer’s engraving, except done in color. More classical names like Matisse,
Velasquez, Dürer, Goya, Rivera, among many others, have donated their hand to the Saint (see
Figures 10-17). Each age has depicted the saint to work through its own historical curiosities: the
late 12th and 13th because of the social and political upheavals of the ascetic movements; the 13th
and 14th because of the increasing patronage towards monastic churches; the 14th, 15th and 16th
because of formal radicalism that depicting the ascetic body entailed; the 17th and 18th centuries
because of an increasing interest in psychology;9 the early 20th because of the discovery of the
unconscious (Dada and Surrealism). St. Antony has been depicted hundreds of times by various
artists in various ages, all the while retaining a congruous style.

9

Hauptman, Jodi and Odilon Redon. Beyond the Visible: The Art of Odilon Redon (NY: Museum of Modern Art,
2005), pgs. 91-93.
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Figure 10. Salvador Dali. The Temptation of St. Antony, 1946.
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Figure 11. Max Ernst. The Temptation of St. Antony, 1945.
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Figure 12. Paul Cezanne. The Temptation of St. Antony, 1870.
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Figure 13. Paul Cezanne. The Temptation of St. Antony, 1875.
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Figure 14. Lovis Corinth. The Temptation of St. Antony, 1897.
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Figure 15. Martin Schongauer, Saint Anthony Tormented by Demons, ca. 1470–75.
Engraving. Photo courtesy of the British Museum.
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Figure 16. Bernadino Parenzano. Temptations of St. Antony, 1494.
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Figure 17. Joos Van Craesbeeck. The Many Temptations of St. Antony, 1650.

Though such repeated visualization of a saint is common in art history, the Antony series is not
only a form of content being deployed in art, but when set against the prevailing Renaissance
aesthetic, it represents a counter-movement in artistic style. According to a rather dated text by
Thomas Wright, depictions of the demonic had strong roots in medieval comic art which went
dormant during the late medieval period. An interest in demonology was rediscovered by
German and Flemish artists during the late Renaissance, and it is to this rediscovery that one can
credit the initial popularity of the temptation of St. Antony in the 16th and first half of the 17th
centuries, which is where we find numerous productions of the saint being undertaken.
According to Siglind Bruhl, the remarkable consistency in subject matter and execution of the
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Antony series can in part be due to the fact that prints and woodcuts, which do constitute a
majority of the series, circulated widely among pilgrims of Medieval Europe.10 Demonology, as
one might expect, found itself at the hands of the grotesque diablerie painters. The GermanFlemish school of the grotesque, composed of Cranach, Schongauer and the Brueghels, seems to
have died at the end of the sixteenth century, but then travels to Italy and France, where names
like Rabel, Callot, Rosa and Cochin will reinvent the image of the saint.11

Just as the monastics retooled the ideal image of the Greek body, effectively substituting for the
healthy, agile, virile warrior an emaciated body (the “athlete of Christ”), the Antony series serves
not only as a corrective to the heroic bodies of classical Renaissance painting, but actually plays
a more profound role in the history of Western painting. The Antony Series represents the
inspired source of the painted canvas as it began its evolution away from the Byzantine style in
the 12th and 13th centuries, which is not to say that as we move from Giotto’s innovation in
figural depiction to the Antony series there is a concrete art-historical connection between the
works. Rather, the line of connection between Giotto and Antony is strongest when understood
through theological currents, almost as strong when seen through certain devotional practices,
and weakest as a direct line of artistic lineage.

What is a Christological body?

The frame completes the work of art, organizing a zone of perception opposed to habitual
perception; this is most apparent in the fact that we look differently at a canvas than we would at
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the wall it’s hanging on.12 Certain faculties are called into action; our bodies cease to move, our
eyes scan the surface, and it is a hermeneutical game of competing approaches—emotion,
reaction, color, texture, figure, size, context, etc. In fact, it is hard to think of painting other than
on a canvas. All Modern art rests on a canvas, as does Baroque, Mannerism, French Realism, etc,
and it can be argued that all Western art, at least until the Minimalism of the 1950’s and 1960’s,
worked within the assumption of the canvas: the frame of the canvas designates that art is an
object; and that said object is delineated here (in the canvas). Clement Greenberg writes: “The
easel painting, the movable picture hung on a wall, is a unique product of the West, with no real
counterpart elsewhere.”13 The canvas, understood in its contemporary sense, emerged as an
adaption of Byzantine iconic style through the theological concept of force. Painting, as we
understand it today, is primarily an art of capturing forces, and the canvas is a mobile body
analogous to the monastic body.
In the case of Grunewald’s Antony, force is inscribed in gesture. His body is Christological
because its success is measured by its openness—the goal of asceticism—not its isolation. The
task of asceticism was to open the body via discipline, and the body’s deformation is given value
above the healthy body. St. Antony is unique among the cast of painted characters in Western art
for, first, the freedom artists grant themselves in expressing his body, and second, the fact that
when he is painted Antony is nearly always isolated and surrounded, forcing all the painted
forms and colors to descend on his body in the same way the demons descend on him. The
movement is one of intensification, and the painting compresses the pictorial violence on
Antony’s body. Antony writhes in violent onslaught. It would be a mistake to merely read these
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images as the simple deformation of a body. Rather, what is being depicted is not the inferior
state of a superior body, but an experimental interrogation as to what a (painted) body is, since a
large portion of Renaissance painting was, after all, a search for the body.
This body is not a body per se, but a pack of gestures; it is a pack because Antony’s figure
belongs to no one. There is no one will to ascribe to his gestures. Antony is given over, exposed,
stretched, opened—there is no interior to Antony. The exterior of the body does not represent an
interior. As with asceticism, the way to approach the body was through its members: a discipline
of movement. The body simply is a state of conflicting forces, and if the task of asceticism was
to pacify those forces, the goal could never be achieved.14 One had to forever work within and
through temptation, hence the impossible task that was the ascetic project; to be human was to be
as Antony was—surrounded. The state of being consumed translates, in aesthetic terms, to a
chaotic gesturology of bodily deformation, and the gestures, because they are the very
instantiation of a split will, cannot be given names. The integrity, and, one might say, the
transcendent property of the body is lost in the radical gesturology. The painters of Antony,
however, are merely taking Giotto’s discovery to its ultimate conclusion. To understand the
profound role of gesture in Western art, we need to go to Giotto, considered the deep source of
Renaissance figurology. Only then can the Christological properties of Antony be discerned.
Before we get into detailed theoretical discussions of what the figures are accomplishing in the
Antony series, first we must understand the historical situation in which they arise.

Giotto and the Stigmata
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According to Moshe Barasch, it is the gesture that allowed art to emancipate itself from the
confines of Byzantine formalism, i.e., the timeless faces and bodies of icons.15 With Giotto’s
genius for depicting real bodies, especially the narratives of St. Francis and the stigmata, the
transcendent dynamics of the iconic space was translated into the force of incarnate spirituality
understood via the life of a contemporary holy man.16 These social developments paralleled the
growth of Dominican and Franciscan piety movements and a cult of the saint that understood
God, especially in the latter, to act in this world. Centuries later, Hegel noted Giotto’s genius for
this fact in his The Philosophy of Fine Art, where he commends Giotto’s ability to depict the
realities of Christ’s time on earth: “Every sort of object and every sort of setting that has been in
any sense touched by Christ’s presence in the world, or by the saints, old and new, now finds a
place in art.”17 It is as if the concept of Christ’s recapitulation has been exhumed, and rather than
being relegated to his presence in/as past prophets, Christ finds himself embedded in
contemporary bodies and how these bodies act in history—bodies which portend an immanent,
Christological value. Above all else, St. Francis’ stigmata would be finest representative of the
theological and artistic developments.

Giotto was born around the year 1226 in Vespignano, just outside Florence. He died in 1337 and
is buried, according to a few sources, in Santa Maria del Fiore, the Cathedral of Florence. From
his disputed self-portraits found in the Church of Santa Croce and in his Last Judgment in Padua,
we know little about the man himself. Giotto may have suffered from congenital dwarfism,
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which would explain the tradition that he was in fact the painted dwarf in the Church of Santa
Croce, a fact that supports Giorgio Vasari’s claim—the famed Renaissance biographer—that he
was uncommonly ugly. Vasari even writes that there was “no uglier man in the city of Florence."
Dante Alighieri, a close friend of Giotto, would make the same claim about Giotto’s “plain”
children, amazed at how a man who makes such beautiful pictures could conceive such
aesthetically uninteresting children. Nonetheless, the picture of the dwarf at Santa Croce shows a
man with a round face, large eyes set below a bony brow, thin lips and a nose that bells outward
at its end. The man with the white hat in his Last Judgment, supposed to be a self-portrait as
well, has him of normal stature and countenance. Nevertheless, such mythologies of ugliness no
doubt lend credence to the aleatory appearance of outstanding beauty from his hand, hands
which would begin the Renaissance.

Giorgio Vasari, author of the most important document for Renaissance art, the Lives of the Most
Excellent Italian Painters, Sculptors, and Architects, From Cimabue to Our Times (1550), wrote
centuries later that it was the great painter Cimabue who discovered the young Giotto while
tending sheep on his father’s farm. The myth has it that at the age of ten Giotto was “impelled by
nature herself” to draw pictures of things. Wandering the Italian country side, it was Cimabue
who stumbled upon the young prodigy. Astonished at the small drawing on a flat piece of rock,
Cimabue asked Bondone, Giotto’s father, if he could take the boy with him to Florence. Unable
to turn down an offer from the famed Cimabue, Giotto goes to Florence and the rest is history.18
Surely legend, the story is symbolic of Giotto’s dark horse status when it comes to the birth of
the Renaissance, representing more the Renaissance’s anxiety of influence than its true
18
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beginning. Yet despite the slow development that all arts are required to undergo, in the opening
lines of Vasari’s monograph, he boldly claims: “Giotto alone, in a rude and inept age, when all
good methods in art had been lost, dead and buried in the ruins of war, set art upon the part that
may be called the true one.” 19 The rude and inept age is a reference to what Vasari calls the
“rude Greek [Byzantine] manner,” a pictorial style of iconic, stylized bodies, golden and
unrealistic faces of saints that dominated medieval art. Retroactively attributing to Giotto a pure
natural humanism—the hallmark of the Renaissance—it is paradoxical that Vasari is quick to
align Giotto with Nature when Vasari, paragraphs later, admits that it was Giotto’s
Stigmatization of St. Francis that he likes best, an image which blurs the distinction between the
mystical and the natural (Figure 18).20
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Figure 18. Giotto. Stigmatization. Bardi Chapel, Florence. 1319-1329. Fresco.

Giotto is famous for his large narrative-cycles of Saint Francis, whom at the time of Giotto’s
birth had been dead forty one years. In many ways, St. Francis and Giotto form one of the most
important relationships in art history, as important as the Vatican and Michelangelo or Alfred
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Barr and the Museum of Modern Art in NY. Giotto is the painter’s hand, but St. Francis is the
figure; Giotto is the technician, but he expresses St. Francis in a way never before seen. Painter
and painted cannot be historically isolated. Giotto would even name his children Francesco and
Chiara.21 In this context, what goes under the name of St. Francis is best described as an anticlerical, naturalistic piety movement focusing on the poverty and humility of Christ. St. Francis
died in 1226. He was canonized two years after his death.22 Three vitas of Francis’ life—one of
them begun at the same year of his canonization—would provide most of the artistic imagery for
the Franciscan tradition.
The Franciscan piety movements would affect art in numerous ways.23 First, Franciscan building
requirements were different than most. Their buildings were natural and plain, and this led to the
creation of distinct hall-churches whose interiors, devoid of ornate columns and load-bearing
arches, provided the suitable environment for large, flat-wall frescoes.24 Because the Friars often
preached in the vernacular, the aesthetics had to match the language in accessibility, and so the
naturalistic style of Franciscans followed suit.25 The rapid popularity of the Franciscan
movement required an immediate demand for art, and frescoes, as opposed to the laborious
construction of traditional panel art, met that demand. Giotto would be considered a master of
the large-scale, narrative fresco. A new type of architectural addition would also come as a result
of the growth of the Franciscans, and this came in the form of small chapel additions to churches,
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especially the ones opening off the transepts and the nave of the Lower Church at Assisi.26 Such
additions provided, like the hall-style church, large, unobstructed flat surfaces and constituted a
serious design challenge for any daring artist, not to mention increasing amounts of
commissions. Giotto would be at the forefront of filling these spaces.
Secondly, in addition to the large scale frescoes preferred by the Franciscan’s, around 1300 there
appeared a new form of altar art—the monumental crucifix (see Figure 19).
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Figure 19. Giotto. Santa Maria Novella, Florence. Tempera on Panel, 1300.

Intended to evoke an emotional response from its viewers in line with Franciscan philosophy,
especially its emphasis on Christ’s passion, the monumental crucifix dominated the altar; often,
the wounds of Christ were dripping blood, a fact supporting the act of transubstantiation that
occurred below. At the time, devotional texts began to appear focusing primarily on Christ’s
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passion, foremost among them Meditationes vitae Christi (Meditations on the Life of Christ).27
These texts were often distributed by the Franciscans. Combining visual imagery with textual
imagination, the movement was beginning to produce a specific body of media intended to strike
at the private affectus of the faithful. The new cult of affectus, however, was not confined to the
Franciscan’s. St. Thomas Aquinas, the great Dominican theologian, would write in the middle of
the thirteenth century that art in churches could be justified not only to educate and solidify
memory, two arguments known to late antiquity, but to “excite feelings of devotion.”28 The
latter’s emphasis on emotion, feeling and affect—in short, art’s power—reflected new
developments in the role and function of art.

Thirdly, the body of St. Francis provided a new subject in Western art—that of a contemporary
layman who had modeled his life on Christ, and whom Christ had countersigned in the form of
the stigmata. St. Francis spent time outdoors, wrote poems about the Sun, built his own
hermitage, and was the first to receive the five wounds of Christ: two on the feet, one on each
palm and one on the side. St. Francis and his followers would open an age of the cult of the
crucified, and Francis is both responsible for this shift and he is also a product of its time. During
the thirteenth century, the panel cross traditionally hung above the altar changed in appearance,
and not just in size. Prior to this century, it was traditional to depict the crucified Christ with
open eyes and a body that portended the resurrection—the christus triumphans. However, it was
during this century that saw the popularity of the Christus patiens, which was a Christ that really
suffered, a Christ that hung dead on the cross with closed eyes, brown flesh, limp arms and
exhausted torso; such affects opened up an empathic space between the picture and spectator,
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suiting the spiritual needs of the time;29 that space was private, solitary in its public nature,
devotional, and not entirely unlike the function of the icon. Yet the Christus patiens
accomplished the effect not through the golden, transcendent body, but via the broken, deformed
body. Cimabue’s Crucifix in the 1270’s (Figure 20) at San Domenico, Arezzo, can serve as a
transitional piece.

29

Belting, Hans. Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image in the Era Before Art, trans E. Jephcott (Chicago and London,
1994), p. 358.

244

Figure 20. Cimabue. Crucifix, 1270’s, San Domenico, Arezzo.

Here, Christ is stylized in the Byzantine manner and yet he suffers in the manner of the new
style. His body has weight, yet his muscles are organically geometrical and darkly outlined as in
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icons; he is humanly suffering yet his body is angular, so curved on the cross in fact that the edge
of his left hip marks the center of the crucifix’s central pillar. Strong attempts were made by
Cimabue to shadow the failing body, but he is still caught in a Byzantine manner. More than
anyone, the Franciscans encouraged identification with the Christus patiens.30 Pushing the
patiens further, Giotto’s Crucifix (1300) in Santa Maria Novella, Florence, depicts a sickly, fully
dead Christ whose nails holes feel as if they are about to rip from Christ’s hands due to the fact
that you feel him hanging. Christ’s muscles are not stylized but realistic, and so too is the
masterful shading upon his entire figure. The dramatic curved flare of Cimabue’s Crucifix has
been neutralized in favor of exactly how a dead body would hang on the cross. Giotto’s Christ
drips blood from all his wounds, and while Cimabue’s Christ does bleed, his blood pools
unrealistically on the framing of the crucifix. In Giotto’s version, Christ’s blood falls to the
ground; the blood from the holes in his feet spatter on the rock below, and the wound in Christ’s
side, barely visible in Cimabue’s version, gushes as water from a sliced garden hose.
Aside from Christ and the Virgin Mary, St. Francis was the most depicted figure in 13th Italy. It
is possible that more than 20,000 images of the saint were created in less than a hundred years
after his death.31 The earliest images, however, of the newly canonized saint depicted him as a
saint with halo, which is standard fare for the iconic image of the holy man during the mid
thirteenth century.32 These were done in the prevailing Byzantine style on wooden panels in the
manner of icons. What distinguished St. Francis from all the others were the nail holes in his
hands, and this representation created an easily identifiable figure new to art history, one which
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was “instantly identifiable even without an inscribed name.”33 St. Francis would forever be
defined by his body—by the event of Christ’s descension in the stigmata. It was a new
perspective on the incarnation, and its visual implications, both in terms of pictorial space and
the gesturing figures that populate the works, will be ultimately be expressed in the Antony
series. In short, gestures would distort the beauty of the icon.34

Fourthly, because of the stigmata, painting not only has a new body but a new event. Because
history is now a place where we find Christ embodied (the stigmata is the watershed event for
the new incarnate spirituality and pietism) the painted canvas is now a place for Christ’s real
presence, as opposed to the transcendent presence of divinity through the iconic body of the
saint; hence St. Francis’ moniker as alter Christus.35 We saw a similar move in terms of the icon,
where John of Damascus authorizes the painted icon by virtue of God making himself visible in
Christ. This visibility authorized the visibility that the artist enacted, and so therefore the icon,
because it was a body and because Christ took the form of a body, could be seen to give way to a
meditative transcendence bordering on God’s real presence. At this point in history, the
descension of Christ in terms of the stigmata is more important than God’s act of making himself
visible. Everything requires an ascetic logic of the body. The immanence of Christ repeats itself
in another body (St. Francis); that body is shocked, awakened, and can only be effectively
represented by this shock. But further, this shock does not serve just the pictorial space, but the
viewer’s body. We become physically engaged with the picture (affectus), and this is
accomplished by spontaneous gesture. This repetition authorizes a new understanding of the
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body. In aesthetics, this new understanding will be found in the gesturing figure. A christology of
the body must now cater itself to lived bodies.

Fifthly, this event is both isolated (stigmata) and extended across a life. For what may be the first
time in history (around the 1270’s), in the lower nave of the Lower Church of San Francesco a
pilgrim could find opposing, life-size narratives of the humble saint and Christ. Each on their
own wall, the pilgrim could view scenes from the passion, then turn around and view a
contemporary scene of a recent holy man. San Francesco provided a living hagiography,
collapsing the bodies of the two men, just as Athanasius had done for the first time in his Life of
Antony. The parallels and theological implications cannot be mistaken. St. Francis was more than
a saint—not only his life but his bodily afflictions ran parallel to those of the passion.

Christus Patiens
St. Francis’ stigmata atop Mt. La Verna was the sign par excellence of the new form of what a
saint was—a performative manifestation of Christ’s ability to incarnate himself at will. The
stigmata has no biblical prototype, appearing once in the New Testament, Galatians 6:17, and
even there little can be determined if Paul is referring to Christ’s actual wounds.36 Christ’s bodily
descent, however, does have precedents, and ascetic literature is rife with references to holy
bodies painted by God, a body that would elicit from its viewers what Patricia Cox Miller terms
a visceral seeing.37 What we are dealing with here is the aesthetic equivalent of visceral seeing.
Whereas the divine bodies of the early monks were no less painted than the violent marks of the
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stigmata—the former consisting of battles with demons and emaciated yet glorious flesh—they
remain in history as testaments to the full expression of the incarnation. The monks as well took
part in testifying to the glory of the incarnation. We must remember, however, that the
crucifixion is the arche-gesture of asceticism and the stigmata—the gesture of willed suffering.
The expressionistic gestures of St. Francis in Giotto’s Stigmatization of St. Francis in the Bardi
Chapel, Florence, are revolutionary for their depiction of a body under intense forces. St. Francis
is kneeling and his mouth betrays a seductive rapture bordering on joy. It is indeed within the
genre of crucifixion aesthetics, and yet is revolutionizing what a crucifix can be. The traditional
backdrop of the Crucifixion is the wooden cross with Christ’s body hanging on the wooden
frame; body and frame (figure and structure) form a pair, and we cannot think the power of
Christ’s message without the cross. Christ is a sacrificial victim. The cross, therefore, is a
theological prosthetic. Christ never really interacts with his device of torture; he remains aloof to
it. His back and shoulders press against it, but his head usually hangs downward, away from the
wood. The forces are mainly those of gravity pulling his thin bones downward, and the crucifix
is a profound gesture of isolation. The crucifix is meant to isolate this body from the rest of the
bodies, but it does so through the throngs of pain. Except for depictions of the Passion narrative
where Christ embraces the cross, typically his back is always turned toward it.

Christ hangs alone, his head dangling from the cross, and the cross strangely appears to embrace
him in fait accompli. If there is a pedagogical “background” to this image it is necessarily
Christological—the background is the incarnation, as only it can provide resonance between
structure and figure, Christ and crucifix, Christ and St. Francis. Which is also to say that thoughts
of the incarnation (incarnational theory) had to come historically later than the crucifixion, which
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is in fact the case. Agreement was not had until four centuries after Christ’s death. The
Incarnation, as a titled theological category of thought, is but a series of philosophical reflections
on this problem, and as early discussions testify to the dying man-God on the cross, it was a
problem. The incarnation was a solution.

If the incarnation made sense of the crucifixion, then a similar doubling of the logic applies here:
only the crucifixion can make sense of the stigmatization. In other words, the stigmatization is
yet another expression of the incarnation itself. Of course, one could disagree and propose the
resurrection as the finest expression of the incarnation. Yet to do so one is substituting the
product for the process, or to use Deleuzian language, the expression for the expressor. The
resurrection is the product of the crucifixion, and though the resurrection does give glory to the
crucifixion, it is the latter that organizes the material on which to think about the Christ body.
The “final” expression of Christ is the resurrection, but what is achieving that expression, what is
getting the work done, is the crucifixion. Simply put, the event of the resurrection must be
relegated to what is happening on the cross because it is here and only here where the incarnation
is tested.
We must now think stigmatization in terms of crucifixion. Giotto’s monumental Crucifix in
Santa Maria Novella, however, does much to force Christ to interact with his instrument. This is
accomplished by weight, shading, blood, gesture and even the lack of gesture to signify a dead
body—Christus patiens replaces Christus triumphans.38 The stigmata reverses the force. Rather
than Christ’s body undergoing force, in the stigmata he is the giver of force, and the translation
from a divine body becoming-human to a body becoming-divine requires that a new form of the
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crucifix be established. Then the revolution occurs: Giotto paints St. Francis’ entire body as a
live crucifix.
Giotto’s Bardi Stigmatization is unlike any other. This picture differs vastly from the gesturing
saint in the Assisi Stigmatization. In the latter, arguably not of Giotto’s hand, St. Francis receives
the stigmata passively; his body faces the seraph-Christ, and his hands never go above his head;
they are rather placed slightly upwards, palms out, in an accusatory manner. “What me?”
seemingly cries out the saint. His face could almost be contemplating, rather than feeling, the
sweet pain that St. Francis personally described. As spectators, we are not privileged to the
vision in Assisi, given the closed body language.39 In the Bardi chapel’s version, however, the
body of the saint is turned towards the viewer, literally opening up the body for the spectator to
feel and enter. St. Francis’ hands rise far above his head as if photographically caught in the
violent throes; his fingers are open, his body extended, and it looks as if his mouth is open ala the
mystical union of Bernini’s St. Teresa. Centuries later in his treatise on painting, Da Vinci will
claim that the most expressive body is the extended body, where its limbs reach upwards in
ecstasy. It is for this reason that Giotto is considered the father of the Renaissance. Giotto’s
bodies reach from themselves, out of themselves and toward themselves, as will Michelangelo’s.
Giotto’s St. Francis does reach toward the angel in heaven, but it is an immanent angel in the
body of the saint.
In the case of Giotto’s Stigmatization, the background is pictorial space itself. How could this
be? Pictorial space in the Antony series is immanent, thanks to its use of the figure, while for the
majority of painted spaces it is marked by depth, hierarchy and values. As the hallmark of the
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Renaissance picture space, linear perspective is the best representative of the latter. Perspective,
and/or the illusion of it would dominate the pictorial plane until the advent of Modern art in the
mid nineteenth century. If linear perspective repeated the iconic space of surface as window to
the transcendent, then the Antony series is struggling to collapse the distinction between concept
and material, God and vessel, divinity and saint. The figure of Antony in the series does not ask
us to seek a transcendent God, as an icon would draw our gaze to the gaze of God. Rather, our
gaze is forced unto his body, and whatever theological force remains on his body, self-sufficient
and immanent. The insistence of Giotto in his stigmatization is to embody an invisibility—the
force of Christ’s descent. Reminiscent of the golden lines in icons of the transfiguration, Giotto
does this with golden lines of light. Holes are indeed depicted in the hands of St. Francis, yet
there are strait, golden rays from Christ’s wounds, who flies in the air, to Francis’ wounds.40 It is
this transference of suffering with line (disfiguration) that allows the force of God to descend
onto the body, and therefore by default, onto the canvas. The force of God collapses with the
force of the body. Agents of a reconfiguration of immanence, the diagonal, golden lines of
flight—to borrow a phrase from Deleuze and Guattari—extend their influence in an immanence
without pretense to height or depth: they are indications of a body doubling; Christ becoming St.
Francis, St. Francis becoming alter Christus. What is getting communicated is the collapse of
space and temporal dimensions—an eternal Christ-body folded into a temporal body; which is
another repetition of the incarnation, as it was in the latter that God took the form of temporal
body. This infusion or crossing of thresholds causes a zone of indiscernability, of passage, to
extend across the surface, from heaven to earth, and we can attribute to it the presence of
immanent, theological force, just as Christ was the becoming immanent of God. The golden lines
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of descent are the agents of indiscernability, of this body doubling. Remarkably, the golden lines
engender gesture, and gesture reveals Christ. In this sense, only bodies after Christ are properly
Christological.
Giotto’s use of line is a profound adaptation of the strait lines found in icons of the
transfiguration. For example, in an early twelfth century Byzantine icon of the transfiguration the
glory of Christ is depicted by thick golden lines streaming from behind his body to those
witnessing it; all those who are present are cowered on their knees, shocked, frightened and
weighed down by the miraculous vision. It is both painful and joyful, blinding and beautiful.
Similarly, another transfiguration icon from the twelfth century, found in Saint Catherine’s
Monastery in Egypt, shows similar golden rays emanating from the body of Christ,
metaphorically piercing the spectators with dread, joy, fear and elation. Though these icons are
of Christ’s miraculous beauty, divine nature and power, Giotto’s adaptation of the iconic
technique equally blurs the distinction between pain and beauty, joy and suffering, cataphasis
with apophasis. He has translated the techniques of the transfiguration and made them work for
the stigmatization.

The crucifixion is the transcendental a priori of the stigmata, and both are expressions of the
incarnation. The stigmatized body extends Christ’s passive gestures to include a more profound
deformation, a determination that reveals what the Crucifixion hides. The lesson from Giotto is
this: bodies become in virtue of (theological) force, thereby giving birth to a gesturology of
suffering. It is as if the saintly body of St. Francis can now gain its authority in virtue of the
disappearance of Christ (the logic of immanence). Bodies no longer are alive in virtue of an
invisible theological force but received their humanity by an extreme visibility. The stigmata
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simply captures the point of suffering’s passage—afterwards St. Francis is a duplicate of Christ.
It was as if the transcendent element in icons had to be removed in order for a realistic figure in
painting to emerge.
If it is the gestures of Giotto’s bodies that loosened the tongue of Medieval art so that the
Renaissance could develop the movement figure, then the Antony series takes gesture to its
extreme conclusion—the body that disappears visually engenders our perceptual act of seeking
an invisible force. Painting is an art of capturing forces because in painting bodies we are, by
default, capturing force.41 Force in aesthetics is a theological concept; force is an attribute of
specific coordinates. Force is the name of one power masked by another (God masked by Christ,
Christ masked by Antony, Christ masked by St. Francis), yet for most of history it retains the
power to be isolated from its expression. Until Giotto, that is, when the expressor and the
expression are unified in the singular, deformed body.

If painting is a matter of capturing force, then painting is beginning in the thirteenth century and
relies heavily on a theological premise. Further, if it is the radical gesture that allowed real
bodies to emerge in the pictorial plane in the 12th, 13th and following centuries, then painting
relies on a theology of the incarnation. The figure is the foundation of the abstract object;
abstract because, like Antony’s wracked body, the force is identical to the figure, and merges
with it completely. The Modern canvas relies on a similar infusion of force, except in latter’s
case the infusion is of a neutralized, abstract force; in other words, Modern painting has
forgotten its origins. The property of Modern abstraction is de-theologized force. The body is
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properly Christological in that power is attributed in moments of effacement, passage, and the
preferred mode of representation is decidedly non-representational—i.e., zones of indiscernment,
a phrase Deleuze uses to characterize the property of Francis Bacon’s figures to melt into their
structural backgrounds. Though the relation between body and force appears to be fortuitous in
history, it is not. A specific logic is being deployed in asceticism and aesthetics. In order for
force to develop as the main component in the birth of Western painting, the body had to be
utilized since it, and only it, is the only site in which to understand this (Christian) ontology.

Background, Figure and Temptation

Earlier it was said that the Antony series is marked by an immanence of form without
background. Presumably, a background adds depth and perspective to a painting (marking the
logic of transcendence), thereby robbing it of its immanent property. By necessity, backgrounds
have a foreground, and the mere presence of these two elements reveals the presence of illusion,
which is a property of perspective. With perspective comes visual hierarchies, as the foreground
is always more important than the background and the right always more important than the left.
The eighteenth century paintings of the Romantic sublime are famous for singular figures
contemplating a dark and mystical nature. David Caspar Friedrich’s The Wanderer Above the
Sea of Fog (1818) and his Monk by the Sea (1808-1810) use background precisely for this
reason—to isolate contemplating humankind from a paradoxically distant, intimate nature.
Backgrounds anchor a painting in this world by allowing the figure to be distinct from it. But
backgrounds do occur within the Antony series, and we must account for them. In the Antony
series, it is often the desert or the city that is the background. We should, however, not be so
quick to think backgrounds solely in terms of depth, nor distance in terms of perspective.
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The desert figures prominently in ascetic literature and hagiography. More than mere
background, the desert is the stage upon which the monastic wages his spiritual war. What
attracted the monks to the desert we can never be entirely sure, given as such movements are to a
variety of influences, but what remains constant is that the desert is where monks need to go in
order to find the demons.42 The desert isolates and compresses time and place upon the fleeting
screen of consciousness, and amplifies the dark interiority of human temptation. One can of
course fight the fight in the city, but only the desert distills life’s movement to its bare essentials.
The desert brings into focus the daily assault that occurs in the city without our awareness.
Merely bringing to the surface what is ever-present, the desert is the place of truth. For these
reasons, it is not correct to posit a city/evil and desert/truth dualism, as many have done.43 For
Athanasius, the author of Antony’s vitae, the demons have taken refuge in the desert, and so
Antony’s quest is to civilize the desert, rid it of demons, and make the desert a city of God. The
projection system that is the stark desert landscape is conducive to the production of media—the
monks were on stage, they were actors in a drama; there were villains, victors, battles and
miraculous events. There were even spectators, as texts like Palladius’ Lausiac History testifies
to. Some have argued that the Life of Antony is the first modern novel, under the assumption that
the modern novel is defined by an interior psychological struggle.44 As a witness to the struggle,
the novel invents foes, friends, dramatic moments in order to create a narrative for the character,
and writing produces affects for the reader through these movements.
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Goehring remarks on the spatiality of the desert and how this spatiality is the most conducive
element to this new media.45 In some in the Antony series, it is as if the full spatiality of the
desert has become the extended spatiality within the works—the lack of backgrounds are
translations of the focused, intense desert theatre. The feeling of extension that one feels when
viewing Schongauer’s Temptation or Grunwald’s Isenheim Altarpiece is also the feeling of the
vastness of the desert landscape. Only the desert can engender a claustrophobia that topologically
morphs into an expansion. The monks sought space for its amplification of an inner
claustrophobia. The pictorial space is claustrophobia extended; it is too full, not empty.

Artists in the series have dealt with this claustrophobia in a number of ways. Some have
underlined it through the use of demons. The demons are more than attachments to Antony, they
are his extension, this being most pronounced in Schongauer. But even where it is not as isolated
and frontal the extension occurs by surrounding demons in the air, blackness, or a cave interior,
the latter where Antony had a few bouts with the demons. Two types of backgrounds call our
attention. First, the cave scene is incredibly popular, and Brueghel and Parenzano use the blurry,
dark claustrophobia of the cave to extend the body, or, more precisely, the event that is bodily
temptation; temptation is always immanent to the body. Bosch populates the canvas with evenly
distributed figures surrounding Antony.46 But as said earlier, backgrounds often frequent the
series.

Second, the city-background is an extension of the desert, as it were, and due to this, it holds
affinities with Antony’s body. We must caution, however, against formulas, as no formulas exist
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for navigating this strange tension. All artists have are methods. One method is that of repetition.
Just as the stone mountain in Gitto’s Bardi Chapel Stigmatization, and the Upper Church
Stigmatization in Assisi, is a figural repetition of St. Francis’ body, the desert is not a mere
backdrop but a figural form in communication with the figure of Antony, much as Rothko’s
abstract shapes are meant to communicate with each other. The two features speak with each
other. Albrecht Dürer’s St. Antony (1519) exhibits this repetition of forms nicely. Both figures
rise in pyramidal structure. Whereas in Dürer’s Antony is turned away from the city, in Jan
Brueghel’s The Temptation of St. Antony the city is temptation itself. This method uses the city
as a reminder, castigation and a form of temptation itself. The scene is a cave, and Antony is
surrounded as usual. The cave is dark, but in the upper recesses there is an opening flooded with
white light, and in this opening there lies a silhouette of a church. Similarly, in Marten De Vos’
rendition a huge church is sandwiched between Antony’s flight-bound struggle and demons on
the ground. Lucas Cranach the Elders’ Temptation (Figure 21) resembles De Vos’ in
composition, with a Church sitting idyllically in a serene valley while Antony fights for his life
above.
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Figure 21. Lucas Cranach the Elder. The Temptation of St. Antony, 1506. German. Woodcut.
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Functioning as a pair, the city-church are temptations and reminders of the ultimate goal of
asceticism—to bring God to the desert. Urban structures in general, therefore, function to mark
the struggle of monastics: the church is both what they desire and what they cannot have. Their
bodies are repetitions of the city in that the demons must be excised from both, yet it is always in
the body that they must first be released, the city feeling this release immediately. They fight
here for that over there. Their bodies are coded with empire, and Athanasius more than anyone
uses the ascetic body as a stand-in for empire itself. What desert hagiography accomplishes for
asceticism in literature, the Antony series accomplishes for asceticism in art.

Figure and Joyful Suffering
The body completely wracked by suffering and torture expresses itself spatially. Deleuze found
in Nietzsche a helpful hermeneutical device—a body is defined by what is capturing it, and it has
as many senses as “there are forces taking possession of it.”47 Forces, however, can never appear
pure. It is of the nature of force to mask itself in order to survive; force will conform itself to any
given material, just as Nietzsche will claim of philosophy’s adoption of the ascetic mask when it
was struggling for its existence. Essentially, force has no name nor visible properties of its
own—this is not a fact of force, as it has no facts, but a problem lodged within perceptual
attribution, as in “this or that body is under force.” It is a problem of designating what is
happening to this or that body. Force is what we attribute to bodies under pressure, and the name
we give to it is just as likely to designate the provenance of that deformation. Yet for reasons
previously detailed, force must remain the most cryptic (and fertile) element in crucifixion
imagery. In the case of the latter, force is given a very specific name—that of Christ. But force
belongs to the body and only the body, and Christ is merely another name for the body. The body
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is the best conductor of force, hence the conducting (productive) property of Christ and the
bodies that model themselves on this logic.
God was capturing Christ’s body in the crucifixion, but what is capturing Antony’s? Nothing
other than the demonic. Because for Athanasius, the author of Antony’s hagiography, the
demons are manifestations of thoughts, the demons are really correspondences of thought
processes: “For when they come, their actions correspond to the condition in which they find us;
they pattern their phantasm after our thoughts.”48 The demons are therefore perfect bodily
repetitions that represent both the goal of asceticism (the monk becoming like Christ) and its
greatest danger (the ability of the demons to take any form and become the monastic body,
which the Antony series comes close to expressing).49 Hence the fact that the demons are often
indistinguishable from Antony’s body, as in Lucas Cranach the Elder’s Temptation of St.
Anthony (1506). Eugene Isabey’s The Temptation of Saint Antony (Figure 27), some three
centuries later than Cranach and Schongauer, remains faithful to the blurring and collapsing of
Antony’s body with his surroundings. Isabey has Antony surrounded by swirling masses of nude
and clothed bodies, angels, temptations, wind, fruit, gold, color, movement. In Pieter Bruegel the
Elder’s Temptation of St. Antony (Figure 22) one can barely find the figure of Antony among the
fantastic creatures, demonic dismembering and general madness.
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Figure 22. Pieter Bruegel. The Temptation of St. Antony, 1556.

The fantastical depictions can be explained by the fact that for many medieval artists the source
text for depicting Antony was not the Life of Antony but the Golden Legend50, a collection of
fantastical hagiographies written around 1260 by Jacobus de Voragine that would become the
most printed book in Europe between the years 1470 and 1530.51
Paul Cézanne’s Temptation of St. Anthony (see Figures 12-13), centuries after Isabey, blurs the
figure in sharp impressionistic strokes, surrounded by a beautiful female nude, a demon and
other small creatures. Like Grunewald’s Antony, Stefano de Giovanni’s St. Antony the Hermit
50
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Tortured by the Devils,1423, (Figure 23) uses color as much as figure to blur Antony and the
demons; the black robe of Antony is extended to the black of the devils, while the golds and reds
of Antony’s halo are repeated in the demon’s bodies and faces. As usual, Antony is central and
in focus.

Figure 23. Stefano de Giovanni. St. Antony the Hermit Tortured by the Devils, 1423.

But a serious problem confronts us. Ascetic hagiography and discourse are firm in their
conviction that the divine body communicates through its gestures. The Life of St. Antony reads:
“His soul being free of confusion, he held his outer senses also disturbed, so that from the soul’s
joy his face was cheerful as well, and from the movements of his body it was possible to sense
and perceive the stable condition of the soul.”52 The body communicates its holiness through a
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combination of Hellenistic grace, Stoic calm and Christian piety. Yet this semiotic in Antony’s
vitae is one of joy, and differs markedly from that in the Antony series. So there appears to be a
discrepancy between a stable soul seen in a joyful body and that of body under demonic
onslaught. There may not be any discrepancy at all. They could just be two different scenes in a
man’s life, and yet if the divine body communicates itself through the monk in gestures, why is it
that the most gestured figure covers the body under the attack of demons? Isn’t that akin to
saying that God itself is another form of the demonic? Can we read the dismantling of Antony’s
body as one of joy? In Celano and Bonaventure’s vitae of the Franciscan, it is said that during
the receiving of the stigmata, the saint felt sorrow and joy. Bonaventure writes of the
stigmatization:

Two wings were raised above His head, twain were spread forth to fly, while twain hid
his whole body. Beholding this, Francis was mightily astonished, and joy, mingled with
sorrow, filled his heart. He rejoiced at the gracious aspect wherewith he saw Christ, under
the guise of the Seraph, regard him, but His crucifixion pierced his soul with a sword of
pitying grief.53
Celano describes it in no less paradoxical terms. Much depends on how we understand joy. We
have to ask the question differently—what event does the joyful harbor? The joyful harbors a
performative, neither one of pain nor pleasure, but extension. Compatible with Spinoza’s idea
that joy increases with the body’s power, and/or the politics of Zarathustra’s dance, the body
extends itself universally and more powerfully the more joy it has. Nietzsche will term the
body’s innate ability for extension its will to power. Conversely, however, the body must receive
as much as it extends. This form of universal extension is well known in theology—Christ’s
body was always a stand-in for the cosmological story. Christ’s body was the all, and extended
itself across materiality and history either as eternal Logos, incarnate materiality, divine
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intelligence, Mind eternal, Hegel’s absolute, and so on. On this account, Christ recapitulated all
of humanity in his body, making possible a renewed humanity; but of course, his extension was a
retroactive invention by the early Fathers, acting as a solution to the how of Christ’s divinity, and
the why of his active involvement in worldly affairs. God was already an abstract form of
universalism, but the philosophical tradition that the early Fathers inherited made it difficult to
think both his isolation as Eternal being as well as his immanence in the world. With the concept
of Christ, the early theologians solved this problem at the cost, no doubt, of God’s transcendent
status.
And so, to the problem of seeing the divine in the gestures of Antony’s tortured body, a simple
solution is found: the joyful is the encounter with temptation, the latter the most necessary of
ascetic psycho-somatics. One can see Antony’s soul regardless of its turbulence, and, more
importantly, one can see it more clearly, honestly, in virtue of that turbulence. The soul is
turbulence, is conflicting forces, is the body.

The joy in the joyful space comes from a prior Christo-logic—the performative glory of
martyrdom. Appearing alongside the growth of Christianity, fueled largely by widespread
persecution, martyrdom was one of the earliest interpretations of the Christus triumphans, and it
remained but one expression of what was really going on in the crucifixion event. Asceticism,
which can be understood to be the replacement image of the martyr, begins later in history, but
the joy of the martyr’s death in his final moments will forever be lodged within Christianity’s
own understanding of asceticism. Ignatius’ wild desire for complete dismemberment is perhaps
the most famous masochistic text in Western history. In his “Epistle to the Romans” of the early
second century, Ignatius exclaims, “Let fire, cross, groups of wild beasts, the scattering of bones,
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the cutting up of limbs, the grinding of the entire body, and the devil’s evil punishments come
upon me, only that I may attain to Jesus Christ.”54 Though he is without a stage in the desert,
Schongauer’s Antony resembles Ignatius in imagery and bodily dismemberment. And yet, the
stage is the painting—affect travels across it as cries for mercy in an ancient coliseum, ending up
on our hearts. To be more precise, Antony’s body is the canvas. His body is the will to power in
aesthetic terms, given that it desires full extension. A revealing comparison is Dürer’s St.
Michael’s Fight Against the Dragon of 1498 (Figure 24).
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Figure 24. Albrecht Dürer. St. Michael’s Fight Against the Dragon, 1498.

Resembling the Antony series in innumerable ways, with the floating, isolated central figure
surrounded by an onslaught of demonic forces, St. Michael can in no way be mistaken for St.
Antony. The difference is that the former has a weapon, actively fighting the dragons, while the
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latter has no weapons. St. Michael is trying to protect the integrity of his figure, his formation.
St. Antony welcomes his deformation.
Because his body is open to temptation (desire opens), Antony’s figure has the property of
extension. His body is extended in virtue of its indiscernability with the surrounding figures.
Deleuze remarks that for Bacon the contour line, the organic membrane surrounding his figures,
becomes the “trapeze apparatus or prosthesis in a new sense, for the acrobatics of the flesh.”55
The contour line is the fluid boundary separating an organism from its surrounding, and in
Bacon’s work the membrane is punctured so that the outside bleeds toward the figure and the
figure bleeds outward. For the Antony series, the demonic is the outer membrane isolating the
figure from the outside, yet also the agent by which it is swallowed by the outside. Just as the
crucifix is a prosthetic for Christ’s becoming flesh, Antony’s flesh is in a process of becoming
Christ through its radical deformation. It is through the demonic membrane that Antony becomes
Christ.
We spoke earlier of Giotto’s Stigmatization of St. Francis. Giotto uses bold lines to mark the
lines of force. What Schongauer adds to Giotto is focus, and he interprets the line of descent
across the entire body, multiplying it. The entire body is stigmatized, without line, and by
demons. In Giotto, the stigmata, even while being the central tenet of the mural, is in Schongauer
centralized to the point of having no background. The struggle is spread before us in the form of
a figure, populating the entirety of pictorial space. What is born in this (ascetic or aesthetic)
struggle is the canvas. The canvas, as one of equal resonance among marks follows from this
extension, does not precede this extension. Space follows from force; space is born of force, and
resonance is the quality of space.The body is awakened by the force of God’s radical incarnation
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(Antony first, but enacted in St. Francis). Gestures are an expression of this force. A body is a
contour line of God—he enters via deformation.
All the elements in the Antony series center their formal action around Antony’s isolated body,
and especially in Schongauer’s simplified and pair-down version, one can discern remnants of
the iconic tradition’s emphasis on flatness.56

All the forms, shapes and lines in the paintings compress on his body, which is the central point
of the canvas. Schongauer’s takes this resonance to a new level. Schongauer’s Antony is
weightless in the air against a colorless background. Demons with clubs pound the monk’s body,
tearing at anything they can get their hands on—a wrist, an arm, a leg, his cloak. The picture
space is remarkably flat. There is representational “depth” only in overlapping figures, only in
the violence to come forward. Full and robust, the composition fills the white space with pointed
wings, talons and aching feet. Only this figure has allowed disfiguration to be credible and
worthy of depiction; only with this figure can the space of the canvas be opened up to an even
palate of sensation, for, after all, what are we witnessing if not a pure multiplicity of sensate
experience, where blurring of shape is more important than form, when shared line and shared
color are more valuable than definition.

The Erotic
“Hence the ecstasy of exposure.”
Michael Hardt
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Often, as in Eugene Isabey’s Temptation the demonic is substituted with nudity and sensuality,
further drawing the parallel to eroticism and suffering, the demonic and pleasure,
dismemberment and the dark touch of joy (see Figure 25). Orthodox readings of monastic desire
understand pleasure to be had in the overcoming of temptation. The erotic is what precisely
needs to be avoided, and this is exactly the case in Antony’s vitae.

Figure 25. John Charles Dollman. The Temptations of St. Antony, circa 1925.

The demonic, if it is anything, is not the same as joy or pleasure. Monasticism is a project of
doing away with temptation and desire.57 And yet, as the series testifies, temptation is the vehicle
through which the monastic body is defined. Temptation opens the body up, literally and
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figurally, and it gives the body the scope it needs in order to be equated with the ontologically
prior body, Christ. If he or she is glorious, they are glorious in virtue of the battle with
temptation. Temptation cannot be extracted from the monastic enterprise—it must literally
surround the monk on all sides; in the case of the Antony series, it surrounds him to such a
degree that the line between his body and theirs dissolves:—“The monk must always consider at
least a part of himself as demonic.” 58 Extension is the name for the body’s attachment to these
“exterior” figures. Temptation is extension. Rather than avoid temptation, the monastic needs it
and requires it. Pictorially, the extension flattens the body, but theologically, temptation opens it,
gives it dimensionality. In aesthetic terms, the extension of Antony populates the canvas with
sensation, a fact that gives this series its modern, abstract characteristics. Michael Hardt comes
close to articulating the monastic phenomenon of erotic exposure and how in the face of desire
ecstasy follows suit. Hardt writes: “In erotic exposure the boundaries or discontinuities between
self and other are broken down and dissolved to open a kind of communication or
communion.”59 Though the monastic must resist desire, he must equally court desire and open up
his body to its powerful agents.

If in previous variations extension (which is another name for the building up of consistency of
surface) occurs via the demons or the city, we can add desire as a third principle of extension.
Extension always occurs through figure, color, line and blurring. Felicien Rops is the most
radical of those using nudity. In his version of The Temptation of St. Antony, 1878 (Figure 26) a
nude female hangs crucified from the cross. Hanging where Christ ought to be, she smirks in
erotic invitation.
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Figure 26. Felicien Rops. The Temptation of St. Antony, 1878.

Remarkably, Antony gazes upwards with his palms to his ears. His beard flies ragged and tosses
in the wind, and his clothes are in tatters. Above the nude’s head is a sign that reads EROS where
INRI should be. Antony’s posture is eerily similar to Giotto’s Francis, with his body open to the
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viewer, one knee planted and arms extended. A post-mortem Christ seems to float behind the
cross, and demonic angels toss about in the air. A demon appears on the other side of the cross.
Rop’s picture defies words. Is the body of Christ a desirable object? Or is Rops taking part in the
“Christ as Scarlet Woman” tradition, which, according to Oliver St John and Sophie Di Jorio,
Rops interpreted from an apocalyptic passage in the Book of Revelation.60 We are not exactly
sure what inspired Rops, but we do know he is working within the thematic of the demonic and
ascetic desire.

60 St. John, Oliver, Sophie Di Jorio. The Ending of the Words - Magical Philosophy of Aleister Crowley (Crown Quarto, 2008) p.
44.
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Figure 27. Eugene Isabey. The Temptation of St. Antony. 1869. Oil on canvas.
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Seeming to pull in all directions, and without general strategy, Athanasius’ Life of Antony gives
us hints as to what the demons want. Firstly, they want to keep Antony on the ground. Demons
populate the air for a very specific reason—keeping Antony from bodily resurrection: “Next, he
saw some foul and terrible figures standing in the air, intent on holding him back so he could not
pass by.”61 The foul beings in the air asked for an accounting of his life, and according to the Life
of Antony, Antony’s guide-beings said that his slate before he was a monk has been wiped clean,
but that of after becoming a monk you can take an account. “Then, as they leveled accusations
and failed to prove them, the passage opened before him free and unobstructed. And just then he
saw himself appear to come and stand with himself, and once more he was Antony, as before.”62
Schongauer as well captures this passage, of a body literally stretched in space. According to
Siglind Bruhn, Grunewald’s immediate model for a singular body in space can most likely be
traced to a copper print by Bernardo Parentino, itself made after some images Andre Mantegna
had done of Antony.63 The space does not precede the body, just as “new life” did not precede
the ministry of Christ. It was Christ who first cleared the air, making passage within verticality
thematic, and Antony was merely following suit. Antony’s body merely doubled Christ’s body
when it entered the arena of force and became deformed in the process.

The passage within the air, without gravity, suspended in demonic onslaught is what conditions
the strange ethereal expansion of Antony’s figure. Without the concern of gravity, the demons
attack him from all angles, his feet, hair, hands and midsection. This tearing apart is also his
expansion. The only dimensions in these series are not those of gravity or landscape, but
horizontality and verticality—the canvas does not open up behind the figure, but across it,
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through it, and only by it. What results is an immanent, modern picture space where our eye
traces the figure’s entirety, where color, and form are content, communicating with each other
across the figure. The figure is decentralized, and without value as an individual subject; no one
demon takes precedence, as it is a total body onslaught; there is no body per se, only a dispersed,
deformed figure. His ultimate value is his sacrifice.

A Higher Formation?
Another principle of ascetic discipline is the fact that the ascetic body must never come to
completion. Deformation is not a virtue in light of a higher formation. The deformed body is
guided by its transcendental body—Christ—but it is guided by it in a strange manner. First, we
have seen how the crucifix has engendered an aesthetics of the body’s dismantling. Second, we
can also understand transcendental in the ontological sense of Christ’s status as a screen for
creation, his logos (near point). The first is the ontological image providing the rational for the
second. Everything springs forth from a meditation on the crucifix. When the thinkers placed
Christ at the near point, they attributed to him a ceaseless quality; his work is never to be
completed. Of course, in history his work was completed on the cross, but for humanity this
completion becomes our incompletion; the body is never finished erasing the original stain of its
corruption, and so therefore the image of man becomes one of impossible completion, which is
the property of (Antony’s) extended body.64 Man must never risk full deification.
What must be protected at all costs is the ontological athleticism of Christ’s body at the time of
its becoming. Theologians are anxious that Christ never fully form, and that he remain in a
permanent state of ungrounding. This is the fundamental aesthetic quality of appearance peculiar
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to a human body that has no shape and yet informs all shapes. Harpham writes: “Christ must
resist the tendency to form; he must remain in finite and inchoate, free from all objectification of
his being, all commodification of desire—we might say he must remain in parable and resist all
metonymy.”65 This anxiety to keep Christ inchoate had practical consequences, for how could a
totally complete, fully formed being be said to exist inside another fully formed being, which is
us. First, in order for Christ to be able to redeem humanity he must be isolated from it. This was
the concern of the early Fathers in their insistence that Christ not be fully equated with humanity.
Though it is commonly asserted that this distance is one of transcendence, the logos status of
Christ is in fact a function of becoming. The problem resides in making a place for immanent
life. Just as for Deleuze the concern in drawing a distinction between the virtual and the actual is
not one of transcendence vs. immanence, nor to claim truth vs. falsity. Rather, the problem is to
protect the virtual so as to be able to account for new actualities. The early fathers have the same
concern. They are adamant that Christ never die. He must live on. Why? So the Christ can be
present to us in all our times. How? The difference is one of intensities (virtualities) and
formations (actualities). What is at stake is reserving for Christ a special virtual status, and
eternal generation is the classical nomenclature to describe the virtual property of Christ. One
only has to ask the question of Does Christ get tired? to grasp the requirement that he be a
ceaseless, restless power.

How exactly does Christ resist the tendency to form? Christ will be characterized by a bodily
logic known more precisely by dancers than theologians. Athanasius, in an imagined refutation
hinted at earlier, interrogates the Greek image of thought.
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The Greek philosophers say that the universe is a great body, and they say truly, for we
perceive the universe and its parts with our senses. But if the Word of God is in the
universe, which is a body, and has entered into it in its every part, what is there surprising
or unfitting in our saying that He has entered also into human nature?66
An image common among the Stoic philosophers, Athanasius is well aware that for Christianity
the debate really hinges on the meaning of an (ascetic) logic of “human nature,” as there must be
something already immanent in human nature, now, which reveals the manner in which God
incarnated a body. Athanasius is no doubt rigid in his formulations, drawing a strict divide
between the whole and the part (the one vs. the many).67 The universe is a whole body composed
of shifting parts, yet how to differentiate between God’s presence in the whole and God’s
presence in the parts? As we suspected, it is a difference between two forms of repetition.
Strangely, Athanasius doesn’t concern himself with the formal difference between the whole and
the part, for the very question negates the revelation of Christ, a revelation that rearticulated the
question in terms of how in creation God can express himself in the form of a body. Athanasius
continues:

Take a parallel case. A man’s personality actuates and quickens his whole body. If
anyone said it was unsuitable for the man’s power to be in the toe, he would be thought
silly, because, while granting that a man penetrates and actuated the whole of his body,
he denied his presence in the part. Similarly, no one who admits the presence of the
World of God in the universe as a whole should think it unsuitable for a single human
body to be by Him actuated and enlightened.68
Athanasius at once utilizes the whole-part distinction in order to make room for a new image of
thought expressed on the inherent movements of the body. We say expressed because Athanasius
is not simply asking us to imagine, in literary fashion, how God could move in the universe in
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the same way the body moves its toe. Athanasius is not presenting a metaphor. Rather,
Athanasius is translating a certain ontology into a bodily epistemology in order to authorize his
conceptions of corruption and incorruption. Moreover, this is how the Son theoretically appears
in the world, the practical appearance being his mask of the prophet. It is not the case that
Athanasius, at such a young age, is unaware of overlapping logics at work: “Man is a part of the
creation, as I said before; and the reasoning which applies to one applies to the other….All things
derive from the Word their light and movement and like, as the Gentiles authors themselves say,
“In him we live and move and have our being.’”69 Equally powerful, Christ moved into our
bodies as God moved in Christ. A single movement, but two forms of gesture.

A logic of immanence therefore presents itself: one must assume the form of that which one
desires to correct. One tree had to replace another. In order for man to be cleansed and the way
shown to him and materiality redeemed, Christ had to adopt the form of man. Yet, as we have
seen, much philosophical maneuvering had to take place, foremost being a three point
ontological narrative, with Christ inhabiting a near, immanent and far temporal point.70 Equally
aesthetic and ethical, herein lies the origin of ascetic imitatio Christi.

Conclusion

In the previous chapters, we have thought together two bodies, which are two forms of
repetition: crucified body and ascetic body. With the Antony series and Giotto, we have added a
third—the aesthetic figure. As a conceptual persona, the first is found in early theological
literature and expressed in christology, the new form of philosophy in the ancient world. Christ
was understood to be without end and beginning, and so resembled Greek notions of eternal
69
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Nature. “All things move in Christ” sums up this conception. As the visible, repeated image of
God, Christ is bound to repeat, but repeat human nature with difference, that is, to continue to
create inside immanent humanity, all the while remaining a virtual presence within it.

The second we saw in various guises in hagiographical texts where the monastic found himself
clothed in Christ. An ascetic moved about in the crucified body of Christ though his discipline,
channeling the suffering and purifying rites of the Crucifix in the desert. The silent gestures of
the crucified Christ are translated into a gesturology of divine expression. Pilgrims found Christ
at work because they could viscerally see the force of the incarnation at work. Antony’s struggle
was defined by exposure. The art of the human body found its divine inspiration in embodying
the force of Christ so as to be victorious over the force of the demonic. Actual martyrdom
extends itself over a life, the monk’s life, and over the body. If the crucified body was a
compression of humanity’s suffering, then the ascetic body was its unfolding.
A third form of repetition, the aesthetic figure, was first found in Giotto’s Stigmatization, which
is itself a culmination of the previous forms of repetitions, then second in the Antony series. The
Antony series, in lineage with Crucifixion imagery and Giotto’s gesturing bodies reveal a simple
logic long at work in aesthetic theory: the event of the body remains Christological because by
attributing force to the gesturing body we admit it is taking part in another body. Force populates
the canvas, removing the dramatic or narrative quality of pictorial space and replacing it with
abstraction—i.e., expression. The crucifixion, martyr’s death, ascetic struggle or the
stigmatization are not stories but express the power of theological embodiment. The narrative
quality of the pictorial space is only replaced by a non-narrativable event: force. Further,
sensations masks force with color, line and form—three of the main forms of pictorial sensation.
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Indiscernability is the name we attribute to zones where force has become most palpable: when
the body is dismantled in virtue of a higher formation—deformation.

Through the work of Giotto and the Antony series, this case study has attempted to unravel the
knot that is the ascetic body’s role in early Renaissance art. As we have seen, the contribution of
the ascetic body to Renaissance art is multi-tiered. Theology, pictorial construction, affect
philosophy, the cult of the saints, etc—these are all areas where one can locate the influence
ascetic theory and its visual imagination has had on the Renaissance. In the following chapter,
and second case study, the notion of istoria will be taken up. So crucial to the Antony series was
the body’s gesture, since it was gesture that aided in the earliest developments of Western art
away from Byzantine influence. Latin for story or narrative, istoria would become with Da Vinci
one of the most important aspects of the painted canvas. While attention will be paid less to
asceticism and its logic, it will become clear how istoria employs gesture to create
communication within the painted canvas (autonomy). In other words, a latent ascetic logic does
reside within the notion of istoria.
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Chapter 6

Istoria—Da Vinci’s Renaissance Bodies

The most prodigious strokes of madness appear on
canvas under the auspices of the Catholic code.

Gilles Deleuze

This is the second case study to explore the ascetic logic of the body in the visual arts. In the
previous chapter, it was shown how the Antony series provides the viewer with a singular figure
surrounded by demons. The scenes in the series depicted a specific moment in the hermit’s life,
and the series gains its power from a remarkably consistent style. What is “modern” about this
series is how it is attempting to portray a different body (disfiguration) than the one that will
eventually gain traction in the Renaissance and be known as the hallmark of Western painting:
the anatomically rendered nude figure. The body in the series, however, never acted to simply
display a body—it served an artistic function. Antony’s figure allowed artists to take chances in
terms of composition, chances that would eventually contribute to a notion of the art work as a
self-sufficient field, another form of a body whose main properties were immanence,
correspondence and communication—i.e., autonomy. Autonomy is not here being used to define
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the work of art as without function or purpose, as does Adorno, though Adorno did claim a
functionality in art’s lack of functionality.1
It is in this context of autonomy that we turn to Leon Battisti Alberti’s concept of istoria. Like
Giotto’s stigmatas and the Antony series, this case study is an attempt to unravel the creative
deployment of the ascetic logic of the body in the visual arts. What is not being claimed is that
istoria historically relies on an ascetic concept of the body. Rather, all three discursive
formations—asceticism, Antony series, istoria—return us to a logic of the body that is not
created by said traditions, but exploited by them.

From Temptation to Torment

During the Italian duecento, a revolution in the visual arts gave birth to a new conception of what
painting could be. At the time, however, it was not entirely clear what the “modern” styles of
Cimabue, Duccio and Giotto, among others, were doing to revolutionize the prevailing
Byzantine iconic style. It would take a few centuries until their “modern” style, as Vasari termed
it, received formal attention.2 In retrospect, a few things are clear: the paintings and murals are
beginning to rely more and more on the painting’s internal characteristics for their status as
works of art. In contrast to the iconic tradition, whose expressive features are often as highly
stylized as much as formally coded, the new bodies of Giotto appear lifelike. Figures speak to
each other in dramatic narratives on the canvas, communicating across bodies or singularly, on a
single body. The icon that was the window unto God is being painted over in praise of a window
unto nature, and the gaze of the body, formerly thought to transcend the symbolic face of the
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saint, now remains fixed to gesture, body language, posture and expression; there is a general
trend that indicates that the eyes of figures are looking less and less at the viewer and more
frequently at their peers on the canvas. In addition to eyes, the body is beginning to express a
semiotic that will eventually dominate painting for centuries.

Painters are taking liberties in expressing their bodies. Giotto nearly revolutionizes painting
when in his Baptism of Christ (Figure 28) he paints Christ’s hair as wet, heavy and slick against
his right shoulder, exactly as wet hair would be; the others stand on the shore, their hair wavy
and full of volume, i.e., dry. Equally revolutionary is Giotto’s depictions of the infant Christ
sprouting a childish band of hair in Nativity, in the Arena chapel, and the filling out of that hair
in Adoration of the Magi in the same location. 3 Richard Viladesau sums it up when he states that
Giotto “portrays Christ’s humanity but does so in a usually convincing way, after the manner of
sculpture, and not solely as a theological statement.”4 In addition to his superb attention to detail,
Giotto further emphasizes the subsidiary actors, which many didn’t do. His people interact with
one another, as in his Betrayal of Christ (Figure 36) and The Massacre of the Innocents (Figure
29), rather than on the central character.5 Giotto paints real bodies in scenes “without” theology,
and it is for this reason that his “modern” paintings will be mentioned in the same breath as
istoria.
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Figure 28. Giotto. Baptism of Christ. Arena chapel. 1304-6.
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Figure 29. Giotto. The Massacre of the Innocents. Arena Chapel, 1304-6. Fresco.

With the concept of istoria in mind, philosopher Leon Battista Alberti writes that Giotto
“expresses with his face and gesture a clear indication of a disturbed soul in such a way that there
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are different movements and positions in each one.”6 Though Giotto is supposed to bring
painting back to nature, and loosen the tongue of painting, his paintings are strictly coded.
Writes Barasch: “He infused gestures that appear to be ‘conventional’ with the spirit of life, of an
immediate, often urgent, psychological reality. On the other hand, he often imparted the quality
of emotional restraint, usually characteristic of conventional gesticulation, to movements
representing natural reactions, expressing agitated minds and turbulent experiences. In his style
Giotto tended to level the difference between the two modes.” 7 Giotto uses social conventions,
but makes free use of them. The content of his naturalism is that bodies begin to express coded
behavior but in an uncoded fashion.8

During these crucial centuries, late Medieval painters, Giotto foremost among them, are relying
less and less on accepted traditions of viewing, such as the conception that the picture space is a
window that opens unto God. The claim that painting is now a window upon nature, was, of
course, said centuries after Giotto, and he surely would not have agreed with the statement. Yet
what exactly is this nature for Alberti that he retroactively attributes to the Florentine? And if the
painting was of nature, what is its relationship to bodies? Painter, writer and philosopher, Alberti
speaks for generations of painters when in his Della Pittura (1435), the first treatise on painting
in the Western world, he writes that “The greatest work of the painter is not a colossus, but an
istoria. Istoria gives greater renown to the intellect than any colossus.”9 To claim that Giotto is at
once the founder of “modern” painting, and to place the brilliance of that “modernism” in istoria
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is not to simply claim that Giotto’s bodies were realistic.10 Rather, it is to claim that something
formally is occurring in Giotto’s picture spaces in addition to realistic bodies. Istoria is that
addition, and while istoria on first glance seems to be about gesture and figure, the primary
import of this concept remains embedded within the logic of immanence.

Istoria

The concept of istoria dominated the theoretical conception of the pictorial space in which
Michelangelo began producing art. Two hundred years after the appearance of Alberti’s Della
Pittura, La Font de Saint Yenne in his Reflections on the Present State of Painting (1774) still
declared history painting—one of the genres of istoria—to be the most important aspect of
painting.11 Because of his theorization of istoria, and the dependent concepts of figure, body and
composition, Barasch writes that Alberti is the “founder” of modern art theory. It will not be
until the canvases of Cubism in the early twentieth century that Alberti’s theories are sufficiently
challenged.12 What, then, is istoria?

First given renown by Alberti, istoria (Latin for story or narrative) was a property of the picture
plane intended first to give a reality effect to the plane, and second, allow something (a soul) to
emerge from the painted figures. Istoria relies heavily on a formal characteristic within the
painting (line, shape, color, body) which in turn produces the istoria that the painting emits. As a
rule, istoria cannot be isolated apart from its reliance with bodies or figures, though it is distinct
from it. It is this quasi-independence, this short-circuit of representational fidelity, which places
istoria at perhaps the first appearance of expression in Western painting. Istoria needs to be
10
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located in two places: in a theory of perception and composition. As I will be arguing, the figure
remains the deep source of Western painting.13 This is entirely different from claiming that the
hyper-realism of the Renaissance figure—which it often wasn’t—in communion with its
humanism, would solidify painting as the art of mimicry, and so therefore we can attribute this
fact to its rise in prominence in the fine arts. Of course, the discovery of the human body in its
divine and anatomical greatness sparked the trend to realistic painting. Yet here we are speaking
of another property of the figure: not its value as agent and symbol of what painting can be,
where it is and where it is going, but specific properties of the body that force it center stage in
the birth of the canvas. The figure is crucial not in terms of what it represents, but in how it alters
the course of representational practices.
Alberti’s Della Pittura begins with the basics. A painting is a plane of material reality.
Populating that plane are figures, which are made up of points. A point is a figure that cannot be
divided up into parts.14 Composed of straight and curved lines, figures cannot have depth on the
plane. Figures are mathematical and organic. Figures appear large or small on the plane
depending on their distance in the appearance, and Alberti will use the term plane to describe the
limbs of a figure, for there exists many internal planes inside the main picture space. The picture
space has a mathematical foundation akin to the square pattern of floor tiles (this is Book I of
Della Pittura), and remains subservient to quantification, measurability and uniformity. Most
importantly, the latter is the cluster of singular, indivisible points that the abstract grid is
composed of. Borrowing a phrase from Deleuze to indicate a space that is quantified and
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measured, one could call this space striated.15 Perspective, which allows for the semblance of
distance, is based upon a centric point, and the surrounding light sources (rays), and angles,
become subservient to this point, constantly aware of its presence.16 One can already sense a
hyper-compositional consciousness to the picture plane. Perspective required of painting a
certain obsession—i.e., that all its parts agree. Consistency and agreement was its most basic
proposition. For instance, an angle of a building in the top right corner must agree with an angle
in the bottom left; agreement is mathematically based. Disagreement is not only distortion, it is
fragmentation of the plane of nature.

Serving as the abstract grid, the striated space of the canvas receives another layer, that of the
volumes of human bodies. Predictably, the body is broken into shapes. Alberti has no pretence as
to what a body is on the canvas. It is not real, not a child of God, and not symbolic—a body is
nothing but line, volume, shape and color; in contrast, the istoria is merely a product, an
expressive vapor emanating from the comingling of bodies. Any movement attributed to those
bodies comes as a result of these and other material elements.17 Even grace and beauty, two of
the great transcendent ideals of Renaissance Neoplatonism, is for Alberti a brute fact of the
planes:

That grace in bodies which we call beauty is born from the composition of the planes. A
face which has its planes here large and there small, here raised and there depressed—
similar to the faces of old women—would be most ugly in appearance. Those faces
which have the planes joined in such a way that they take shades and lights agreeably and
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pleasantly, and have no harshness of the relief angles, these we should certainly say are
beautiful and delicate faces.18
Beauty is not participated in the manner of Plato’s Symposium. The concept of beauty is born of
grace in bodies, and bodies are composed of the composition of planes. Beauty is a matter of
physics, of harshness in the jaw, angles of the eyes. Beauty is not a transcendent principle, not an
essence, not a property of the subject—beauty is born of a specific material organization. The
many planes that construct the body Alberti refers to as members, and in his attempt to explain
the proper way to depict a live body, he begins with the example of a dead body. He argues that
the members of the dead “should be dead to the very nails,” while those of the living “should be
alive in the smallest part.” Because “the body is said to live when it has certain voluntary
movements…the painter, wishing to express like in things, will make every part in motion—but
in motion he will keep loveliness and grace. The most graceful movements and the most lively
are those which move upwards in the air.”19 Life, such as in his expression “to live,” must be
immanent to the entire body, and movement, preferably upwards, is the best expression of that
force. Something about the weight of gravity dulls the life of bodies on the canvas, and only
when they defeat gravity, or at least gesture against it, can we find life’s fullest expression. The
Antony series obeys this qualification rigorously.
Alberti repeats himself often: “The greatest work of the painter is the istoria. Bodies are part of
the istoria, members are parts of the bodies, planes are parts of the members”20; “Bodies ought to
harmonize together in the istoria in both size and function.”21 Istoria composed of bodies (see
Raphael’s School of Athens for a great example of bodies and istoria). Members are parts of
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bodies; planes are parts of members; points construct large or small planes. The points populate a
geometrically organized canvas. Each must inform the next, and each must follow strict rules of
composition, grace, harmony, beauty and form. All the bodies ought to move according to the
istoria.22 However, two problems in the critical reception of the concept remain. First, while
much of the critical attention paid to istoria has been in terms of its relationship to narrative,
istoria is not simply a descriptive term for narrative paintings; it is rather an active principle of
construction. 23 Second, most the attention paid to the formal organization of the canvas has been
in terms of perspective. No doubt Alberti’s own writings support the perspective that the laws of
perspective are the most foundational to painting. He is adamant that the laws of perspective are
absolute and not to be broken. On this account, istoria is labeled as the content of the painting.
Yet seldom is istoria mentioned as an equal force in the formal construction of the canvas. In
fact, two laws populate the canvas as two layers that must communicate with each other in
specific ways: perspective and istoria.

Under the influence of istoria, pictorial space is dominated by a principle internal to itself. This
central element to which pictorial space defers, and to which all elements must agree, is slowly
becoming one of the principle elements of the new pictorial style: i.e., that it contains within its
frame all the elements needed to make its point. The push towards immanence—self-contained
relationality—is profound for its time. According to Greenstein, Alberti’s conception of istoria,
though unintentional, signaled a decisive break against previous understandings. The concept of
istoria can first be traced to the sixth century and Gregory the Great’s defense of pictures during
the iconoclast controversies. Along with iconophile John of Damascus, Gregory claims that the
22
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picture’s ability to educate by signifying history outweighed its ability to corrupt worship.24 This
ability of a picture to educate would have an ontological significance for the pictorial space.
Under this conception, the picture becomes an illustration, and its role as commentator is
analogous to Luther’s position on art. This is another way of saying that the picture gains in
meaning the more it is tied to a text. Alberti, however, would liberate painting from its textual
reliance through the concept of istoria; or, more precisely, because istoria required the gesturing
figure, it was the figure that liberated painting.
Classically, istoria was tied not just to any event, but a biblical event.25 Because of the moral
import of the biblical scene, mundane scenes would not receive the label of expressing an istoria
unless they were clearly allegorical of a Biblical story. Prior to Alberti, istoria (historia) had
embedded within it the sense of a theo-moralistic truth. The usage he inherited was “out of the
late medieval tradition that linked historia with pictorial representation…Alberti used the word
historia as a metonymic synonym for a pictorial work of art that depicted a narrative scene.”26
But Alberti introduces one theoretical element that will alter the course of aesthetics—gesture.
Alberti makes gesture the cornerstone of his theory of art. Alberti does not invent a theory of
expression nor does he invent the important of gesture in painting. Giotto already accomplished
the latter. Alberti’s contribution is descriptive and constructive: he theorizes what gesture is
doing for the maturation of pictorial space (istoria), and further, how one can actively construct
an istoria. In doing so, Alberti draws upon Greek rhetoric, especially Quintilian’s Instituto
Oratoria and the thoughts of Cicero, to refine his understanding of istoria. Figuring prominently
in Alberti’s use of their ideas is the concept of figura. According to Greenstein, there were two
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uses of the term for the classical rhetorical tradition: 1) figura designated the “outward form”
(Aristotle); 2) and for Quintilian, figura mitigated between speech and the speaking body, aiming
for its ideal a flow between body and speech in such a way as to rouse the audience to maximum
intensity. Alberti’s conception of istoria combines the empiricism of Aristotle’s material form
with Quintilian’s emphasis on the triad of body/speech/affect to such a degree that he is now
equating painting itself with the figure.

Alberti accomplishes this fact not just by understanding istoria in terms of bodies and gesture,
but of finding istoria across a variety of non-biblical sources.27 This movement of istoria out of a
strict biblical context allows Alberti to claim that it is a function of the picture, not what the
picture represents. In so doing, istoria becomes dependent on an immanence of artistic form, on
the material realities of the surface, especially gesturing bodies. Given this emphasis, Modern
compositional theory is born in that for Alberti istoria is achieved only through compositional
techniques. Istoria not only becomes a trait of the canvas, but, more importantly, infuses the
picture space with the sense of the mobile and migratory. Painting is on its way to becoming its
own liberal art, and so we shouldn’t be surprised that he presents the concept of istoria in Book
II of his treatise, the same book that begins with how painting compares, and is distinct from,
poetry, music, and religion.
It would be too easy to claim that what we are witnessing is the birth of a painting’s secular
meaning, for even though the istoria is the soul of a painting, it is hardly like the transcendent
movement within icons. Shouldn’t we just say that the istoria is another name for a painting’s
meaning, its signification? To retroactively assign the semiotic term of “meaning” to this
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organization is to veil the active, transcendental principle of such meaning. As the condition of
possibility of meaning, the transcendental is first a property of the painted surface, strictly
concerning the materialism of the canvas, and it would be unjust to apply twentieth century
trends in semiotics to Renaissance theories of perception. We are not dealing here with signs and
signification. Rather, the discussion is what justifies the correspondence of elements in such a
manner that an expressive entity can be said to be at once an expression of a set of elements and
yet distinct from said elements. By correspondence we mean the ability of the elements on the
surface to agree with one another.

A Quick Note on Space: The Smooth and the Striated

In their collaborative work, Deleuze and Guattari employ the terms smooth and striated space to
denote properties of material fields, and/or spaces in which matter is active.28 Here, we will
employ such terms to better understand the pictorial space. The concepts are especially relevant
to A Thousand Plateaus, where it is their stated goal to seek out the expression of what they call
a rhizome. Equal part metaphor and metonym, the rhizome is a figure of connectivity, and in
their introduction they discern the principles of the rhizome: connection and heterogeneity.
While such terms often lie in opposition to each other, the theories of multiplicity put forward in
the text understand connection across materiality to be a requirement of heterogeneity. But what
exactly are they speaking about? In a sense, everything—it is the image of a transcendental
empiricism. We should understand their investigations across various disciplines—from music to
art to animals to nature—as a theoretical performance of Deleuze’s earlier work, Difference and

28

Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus (1987: University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis), see
their chapter titled “Nomadology.”

295
Repetition.29 In the latter, being itself is generative of difference, which is in turn repeated in
temporality.

The general thrust of the investigations in A Thousand Plateaus are transcendental, and so they
are after answering a few simple questions: How do connections happen? Why? How can diverse
elements be related? Given change, how to account for stability? The plateaus of A Thousand
Plateaus are precisely this: not amorphous forces of materiality, but relatively stable
actualizations of a ceaseless, energy emitting ontological force: Nature, the virtual. A tension
inhabits the entirety of Deleuze’s work, and especially this collaboration with Guattari. The
tension is between structure and expression, the coded and uncoded, the state and the nomads.
Their concern to account for the unpredictable does place them squarely in post-structuralist
discourses, and yet they will locate the genesis of the creative in the coded just as much as they
will locate the coded as a defeat of the creative. In other words, structures are not oppressive,30
and, in what defines his thought over against many of his French contemporaries, structures (read
metaphysics) are necessarily open; machinic assemblages are routes of escape as much as agents
of capture. It is in this context of the semiotic between structure and expression that we can
understand the difference between smooth and striated space. Further, this difference exposes
one of the foundational principles of the Renaissance canvas.

29
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According to Deleuze and Guattari, smooth space is intensive and directional, and materials on it
signal forces and serve as symptoms for them.31 Points are subordinate to the trajectory of forces.
Striated space is extensive, dimensional, geometrical and metric. Striated space deals in points,
and forms are relegated to their relationship to an abstract point system, the grid or centric point.
Striated space is optical and epistemological in that one has a reference system to measure for
distance and accuracy. Striated space is metric and homogeneous. Striated space corresponds to
Alberti’s mathematical grid underlying perceptual laws, which in turn governs how figures are
constructed so as to give the semblance of reality. Striated space has a metaphysical hierarchy—
forms are relegated by an immanent principle, and this principle, as varied as it is, gives birth to
properties. This principle acts like gravity in that all things move toward it, just as properties
surround an essence. Striated space requires strict composition and formal organization. In
contrast, smooth space is heterogeneous, a space of contact, vectorial, projective or topological.
Smooth space is connective, yet it organizes as powerfully as striated space. “Smooth space is
filled by events or haecceities, far more than by formed and perceived things. It is a space of
affects, more than one of properties. It is haptic rather than optical perception.”32 In terms of
painting, if the striated is the transcendental, and must be forgotten (painted over), then it can
technically never be seen. The striated is the structural transcendental. The most basic element to
perspectival painting is that which cannot ever be sensed. However, what it does allow is optical
perception. It lays the foundation for a painted reality, but in itself it is merely the ground.
Perspective can never be touched. Yet smooth space, as the space of the affect of figures and the
perceiver’s affect, relies on striated space for its principle of organization. Figures must follow
the laws of perspective to appear real. The real is what gives the figures their emotive content.
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Pictorial perception of istoria, strictly speaking, occurs only inside this double premise—
transcendental structure and affect-expression. The emotive figures ensure an emotive response,
and haptic perception is the name Deleuze and Guattari give to this modality of looking that is
also a touching. Smooth space, as one engendering affect and connection, is the space of figures
on the canvas, and Alberti’s concept of istoria utilizes the same principles of connectivity as
smooth space. Smooth space and striated space do not work in opposition, but in collaboration.
Affectus and the Commentator

Though neither Alberti nor any other fifteenth century author clearly states what an istoria
actually is, it is clear that it expresses the soul or passion of a figure.33 There is body, gesture,
will and soul. The will expresses itself in the figure in the form of gesture, and this will, when
under “moral” guidance, expresses a soul. A soul has many movements. Alberti will call the
movements of the soul “affections,” and he lists as these affections grief, joy, fear and desire. In
addition to the movements of the soul, there are exclusive movements of the body, though both
are expressed bodily.34 One is reminded of the letters of St. Antony and his emphasis on natural,
unnatural and evil movements. The first are of first creation, and the soul must will it, the second
are the movements of warfare in the body, such as when too much food or sexual energy causes
the blood to rise, and the third are those of the evil spirits removing us from a life of purity.35
While the two conceptions of movements do not align in terms of content, they do formally in
terms of movements of the body produced by the soul and movements of the body produced by
the body itself. Interestingly, Alberti makes an addition to Antony’s otherwise unspecified
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natural movements, adding joy and fear alongside desire, while also treating the body less
spiritually in that he considers movements of the body as concerned solely with change of place.

Because painting’s language is not of words, as Alberti will say of poetry, the visual arts have to
rely on a different medium in which to express its soul. To accomplish this, the painter must
employ a figure on a flat surface, and the artist must move the figure in such a way as to produce
affect in the viewer. Alberti did not have to worry about how this affect traveled from the canvas
to the viewer, for his theory of perception supposed it, a fact uncommon to modern aesthetic
theory given that it is the heir to Kant’s disinterested sublime. Alberti writes: “It happens in
nature that nothing more than herself is found capable of things like herself; we weep with the
weeping, laugh with the laughing, and grieve with the grieving.”36 Alberti did not have to argue
around the issues of real vs. copy, representation vs. presence, nor figure vs. body. Old
metaphysical schemas provided the golden thread between the painted body and the viewing
body. First, as Greenstein observes: “The viewer would feel, or at least recognize, these emotions
because, according to a Ciceronian dictum, nature provided every animate creature with the
desire and capacity to share the feelings of its likes.”37 On this account, desire aroused desire
through an innate transference mechanism. Second, borrowing from Quintilian’s rhetorical
method, the audience could only have their souls moved if the orator had his moving first, in an
authentic manner, and so affect had to travel from a central point outwards to the audience. A
certain amount of corporeal correspondence had to occur, and yet, Alberti must have known that
the posture of an orator cannot resemble what dynamic bodies in painting looked like. Third,
Alberti adapts an Augustinian notion of the moral sense. In the City of God, Augustine argues
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that the soul is the seat of the rational will, and that, according to Greenstein, “affections or the
movements of the soul are nothing other than the response of the rational will to the sensible
perception of a given set of circumstances.”38 Crucial is the term rational. The import of
Augustine’s ideas center on the discipline of the will; nothing is haphazard in an affect entering
our bodies, and in terms of automatism (affect entering us without our will’s authority),
Augustine solves this issue with morality. Each reaction of the viewer contains the germ of a
moral sense, whether our response is pain or piety. Granting to affect an independent status,
judgment occurs on the side of the rational choice one makes when receiving affect. When we
are moved, there is a hidden rationality of the will that has directed us to this or that response.
When we are moved to hatred, and or when we are moved to joy from an immoral scene, this
exhibits not the corruption of affect, for all it can do is be emitted and enter us, but of a
disciplined will.

This triad of will, response and morality established, Alberti organizes them in terms of the
figure. He will do this by assuming that the istoria can move the soul because it is moral.
Moreover, akin to the potency of rational discipline in Augustine, Alberti will populate the
pictorial istoria with varying (moral) actions: some figures delight in the action, while others are
horrified at the given scene. So as to not get lost in the clamor of competing gestures, Alberti
councils the would-be painter of istoria to provide the picture with a commentator. In case the
viewer cannot discern the correct way to view the scene, the commentator can provide clues.
Aesthetics, it seems for Alberti, is too unruly to let it speak for itself, for one cannot count on a
rational discipline to gauge our reactions. Acting as its own form of reception, or as a way to
control the representational process, the commentator is the central actor in the pictorial drama,
38
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formally and theo-psychologically organizing the space. Louis Marin, in On Representation,
speaks of processes of representation in visibility and/or metafigures of reception.39 Marin takes
as his cue two notions: the frame as a device of representation and the central actor or
commentator in istoria. Each in its own way governs the process of representation. As we shall
see later, the frame is the condition of possibility of pictorial visibility.40 However, here the
central figure’s role in governing visibility is more elusive, and much more interesting
considering the central figures of the Antony series.

Alberti believes that inside the istoria there should reside a commentator that “admonishes and
points out to us what is happening there [in the story].” This metafigure of representation teaches
what is being taught. It points to the central element, in case as viewers we are confused, and
with its gestures we can discern the true action of the painting. Just as the central point in linear
perspective dominated the hyper-organization of the striated grid, the metafigure brings with it
an analogous device, that of acting as the recapitulation of the scene itself, and in such a manner
that the entire picture is written in their gestures. Secondly, there are witnesses, and these figures
populate the canvases with a dizzying amount of diversity. The witnesses whorl around the
central actor in a formal gravity, acting as the stage (not the actors), for one actor is most
important, the commentator. In fact, the diversity of the witnesses inform the singularity of the
commentator. Witnesses are appendages and outgrowths to the central element. Raphael’s The
School of Athens, 1509, (Figure 30) beautifully displays the interplay between witnesses and the
commentator. Central to the picture is two figures, Plato and Aristotle, and together they
constitute the commentator.
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Figure 30. Raphael. School of Athens, 1510-15. Rome, Vatican City.

As expected, the striated and the smooth converge on the central figures, as the central point of
perspective in which all subsidiary lines converge rests between the two great masters.
Surrounding them, circling them in almost a celestial manner, gesturing bodies display the
various modalities of the affect of philosophy. It is a clamor of pedagogical beings, their bodies
roused by philosophical thought; paradoxically, only a few witnesses actual gaze at the teachers.
Most of the bodies, as in Da Vinci’s Last Supper, reside in self-contained clusters arguing
amongst themselves. As if to round out the space, Plato points up, arguably to his theory of
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forms, and Aristotle, the apprentice of Plato, points forward, perhaps in an attempt to understand
Plato or designate his more materialist ontology.

If we apply this tension of metafigure and witness to the Antony series, we find that Antony is no
doubt the metafigure of representation. Antony’s figure organizes the picture space, creating
formal gravity around his body upon which the witnesses act. But what are the witnesses? What
is his figure trying to organize in terms of representation? Could the witnesses be the demons?
The Antony series is a profound body of work spanning numerous centuries that could be
understood as a collective meditation on immanence’s relation to the body. The figure of Antony
in the series established a collective center, and aided in the construction of an extension of that
center across the surface. This extension, as the by-product of his front and central posture,
produced the semblance of flatness, or what one may call a transcendental immanence of the
picture plane. Given this confrontational posture, what role, if any, does the close-up have? And,
to answer our first question, how to understand the witness as itself just another formal mark on
the canvas that corresponds to the other marks?

The Close-up
Commonly it is the face of the figure that reveals the body’s true torment, as if the face is the
zone of discipline, wherein whatever it is the body undergoes, the true marker of interiority (i.e,
subjectivity) is the face. In the genre of portraiture, the face is the seat of dignity, composure, and
calm, and the placid aristocratic face is never to be confused with the scarred face of the warrior,
for each face speaks for the body and its world the same way Rembrandt’s faces, arguably the
best portraitist in history, speak of the insecurities of seventeenth century Dutch privilege. The
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face is the seat of the body’s tyranny, where the entire body goes to be coded, to reference itself
in a condensed manner and to communicate all its complexity through the cheeks, eyes,
forehead, nose, jaw, temples and lips.

It is in this vein that Deleuze and Guattari give the face two properties: loci of resonance and
despot.41 Faciality in general is marked by a double process of signification. First, as loci of
resonance, it speaks of an entire system of communication. Faciality is a process of selection
wherein the intensities of the body conform to a singular motor system. The face acts as the wall
of the signifier allowing the abstract energy of the body to find coherent expression. Deleuze and
Guattari call it a “frame or screen.”42 Analogous to the way concepts make the plane of
immanence comprehendible, acting like a screen thrown over pure differential chaos, the face is
the screen thrown over the body, making subjectivity as a mark of interiority possible. Because
of this, the face is the body’s despot precisely because it wishes to speak for the body, to usurp
the body’s energies. Further, the face, because it represents interiority, is also the image of
desire, and we shall get to this point of desire later on.

As we might expect, the face is just another mask for power, and it—strangely one might add—
will be referred to by Deleuze and Guattari as Christ: “The face is not universal…The face is
Christ.”43 Though perhaps it is not too strange considering that religion in general was for
Deleuze often an agent that destroyed immanence by introducing the transcendent. As the
process through which the universal generates itself, the face is Christic because Christ was
himself a form of the universal, an embodiment of the universal; i.e., a universal body.
41
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Christology is the name for a body of theological meditation that establishes this fact. Because it
goes to the property of the universal to be communicable and a stable form of identity, it masks
the difference that underlies actualities. However, “on the brighter side,” Deleuze and Guattari
note that painting has exploited this universalization towards increasing art’s expressive
capabilities, its “unbridled freedom”—a statement that must be understood alongside claims
from another text that Christianity liberated painting from a strict adherence to forms.44 It was
the concept of Christ, and not Christianity in general, that for Deleuze in a few instances actually
increased the power of immanence. The “brighter side” of Christianity’s concept of the Christ is
that because of the crucifixion/incarnation complex internal to Christian thought it became not
only possible but encouraged to facialize the entire body. Deleuze and Guattari even cite Giotto’s
scene of the stigmatization as one of the prime examples through which is achieved the
facialization of the body of the saint.45 Christological aesthetics is the facialization of the body.
Yet to make such a claim is to import specific properties of the face that don’t belong to the
body.

One might expect that Antony’s face would be depicted as serene and placid, perhaps symbolic
of his ascetic discipline; his face calm like his soul amidst the demons, composed in the martyr’s
fight to show composure, strength and victory before defeat. But this is not the case—his face is
just as often as gnarled as his limbs (see Grunewald’s Isenheim Altarpiece and Parenzano’s
Temptation of Saint Antony), and on more than a few occasions he is clearly fearing for his life.
Assuming that the face is a special locus of power, one could propose two answers to the
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problem. First, everything about Antony’s body is undergoing torture, even his soul, and this
would justify a contorted face. Such a line would undercut the “silent center” theory of ascetic
discipline, or Deleuze and Guattari’s facial despot, which believes that the monk’s center is also
Christ’s center, with both remaining unaffected by the onslaught.46 The face does matter as a
regulated zone of the body’s interior, but because that interior zone is being crucified, the
expressions of torture move outward to the sacred zone of faciality. Second, it could be that what
is occurring is precisely what Deleuze and Guattari suspect—the facialization of the body—
which would understand the logic of the face to remain intact (that is express the body better
than the body), except for the fact that the face has been stretched across the body’s exterior (in
which case the body becomes closer to a body). If these were the case, it would explain the
frequent use of the close-up technique in the Antony series. The close-up of his figure is a standin for his face, a body completely deterritorialized in terms of ethical zones; the face is no longer
the gravity of good when evil has attacked his members and limbs. To the contrary of Levinas’
prescription that the face is the call to ethical transascendence, the face of Antony becomes just
another part of his body, no more special than a foot or an arm. The viewer, staring directly at the
body-face of Antony, cannot help but be reminded of the absolute inability to fully transcend the
body. Further, we must remember all this is possible because of what the crucifixion justifies.
The crucifixion justifies an absolute bodily drama.

Antony’s body is often isolated and the framing is close-up. Though the finest example of
isolation and the close-up is no doubt Schongauer’s The Temptation of St. Antony, this example
merely takes to its logical conclusion the purpose of the Antony series: display his body across
46
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the entirety of the surface; make his body subservient to the laws of immanence; highlight the
minor movements that the ascetic encounters through gesture; render these movements in terms
of an externality that is really another form of consumption—the ascetic body must keep nothing
out, for in order to attain to the universal form (Christ) he must be courageous enough to ingest
or allow all forms to attach themselves to him. Temptation must be courted and desire must
infuse all the limbs. Schongauer’s copperplate engraving frames the entire body up close and
center.47 When in Cinema 1 Deleuze claims that “the affection-image is the close-up, and the
close-up is the face,” he was referring to a property of the close-up face to act as a recording
device in which, as we have noted, the body sacrifices (one could say martyrs) itself in its
movement toward the face. As a screen through which bodily events surface to visibility, the
face, as a metonym for immanence, is a property of resonance, just as immanence describes the
quality of an action rather than a being or entity. What resonate are the forms on the face (the
face resonates in-itself), but it only resonates in-itself because it speaks for a prior whole, the
body. Deleuze uses the analogy of the clock in film that is presented in close-up several times. A
clock has two features: it has the hands, acting as an intensive series towards a dramatic point.
But the hands only function with the immobile surface of the clock’s face, the second feature.
The latter acts as the “plate of inscription,” or a “reflected unity” for the minor movements of the
body. Taken together, these two features of the clock constitute the affection-image. Moreover,
the crucial link between affect and face can be found in the fact that when the movement of the
body is translated to the face, the transition is really between extension and expression. A body
that is extended is now compressed onto a surface-face, creating for the first instance an
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expressive tendency.48 Why not simply say that the face represents the body? Why must one
insert the concept of expression? For the simple reason that the face quite literally removes the
body—a process of abstraction; we designate here the term abstraction to be the uncoupling of
representation from meaning. One cannot learn anything, cannot think, when given just a face. A
face needs context to explore its meaning; the face needs a crowd, just as the portrait needs a
date. But, when you are given just a face, it cannot simply represent, only express in a manner
without reference. The close-up of the face represents nothing. The face expresses, and it does so
exclusively through gesture, color and shape. Rembrandt’s Self Portrait with Turned up Collar,
1659 (Figure 31), as with most of his faces, depict such minor insecurities and faults that they
seem to be invisible; and what adds to the drama of his faces is that they are virtual extensions of
his figures—dirty, musty, ochre-colored folded cloths of flesh from head to foot. Rembrandt’s
bodies are faces.
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Figure 31. Rembrandt. Self-Portrait with Beret and Turned up Collar, 1659.
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Through the confluence of face, body and gesture in the Antony series one is led to the following
conclusion: Antony’s body is a screen because it is a face, or, it is a face because his body acts as
a screen for the communication of events. When it is all face, it is not an abstract entity, but the
process of abstraction itself. An earlier investigation into gestures has revealed that bodily
gestures are also faces, for they too bring our attention to specific zones, and they too speak for
the body. Degas is the master of focusing on the extreme appendage, retaining the body’s athletic
feat all the while washing the scene in joyous color, the latter echoing the joy of the movement
(see Figure 32).
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Figure 32. Edgar Degas. The Star, Dancer on Stage. 1878.
But the difference between gesture and close-up of the face is that gestures move across the
body, being defined by this migration, while the close-up in any form compresses that body. In
the Antony series, the specific relationship between close-up and gesture was as close as it can
get. It was a close-up of a gesturing body, an affect-body/affection-image, a power-body (we use
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this last term because this moment of Antony is about being overcome with power). As one
might expect, the final outcome of this process is the redemption of the screen. In other words,
that which gains in affect from this exchange is not the body, the face, nor Antony nor any other
figure—the screen wins, becomes established and is granted more affective, immanent power.
Antony’s extension is the establishment of the screen. But is the close-up of the body the main
contributor to a painting’s self-sufficiency? What about the frame?

Marin claims that two features in the visual arts organize representation: the frame and the
commentator in istoria. The former remains no doubt the most obvious, and so therefore the
most theorized. Because of its irreplaceable role for producing and displaying visual art, the
frame receives the most attention as the main force in creating the conditions of possibility of
comprehending art; or, in other words, without the frame we would no more “think” about
artworks than we do sections of our walls. The frame is indicative of an artist’s intentionality,
meaning, vision, and so on. Through its mono-tonal border, the frame creates the effect of
wholeness. It is for this reason that the frame has become such a topic of discussion in poststructuralist circles, where it is understood to create an artificial, self-enclosed semiotic. There
are a few problems with this general theory: first, it places the burden of framing outside the
picture, as an addition or a supplement to vision. The frame is merely a performative, designating
a special zone telling the viewers how to act, and where to act. The thrust of such an accusation
is that all systems of meaning are human generated, and further, specific discourses (or coded
systems of meaning) are only intelligible with relatively stable boundaries. The frame makes
what is unintelligible intelligible, and as Poussin will say, the frame keeps the sensations outside

312
the frame from interfering with what is inside the frame. As to what the unintelligible could be is
to ask what is outside thought, which is precisely the question that cannot be thought.

The second problem: nothing immanent to the materiality of the picture is given enough agency
to act as a self-framing device. Can we imagine something immanent to the picture that does not
need the framing device of the frame? Something that frames itself? The figure, especially how it
has been deployed and with what philosophical resources it assumes, has come the closest to
answering this question. We do not know when the frame first appeared in art history, but we do
know it is practically coterminous with pictorial works. Yet for much of art history, many of the
objects cannot be said to “carry” their meaning with them. Such objects, whether of cultural,
liturgical or spiritual value, were understood as part of a larger context and could not be divorced
from that context without losing their efficacy. But something happened roughly around the time
of the Renaissance, both before and after, that gave pictures the ability to move freely, from one
hand to the next. Pictures were now being commissioned and traded across households,
government officials and into various cultural contexts.

This is what one may call the birth of the canvas—a mobile pictorial unit. The movement of the
picture is a testament to its immanent properties. Because the frame has always existed, one
simply cannot attribute the frame as the main cause of a picture’s independent nature, for that
came later in history. Another element inside the picture is framing the work of art. This does not
amount to saying that the picture, because it is mobile, is not embedded with culturally distinct
modes of perception residing outside the picture; each age has its own methods of perception.
The problem with understanding the question properly is that perception, because of
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contemporary theory, has become an operation of framing, and framing has been conceived as
artificial at best, and violent more commonly. However, to the contrary, framing is not a matter
of perception, it is a process of organization. What is being underscored here is that its mobility
during this historical period is inextricably linked with its figural obsession; its immanence is
tied to the painted body. It is this confluence of items that is suspect and under investigation. In
short: the figure guarantees the integrity of the picture without the frame. Something about the
body, something that we give to the picture because of our own embodiment creates that
wholeness of the surface (immanence) that is said to be a product of the frame. To answer this
question, we need to see what the figure actually means for the Renaissance artist.

The Avant Garde Figure
Observe real bodies, councils Alberti, but do not just copy. Cover up nature’s ugliness, add
beauty here and there, or simply find a crowd, select the best parts of each person, then put those
parts together to achieve a most beautiful body. Selection, modification, alteration and
intensification of nature—these were as much the priorities of Renaissance artists as reality,
fidelity to appearance and imitation of nature.49 Book III of Alberti’s Della Pittura confronts the
issue of selection directly: “It will please him [the painter] not only to make all the parts true to
his model but also to add beauty there”50; “So great is the force of anything drawn from nature.
For this reason always take from nature that which you wish to paint, and always choose the
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most beautiful.”51 A perfect body is elsewhere—it must be put together, compressed into one.
Certain parts are amplified, others lessened or ignored.

Not just idealism, but ascetic logic at work no doubt—a real figure exists elsewhere. Figures
broken down into parts; gestures must be put together from various sources, yet made to comply
all the more convincingly on the surface. Not just the idealism of beauty either. What authorizes
the selection, borrowing and modification is the fact that a figure can still communicate when its
forms are alien to each other, i.e., when the painter selects the best traits from a crowd. What is it
about our bodies that allows perception to see not a discordance in the various parts, but a unified
whole? What is the logic behind even attempting to select body parts and put them together with
the hopes of producing a greater one? What type of body is this? The universal body that
authorizes the pilfering of members is not the ideal type, but the public body in which the parts
are taken; this public body goes by another name—incarnated materialism. The justification is
ontological and not aesthetic, though at some level it is both. Why materialism? Because first,
the public body is amorphous, and second, because it is the shared substrate. The two reasons
inform each other—amorphous because shared. Something about an understanding of the body’s
material properties allow this conjunction to be successful. The answer is that all bodies lie
inside another: an anonymous body then, a shared artful materialism incarnated by virtue of its
ability to add to life in its very deformation. The difference between matter and materialism is
analogous to humanity before Christ and humanity after. Christ was a new figure that became the
virtual extension of all previous forms (his status as recapitulated body), so that the new thinkers
could make sense of his claims of new life. Christ is another name for an embodied
materialism—the new face of (Stoic) nature—one which contains the potential of its redemption.
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Further, the catalogue of ideal types has no limit. Painting will continue to attempt to paint the
final figure, beauty itself, but because of its ontological foundation it will never succeed. There is
always a new form of repetition, and it can never reach the figure because the figure is not the
form figure but the form-giving figure, Christ as logos/screen. Moreover, the figure is not
devalued because it can be repeated. The opposite is the case: it is more valuable in virtue of its
repetition. Painting eternally contains a neurosis; it must create new forms of life at all cost. The
virtue of the figural repetition gathers its identity not from the painting, but from what the
painting presupposes.

Da Vinci: Ontology, Figure and the Social Body
The painting presupposes two notions: nature has implanted within it the seeds of its own
overcoming (a certain ontological understanding), and the task of the artist in painting the figure
is to engender this overcoming (its avant garde property). Regarding the first notion, classical
conceptions of nature’s essential activity and infinite, form-giving properties are no doubt at
work here.52 Of course, an artist cannot “overcome” nature, but only perfect it, add to it, modify
it, as we have seen with how to create the most beautiful figure. Art historian Erwin Panofsky
notes that,

On the one hand, nature could be overcome by the freely creative “phantasy”
capable of altering appearances above and beyond the possibilities of natural variation
and even of bringing forth completely novel creatures such as centaurs and chimeras. On
the other hand, and more importantly, nature could be overcome by the artistic intellect,
which—not so much by “inventing” as by selecting and improving—can, and
accordingly should, make visible a beauty never completely realized in actuality.53
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Da Vinci, to whom this analysis will now turn, will go so far as to claim that painting is the
offspring of nature itself.54 The artist sees his task and the task of nature as inextricable—novel
creatures—yet they are but repetitions of a Christological type. Painters do not copy nature, but
see themselves as the principle of nature.55

Second, in order to carry out this task the artist must share the same attributes of the Christ. As
we saw earlier in the case of the early Christological thinkers, the figure of Christ was prophetic
in history, and he came to earth in the form of the prophets in order to set mankind on the
righteous path.56 His final appearance in Jerusalem, leading to his crucifixion, was the
recapitulation of all previous forms. Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origin and Athanasius—all held
theories of Christ’s morphological potential in history. In his descension, Christ formed himself
appropriately to all of humanity’s forms, adopting the most effective visual form to complete his
task, and the task was not small—inhabit a specific body, then push humanity forward by
educating their senses (pushing is its avant garde tendency).57 With the help of Stoic sensibilities,
late antique asceticism brought this message to its logical conclusion with an emphasis on selfeducation through morphing one’s own sensate condition. The monastic body was understood as
an avant garde body by its viewers because of its power to alter other bodies, inspire, arouse
piety, whether it was through beauty, spectacle, wonder, etc.; the affect is the same either way.
Whereas before the term ideal type was used to describe artistic figures and the way ideal forms
take part in ideal types via a vis Neoplatonism, such as Michelangelo’s David, it also needs to be
complimented by its active role, a role that bridges the iconic tradition and the art that came
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thereafter. This role is affectus, testified by the istoria and employed by various instantiations of
the “one” body, the “one” body being the body we can never escape, the Christic body. Christic
because Christ is the metonym for an entire ontology.

The figure in art is also an avant garde body. Because the artist is ultimately responsible for
creating the sensible conditions of the painted figure, they must undergo a proper “ontological”
training. Reminiscent of Baudelaire’s treatment of Constantin Guys in his “Painter of Modern
Life,” Da Vinci recommends that the mind of the painter,

…should be like a mirror which always takes the colour of the thing that it reflects
and which is filled by as any images as there are things placed before it. Knowing
therefore that you cannot be a good master unless you have a universal power of
representing by your art all the varieties of the forms which nature produces,—which
indeed you will not know how to do unless you see them and retain them in your mind.58
Like the catalogue of forms residing eternally in the divine mind, the painter must have them as a
virtual storehouse in his mind; they must be immanent in the mind so as to be deployable by the
hand.59 The mind of the painter must internalize all the varieties of forms, lines and colors, and
when the moment comes, all the images are recapitulated in the forms he lays down on the
canvas. Da Vinci says as much: “painting embraces and contains within itself all the things
which nature produces or which result from the fortuitous actions of men, and in short whatever
can be comprehended by the eyes.”60 By default, the painter contains them first. Giving form to
the formless, the artist makes visible the invisible—just as Christ was a making visible in his near
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point status. Nowhere is this process described as representation or imitation: beauty is about
selection, modification, and recapitulation.

As a bit of practical advice, Da Vinci believes that a painter needs to spend time outside studying
people, watching them gesture, lean on benches, laugh, cry, smile, fear, embrace and fight. He
recommends watching the dumb, as they are more animated than intellectuals and need to use
their bodies to communicate their thoughts. But more is at work than merely the painter
watching, remembering, then putting that memory onto the canvas. If that was the case, then
painting could hardly be considered an offspring of nature. It is in the act of painting, through the
medium of line, that the painter deploys a pedagogy of the senses.61 Further, the painter must
employ a discipline on himself in order produce beauty—the painter who has clumsy hands will
paint clumsy figures, and an ugly person paints ugly figures.62 Painting required an ascetic
discipline, and for all the language of the painter as a divine being, he differs from divinity in one
remarkable way—his purity in exposition is vulnerable; his art needs an art of its own. The
classical difference between the bodies of men and the bodies of Gods, brought to our attention
by Vernant, is once again rehashed: the vital force that inhabits man is liable to exhaustion,
imperfection and vice, and is therefore in need of constant replenishment.

Of the representation of bodies, Da Vinci writes:

When you wish to represent a man speaking to a number of people, consider the matter
of which he has to treat and adapt his action to the subject. Thus, if he speaks
persuasively, let his action be appropriate to it. If the matter in hand be to set forth an
argument, let the speaker, with the fingers of the right hand hold one finger of the left
hand, having the two smaller ones closed; and his face alert, and turned towards the
61
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people with mouth a little open, to look as though he spoke; and if he is sitting let him
appear as though about to rise, with his head forward. If you represent him standing make
him leaning slightly forward with body and head towards the people.63
There exists a rationality to man inherent in his movement. Movements are not without
intelligibility. In the process of observation, the social body is cut by the artist’s gaze, and
analogous to the Renaissance practice of dissection, that body is reconstructed on the canvas. Da
Vinci’s notebooks are filled with near-obsessive relations between the body’s parts64; the face is
dissected in any number of ways, lines drawn from organ to organ across gaps of white flesh,
from the nose to the ears, the ears to the forehead, the forehead to the lips, the lips to the eyes,
and so on. Da Vinci is clear that all his anatomical studies, ratios and mathematics of the body
are for the purposes of being able to better paint the body, and so that the spectator may easily
view “the purpose in their minds.”

The borrowing of types from the social body requires precise observation and surgical precision.
It is about the specific cutting out of those forms from the social body: limbs, members, faces,
feet, stomachs and elbows, pointed gestures and expressions. The social body, at once unified
humanity and community of gestures, can be pilfered by the artist because there resides inside
this community the materials of a body that will, in turn, carry that community forward through
the creation of a new body—hence its alignment with the Stoic concept of nature as the thing
that carries inside itself, immanent to itself, the potential of its own reproduction. Marcus
Aurelius, in his Meditations, refers to the force inherent in naturally occurring things as present
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in those things and remaining there.65 An artist, therefore, must guide his hand by the process of
nature’s force, not its products, for nature cannot be found in the objects, just the force that
actualizes the objects. Aurelius, like the Christological thinkers following him, understands
nature itself under the image of an interconnected body (“the world as a living being” composed
of interconnected parts and “we all move in Christ”), and will also, like its Christological
offspring, define this nature by a forward progress. The crucial purpose of the artist is to align
themselves with the logos, and direct nature as nature itself does. Easily confused with Christian
political theory, perhaps beginning with Augustine, which understands the community of the
faithful to be the body of the church, the social body under discussion here is not to be mistaken
for a community of believers. In many ways, the social body is the elusive image of Renaissance
pictorial ontology. One need only describe it to get a sense of its importance: it is the place artists
go for their materials; every figure must reference it; it is never exhausted; one must go there for
beauty as well as ugliness; the artist must learn from it; it is an interconnected system of nonfragmented parts, of whose intentional putting together by the artist supersedes its normal power;
it is filled with incorporeal acts that express an incorporeal will, yet the artist must capture the
acts through the gestures of the bodies; only the acts of utmost intensity ought to be selected, and
one must not judge intensity solely in terms of dynamism of movement; it is at once incredibly
mundane while incorrigibly mystical, highly striated in terms of social expression yet its bodies
allow themselves to be disfigured (deformation); and finally, like the bodies it creates, it is itself
a living organism woven by the fabric of gesture.

It is because of this certain anxiety—of not being able to capture at once the immensity of social
expression—that variety and diversity is greatly appreciated by Alberti and Da Vinci.
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Multiplicity in poses, objects, gender and age, is another aspect of a successful istoria. In fact,
the innate multiplicity of istoria prefigures Da Vinci’s concern for diversity.66 Alberti praises
Giotto’s work for its diversity of gestures, and the gesture’s ability to reveal the many souls in
the painting.67
Da Vinci is acute in his observation of the human body: “So the limbs of the youths should have
few muscles and veins, and have a soft surface and be rounded and pleasing in colour.”68
Children have slender joints; old men are sinewy; and if a man rests on his right leg, be sure to
have the left one bent slightly. Grace is the end result of proportionality and expressivity.
Anatomy is always useful, but he councils to be sure to clothe your skeletons in flesh. Extended
limbs are more graceful than non-extended limbs. Movement is key, and Da Vinci concedes that
there is no rule or pattern to follow—make it pleasing to the eye, make the body expressive,
gesturing, active, extended, proportional, realistic and wild. Bodies must not only, however,
resonant internally with proportionality (members/limbs) and expressivity (qualities) but they
must also resonate with other bodies. One may ask, why not use the term “interact”? Because we
are primarily dealing with aesthetic objects—figures—not real bodies. Further, any interaction
that we attribute to the bodies comes as a result of the painter’s ability to mark the canvas in such
a way that interaction is a second-order attribute of the bodies. Resonance is primarily a feature
of sensation, form, color and texture. Resonance is a feature of the canvas; interaction is what we
see between figures when this is forgotten. Resonance is a transcendental, an agreement across
sensate forms.
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Drama infuses the istoria like a specter, drawing in the viewer’s senses to the soul being
expressed. Often, all the passions in the painting converge on a single passion. Da Vinci’s Last
Supper , 1495-98 (Figure 33) expresses the singular passion, with the subsidiary passions
supporting the true Passion.

Figure 33. Da Vinci. Last Supper, 1495-98.

Twelve gesturing bodies are put into four groups, with two groups on each side of Christ. While
only the far right group is sufficient unto itself, the other three groups are clearly gesticulating
towards the central point of the canvas (the “silent” commentator), which is not by chance the
central vanishing point. As all the lines of perspective converge on Christ, so too do the actions
of the disciples. Technically speaking, the istoria of the Last Supper is when Christ reveals that
he will be betrayed by one of the apostles. The movement of the bodies are restless to uncover
the malevolent force, and so dedicate their posture inwards toward the center of the canvas with
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pointed fingers, aping necks and arching backs. In other words, the bodies resonate inside the
istoria, requiring a hyper-vigilance of gesture and movement. In the modern era, Andy Warhol
famously took up the imagery of the last supper towards the end of his life, completing many
series, crops, colorings and material processes to reworking Da Vinci’s mural. In one of his large
reproductions, Detail of the Last Supper, 1986, (Figure 34) Warhol prints the entire image in
black and white, and over top the black and white background he produces large rectangular
strips of color vertically across the groups of figures. Warhol uses five strips of color left to
right—blue, red, orange, purple, yellow—and each strip conforms to a cluster of bodies.

Figure 34. Andy Warhol. Detail of the Last Supper, 1986.

Because of the detail enhancing effect of the color, the groups emerge more colorfully than they
did before, and, it must be said, they appear with increased vitality, as if he is asking us to look
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closer at the color-bodies, or bodies of color. Warhol’s bodies become cartoonish and violent in
their hyper detailing. Their gestures come alive as seemingly unprovoked and unnecessary, and
the istoria has been translated into fields of color, into the most basic element of pictorial
representation.

As Warhol continues to work with the image, it becomes clear that what he is interested in is the
central figure, Jesus, and it is this passive image of Jesus before his final meal that will appear on
a set of ten punching bags, a work he would create with fellow NY street artist Jean-Michel
Basquiat. In the punching bag series, it seems that the violence inherent in the gesturing apostles
has come to the surface—the repeated face of Christ on the hanging bags is scarred, scribbled
upon, and clearly defaced even as the word “judge” is scrawled all over the series. The close-up
face of Christ speaks for, expresses the apostle’s energy. Warhol would again deconstruct the
iconic with color in the Marilyn series, drawing our attention to the divine color scheme—gold,
reds, etc—by inverting them and replacing them with the quick capitalist colors of bright blue,
transparent red and comic-book yellow. Then Warhol juxtaposes an outline of Da Vinci’s Jesus
with a body builder in two series.
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Figure 35. Andy Warhol. Be Somebody with a Body, 1985.

In Be Somebody with a Body, 1985 (Figure 35) Warhol places the image of a body builder to the
right of Jesus, the same image taken from Da Vinci’s Last Supper. A caption right above the
muscled man reads “Be Somebody with a Body,” and the bodybuilder stands tall, looking at
Jesus askew, almost crowned with a glowing white halo. To the left is Jesus, the same placid face
and hands, as if he cannot say anything to the bold statements coming from the other side of the
canvas. Has Warhol hit upon a well known criticism of Christ—his radical passivity—but
couched it in terms of his lack of a body? This would be strange, considering that the image
Warhol has selected depicts the moment at which he becomes other bodies (the last supper).

Warhol presents no theory, no consistent rendering of the figures, but his musings are relevant on
a number of levels. In this moment of making betrayal known, which is the istoria of the mural,
Warhol focuses on the silent figure in the scene, the same figure which causes the activity of
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other bodies. Color brings to attention the gestural istoria, but color neutralizes the gestures in
favor of a color washing over the clusters of figures. Warhol further explores what this figure
does alone, and his use of the image in a block screen, featuring Christ’s head outlined in yellow,
forces us to contemplate the agent of unrest without the unrest. Warhol has successfully
understood that classical gestures can be functions of composition and theological
determinations, and further, the best way to be faithful to these gestures is to neutralize them in
the bright coloration.
Giotto’s The Betrayal of Judas (Figure 36) in the Arena Chapel, dating from around 1304-1306,
depicts a much earlier form of interacting bodies caught in a passionate moment. Here, the
central interaction between Judas and Christ in the form of a kiss frames the dramatic moment of
the scene. They look squarely into each other’s eyes with a placid resolution.
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Figure 36. Giotto. Betrayal of Christ, Arena Chapel, 1304-6.
Giotto reinvents the scene, however, when he paints Judas’ golden cloak as swallowing Christ,
perhaps as a sign to seal the betrayal. Yet paradoxically, against the Byzantine iconic tradition
Giotto’s uses this color of gold for Judas, not Christ. One way to understand this use of color
would be to underscore Judas’ role, and hence of betrayal itself, as the agent of the incarnation;
as if to say Jesus is already in the process of becoming divine. And rising pointedly above the
chaotic scramble are golden staffs and clubs, items which resemble an extended crown above
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Christ’s head, given that they all descend in a circular gravitational manner towards his bright
golden halo. Surrounding the intimate betrayal are the witnesses or subsidiary actors to the scene,
soldiers, St. Peter holding a knife and other disciples, and it is these figures of violent gesture
that allows for the scene to be interpreted as one of upheaval, for one would not know the gravity
of the situation by focusing on the two central figures. The vitality given to the canvas through
these gestures is a signature mark of Giotto, and one need only glance at Duccio di
Buoninsegna’s The Betrayal by Judas (Figure 37), of roughly the same era, to see how Giotto’s
scene is less a symbolism in theology and more an actual scene from daily life.
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Figure 37. Duccio di Buoninsegna’s The Betrayal by Judas. 1308-1311. Tempera on wood panel.
Duccio’s bodies stand as if they could be a group of philosophers discussing the newest
interpretations of Philo, while for Giotto the scene radiates a profound shift in energy, beginning
in the silent center then expanding outward to the subsidiary actions. The body language of
Giotto’s Jesus is one of knowing capitulation, and this silent point amidst the other gesture
bodies speaks of the act of martyrdom.
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While istoria is often translated as narrative, understanding it in temporal terms is misleading.69
Medieval art was fond of multiple scenes inside a single frame. For Alberti, istoria is less a term
for a picture’s ability to tell a story and more a spatial rule of composition. In fact, Da Vinci fails
to mention the flow of temporality as a property of narrativity, but “uses narrative painting for
the stopped-action historical, biblical, or mythological scene. Everything that he says about such
works is predicated, in fact, on the absence of temporal flow.”70 Istoria is a fact of the absence of
narrative.

Istoria as Principle of Composition

Istoria guides the organization of pictorial space. It ensures a consistent surface, solidifies
communication across that surface, and organizes the diverse elements into a coherent
expression that is intelligible, dramatic and affective. Istoria utilizes the body and/or bodies for
this consistency, because it is the gestures of the body that communicate across medium that is
the canvas. Such affect is the quality of line, color, form, shape, texture—the bodies create
virtual lines across the canvas, turning the striated space of perspective into a corporeal place of
gesture. Many characters are used for the composition of the istoria. Istoria releases the affects
within the bodies on the canvas, which in turn releases ours—body and canvas, nervous system
and color field stimulate each other.

Istoria is built upon a mathematical grid of points, a surface or striated space. When Alberti in
Book I of Della Pittura defines the “window” of the picture plane in terms of rays, centric
points, planes and lines, he is working within a mathematical epistemology. Though we have
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said earlier that it is istoria that creates a zone of consistency across the canvas, we must not
confuse consistency with homogeneity. Consistency refers to a specific property on the canvas.
At its most brute level, consistency is a fact of agreement of things placed on the surface. The
crux of the matter is having to decide whether this is merely perceptual (the viewers attribute
consistency to a discordant set of elements on the painted surface) or actual (consistency is the
property of material forms). The former point places the burden of connection on the eye and the
ability for it to make connections with the help of a thought process, while the latter thesis could
perhaps force us to conclude that sensate division is artificial, and consistency natural. And what
about the role of the artwork’s frame in organizing this consistency, for isn’t it really the frame
that tells viewers of art to concentrate solely in one space at a time, and not to try to consider
anything outside that frame as essential to the painting? Isn’t consistency a product of the
framing device, whereupon given strict boundaries by the artist we infer that everything inside
the frame is of the artist’s intention, thereby forcing the viewer to perform the hermeneutical task
of putting those elements together? Where does a work of art begin? Who says so? Why? These
are relevant questions, questions to which mid to late-twentieth century European art movements
dedicated themselves—Minimalism, conceptual art, performance art, land art, Pop art, and Dada,
among others, not to mention theorists, philosophers, critics and theologians. In art history, the
debate surrounding composition first took hold around the time of the Minimalist movement, for
it was the Minimalists who were one of the early groups to challenge the conception of the
frame.

332
For decades the Modern work of art was predominately assumed to be on a canvas and framed.71
In the 1960’s the Minimalists began to ask what is it the frame did, what it was, and how it
worked. Quickly, it became obvious that the frame could not be separated from the canvas, as if
somehow painting had relied on this device for centuries without ever becoming self-reflective
about this device. Michael Fried’s essay of 1967, “Art and Objecthood” situates the debate
succinctly. Fried lists what he thinks are the literalist’s “case against painting”; Fried uses the
term literalist art rather than Minimalism. The Minimalist case against the canvas rests on two
ideas: painting’s relational nature and the inescapability of pictorial illusion.72 Presumably,
Minimalism attempts to do away with both these elements. Though Fried will go on to criticize
Minimalism for being theatrical, his initial discussion of composition is the backbone of his
argument, and it is these ideas that will be used here.
Fried uses Donald Judd’s writings for the counter argument in favor of Minimalism. What is
remarkable about Judd’s writings is that while they are critical of the painting, they define the
fundamentals of painting clearly. Critical of the canvas, Judd writes that “when you start relating
parts, in the first place, you’re assuming you have a vague whole—the rectangle of the canvas—
and definite parts, which is all screwed up, because you should have a definite whole and maybe
no parts, or very few.”73 According to Fried’s reading of Judd, the parts inside the painting
subordinate themselves to the rectangular shape of their support, the canvas, in such a radical
fashion that division or absolute discord is impossible. A unified painting is inevitable regardless
of what is on it. It is through the frame that a painting is born, comes alive—one could say it
becomes a body. The rectangular frame creates the semblance of wholeness.
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As a piece of the “metalanguage” of pictorial representation, the frame makes representation
possible. The frame induces a change in the spectator’s gaze. Louis Marin notes this fact,
claiming that “the frame is a necessary ornament of the picture; the painting needs it. It is a
requirement of the painting, and not of its painter: it signals the real functional autonomy, and
the possible aesthetic autonomy, of the mechanism of representation.”74 Marin uses a remarkable
1639 letter by Poussin where the latter begs the recipient of a painting to put a frame around it
immediately, lest the eye be “not dispersed beyond the limits of the picture by receiving
impressions of objects which, seen pell-mell with the painted objects, confuse the light.”75 For
Poussin, the frame acts as a gathering devise for sensation, telling the eye that what is inside the
frame is of importance, while the impressions gathered outside, such as those of the wall, are
unimportant to the work of art. Poussin makes a distinction between aspect and prospect to argue
his case of differing impressions. The impressions differ in terms of function. Aspect is viewing
by habit, normal perception; the gaze does not come into play. Prospective viewing requests that
we attentively view the piece in light of what it presents. What it presents is the potential for a
concept/comprehension, what Marin terms its “theory in itself.” The impressions inside the
frame activate thought, but not for the obvious reasons. Not because thinking can only become
thought in a focused, confined manner. Quite the contrary, thought arises inside/on the painting
because thought is forced to digest the contrary parts within the frame. Thought arises not with
the leveling of difference but inside the effort to manage it. According to Marin, pictorial
representation transforms the “infinite difference of the perceived world” into the “absolute
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differentiation” of pictorial space.76 What the frame establishes is an absolute, albeit localized,
zone of difference. This specific property does not pre-exist the canvas, it is a product of it.

Moreover, as the quote above highlights, one fact firmly entrenches the frame inside the act of
representation—the painting is a requirement of the painting, not the painter. Do not all paintings
have edges, whereas the frame merely makes this edge more decorative? One could reply
affirmatively and negatively. First, of course every painting has an edge, a point at which art
stops, so yes, the frame merely makes it easier for the viewer to understand the artist’s gaze, and
yes, the painter needs an edge to control the beginning and end of the artistic process. Second,
negatively, the painting is not a complete object, but a slice of vision of an artistic life. The art is
the life of the painter, and the painting is a necessarily incomplete snapshot of a process always
in motion. In this manner, the frame is not an institution, not an artificial, semiotic system. It is a
contrivance for consumers of art, and a requirement for art to be collected and sold, but a painter
does not need a frame, only employs it out of convenience; we need it.
But there is plenty of art that doesn’t employ a frame. For Judd, as for many mixed media and
three dimensional artists working after the glory days of the American Abstract Expressionists,
the rectangular form needs rethinking; hence Judd’s thoughts on the limits of rectangular
painting. Post-structuralist theory is at this time gaining intellectual credence, (influenced by
French phenomenology), a tradition which can only be understood as a loose critical trajectory
that understood the frame as an artificial structure designed to create a meaning-system (the
canvas). Jacques Derrida’s main work on aesthetics follows this path, as does Jean Luc Marion,
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Jean-Louis Chretien, among others.77 What Judd and the Minimalists desire is a work of art
unlike the rectangular form, an art without an internal relation (correspondence), art without parts
(consistency), just a single object and a single presence (see Figure 38 below).

Figure 38. Donald Judd. Untitled, 2003.

For Judd, the simplicity of the Minimalist object—the steel box, for example—itself can achieve
this absolute plainness, for this object requires no canvas, and its reflective surface denies the
viewer any pretense to interiority (i.e., metaphysics).
77
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Fried’s essay can be put into the discourse of the death of painting, or what Clement Greenburg
in his 1948 essay as “The Crisis of the Easel Picture.” Fried is trying to make his case for
painting against the onslaught of Minimalist criticism. This interrogation of the how painting is
presented, whether it is causing painting’s death or symptomatic of it, is what led artists and
critics to reevaluate what painting pre-supposed. The title of Greenberg’s early essay correctly
summarizes the era as a “crisis.” Paradoxically, what Judd refers to as relational painting (what
painting as a whole is for Judd: Renaissance, Abstraction, etc), which is composed of parts,
Greenburg refers to as “sheer monotony” and “uniformity,” language which leads one to think
that Modern painting, for Greenberg, has no parts; or at least has no parts the way Judd
understands them.78 In contrast to Judd, Greenburg characterized the Modern canvas as an “allover,” “sheer sensation,” “sheer texture,” “an accumulation of repetitions,” “decentralized,”
“uniform,” “polyphonic” and nearly “antiaesthetic” surface (see Figure 39 below). Greenburg is
thinking of the canvases of Mark Tobey, Jackson Pollock, Rudolf Ray and Janet Sobel, among
others.79
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Figure 39. Jackson Pollock. Lavender Mist, 1950.
The result, Greenburg declares, “became an evenly and tightly textured rectangle of paint that
tended to muffle contrasts and threatened—but only threatened—to reduce the picture space to a
relatively undifferentiated surface.”80 According to Greenberg, this new space is the result of
decades of evolutions in art since the canvases of Manet. Foremost among those evolutions
leading to Modern abstraction is the disfiguration of the figure, and one need only list the
numerous examples of Modern art narratives that understand abstraction to begin with Picasso’s
Les Demoiselles d'Avignon, 1907 (Figure 40), a work of art that translated the beauty of the
female nude into the broken-plane bodies of prostitutes.
80
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Figure 40. Pablo Picasso. Les Demoiselles d'Avignon, 1907.

The figure, one might say, has become broken down into simple planes of color; Cubist
technique triumphs classical content, and color dominates form. The female bodies have literally
been spread onto the canvas, and modern abstraction was born. As with the facialization of the
body in the Antony series, the canvas, as a unit of immanence, is the prime beneficiary of this
logic.
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More important than any one style was a technique—they way modern artists applied color. It
was the finely differentiated tonal values of their color that led to a “relatively undifferentiated
surface”; prior to this surface was the Renaissance semblance of illusion, the latter having held
all previous art under its spell. According to Greenberg, it was not until color was applied in such
fashion could perspectival depth be abolished and the affect of “sheer sensation” could replace
illusion.

Uniformity is color field painting, abstract painting and a style of painting whose colors and
shapes and lines bear no resemblance to nature, only color, sensation and affect. Greenburg is,
however, speaking more specifically about Modern abstraction. Greenburg’s analysis revolves
more around sensation and the transcendental of the Modern canvas; its flat, monotonous and
democratic nature. The transcendental of the new painting surface is non-hierarchal and
indistinct according to Greenburg, unlike the striated space of Renaissance perspective. In many
ways, Fried’s analysis takes place after Greenberg’s. Fried’s relational painting is really a
product of the uniformity of sensation; that is, this type of pure relation, which is not the relation
between bodies (istoria), but merely the communication of marks on a surface. Fried understands
the parts of the painting to be marks, not bodies, with these marks betraying a semblance of unity
and consistency given truly by the frame. Their analyses can be combined, however, in that the
new composition occurring on the monotonous, Modern surface is one between color-parts, and
we must understand these not so much as fragmented parts but as elements of sensation inside a
given field intended to express.

Conclusion

340
As the second case study to explore the role of the immanence and the ascetic body in the visual
arts, the notion of istoria has been shown to rely on a logic of the body found in the ascetic
tradition. That logic concerns the ability of the body to effect the space around it, as well as the
concept of the part vs. whole reminiscent of Athanasius’ concerns in On the Incarnation and Life
of Antony. This is not to say that istoria is a direct result of the Antony series or early
Renaissance painters’ use of the ascetic body. Rather, affinities and trajectories have been
located within the formal definition of istoria that correspond to the same logic of the body
found in ascetic, christological and theological texts. If we found in Giotto and the Antony series
plausible reasons to suggest that an autonomy of the work of art is beginning to take hold in the
13th and 14th centuries, one which relies on the painted figure, then the analysis here extends the
thesis with the claim that a properly executed istoria on the canvas also takes a step toward
autonomy and internal resonance through the use of the gesturing body.

Put in theoretical terms, the debate about the wholeness of the singular body (which Judd says is
only achieved with the Minimalist object) and the fragmented nature of the relational or part-bypart body is the same as the one we have been discussing with istoria. Does istoria reveal the
body as inherently relational, or does its practice allow us to glimpse another body, a social
body? If the body is relational, what would a figure look like on the canvas that attempts to
express a body without relation? What is the figurative equivalent of the pure object of Judd? Or
is that impossible and the very reason why Judd uses steel and not a human body to express this
quality?

But could it be that the parts organize the frame, and that undue attention has been given to the
frame for creating the autonomous work of art? If so, what type of parts could have this power to
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concentrate attention on themselves in such a way as to construct an immanent field of
materiality? In fact, we have already answered this question—the power of the close-up body
brings with it its own field of immanence. The figure guarantees the integrity of the picture
without the frame. Though Modern abstraction required a disfiguration, it could not do away
with the figure. If there was a semblance of unity to the canvas we must also attribute this factor,
first, to the continued presence of the figure beneath abstraction, a presence that brings with it
properties of extension, affect, and, more subtly, a repetition of another body. For it is the
relation between the repeated body (sensation) and the archi-body (the screen) that allows the
canvas to be populated by force. Wherever we find processes of disfiguration, we find the
concomitant expressions of force. To say that a Modern work of art has a power or a force is to
say it expresses without reference, and it is for this reason that the ascetic body, Christological
body, or any other variation are abstract bodies, for they are all expressions of another body.
Istoria was one such concept in the history of aesthetics that put this abstraction into an equation
with the body, understanding something to arise from a configuration of gesturing bodies (a
soul), yet this soul is more of an expressive corporeal residing in the formal composition of the
canvas than it is the remnant of metaphysics.

342

Chapter 7

Conclusion: Body and Concept

“Here note that when we say that all things are in
God [that means that] just as he is indistinct in his
nature and nevertheless most distinct from all
things, so in him all things in a most distinct way
are also at the same time indistinct.”
Meister Eckhart, Latin Sermon IV
“The philosophical concept does not refer to the
lived, by way of compensation, but consists,
through its own creation, in setting up an event that
surveys the whole of the lived no less than every
state of affairs.”
Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?

Between Body and Concept
The first section of this dissertation (chapters 2-5) is a strategic genealogy of the construction of
the concept of Christ through late ancient thinkers, while the second section explores the theory
that the first section locates. This genealogy was intended to distill a logic of the body found to
be operative in Christianity, though this logic is not exclusive to Christianity nor necessarily
religious in nature. In theoretical terms stripped of its religious content, that logic was, firstly, the
ability of the body to become transparent to externality in such a way that the body has life
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immanently within it, and secondly, the ability of this immanent body to in turn effect
externality. The immanent body was the name given to the type of body inscribed with/by
cosmological forces, understood in such a way that when it moved, creation itself moved
(Athanasius). This type of body becoming transparent to externality marks many of the
subjective or bodily articulations found in contemporary theory. The ascetics in their journey had
as their goal what Brakke calls a return to an “original undifferentiated unity,” 1 and while the
focus here has been on asceticism, numerous examples of what I have termed the immanent body
can be found in continental philosophy, cultural studies, and the visual arts. Bataille’s
transgressive body opening onto the infinite is one example, as is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (“I am
the meaning of the earth”) and Deleuze’s counter actualized body. Other names mark this
phenomenon. Simone Weil terms it affliction, while according to Amy Hollywood, Simone de
Beauvoir was constantly tempted by the “desire to be everything,” which defined the mystical
for Beauvoir.2 The type of body being inscripted by an ontological All is the socio-political
foundation of performance art, which had begun to be traced out by Eleanor Heartney using
Christian categories, as was done here.

In Christianity, this body is found in the mystical tradition, with such voices of Teresa of Avila,
St. Francis, Bernard of Clairvaux, or Meister Eckhart, among others. In most of these cases, it
was “God” who was understood to be enfolded into the body at the point of the subject’s
transparency in the face of externality, whether you understand this externality as force, nature or
God. This is because God was the All, all existence and creation itself. In the opening epigraph,
Eckhart describes this transparent moment when the soul unites with God. As a distinct being,
when the soul enters God, who is indistinct, the soul collapses and unites with God and becomes,
1
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if only for an instant, “indistinct,” in virtue of being encompassed by indistinction. The soul
achieves a state of “nothing,” yet it is a nothing which is everything (an All), since it is identified
with God. Though Eckhart uses the term soul to describe this moment, the body can be
understood in this fashion as well. Eckhart is fully aware that the strict definitions of terms, as
that between body and soul, are mere semantics. Speaking of the artificial distinction in the
trinity, for instance, it is admitted that everything that is written about it “is in no way really so or
true.”3 Everyman is a liar, Eckhart admits, citing the Psalms, and expressing the fact that
distinctions between the material and spiritual body are mere linguistic necessities: the
incarnation complicates distinctions.

Within the language of becoming-All, described in the experiences of men and women, one
cannot simply sidestep the sexual politics of what it means to be a mystic. In other words, is this
type of mysticism—of becoming the All—already a gendered practice? Could it be the case that
the genre of mysticism traced out in this text—if it deserves the title of genre—has been what is
historically considered feminine? First used by Tertullian to discipline the “independent virgins
of Carthage,”4 a complex and sophisticated history accompanies the phrase “brides of Christ,”
which was often applied after the women’s mystical movement of the thirteenth century to the
souls of men (and women) who desired union with Christ.5 Without question, the spiritual
seekers of the desert can be considered brides of Christ; but to be a bride of Christ is just one
articulation within the discourse of mysticism where problems of gender surface.
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According to Amy Hollywood, Beauvoir and Irigaray agree that “mysticism is the sole place
within the history of the West where women have achieved full and autonomous subjectivity”6;
which does not mean that their “full” subjectivity has been achieved because they practiced a
form of mysticism analogous to their more masculine counterparts. Blending medieval and
modern writers through her musing on what it means to be a mystic, according to Hollywood
mysticism was for Beauvoir “about the human desire to be everything, a desire shared by both
men and women. Lacan will argue, on the contrary, that the desire to be everything—and the
illusion that one is everything—are marks of masculine subjectivity.”7 To be on the side of the
“not All” is for Lacan the true subject position of mysticism, described as split, lacking, or
wounded. However, the notion of a “transparency” of the subject or the desire to become
everything, which Hollywood finds operative in female mystics as well as twentieth century
writers, is precisely the type of imitatio Christi mysticism that has been analyzed here, and it is
not limited to male or female practice. Moreover, the masculinity or femininity of this mystical
language is, as Hollywood rightly observes, “loosely tied to bodily differences; to say that the
site of mysticism is feminine does not mean that men cannot go there.”8 While no claim has been
made in this text as to the gendered quality of mystical experience, what often gets overlooked in
the language of becoming-All is the counter movement of this act, for in the act of becoming-All
one therefore has the power to have effect within the All.
One of the problems scholarship has had in understanding this “experience” was how the
question of the what of “God” was never theorized specifically. Neither apophasis nor cataphasis
were found to be sufficient to explain how it was that the body—a body—could come to embody
6
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creation, speak for it or “move” it. If one refuses to interrogate the question of God in this
literature then one has merely assumed that, indeed, it was an experience of God—a line of
interrogation leaving little room for interrogation. God was simply present in the body of the
subject, and to go further in describing this phenomenon often takes one into apophasis (words
and signification fail at this limit) or cataphasis (perhaps akin to Avila’s rich bodily descriptions
of mystical union). One could choose between theology and literature. God was not a precise
term of analysis in this dissertation for the following reasons.

On the one hand, the concept occludes secular or atheistic conceptions of the body which speak
of this experience in the same manner as the mystics. As an object of analysis, God does not help
us make sense of, for instance, Walt Whitman’s line in Song of Myself, where he writes, “I
bequeath myself to the dirt to grow from the grass I love / If you want me again look for me
under your bootsoles.” Whitman’s prose poems are filled with such statements of identification
with the outside. Whitman’s becoming of the dirt to the shared “atomic soul” of the earth, does
not speak of God entering him, and yet, in his language the notion of the earth flowing through
his body is repeated over and over again. This desire of bodily transparency marks, if anything
does, the late American poet’s conception of nature.

On the other hand, because the Christian God is often understood to be commensurate with life,
embodying life, directing it (albeit virtually removed from it), then one ought rather to
conceptualize the concept of life within Christianity. Rather than take the incarnation as an act of
faith, the question then becomes, how did God become enfolded within life in a material fashion
in such a way that God was understood to be immanent to it? It was through the concept of
Christ that God was able to be thought as commensurate with life. The concept of Christ makes
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the incarnation of God possible; it is not the case, as is commonly assumed, that God makes the
incarnation of possible through Christ.
The first section of this text was therefore titled the “Construction of Christ.” There are many
different Christs in late antiquity—Gnostic Christs, heterodox Christs, and many other eccentric
Christs—just as there are many different Christianities. The Christ that this text sought to bring
to the surface was not necessarily a Christ according to one thinker, but a Christ that would
eventually enable the logic of the immanent body to come to fruition in asceticism. Ascetic
practice, therefore, is one of the great flowerings of high christology, a fact countering the claim
that the high christology developing out of Paul’s letters has had little bearing on Christian life,
the former being merely a disembodied philosophical enterprise. The strategic genealogy was
strategic because it was not focused merely on a concept of Christ, but on the way or manner in
which the Christ concept—the conceptual persona of Christ—authorized a practice and
hermeneutic of the immanent body. Each thinker presented here is therefore an exposition of a
philosophical operation, and each operation is but one step in the construction of conceptual
persona—Christ—who was to have unforeseen consequences on bodies throughout Christian and
non-Christian history.
The “way” or “manner” in which a body could be thought to contain life was precisely the
question this text set out to answer, and the conceptual persona of Christ was for christology a
crucial theoretical architecture allowing this process to occur. In terms of bringing Deleuze’s
thought into Christian late antiquity, a place we rarely find it, at the outset it was Deleuze and
Guattari’s notion of conceptual personae framing the initial inquiry. This has been a heterodox
reading of Deleuze, and should not be understood as a simple appropriation of his ideas, but
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closer to an inspired reading of history based on a method—that of finding the influence of a
persona in philosophy and theology. The concept of counter-actualization has been made a main
attribute of the conceptual persona, a connection Deleuze does not make in his own or
collaborative work.9 Moreover, this text takes Deleuze’s notions of immanence into late ancient
Christianity, and charges that it is the latter that perhaps contains the resources for a concept of
immanence as profound as the ones Deleuze locates in Plotinus, Spinoza, Nietzsche and Duns
Scotus. True to Deleuze, the power of a philosophy of immanence must be judged by the type of
bodies it creates, and the modalities of life those bodies construct. If this text has done anything,
it has illustrated how within Christianity certain figures are articulated and certain strands of
thought can be found to be amenable to a philosophy of immanence. In this manner, there is no
doubt here a constructive critique at work towards the various Death of God theologies which
have spoken at length of immanence as the solution to the loss of transcendence.

Irenaeus, Tertullian and Athanasius—these are not philosophers of immanence. In fact, historical
theology has deemed them philosophers of transcendence, thinkers of orthodox transcendence,
for whom correct thinking was required and for whom unorthodox thinking should be met with
charges of heresy (Irenaeus invented the idea of heresy against his “right” thinking). Such figures
would hardly seem worthy of a Deleuzian reading. However, this is a fact that, in my opinion,
requires a Deleuzian reading all the more. But more is meant by a Deleuzian reading than just the
application of Deleuze’s ideas to ancient material, which this text certainly does not do. The
project undertaken here is analogous to Deleuze’s “reversal of Platonism,” in which he claims
that the reversal accomplishes much more than “the abolition of the world of essences and of the
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world of appearances.”10 Deleuze’s reading is not a reversal of Platonism nor a rejection of Plato
since Deleuze is aware that Plato’s text, the Sophist, is quite aware of the problem. Deleuze cites
Plato himself as discovering the reversal of Platonism.

Rather, one must seek out the motivation of the Platonic ideas, which Deleuze understood as a
will to select and to choose. The motivation of Platonic philosophy is not to divide a genus into a
species, but to distinguish between the pretenders and those who really participate in the Ideas.
Whereas it befalls those who participate (the copy) to affirm the Idea, since those who participate
resemble the Idea, the real danger to Platonism is thus not between the copy and the original (as
this relation is well established), but between the copy and the simulacrum.11 A true threat to
Platonism, the simulacra must be contained by the method of selection because it sidesteps the
hierarchical relation of Idea, participation and participator. Under the Platonic system, the only
real is the Idea, and the world of materiality, and the senses, are degraded as both a copy and
apparent. Contrary to deferring power to a transcendent Idea, the simulacrum is defined by
becoming—a becoming mad, a becoming unlimited; in short, the event of singularity. Simulacra
are entities whose existence need not pass through the Idea, and the justification of their
existence relies on the fact that existence passes through them, not that the One or the Idea
authorizes them. They are becoming-other, becoming itself, not participation. If the copy, of say
a horse, relies on its existence because it passes through an idea, the opposite is the case for
simulacra. Their modality of connection is horizontal rather than vertical, rhizomic rather than
hierarchical. Many Deleuzian ideas come together here: (i) becoming is always an event, (ii)
simulacra are events, (iii) events are defined by multiplicities enfolded within them, (iv) bodies
10
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are events like other forms of life ,(v) the whole of creation (difference itself) is enfolded in these
body events (which unify difference), (vi) concepts must attempt to manage difference while
refusing to master it, but, more importantly, difference itself must be brought out of the concept.
A body, especially the ascetic body, exhibits these traits. We have not reversed christology, but
attempted to find an inspiration lodged within its confines, a inspiration towards immanence
working on bodies and against the orders of the church, an inspiration seeking life in nature, in
bodily discipline, in athletic feats, in the beauty of the body as much as its disfiguration.

To make such a statement is not to reopen a theory/practice divide in such a way that practice (of
the body) is an a priori of philosophical systems. Rather, it is to claim that certain characteristics
of the concept of Christ are repetitions of phenomenon occurring in life, and on bodies. This was
accomplished through a focus on the philosophical implications of the crucified body (Irenaeus),
the shared phenomenality of flesh (Tertullian), and the manner in which movement immanently
enfolds the body (Athanasius).

There is no gulf between body and concept. One cannot theorize the body except through a
concept, which goes for all understanding; Kant said as much in his First Critique. On the other
hand, one cannot create a concept that is not conditioned by the body. The materiality of our life
cannot but condition the concepts we create. The interesting question is not to give primacy to
body or concept, but to find each in the other, to find how the concepts we create contain traces
of the body and how the bodies we have are created in turn by concepts.12 Not all concepts have
the same power to alter our bodies, and all our bodies are not equally affected by concepts. The
focus here has been on a concept and a system and their relation to a practice. Asceticism was a
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clearly defined bodily practice, and if it was focused on to the exclusion of many other bodily
practices, it was merely a pragmatic concern. The strategic genealogy presented here
concentrated on how the concept of Christ, including all its theoretical architecture, would find
itself implicated in the ascetic project, while also claiming that the concept of Christ, as found in
the conceptual persona of Christ, was a repetition of a logic of the body. The logic of the body,
requiring the concept of immanence to make sense of it, is not religious in nature. It is in this
manner that this project is a reversal of christology. Christology’s motivation was to insinuate
Christ at the center of life and thought. There is no lack of texts from either biblical studies or
historical theology to delineate how the concept of Christ was made. However, a reversal of
christology is to find Christ the concept in the material conditions of life, to investigate how
concepts are born of the movements of the body, to discern how ontology repeats the
phenomenon of lived bodies.

The Portrait
The purpose of the project has not been to merely restate Irenaeus’ notion of recapitulation, nor
to lay out Tertullian’s conception of flesh, nor to summarize Athanasius’ On the Incarnation.
The hermeneutic in which the texts and analyses were conducted were undoubtedly from a
contemporary perspective, and in this manner, this strategic genealogy responds to contemporary
trends in continental thought—the relation of bodies to thought, the genesis of a concept,
embodied materialism, immanence studies, and the problematic relation of Christianity to
contemporary continental philosophy. As stated at the outset of the second chapter, numerous
appropriations of the Christ concept are made in continental philosophy, yet each appropriation
is precisely that, an appropriation. What these studies lack is history, an ancient idea of
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immanence that must be thought alongside a contemporary one, and the fact that Christ does not
begin with Jesus, nor Paul, but is constructed with philosophical tools and procedures. Christ
may be, in the end, a figure of immanence, but immanence must be constructed like any other
philosophical notion. If immanence has been privileged here, it is only because the trait of the
immanent body was its revolution in bodily practice. Moreover, conceptualizing christology in
terms of immanence or transcendence would undercut the very thesis put forward in this
conclusion, namely, that Christ deserves a new title. Simply saying that Christ is pure
immanence or pure transcendence ignores the profound addition to philosophical thought that
this figure introduces. Moreover, focusing on Christ in this manner may allow us to better
understand how transcendence and immanence are themselves expressions of forces the body
can both undergo and produce. Has not the concept of Christ, via the philosophy of the
incarnation, made the opposition of terms problematic in the first place?

Below, I will briefly summarize the role each thinker played in the construction of Christ, how
this Christ was deployed as an agent of immanence, and lastly, how this concept would
contribute to the ascetic understanding of the body. What the final Christ looks like, to which the
construction of Christ builds, is a Christ that embodies creation (the All) in an immanent fashion.
In order to paint the picture that is Christ, the strategic genealogy employed ought to be
understood in terms constructing a canvas, laying the foundational color, then slowly building up
contrasts, color and detail. Irenaeus is the craftsman of the frame in which will be painted the
portrait of Christ.

Since it is the assumption here that the concept of immanence has played a major role in Western
political as well as philosophical history, and further, a concept shapes a body through the
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deployment of immanence, this text began with Irenaeus and the construction of Christ as a
figure of immanence. Immanence should be defined by its classical Aristotelian usage, as the
quality of an action beginning and ending inside an agent. When we speak of God being in
and/or on the body, God is the name of a certain quality, or intensity, inhabiting the body, albeit
virtually; perhaps the same way beauty inhabits a moving body without being directly attached to
that body. A body becomes an immanent body when it is understood to have the All within it, in
an immanent fashion. It therefore can act immanently in the All as an agent within the All
because the All is enfolded upon it. Recapitulation will establish these properties for Christ.

Irenaeus

Irenaeus plays an important role in the construction of Christ in that it is through his notion of
recapitulation that Christ is understood to take on immanent characteristics. Recapitulation
established the idea that Christ sums up history. Recapitulation stretched Christ out, as it were,
temporally and materially. Irenaeus cites Romans 5: 12-21 frequently in support of his idea,
“Consequently, just as one trespass resulted in condemnation for all people, so also one righteous
act resulted in justification and life for all people. For just as through the disobedience of the one
man the many were made sinners, so also through the obedience of the one man the many will be
made righteous.” The curse that bestowed sin upon humanity is now put into question.
Recapitulation obeys a unique logic: one tree cancels out another—the crucifixion overrules the
tree of sin, and makes a life without sin possible again. Athanasius, centuries later, reiterates this
logic precisely. Irenaeus writes: “For He would not have been one truly possessing flesh and
blood, by which He redeemed us, unless He had summed up in Himself the ancient formation of
Adam.” Recapitulation is this “summing up.” Irenaeus establishes the fact that Christ is the end
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of the law, however his major insight comes in the form of a question: “How could Christ be the
end of the Law unless he were also its beginning?” Irenaeus answers by citing the opening verses
of John’s gospel, explaining that Christ’s status as co-creator justifies the fact that he is the end
of the law, since with co-creation he is also its beginning. It wasn’t enough for Irenaeus to refine
the idea of recapitulation, he also had to “put” this concept at the beginning as well as the end.

What is getting witnessed here is the inverse of Christ as recapitulated being (the end) in the
form of Christ in the beginning (logos). In fact, an incarnated revealed eschatology, such as we
find in asceticism, requires co-creationist logos christology to be thought along with
recapitulation. Christ is the end only by virtue of being the beginning. He can enter Life at the
end because he is the image-principle of its creation, which makes him easier to enter, and he is
the beginning because he “was” the end. The second half of this formula is no doubt inspired by
the crucifixion. Eckhart, in his attempt to keep God unified at these extremes, warns against
calling the beginning and end two different causes, writing that “This is because existence, that
is, God, is within every being, every form and end.”13 Though from the standpoint of faith God
may have made Christ, philosophically it is Christ that makes this God possible. Christ, not God,
pulls all the weight of Christian immanence. Between causality (beginning) and teleology (end)
there is the third term, immanence, which is defined as the ability to find Christ immanently in
all aspects of creation. The overall importance this conceptualization of Christ has for asceticism
is the way Christ is virtualized (conceptual persona) and in this virtualization is guaranteed
ontological virility. Because of the virtuality of Christ, he can never be exhausted, yet he can be
repeated. The immanence of Christ in life is established as a saving power through his virtuality.
Most importantly, Irenaeus establishes a precedent for the power of an act to embody all of life,
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an act though which, enfolded therein, life’s faults are corrected. It is this last point, borrowed in
part from the Stoics, which will become crucial in understanding the body language of ascetics
as implicated in a larger cosmological fabric.

In a larger context, the areas where this chapter responds to contemporary concerns in
philosophy is, first, its constructive engagement with bringing Deleuze’s ideas to late antiquity,
the instituting of theological immanence (Death of God theologies), the role of the body in
thought, and lastly, the relevance of christological contributions to postmodern studies.

Tertullian

If Irenaeus constructed the frame to this portrait by laying out an immanent Christ, Tertullian
would begin to lay out the foundational color and texture. Tertullian would accomplish this via
his notion of flesh, and through a methodology in which the concept of flesh exerts a
gravitational pull on the architecture of this thinking. Irenaeus established Christ as the
conceptual persona occupying the central position of logos christology, and he stretched the
Christ canvas over the philosophical landscape by placing Christ at all the crucial points required
for a robust ontology: co-creation, immanence, telos (near, end and far point).14 Tertullian would
say outright what Irenaeus almost said—Christ is the “fabric of life.” This expressive phrase
follows from Irenaeus. By this phrase Tertullian meant that Christ’s incarnation signified much
more than his assumption of a body, but that his body ought to be understood to be enfolded into
material life. Material life was not limited to bodies, but to “abject” and “accursed” materiality,
such as the fluid of the womb, dirt and blood. Christ embodied the form of the accursed so that
the curse would be no longer. Building upon Irenaeus’ concept of recapitulation wherein Christ
14
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is said to have assumed all of humanity, “summing” it up in his body, Tertullian established
Christ as a fabric of life through which All is bound: the concept of Christ reorganized the
manner in which to view God and humanity, allowing them to be thought together. Using the
term “flesh” to designate this fabric of life, Tertullian indicates the ubiquity of flesh to be
symptomatic of what the incarnation means, that is, Christ’s ubiquity is not just virtual, as it
appeared to be in Irenaeus. To be able to find flesh everywhere, to be in it and to think through it
in theological terms—this is the ubiquity of the flesh. Flesh’s all encompassing embrace of life is
but one result of the conceptual persona of Christ, since it is the function of persona to guide
concepts, screen, direct and give them behavior.

By calling attention to the tranfigurative power of flesh, Tertullian inaugurates a discussion of
process materiality continuing to this day. Tertullian’s appeal to the processes embedded within
flesh calls forth a logic of implication and explication in which the health of the ground is the
health of the organism. In other words, appeals to the “ground” in philosophy serve one main
function, to vitalize the organism witnessed, or born, by the ground. Born in the year 160 and
dying in the year 225, Tertullian lived during a tumultuous period in the history of the Roman
Empire. His life saw the persecutions of Marcus Aurelius, lasting from 161-180, which produced
the famous martyrdom of Polycarp, and the persecution of Septimus Severus, lasting from 202210, which saw the martyrdom of Perpetua. Tertullian’s tactic was not just to glorify the body
and compare it to the crucifixion, but to construct an immanentist and transcendental materialism
under the name of flesh. Below is a remarkable passage from De Carne Christi employing the
logic of ground and organism: “No material substance is without the witness of its own
original…What is flesh but earth in a special form?” The substance of the body has immanent to
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it the substance of the earth. Therefore, to immanentize the earth in the body is a political and
philosophical strategy of co-opting the forces already flowing through the body. What is
remarkable is how Tertullian is trying confront a biopolitical violence with an affirmative
biophilosophy, or what could be termed a bioreligiousity. His affirmations of the immanence of
God in flesh, but also of the immanence of our flesh in God, has not only made sense of the
phenomenon of martyrdom, but affirmed it. "The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church,”
Tertullian famously wrote. The concept of spilt blood, and broken flesh, assumed extremely
important political and aesthetic registers for the early Christians. This is because flesh speaks of
many things at once: Christ assumed flesh, flesh is immanent to humans, the breaking of flesh
was the means toward sanctity, yet it was the breaking of flesh in martyrdom that was a political,
and grotesque, act of resistance to empire. Tertullian’s concept of flesh is therefore a constructive
response to an alteration in biopolitics. The martyr’s body is therefore the form of representation
responding to biopolitics, and Tertullian’s materialism is the supporting discourse.

The portrait of Christ has, therefore, received its texture in the form of flesh. However, what was
lacking in Tertullian that Athanasius exploits is the precise movement of the organism vis-à-vis
the ground. Athanasius is the third and final major thinker to be engaged. Athanasius’ On the
Incarnation provided the logic in which to think how a body can actually effect the whole, while
his Life of Antony is an illustration of the logic. The overall logic of the whole/part argument as it
relates to ontological movement in On the Incarnation can be summed up as follows: creation is
moved in the advent of Christ. God moves creation, including his own nature, when a preexisting part splinters (or is begotten) from the whole in the hopes of bringing the parts back
together again. Borrowing from Stoic conceptions of tonos (tension), Christ corrects the fallen
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tension in the cosmos and aligns creation through his incarnation. Christ will therefore be
understood by Athanasius to have immanent power in the world, i.e., his ability to effect the
whole of creation is not only unlimited, but immediate and immanent. Athanasius relies on both
Irenaeus and Tertullian to make this possible—he relies on Irenaeus for recapitulation substitutes
(one tree cancels out another, one body replaces another, Christ replaces Adam) and Tertullian
for a materially infused conception of Christ.

Athanasius

In the Life of Antony, and in the surrounding literature, the power given to the part is translated
into two properties. On the one hand, ascetic bodies and their acts are understood to have effects
outside their bodies. Ascetic bodies cleared the devils from the desert, making it possible for
others to rise to heaven. The “work” of the ascetic was always private in practice but public in
effect. On the other hand, the physics of the body itself was conceptualized in terms of the
whole/part and how the discipline of the body’s parts was seen as the effective control of the
body as a whole; hence the focus in Antony’s letters and the vitae on the parts of the body.
Bringing a state of control to the hand, for instance, spoke of a body with perfect tension. It was
in this manner how the ascetic body was athletic, i.e., harmonious, controlled, disciplined and
rational.

Both types of perception—of the ascetic body in general and of its parts—employ the same logic
of the immanent body, and taken together constitute the fact of the ascetic body to have power
and effect outside itself. In order for this power to be attributed to the body, the work of Irenaeus
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and Tertullian had to be utilized. Irenaeus established the possibility that one could think of the
Christ body as a quasi-transcendental universal category, what has been called the recapitulated
body. In the conceptualization of this crucified and resurrected body, there was written on it the
original sin (Adam) and the cleansing of that sin (Christ as second Adam), as well as the human
body in general. Christ became, in a minimalist fashion, a figure of univocity. This is the earliest
theorization of cosmological movement found more decidedly in Athanasius’ On the
Incarnation. This figure was of a minimalist univocity because Irenaeus was more adept in the
ontological idiom. Tertullian would continue this line of thought by virtualizing Christ into the
idiom of flesh and matter. Now, movement ought to be conceptualized in terms of a body
enfolded into an enchanted matter—which is the incarnation—in which that body is ours and that
of the matter is the incarnated matter that Christ divinized. Movement in this current context
does not refer to physical movement. The rivers continued to flow and the mountains remained
mountains. What is being referenced here is a mythopoetic space of immanent, virtual
connectivity, wherein the body of the ascetic is mystically connected to life as a whole.

In fact, movement is the corollary to the mystical experience of being transparent to external
forces (the All). Whereas the experience of being transparent is spoken of in the rather passive
language of being filled, ecstasy, union, rapture, etc, the language of movement is the corollary
of this transparency. Movement is what happens when the body transparent to the All in turn
effects the All. Deleuze termed this process of adding to the creativity of life counter
actualization, and it has been an assumption here, perhaps unstated, that ascetic bodies and
performance artists are figures of creativity whose ability to reconfigure life remains
unparalleled. Moreover, the ability to dialectically internalize and produce has historically been
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the main property of the artistic avant garde, and herein lies the parallel to ascetics as body artists
and performance artists—their ability to prophesy new forms of life through their bodies without
the use of language. Valantasis writes of this intimate connection: “Asceticism may be defined as
performances designed to inaugurate an alternative culture, to enable different social relations,
and to create a new identity.” 15 Co-creation, one of the most controversial and sophisticated
concepts in the late ancient corpus, here takes on a new meaning. While Christ was originally
given the title of co-creator, once this Christ body was repeated and imitated with the ascetics
this concept of co-creation was applied as well to the ascetic body; hence their avant garde
property.

Art, Asceticism and the Avant Garde

Of course, there is a vast difference between an ascetic supporting and altering the world through
the language of embodying Christ and a performance artist doing the same through the language
of a body inscribed by politics. The comparison, however, is more explicit when one compares
martyrdom, in which is a major precursor to asceticism, with contemporary performance art.
Yugoslavian artist Marina Abramovic typifies the performance artist. In her Rhythm O, of 1974,
Abramovic stood silently in a room with a table on which sat 72 objects (Figure 41). Among
them were a rose, a feather, honey, a whip, scissors, a scalpel, a gun and a single bullet.
Abramovic allowed the audience to manipulate her body with the objects for six hours.
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Figure 41. Marina Abramovic. Rhythm 0, 1974.

Needless to say, after being stripped down naked, cut by thorns, had the cuts patched up by other
audience members, the performance had to finally be stopped when an audience member put a
bullet into the gun and held it to her neck. Abramovic’s body, given over to daily technologies,
acted like a confessional booth for a culture’s violent unconscious, and she made her point that it
was not artists who were violent. More recently, Iraqi artist Waffa Bilal used a similar tactic for
his 2007 piece titled Domestic Tension where he lived inside a gallery space with a paintball gun
pointed at him in which online users could fire at him. By end of the month long ordeal, Bilal
had been shot at over tens of thousands of times, and some hackers had programmed the gun to
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fire automatically at him while others programmed the gun to shoot to the side. In both works of
art, the body returns to the performative stage in a hyper display of what is already happening to
the body. In the case of Bilal it was the virtuality of killing, which struck a personal note with
Bilal whose brother had been killed by a war in which troops in Colorado were firing missiles in
Iraq. Martyrs, monks and body artists employ the same logic of the body—internalization,
inscription, embodiment and alteration—a logic embedded within the corporeal politics of late
ancient Christianity.

Precedents for the Christ Concept

The concept of Christ has been appropriated by numerous continental thinkers, either to support
recent materialist theologies or ontologies of immanence, or merely to claim the Christ figure as
their philosophical ancestor. In nearly all cases, the Christ has been conceptualized ahistorically,
to which this analysis is directed as a critique of the idea that Christ is a readymade concept.16
Christ cannot be appealed to as an agent of immanence as if the ancient world understood him
immediately in this fashion. The concept of Christ developed over time, and through many
philosophical cycles. However, a few contemporary texts do stand out as especially relevant to
this project, not in the sense that they have informed it or influenced it, but in the sense of being
analogous. French phenomenologist Michel Henry and Francois Laruelle stand out as thinkers
who have engaged with the concept of Christ in a more profound manner than the rest.
According to the Catholic Henry, Christ’s truth comes in the form of his revelation, a revelation
that is for Henry phenomenological. The title of Henry’s text, I am the Truth: Toward a
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Philosophy of Christianity, is indicative of what Christ is for Henry. Henry’s understanding is
that Christ speaks the Truth of the world, Truth being defined as “both what shows itself and the
fact of self-showing.”17 Henry is not interested in the object of the showing, but in the fact of self
showing, and Christ is the Truth because he reveals something transcendental about the way the
world reveals itself. The figure of Christ and his revelation is for Henry a lesson in life’s
phenomenality, its emergence into being from the Life preceding it. Henry writes: “Before being
living, he [Christ] is himself Life, the eternal coming-into-itself in which Life eternally
engenders itself. It is to this self-engendering of Life, which he calls eternal Life—a Life that
precedes and will eternally precede all the living—that Christ gives the name of Father.”18
Christ’s truth is that he attests to the Father, and Christ’s revelation that we all have our origin in
the Father, and that Christ as well comes from the Father (which is to be distinguished from
biological conceptions of human birth), is the Truth of Life for Henry. The insistence of a birth
into/from Life is a strategy that, according to Henry, undoes modernity’s insistence on birth as an
anonymous and biological process.19 Henry writes, “It is this worldly interpretation of birth that
Christ’s discourse about himself shatters into pieces.”20 Christ points to a Life outside this life,
and to a birth from a Life not visible in this life.

This Life Christ gestures to is never concrete life, never material life showing itself, but the Life
“which never shows itself in the world.” Henry’s example of Christ’s status as eternal logos,
existing before the birth of the world, testifies to a realm of Life outside phenomenal
appearances. The Truth, as Life and Christ, is the illustration of the process of life’s eternal
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manifestation into and out of being. “To believe,” writes Henry, is to have fidelity in an “already
visible” that cannot, on principle, make itself visible.21 Jean Luc Marion’s valorization of the
givenness of phenomenon itself (the fact that there is), as opposed to the content of the given,
ought to be understood in the same register. For Henry, the nature of this invisible visibility is
testified by Christ, who reveals himself to be traversed by Life yet not commensurate with it: “In
this way he [Christ] experiences himself as traversed by this Life, as the site in which it
experiences itself in him—who is himself merely the self-experience of this divine Life.”22
Though Henry’s analysis is phenomenological and not historical, he begins with a concept of a
transcendental Christ (his phrase is “transcendental arch-son”) traversed by Life that was just
being accepted in the 4th and 5th centuries. In other words, Henry’s claims of Christ as
transcendental Life has historical precedents (such as in the work of Tertullian), in which a
knowledge of this fact could only reinforce and provide more sophistication to his
phenomenology.
Henry’s approach and deployment of the concept of Christ, however, is not without illumination.
Henry does offer an original analysis as to how the Christ of philosophy differs from the Jesus of
history, and he goes to great length providing philosophical procedures as to how this is attained.
Problematic is that Henry appears to have found a fifth century orthodox Christ, albeit read
through phenomenology, in the Gospels, especially the Gospel of John. Henry illustrates no
sensitivity to the construction of the object he so eagerly desires. Furthermore, the insistence on
Christ’s message as predominantly a philosophical theorem/revelation severely limits Henry’s
ability to see in the Christ the worldly relevance of his teachings, or, more specifically, the
relevance of the concept of Christ to the material world, since the revelation of Christ is that it is
21
22

Ibid. 84.
Ibid. 88.

365
the invisible that is of value. Whereas for Henry Christ is a figure of the revelation of Life’s
phenomenality, in this text Christ is not a philosophical nor a phenomenological example. Christ
is not a figure among figures, but a case study in the logic of immanence. Before all else, Christ
is a concept. Christ does not reveal the ground of Life’s auto-affection, as in Henry, but is a
concept through which Life can be conceived (Tertullian). Christ is not a figure of revelation, as
in Henry, but a simple concept in philosophy which enabled a certain practice of the body to
emerge (Athanasius).
The second study deserving of note is Francois Laruelle’s Future Christ: A Lesson in Heresy.
Laruelle is highly indebted to Henry’s conceptualization of Life.23 Laruelle’s valorization of
radical immanence (that which is always already and in which we are already in) reiterates
Henry’s task to find in the Christ figure a contemporary subject not based in Christianity, but
from a certain reading of Christianity, a type of reading Laruelle calls cloning or a dualysis.
Laruelle uses Christianity as a resource for thinking through a set of problems: transcendence vs.
immanence, justice, politics, the Jewish question, etc. Laruelle does not care for the historical
truths of Christianity, nor the figure of Jesus, nor actual Judaism, though he speaks of these
figures often. Laruelle, like Henry, conducts what may be called a phenomenological reduction
to immanence. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, is Greek in nature, and in its attempt to
systematize the Real, to submit the real to principles, philosophy makes all things thinkable.
Philosophy makes the world and all aspects of being consistent. The appeal to transcendence is
part of philosophy since its origin. In the notion of transcendence, philosophy attempts to
separate itself from the world.24 Theology—what Laruelle terms theo-philosophy—does the
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same. Immanence in the philosophical tradition is that which encompasses life, the very thing
around us, enfolding us. But there is a problem here, according to Laruelle, and his solution is to
invert the articulation of terms found in the theo-philosophical tradition. In fact and in truth for
Laruelle, it is really transcendence that encompasses the world, trying to render it consistent, and
immanence is that which separates. Immanence separates itself from the world, rendering the
world inconsistent and non-totalizable, which is the type of “world” Laruelle desires. Immanence
cannot be thought of in terms of totality, nor can it be thought from the perspective of
philosophy.
Non-philosophy, which is Laruelle’s self-assigned name for his anti-philosophy, works in the
interstices of making immanence actual to the human subjects already living within it.
Heidegger’s conceptualization of the history of philosophy as a withdrawal from its original
insight into being is here analogous, especially in the sense that Laruelle is saying that
immanence is what is going on inside the essence of Christianity, the only problem being that
Christianity forgot it. The heretic is the name of this figure withdrawing itself from the “world”
of philosophy. Gnosticism haunts Laruelle’s text, and he is advocating a type of Gnostic revolt,
yet the future Christ revolts in favor of this world as opposed to another. Cloning is the name
given to his strategy of reading Christian texts (which he does little of), and the future Christ is
the figure who lives in radical immanence. Laruelle’s anthropomorphic conceptualization of the
real as based in the human is implicit in his humanization of real, and yet his humanization of
immanence remarkably speaks little of the body or the human.
What differentiates Laruelle’s study from the one presented here should be obvious. Laruelle
makes claims as to the nature of the Real and finds historical Christianity irrelevant. Laruelle is
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not interested in the body, nor theological texts. Laruelle is, however, involved in a pseudorepetition of Christianity in such a way that Laruelle is repeating, or cloning, what he thinks is
going on inside Christianity. And the figure of Christ for Laruelle is a figure of immanence, as it
is here. The logic of the body as presented in late antiquity can be cast in similar terms, as a
repetition of what is going on inside christology. Though Laruelle speaks generally of the
human, he does not speak of the body. While Laruelle deduces that the sphere of immanence is
where we already are, he does not take into account the creation of immanence. If the distillation
of the logic of the body was found to be operative in late antiquity, it is because christology is a
virtualization of the body of Jesus. One could deduce from Laruelle that philosophy and theology
are based upon the human, since the human and its sphere of immanence is all there is, however
even if this point could be conceded, the architecture of philosophy and theology would
immediately be abandoned, because they are, quite simply, philosophy and theology. Laruelle’s
analysis focuses itself on immanence for immanence’s sake, and he affirms it as if it were an
object, while here immanence is a trait of a certain configuration of a body, and deserves no
ontological privilege other than its association with figures of intensity, which have been
privileged.

The immanence of life is the final word for Laruelle and Henry, whereas here a philosophy of
immanence is not necessarily being espoused. This is an analytic of immanence, and traces its
historical influence in theology and philosophy. Transcendence is not treated as a violation of
immanence, but as an effect on a specific plane of immanence (the plane organized by Christ).
Christ is not a figure of immanence, but Christ made possible the thought of immanence. To
claim that Christ brought immanence is to countersign God’s existence, and that through God’s
Word divine immanence was installed. The strategy here is markedly different. Christ did not
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incarnate God, and God did not send Christ as his agent. Quite the contrary, the concept of Christ
made the thought of an incarnate God possible. Immanence is thinkable after Christ, which is not
the same as saying Christ brought immanence via God’s incarnation. Immanence and
transcendence, as the two prisms through which so much of the history of philosophy is recast,
are in this particular instance relegated as effects of a persona. The conceptual persona has the
last word here, not the immanence it creates. Another major difference between Laruelle and
Henry’s espousal of Christ as a figure of immanence is that they make claims to immanence as
the Real, or as the true ground of being. According to said thinkers, immanence is the all
embracing property of Life, whereas in this analysis no such claims are made. While for the
Christian the immanence of God may be an absolute truth, here Christian immanence is merely a
provincial concept of a historical period in the Western world, nothing more. Transcendence and
immanence are understood as an effect of the conceptual persona. So as to not be mistaken, this
study has primarily focused on immanence, and immanence does define the conceptual persona
of Christ, but only in the sense that immanence is understood to be the quality of an action, and
not an object of affirmation. Immanence is not a noun to be affirmed, nor the ground of being.
Immanence is what defines christological thought through its affirmation of the enfolding of
Christ in existence.

The Christ Screen and the Event

One can imagine two points of criticism of this project coming from Deleuze and Guattari
themselves. Firstly, Deleuze and Guattari remain adamant that, historically speaking, religion is
not a friend of immanence. Deleuze and Guattari’s problem with religion in their theorization of
the instituting of a plane is that, once laid out, religion makes immanence immanent to
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something else, especially the form of transcendence (God, Being, etc). Life is valued only
insofar as it participates in, is an attribute of, or is in conjunction with a supra-Life principle.
Deleuze and Guattari confidently assert their assessment of what religion does to immanence:
“Whenever there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, there is
religion.”25 Though Deleuze in other texts find instances of religion as positive formations of
immanence—Spinoza and Plotinus, for instance—his major critique of religion, and, it must be
added, of other types of thinking as well, it is that religion makes life subservient to a
supersensible principle or entity. Religion forces the intensities in life and in bodies to extinguish
themselves as entities alive in their own right. Religion creates habitual life on the body,
ritualized life, and the body, like the type of thought it reflects, loses its capacity to exhibit the
full traits of a genuine vitalism. Secondly, the problem with Christianity’s plane of immanence is
that it confuses its plane with the plane. In other words, it is the problem of totality and
universality, a myopia of religious thought forming the basis of contemporary critiques of Hegel.
Contemporary fundamentalism, in its Christian or Islamic variations, is an example of how
religion confuses its plane with the plane. However, to suppose that one really is speaking of
concrete universals and that one is alone privileged to the totality of the Whole is not just the
problem of religion, but of philosophy as well. Deleuze and Guattari are well aware of this.
Christianity, and a particular form of its discourse, christology, is without question guilty of
these two charges. Christology in general does often affirm Christ so as to affirm God, and
christology is just as totalizing in its conception of Christ as other philosophies. In fact, the basis
of this project was trying to understand just how this sense of universalism and totality came to
be, the answer being that the conceptual persona of Christ was the first step in this direction.
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As we have seen, however, Deleuze and Guattari’s assumptions are not entirely correct.
Christianity has generated bodies whose intensities populate its limbs with as much flagrancy as
any other body mentioned in the Deleuzian corpus, and it has been shown how the concept of
Christ itself can be conceived to be the product of a logic of the body that is indifferent to
religion. The famed body without organs, as the benchmark for what a deterritorialized body
looks like, can be found time and time again throughout Christian history, in theology and in
practice. What remains to be done is therefore to conceptualize the how the Christ concept may
not just be a middle term brokering between God and earth, but how something more profound is
going on inside the creation of the concept. Could it be that the main purpose, and inspiration,
behind the concept of Christ is to create intensity—new bodies—not transcendence? Could the
conceptual persona of Christ be the secret trajectory inside christology, a trajectory which finds
itself repeated in the various figures of intensity inside the tradition—the saints, martyrs,
ascetics, artists, and the many figures who don’t fit neatly into one category?

Without question, this text has not done justice to God the Father and the Holy Spirit, especially
the latter. To fully investigate these terms within the present hermeneutic would require a second
text. However, one claim that is getting put forward is what could be called a dishonest reading
of these texts. A dishonest reading doesn’t quite believe the reading. For instance, God is given
full weight in these thinker’s texts. Though they spend more time thinking about Christ, all three
would undoubtedly agree that God is the most important object of reflection. Yet, at the same
time, it is Christ that pulls the most philosophical weight. Though they would agree that Christ
owes his existence to God, one would reply that their God is so colored by Christ that Christ is
the prism through which God is conceived. Transcendence would remain empty, and therefore,
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unthinkable, if God did not descend.26 Though God may be the highest object of thought, it is
through Christ (and the act of descending logos) that God and human are thinkable together. Just
as Plato theorized participation from the perspective of the participating object, not the
participated, and just as Neo-Platonism theorized participation from the perspective of the
participated (the One), christology theorizes human and God from the perspective of the
incarnated Christ.27 What exactly does the Christ of christology contribute to the history of
thought?

Future Study 1: God is a Designer—A New Expression of Immanence

Deleuze locates three historical articulations of immanence: Plato/Neo-Platonism, Medieval
scholasticism, and of course, Spinoza. Deleuze’s analysis largely takes place by reading said
thinkers through their usage of immanent causality vs. emanation and their employment of
transcendence. Any philosophy bearing even a trace of transcendence is for Deleuze a crime
against pure immanence. Neo-Platonism distinguishes itself from Platonism through its
combination of immanent and emanative causality. Because Plotinus and other Neo-Platonists
seek participation on the side of the participated, one necessarily locates the participated (the
One) above the objects participating in it: “To participate is always to participate through what is
given.” What gives is an isolated One above all whose excess of being spills forth (emanation).
What emanation and the immanent cause have in common is that both, remarkably, produce
while remaining in themselves. However, the main difference lies in the positioning of the effect.
On the one hand, for emanation, the effect “comes out of its cause, exists only in so coming out,”
wherein the effect cannot re-enter the One above beings. On the other hand, when it comes to
26
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immanent causality the effect is immanent in the cause: “The effect remains in its cause no less
that the cause remains in itself.”28

At stake in causality is an equality of being, or univocity. Only immanent causality can proclaim
to support an equality of being in the sense that the ultimate act of the One is not a cause above
others, but is equally effected by the effect that it engenders. Negative theology, according to
Deleuze, naturally aligns itself with emanation, though philosophies of emanation are combined
with immanent causality (Stoicism). Neo-Platonism betrays immanent causality through its use
of emanation. Medieval Neo-Platonist Johannes Scotus Erigena neatly combines these two types
of causality through the dual notions of complicare and explicare.29 According to Deleuze, “All
things are present to God, who complicates them. God is present to all things, which explicate
and implicate him. A co-presence of two correlative movements comes to be substituted for a
series of successive subordinate emanations. For things remain in God while explicating and
implicating him, no less than God remains in himself, in complicating them.”30 In other words,
God expresses himself in the world, and the world is an expression of God. Expression is the
unity of the multiple, and the multiple is another name for the self-activity of a God who
expresses himself. Meister Eckhart provides a similar map for understanding the relation of
Unity to Multiplicity.

An expressionist tendency does exist in philosophy and theology, according to Deleuze, but it
was never fully exploited. Deleuze admits that Christianity encouraged it through its
experimentations with the Word and the concept of the logos. One such experimentation was
Bonaventure’s ideas in the mind of God, which was taken up in the third chapter. Creation is the
28
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problem to which “ideas in the mind of God” is the solution. Ideas are placed in God as a way to
conceptualize God’s design of the world (his design then at creation and now as principle and
proof of God’s immanence), and yet we find the same problem repeated in Bonaventure and
Erigena—minimal transcendence. Deleuze then turns to Spinoza, who fully exploits the
expressionist tendencies Deleuze saw working in Neo-Platonism and the Middle Ages. Deleuze’s
Spinozism has been well documented, but for our purposes here it suffices to only briefly state
what Spinoza thinks that the others cannot. Immanence is the first principle for Spinoza, in which
expression becomes unbound to any version of subordinationism, emanation or exemplary
causality. Univocity finds its finest voice in Spinoza. God is not above being, but collapsed with
being in the name of universal substance. God is the name of one substance, and everything that
exists is but a modulation of that substance.
It cannot be denied that Deleuze’s early and mature works of philosophy have done more to
define the terms of what a philosophy of immanence is than any other thinker. In the history of
philosophy, Deleuze’s name will forever be allied with immanence, since he speaks for a
generation of thinkers in an age of post-transcendent, post-structualist philosophy. However,
Deleuze’s analyses of immanence are vulnerable for their insistence on schematizing thinkers as
thinking either from the vantage point of God/One (the participated) or from creation
(multiplicity; beings, immanence). Though his own philosophy requires a sophisticated relation
between the One and the Many, the virtual and the actual, many genres of thinking do not fall
neatly into his schema. Christology is one such genre. While it is true that christology espouses a
One above being, a pure transcendent unity, one must ask, from what vantage point it does this?,
and secondly, how can we recuperate this vantage point? At stake is how philosophy is read,
how it is interpreted. It is not enough to consider what a thinker says as most important.
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Athanasius reiterates again and again the transcendence of God, yet he is known as a strict
thinker of Christ. So, when recasting Athanasius’ philosophy, what should one focus on? The
strategy of this text has been forthright—the most important aspect of a philosophy need not be
the facet claimed by that philosophy. Again, a dishonest reading. What is more important is the
rehabilitation of ideas, and finding resources in a tradition that may not be obvious or explicit.

Deleuze schematizes philosophies in terms of transcendence or immanence, and anything
employing an admixture of both is liable to a failure. For instance, a philosophy of transcendence
has a weak form of immanence when it combines immanent causality with emanative causality;
and a philosophy of immanence betrays pure immanence when it utilizes a form of minimal
transcendence. Contemporary philosophers have been catalogued in this very schema, Deleuze
included. Did Derrida’s use of the quasi-transcendental or the undeconstructible bring him closer
to Levinasian transcendence, or make him a neo-Kantian? The figure of Christ, and the
philosophy of this persona, christology, deserve a positive denotation—not to resurrect
Christianity but to inform once and future philosophies, to aid in the construction of new
materialisms, new disciplines, new figures of political intensity. The Christic cause deserves a
name alongside the immanent cause and emanative cause, in addition to Aristotle’s four causes
(material, formal, efficient, final). Christic causality is not a simple appropriation of classical
articulations of causality, but a new organism defined by its own rules as set out by the thinkers
wrestling with it. First and foremost, the Christic cause begins with a thought on the act of God,
which is different than saying it begins with an act of God. To think Christ is always already to
think God differently. In Contra Eunomium, Gregory of Nyssa expresses this fact when he writes
that because of Logos, “The divine will became nature.”31 The logos was not independent of
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God’s nature, but “nature by God’s will.” This led Gregory of Nyssa to conclude that with God
“there is no difference between will and action.”32 In other words, because of Christ as co-creator
and artificer of God’s will, God’s will could be thought as coterminous with the moving of
agents in the world (action). God could be thought of as immanent only because of Christ.

The new thought concerning the act of God establishes the main foundation of Christic
immanence: one tree cancels out another, or the transcendent takes the form of the immanent, or
one body represents All bodies. In so doing the landscape of thought is altered. Therefore, the
Christic cause begins from the simple premise of recapitulation, first articulated by Paul, then
given rigor by Irenaeus.

Yet the idea of a human body representing a microcosm of the whole, in which the All is
enfolded in and on the body itself, but also in which the All is moved, begins with the birth of
Western philosophy, and can be found in Pythagoreanism, the Eleatics and in the intellectual
climate at the birth of Christianity. “One of the most widespread cosmological ideas at the
beginning of the common era, entertained by both pagan and Christian philosophers alike, is that
humanity represented the living harmony and synthesis of all the forces which make up the
cosmos. A Child of earth and heaven, humanity is the living bridge between matter and spirit, a
living, harmonic image of the entire universe.”33 For Plutarch, Apollo was the perfect example of
a personification of celestial harmony, a muse whose “work” for the universe consisted of his
prophesy, reason and ability to unify the cosmos through his acts.34 Or according to Clement,
man is a “universe in miniature” and an image of “the all-harmonious, melodious, holy
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instrument of god.” It is any wonder then that Clement referred to Philo, the latter known to
translate the logos doctrine into Judaism, as the “Pythagorean.”

If for the ancient world the purpose of the logos was to re-order the world, and if the purpose of
the incarnation was to allow man the possibility of divinity, then the secret trajectory within
Christological thought does lie within the transfer of cosmological power first from Logos, then
to Christ, then to individual bodies. It is to mark this telos that this text has directed itself. If God
is an expression of the Whole, then the becoming-divine of the human must contain the same
attributes, the All. What we find in asceticism and other forms of bodily representation is the
repetition of this logic as it applies to human bodies. Ascetic agency is attributed such divine
power and social-political ontology because of the trace of the notion of the body as universe in
miniature.

In what may be called a preliminary sketch of a potential new project, three features can be
distilled from the Christ persona, which is the architecture of the Christic cause. By features we
mean concepts, and by concepts we do not mean references of/to/about Christ, but what events in
life (actualities) these concepts trace out on the Christ persona (virtuality).

Future Study 2: The Three Features of Christic Immanence

The features delineated below are conceptual expressions of Christ, and express the idiosyncrasy
of this persona, answering the question of uniqueness, and style, of the Christ plane of
immanence.35 The concepts populating the Christ plane of immanence are: (i) communication of
events, (ii) consistency, (iii) deformation and gesturology. It will become clear, therefore, how
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these features are a description of Christian ontology as much as prisms through which to view
famous bodies in Christian history.

(i) Communication of Events

If a plane of immanence is pre-philosophical, and if it’s been argued here that the Christ persona
acts as a plane of immanence, then what specific concepts occupy this plane, since it is the
function of a plane of immanence to organize concepts? It was with Irenaeus when Christ was
first stretched out, as it were, temporally and spatially in the form of a near (co-creation),
immanent (immediate causality), and end point (telos). This act of stretching established a
tentative univocal body upon which to direct christological thought. It established, as it were, a
completeness and consistency of existence. This Christ persona made it possible to think God as
existence, aiding in the early apologetic defense against plurality and polytheism. Jaroslav
Pelikan observes that early Christian “universalism,” defined by a concept of God as not just the
God of Israel but God of all humanity, relied on a christocentric premise.36 Macrina and Gregory
of Nyssa found in nature a “regularity and order” of “all things [ta panta],” an observation
perhaps stemming from natural theology, yet the attribute of order and regularity (akin to
Athanasius’ harmony) was applicable to the cosmos because of the co-creating Christ.

God could be thought to be in all things—the Whole and the Parts—because of the fact that
Christ allotted to the diversity of created things the principle of their existence (arche), which is
the “indissoluble attachment” linking them in their existence, as well as established the
directionality of their existence (telos). The Cappadocians, like many other apologists, appealed
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to Irenaeus’ notion of recapitulation to establish their brand of “universalism.” According to
Jaroslav, Gregory of Nyssa christocentric version of the universe implied recapitulation:

According to Gregory of Nyssa, the original creation of Adam, shaped from the dust of
the earth but animated by the very breath of God, had communicated ‘a single grace
extending equally through all creation.’ Now after the fall and the redemption, as he said
later in the same treatise, Christ the crucified was ‘binding all things to himself and
making them one, and through himself bringing the diverse natures of existing things into
one accord and harmony.’ The metaphysical ground of this state of things was: ‘The eyes
of all creation are set on him and he is its center, and it finds its harmony in him.’37
The system was held together by recapitulation and co-creation working together. The
importance of classical conceptions of causality for arguing this point cannot be
underemphasized. The highly enigmatic articulation of Roman’s 11:36, “For from him and
through him and to him are all things,” was often called forth to justify the becoming-All of God,
as well as the unification of difference through Christ. For Basil, “from him” referred to the
ground of being, “through him” to the continuance of being, and “to him” as that which all things
are turned.38 The concept of Christ makes the consistency of existence possible (that God can
enter the whole and the part), though from the perspective of the Christian it is God acting
through Christ rendering this possible, not Christ making this God possible

In the middle ages, Meister Eckhart reiterates the point of causality, but recasts the three points
of temporality in terms of Trinitarian economy, as Augustine had done.39 On a commentary on
Romans 11:36 (“All things are from him, through him, and in him”), Eckhart writes, “Say then
that ‘all things’ are ‘from’ the maker, ‘through’ the form, and ‘in’ the end.” Eckhart critiques
Aquinas for believing that such a view held back agency from “created things.” According to
Eckhart, Aquinas held a position that the three causes differed in degree when found in God and
37
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created things. This is “crude” philosophy, Eckhart charges, for two reasons. First, for reasons of
transparency—no being can be counted alongside God as a separate entity. And secondly, in a
rather Spinozistic manner, “existence, that is, God, is within every being, every form and end,
and conversely, every being, form and end is in existence itself. Indeed, every maker works
through its existence, every form informs through its existence, and every end moves through its
existence—through nothing else.”40 God is ultimate ground. The language of action and agency,
however, in the second sentence (works, informs, moves), is language of the ontological
movement given to God by the thought of Christ. Christ made it possible to think of God as
active in Life in this manner. Communication of events refers to the immanent activity of God
and the interchangeability of causality (there is no real “number” of causes in God), in the case
of Eckhart, but its roots are in the movement of Christ.

After Irenaeus, it became possible to use the conceptual persona to create concepts, God being
one of those concepts. Christ is not a simple body that christology has as its object, but rather,
the Christ concept is the genesis of a disciplinary thinking, christology.

Instituting a plane of immanence is one of the first acts of thinking. Deleuze and Guattari
describe the first act of a philosopher in the following manner: “In short, the first philosophers
are those who institute a plane of immanence like a sieve stretched over the chaos.”41 Christ is a
conceptual persona, who, to cite Deleuze, acts like a screen ordering thinking and giving
movement to its concepts, though Deleuze will never cite the Christ persona. What the plane of
immanence accomplishes for thought is that it makes chaos, or the unthought, consistent. A
plane of immanence is not an object of thought, but what thought presupposes when it makes
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connections. Consistency and connectivity defines thought against chaos, the latter marking the
limit of human logos. If the goal of philosophy is to give consistency to thought—to make it
real—then the task of the “healthy” concept is to allow for the greatest amount of connectivity on
a particular plane; as opposed to the “unhealthy” concept that remains in-itself, or attributes its
power to a transcendent entity (an element above the field). In the history of philosophy, the
healthy concepts succeed, those that end up becoming philosophies, such as Descartes’ cogito,
Hegel’s absolute, Nietzsche’s overman, Derrida’s differance, etc.
For Deleuze and Guattari, “The concept is defined by the inseparability of a finite number of
heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed.”42 In other
words: the Part in its finite number of points must express the Whole with an infinite speed. Each
concept, though occupying a limited amount of space, compensates for its limitation with
movement and speed. The logic Deleuze and Guattari employ here is consistent with their
metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics—the Part must express the Whole. Moreover, this logic is the
definition of the event, and the concept becomes an event when it forces the thinker to take into
account the “whole,” or All, when the concept is created—“The philosophical concept does not
refer to the lived, by way of compensation, but consists, through its own creation, in setting up
an event that surveys the whole of the lived no less than every state of affairs.”43 The event is
related to the immanent survey of a field without subject.44 The concept is traced out over a plane
of immanence, on whose flipside is Nature (since all concepts have their origin—not reference—
in Life), and when this concept is constructed so as to survey the Whole, the concept births an
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event. It is in this sense that a successful pre-philosophical plane is immanent, i.e., the logic of
connection trumps the logic of reference and identity.

Irenaeus, Tertullian and Athanasius are all thinkers for whom the concept of Christ surveys an
immanent field, and/or for whom Christ is that immanent field. It is true of these thinkers what
Deleuze and Guattari observe of the pre-Socratic Thales: “When Thales’ thought leaps out, it
comes back as water.”45 When Athanasius’ thought exercises itself, it finds Christ in the large
and the small, the One and the Many. Leithart comments on this aspect of Athanasius’ christic
metaphysics: “It is all about Christ. It is a Christic metaphysics. Even when Athanasius is
exploring the nature of created reality, the cross and the Christ of the cross remain in the
forefront of his mind.”46 It is not that God is not important, but solely a matter of emphasis in the
case of Athanasius. It is worth noting that God only appears once in the Life of Antony, and then
only to tell Antony that he is going to be famous everywhere.47 When Irenaeus speaks of the
prophets that have come before Christ, they are but manifestations of a Christ that can slide in
and out of history at his leisure. When Tertullian speaks of the abject fluid in the womb, he is
really thinking of Christ. When Athanasius writes of Antony’s emaciated body under assault
from the demons, it is but a reenactment of temptations that Christ already underwent. It is nearly
impossible to find a concept in said thinkers that does not implicate, in a most ontologically
grounding level, the Christ persona when faced toward thought, and human nature when faced
toward Life. The Christ concept is a concept that “surveys.” Christ makes an event possible for
bodies, and/or to think the body itself as point of infinite speed.
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Events are singular occurrences, actualizations of the Many in a One. Drawing together the
relation between events and the screen, Deleuze writes: “Events are produced in a chaos, in a
chaotic multiplicity, but only under the condition that a sort of screen intervenes.”48 In another
sense, the screen is the event of philosophy, a pseudo-blanket that thought has placed between it
and nature—a logos. The screen is the empty figure of thought, the prephilosophical personae
and the character of that screen is defined by the conceptual persona which is the screen.49 Just as
a canvas is stretched over its framing rods, Irenaeus made Christ a screen when he stretched the
concept of Christ over the three temporal points (near, immanence and far point). It was a precise
philosophical procedure that would have lasting influence on the history of Christianity. This
stretching made the concept of Christian immanence possible, i.e., it was possible to think of all
being in terms of one Being. In On the Incarnation, Athanasius could not be more direct: “The
Self-revealing of the Word is in every dimension—above, in creation; below, in the Incarnation;
in the depth, in Hades; in the breadth, throughout the world. All things have been filled with the
knowledge of God.”50 And there is no shortage of passages in Christian theology reiterating this
point. One can never escape Christ’s body, but only turn from it, ignore it, defile it, or, by
contrast, move toward it, feel it.

(ii) Consistency

The second property of the screen is ethical, existing to provide a plane of consistency upon
which Christian thought can rest, where its prescribed actions can support each other toward an
end goal—the repetition of a body in history. The opening pages of Antony’s vitae highlights the
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true purpose of the hagiographic text, “for Antony’s way of life provides monks with a sufficient
picture for ascetic practice.”51 Antony’s body is a repetition of the Christ body, and the ascetics
soon to follow will be “pictures” constructed in the manner of Antony, just as the human is an
image of the Word, and the Word the image of God. In order for these repetitions to occur, an
architecture must be constructed so as to allow an ethics to be shared between bodies. An ethics
of convergence is more relevant to Athanasius’ conception of imitatio Christi than a
correspondence of truth with Christ’s body, as absolute correspondence short circuits the
homoousios—to converge with Christ betrays his divine status. Convergence, as an art of a lost
proximity to an other body, ensures at once the urgency in bodily construction (to become like
Christ) and the failure to ever achieve that construction (one can never fully become Christ).
Asceticism is an ethics, a “micro-physics” as Foucault calls it, not a morality, if we understand
the former as an art of living with/in Christ’s immanence and the latter as providing prescriptive
moralistic norms guiding behavior (Kant). The analysis presented here has clearly
conceptualized asceticism as the former.

Living immanently induces a displaced perception and a double movement of the text: a monk
feels demons in his stomach, but to repel their force moves his mind to the wounds of Christ.
Demons confront Antony, but the sign of the cross repels them. Or of St. Simeon, “The vertebrae
of his spine were dislocated through constant supplication, but he was fastened and held together
by the love of Christ.”52 In this image, we have a doubling of the crucifix, as spine, which is
being held together by thoughts of a prior hanging, upon whose success at resurrection require a
patient suffering. Simeon’s spine, like the cross, supports our suffering body. Deformation takes
on a beauty due to its intensity, not its moralizing character. If in describing Christ we can utilize
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a “communication of idioms,” as James Carmody and Thomas Clarke term it, allowing us to
speak at once of Christ’s humanity and divinity (resulting from the incarnation), then the reverse
can take place. As Christ’s divine suffering proved his humanity, so too our suffering is
divinized in our kinship with Christ.53

As a concept on a plane facing nature and thought, consistency bridges the gap between creation
and salvation, materialism and ontology, phenomenology and eschatology—in short, a physicomystical solidarity.54 Athanasius again, “There is thus no inconsistency between creation and
salvation; for the One Father has employed the same Agent for both works, effecting the
salvation of the world through the same Word Who made it in the beginning.”55

This virtual folding of the bodily and the divine is the precise mark of rigorous Christological
thought, and within its system is a relay, made possible by the consistency of Jesus’ crucified,
corporeal nature; this phrase “made possible by” cannot be too heavily emphasized, for what it is
calling our attention to are the ontological traits of the human body, traits exposed only in a
specific construction. In the particular case of Antony, Athanasius invents an alter Christ not to
degrade materiality but to recharge the immanence constructing our body—we now know that
the body of Antony is an assemblage constructed from the conceptual persona of Christ.

(iii) Painting: Gesturology and Deformation

A third feature of the plane is the deformation aesthetic found in ascetic literature, paintings and
murals of ascetics, as well as the literature of martyrdom. The accounts of the martyrs are replete
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with violent imagery of bodily tearing, dismemberment and deformation of the human body.
Deformation occurs in multiple valences, and is, one the one hand, more pragmatically the
expressive tendency behind the valorization of the crucifixion; on the other hand, deformation
stems from a disfigurative moment of Christ becoming logos (multiplicity), and his body being
deformed and dispersed in the manner of Stoic spermatikoi. Often, a deformation aesthetic allies
itself with an expressive gesturology, which is what was found in the work of Italian painter
Giotto, working in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century. Giotto was considered the
father of the Renaissance.

The discovery of the gesture was a pivotal moment in the history of art. In expressing the
uncoded gesture of the body, Giotto is credited with beginning a genre of painting—termed
“modern” at the time—eventually leading to the perfection, beauty and interiority of the painted
Renaissance figure. Giotto’s stigmatas of St. Francis embody the extreme limit during the time
for the painted gesture. St. Francis’ body is overcome by the gesture of God entering it, and the
body itself becomes a gesture of joyful suffering. One body one gesture, but many gestures on
the body. As we saw, the phenomenon of the saint wracked by suffering found itself being
expressed in the Antony series, which is a phrase employed here to denote a cluster of paintings
unified by a central theme—the frontal focus of a singular ascetic body under onslaught by
demonic forces.56 With Martin Schongauer’s Temptation of St. Antony organizing the analysis, it
was the formal property that became important in the revolution in art towards a single frame.
Numerous art historians have argued that there is a direct line of influence beginning with Giotto
and ending with Paul Cezanne, who died in 1906. The influence of Giotto, culminating in
Cezanne’s cubism, concerned the autonomy of the work of art. In other words, the body of the
56
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stigmata, and later, through the Antony series, we are beginning witness the birth of the canvas as
an autonomous unit, a unit that would final its final expression in Cubism. The artwork, with its
immanent system of internal communication acted like a second body, an alter body, to the logic
found on the Christ body. This reading enriches not only art history, but adds new texture to the
influence of religion and theology in the visual arts during this period. The Renaissance notion of
istoria, which was argued to be an outgrowth of an immanentist tendency in painting, adds more
support to the claim that a formal thread connects Giotto, depictions of Antony, and Modern art.

Moreover, the frontal property of the body created a pictorial space of extended by immanent
space whereby the pictorial space is linked together through the body. One reason this property
was singled out, since many others did exist during this time, is because of the importance of
istoria for generations of Renaissance painters, including its central theorization in painting’s
first treatise, Alberti’s manual, and in Da Vinci’s theoretical works. Controlling and organizing
the space of the canvas through the body istoria unified the painting, allowing it to have the
properties of autonomy and internal resonance.

Conclusion

A new concept of immanence, one that is not merely the opposite of transcendence, is needed to
account for the Christic cause and for the type of immanent bodies it has inspired in history.
Christian scholarship has long theorized immanence in conjunction with transcendence, and
much has been written on both topics, especially in the contemporary era. What has seldom been
addressed in the literature, to which this text addressed itself, is (i) the relation between
christology as an ancient discourse and the type of immanent causality it constructs; (ii) the
manner in which this version of immanent causality has historically lent itself to the construction
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of revolutionary figures of immanence; (iii) the logic employed according to which figures of
immanence are said to enfold Life. Christianity has not invented the immanent body, since this
body is found in art and philosophy, yet it has said the most about it. The logic found in
christology influencing and influenced by the body is not the property of Christianity. But it is a
trait of the body to which Christianity has devoted the most time to exploiting, in theory and in
practice. Given that these bodies are often bodies of resistance, the implications of this study
ought to be to help future philosophies create new forms of life, new bodies dedicated to altering
the political and social landscape.
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